Chapter Four

Anton Marty

On Being and Truth

1. Brentano and Marty

Being, for Aristotle, is an analogous term. It is said in many ways. We can distinguish above all between being in the sense of the categories and being in the sense of being true,¹ a distinction which served as the basis of the early Brentanian bicategorial ontology of things or realia on the one hand, and entia rationis or irrealia on the other. While Brentano abandoned an ontology of this sort, the idea was defended and elaborated by Anton Marty, who belonged to the very first generation of Brentano’s students, and it is Marty’s work which will be the subject of our present chapter.

Entia realia are for example a soul and its real constituents or ‘divisives’: (the various mental acts of presentation, judgment, love and hate). Entia rationis are for example a seen colour, a heard sound, but also entities such as the existence of A and the non-existence of B.² As we saw in Chapter Two, Brentano embraced in his early writings the doctrine that these and other objects of thought are not merely intentional but in fact immanent in consciousness, after the fashion of Aristotle’s conception of the process of cognition as an interiorization of the form of the object cognized. The object of thought is something non-real which dwells in (innnewohnt) a real substance (a thinker). Each object of thought is therefore sharply to be distinguished from any corresponding actual object (if there is one).

¹. Met., 1017a31ff.

². On the terminology of ens rationis, see e.g. Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, c. 1, In V. Metaph., lect. 9, Sum. Theol., I, 16, 3 ad 2.
Brentano’s reasoning here may be summarized as follows. At this stage he still agreed with what he took to be the Aristotelian view that a collective cannot be real, because one substance cannot be made of many. On the other hand, however, he believed that when we think of an object, then this object is in some sense in our consciousness. It follows that the thought object as such must be distinct from any independent substance; it must be merely immanent to consciousness and can be referred to also as the ‘content’ of the act in question. Thus the content of an act of sensory presentation is an intentionally inexistent datum of sense (a ‘physical phenomenon’, in Brentano’s terms).

With the move to reism of the later Brentano all irrealia or entia rationis, and all divisives and other non-thingly parts of things, as well as all acts and other events, are dismissed as fictitious. We should talk, Brentano now says, not of mental acts or mental phenomena but of ‘thinkers’ or ‘thinking things’. Moreover, all thinking things relate exclusively in their thinking to other things (and to themselves) as their objects.

For Marty, on the other hand, ‘being’ retains its status as an analogous concept. Marty can be said to have refined and extended Brentano’s own earlier commitment to this idea, and to have constructed a bicategorial ontology of realia and irrealia and an associated theory of truth as correspondence out of what, in Brentano’s early writings, is little more than matter for passing remarks.

In the strict and proper sense, according to Marty’s theory, ‘to be’ means ‘to be real’, a notion which we can understand, roughly speaking, as signifying the capacity to enter into causal relations. Here causal relations themselves are understood in such a way that only what is actual – and not mere powers, possibilities or dispositions – can serve as their relata. Mental and physical substances and accidents have real being in this sense. In a wider sense, however, ‘to be’ means ‘to exist’. Everything that exists is either real or non-

3. 1924, p. 222, Eng. p. 156; 1889a, ‘45 and the discussion of mereological potentialism in Chapter Three, Section 5, above.


5. This applies only to the Untersuchungen of 1908 – it does not hold of Marty’s thinking at the time of “Über subjektlose Sätze”. Compare also Husserl’s Ideen II (1952, p. 44), where the real is identified with what is substantial and able to enter into causal relations.
real. There is no golden mountain; but if there were, if a golden mountain existed, then it would be real. *The existence of an apple*, on the other hand, or *the non-existence of a golden mountain*, are nothing real, even if they do exist: they are non-real *entia rationis*.

Marty’s opposition between the real and the non-real reflects the influence in nineteenth century Austria of ideas deriving from Bolzano. But the same opposition can be seen also in the work of Lotze, with whom Marty (like Stumpf and Frege) had studied in Göttingen. Thus it resembles Lotze’s opposition between the ‘sphere of being’ (*Sein*) and the ‘sphere of validity’ (*Geltung*), as also Frege’s opposition between the ‘*Wirkliche*’ and the ‘*objektiv Nicht-wirkliche*’ in the *Grundgesetze*.

For Marty, as for Brentano, however, and in opposition to Bolzano, Lotze and Frege, everything that exists *exists now*, in the present moment. Thus, according to Marty, the real and the non-real exist in the same time. ‘Past’ and ‘future’ are modifying adjectives; they convert the nouns which they modify into merely fictional names, as in cases like ‘cancelled performance’, ‘averted war’, ‘dead man’ and so on. The existence in time of a real object typically involves continuous and manifold changes reflecting the manifold of causal relations in which it is involved. The existence in time of a non-real object, in contrast, may involve no change at all, and even where a non-real object is subject to change, this will typically consist merely in its coming into and then going out of existence as a reflection of certain specific changes in the real.

It holds of the real that it has and suffers effects and in this sense has a self-sufficient coming into and going out of existence; the non-real, in contrast, has a mere secondary becoming [*ein blosses Mitwerden*], i.e. it comes and goes only in that the real suffers effects (1908, p. 320).

6. See on this Marty 1884, p. 43n.


9. We shall return to this issue of ‘modification’ in Section 2 of Chapter Five below.
Thus most irrealia undergo only discrete changes (they come into and go out of existence). Moreover, because irrealia cannot enter into causal changes, they cannot serve, either, as objects of intuition (of inner and outer perception) – something which may help to explain why so many philosophers dismiss irrealia *tout court*.

Martian irrealia, accordingly, have something in common with the ‘Cambridge changes’ of the analytic tradition.10 More precisely, they are analogous to what we might call ‘Cambridge states’ such as *being a father*, *being unheard of in Finland*, *being persona grata in South Africa*, and the like. These, too (if they are admissible entities at all), suffer only discrete changes and are more or less causally isolated from the realia on which they rest. To the class of irrealia in Marty’s sense there belong also such entities as claims, obligations, rights, debts, knighthoods, relations of ownership and authority, and so on, as well as certain abstract artefacts such as works of music and literature.

The non-real is ‘something which, when it comes into existence, is not brought about as an effect and when it goes out of existence does not do so directly in consequence of the ceasing of an effect.’ (1908, p. 321) Irrealia therefore have no history of change *in their own right*; but nor do they stand outside history: the existence of Jim begins to exist with the birth of Jim and ceases to exist when Jim dies; the collective class which is the *natio hungarica* begins to exist with the creation of the first Magyar noble and ceases to exist when the last Magyar noble dies. Certain non-real entities – for example the non-existence of the round square – do not come into or go out of existence. These, however, are not timeless; rather they exist *at all times*.11 The non-real is, therefore, to be distinguished from Bolzano’s realm of the ‘in itself’. It is to be distinguished from the ideal, in Husserl’s sense of extra-temporal existence. And it is to be distinguished also from the ‘abstract’, as this term is understood by Frege and other analytic philosophers, for example in application to numbers, directions, meanings or sets. Importantly, the non-real, as Marty

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10. See Mulligan and Smith 1986, § 2.4, and the references there given.

11. 1908, p. 328. Cf. Chisholm’s concept of ‘proposition’, as set out in his 1976, p. 123; propositions are distinguished from other events or states of affairs by the fact that they obtain, or fail to obtain, always.
conceives it, is entirely autonomous in relation to the activities of consciousness. It is not, therefore, to be confused with the *intentional* or *mind-dependent*, though there are cases – for example *the existence of Jim’s thinking* – where something non-real involves a psychic process *per accidens*.

2. Stumpf, Cantor and the Doctrine of Immanence

The early Brentano, as we have seen, took a view of contents or objects of thought as not merely intentional but in fact immanent to consciousness. This immanental strain in Brentano’s thinking was further developed by Carl Stumpf who, among all the heirs of Brentano, remained most obedient to the claims of psychology. Stumpf is of particular relevance here in virtue of the fact that much of what follows will turn on the role, in Marty’s (and Brentano’s) philosophies, of ‘*Sachverhalte*’ or ‘states of affairs’, and it is Stumpf who is responsible for having introduced the former expression as a technical term of philosophy. Already the early Brentano had used the term ‘judgment-content’. The content of an act of judgment is for Brentano in the narrower sense the immanent content of that act of presentation on which the judgment rests. In a wider sense, however, it is an immanent entity *sui generis*, the correlate of the act of judgment as a whole. We can distinguish further between the positive judgment-content of an affirmative judgment to the effect that A exists, and the negative judgment-content of a negative judgment to the effect that A does not exist: the former might be referred to as *the existence of A*, the latter as *the non-existence of A*, both conceived as special entities somehow immanent to the judging subject. The term ‘*Sachverhalt*’ is introduced by Stumpf to designate the immanent content of a judgment in this wider sense.

For Stumpf, ontology is a branch of psychology. Psychology itself has to do with three sorts of entities: *functions*, *appearances* (*Erscheinungen*), and *formations* (*Gebilde*). The latter, as we shall see, will correspond in some respects to the irrealia of Marty. Functions are just mental acts and processes;


appearances are, roughly speaking, the ‘ideas’ of British empiricism; formations are (for example) concepts, states of affairs, and values; they are not entities existing of themselves somewhere in the world, but rather the contents of corresponding functions – and only as such, Stumpf holds, can they be described and investigated.

Appearances and formations together make up the totality of what is given in mental acts and processes. They differ in that, as Stumpf puts it, appearances are given to us in ‘logical independence’ of the associated functions, that is, they are given as if they originate autonomously, in some separate sphere. Formations, on the other hand, are given to us only in ‘logical dependence’ on the corresponding functions. Moreover, formations are immanent; they exist only ‘in the context of the living being of the mind’.14

The peculiarity of this view is seen most clearly in the fact that Stumpf reckons not only concepts to the category of immanent formations, but also both discrete and continuous collectives or sums (‘Inbegriffe’). We can begin to make sense of what Stumpf has in mind here, however, if we reflect that his idea of a ‘science of formations’ was almost certainly influenced by the ‘theory of manifolds’ developed by Georg Cantor, a colleague of both Stumpf and Husserl in the University of Halle. Stumpf’s notion of immanent collective seems to have been inspired, more precisely, by Cantor’s definition of a set (‘Menge’) as ‘any collection into a whole of definite and well-distinguished objects of our intuition or our thought’, and there is a marked similarity between the examples of ‘set’ discussed by Cantor and the examples of immanent collective discussed by Stumpf.15

Where sense data as such are given to us as independent of the mind, sense data qua organized or collected are, Stumpf argues, taken up into consciousness, so that they are given to us as existing only as immanent parts of the relevant acts. A Stumpfian state of affairs, similarly, can exist only as the immanent content of an actually occurring judgment. On the other hand,

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14. 1907a, p. 34; see also 1907, pp. 11, 32.

15. The stars are real, we might say, but the constellations exist only in our minds. See Cantor 1895/97, p. 282, 1887/88, pp. 421f. and compare Stumpf, 1907a, § 2. Gestalt qualities, too, belong to the category of immanent formations; they are conceived by Stumpf as special cases of Inbegriffe, namely those where there is a network of real relations between the elements summed. For a more detailed discussion see Chapter Eight, Section 2, below.
however, Stumpf wants to insist that the state of affairs itself does not enjoy the merely subjective status of our acts of thinking, feeling or willing. It is difficult to see how to make sense of this idea, as of similar formulations in the early Brentano, but we may suppose that Stumpf saw the state of affairs as being that immanent part of the relevant act which results when we strip away the subject-dependent qualitative moments to reveal, as it were, a common logical core.

Stumpf’s coinage of ‘Sachverhalt’ does, however, mark a step forward in the ontology of judgment in that it helped to crystalize the search on the part of his contemporaries for something on the side of the things themselves, some ‘fact’ or ‘objective’, to serve as that in virtue of which a judgment is true. This idea goes back at least as far as Abelard with his doctrine of the *rerum modus habendi se* developed in the *Dialectica*, and it was pursued especially by philosophers in the fourteenth century. 16 It is, however, only with the turn of our present century that the idea took root to the extent that it was possible to conceive an ontology of *Sachverhalte* and like entities as a special discipline in its own right. The idea is present not only in Stumpf, 17 but also in Husserl and Meinong. And similarly in his *Analysis of Mind* Russell defends on the one hand an immanentist conception of the contents of belief, but distinguishes on the other hand in addition to this content, i.e. to ‘what a man is believing at a given moment’ (a certain wholly determinate mental event), the ‘objective’ or ‘actual fact that makes the belief true’. 18

Marty agrees with Stumpf in the view that ‘states of affairs and values [the contents of phenomena of interest] are not “things” (“Wesen”), for one tends to understand by this something real. And certainly they are not in any place, neither sensory nor extrasensory, for they admit of no spatial characterization at all.’ (Marty 1908, p. 401) Unlike Stumpf, however, Marty


17. See his 1907a.

18. See Ch. XII, esp. pp. 233f. and 14f. Russell’s position is in fact described as the ‘Stumpf-Russell view’ in a review of Russell’s work by Oskar Kraus (1930, p. 59n). Russell’s remarks here, and above all his use of the term ‘objective’, reveal an influence not only of Meinong but also of the other Brentanians. The similarity of Russell’s views at this time to those of Wittgenstein has even been held by Kraus (*op. cit.*) to point to an influence of these Brentanian ideas on Wittgenstein, too.
wishes to provide an account of truth on a *Sachverhalt*-theoretic basis, and this rules out the idea that *Sachverhalte* might be immanent formations in the Stumpfian sense. States of affairs and values are, he tells us, ‘something in themselves’, existing independently of the context of the mind. It is not even the case that they are in some way generated by the latter and then ‘left behind as some sort of residue; rather, they are to be seen as materially prior to or as conditions for the possibility of certain special sorts of acts, namely those which in the sphere of judging and interest have the character of correctness.’ (loc. cit.) Once again, therefore, the non-real as Marty conceives it is not a matter of psychology: it is not to be confused with the immanent or the purely intentional. But nor is it to be confused with the non-existent. Non-real entities exist, no less than do the real.

The category of existent objects is understood by Marty – as by Brentano – as comprehending everything that can serve as the subject of a true affirmative judgment: it is a matter of being in the sense of being true.\(^\text{19}\) How, then, does Marty react to a view such as that of Meinong, according to which non-existent objects, too, may serve as the subjects of judgments of this sort? Certainly it is not possible that we should correctly affirm that the golden mountain exists. But we can, Meinong argues, correctly affirm that it is golden or that it is a mountain. This is Meinong’s famed ‘Principle of the Independence of Being and Being-So’\(^\text{20}\). Marty counters this principle by appealing to Brentano’s theory of the structure of judgments of predication.\(^\text{21}\) Just as judging in general is possible only on the basis of a presentation, so Brentano’s theory implies that there can be no judging of a being-so without a judging of being. I can, certainly, *present* a being-so without accepting the associated being. I can for example think of a unicorn as white without believing that a unicorn exists. ‘But whoever affirmatively judges a being-so, judges necessarily and unavoidably a double judgment, wherein, on the basis of the acknowledging of the subject there is built up as second judgment-relation the conferring of the

\(^{19}\) Cf. Brentano 1889a, § 50.

\(^{20}\) See Meinong, 1904, p. 82 of trans., and Lambert 1983, Ch. 2, III.

The true affirmative judgment of being-so is therefore possible, Marty concludes, only in a peculiar (merely one-sidedly detachable) complication with the acknowledging of a corresponding being, that is to say of something which, even if it is not real, is at least existent.

Consider the following univocity argument put forward by the later Brentano in defence of his ontology of things. Brentano holds that that which is, in the strict or literal sense of the word, is identical with that which is correctly to be acknowledged. Moreover, that which is correctly to be acknowledged is identical with that which is correctly to be affirmed in the present tense. But, Brentano argues, ‘nothing other than a thing can ever correctly be affirmed in this way’: ‘However different the objects of our thinking may be, all of them must fall under the most general concept, namely, that of a thing, an ens reale. If this were not the case, the name “thinker” (i.e. “one who thinks something”) would be equivocal.’ (1933, p. 18, Eng. p. 24)

Marty can be said, in a sense, to have turned this argument on its head: if whatever can be the subject of a true affirmative judging exists, and if irrealia can be the subjects of true affirmative judgings, then irrealia, too, exist. If we use ‘object’ to refer to anything that can be presented, then, Marty argues, since it does not belong to the essence of presentation that it can apply only to what is real, ‘it follows that – even if only what is real were as a matter of fact presented – the two concepts of “object” and “real” ... would not be identical.’ (1916, p. 152) This shows that Marty is not simply the voice of his master, but a thinker in his own right, one who occupies in his ontology a point that is mid-way between Brentano and Meinong. Thus he agrees with Brentano in rejecting tout court the whole motley crew of ideal objects, universal or general objects, immanent objects, intentional objects, abstract and non-existent objects propounded by Meinong, Husserl, Frege, Bolzano et al.; yet he disagrees in two-fold fashion with Brentano’s view that only things exist, in that he accepts both non-thingly irrealia and also realia lying outside the realm of causal change entirely. In what follows, then, we must investigate in what sense his ontology may be said to represent a stable and acceptable compromise between the corpulent and the lean.

3. Bases and Operations

Real entities, for Marty, are:
- in the physical sphere: physical substances and their accidents,
- in the psychic sphere: psychic substances and the psychic processes which are their accidents.

All real entities are therefore either substances or accidents, a thesis which will provide an important instrument for picking out irrealia in the pages that follow. The reader should however beware of understanding Marty’s accidents in Brentanian terms, i.e. as thingly entities which comprehend their substances as parts.\(^{23}\) Marty tells us only, with Aristotle, that accidents ‘inhere‘ in their substances. Hence not all realia, for Marty, are ‘things’ in the reistic sense.

Non-real entities are:
- collectives (see 4. below)
- relations (4.)
- space (5.)
- states of affairs (Sachverhalte) or ‘contents of judgments’ (6.)
- values (Wertverhalte) or ‘contents of phenomena of interest’ (9.)

This is not, by any means, an exhaustive list. Other examples of non-real objects mentioned by Marty are lacks or privations, the merely possible and the impossible. These last examples will exercise our attentions only peripherally in what follows. It is useful to mention them here, however, since they will give us some preliminary insight into the reasons for what initially seems to be a certain lack of discrimination in Marty’s ontology.

Consider, first of all, why it is that lacks, as contrasted with surfeits, are picked out by Marty (as by Aristotle)\(^{24}\) for special treatment. This is because, wherever a surfeit exists, there exists also some thing or collective of things with which the surfeit in question can be identified. Where there is a lack or privation, on the other hand, there is \textit{ex hypothesi} no such thing. Yet lacks, like surfeits, may surely be the subjects of true affirmative judgments. In relation to the merely possible and impossible, too, there is lacking any currently existing

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23. This is referred to as the ‘B’-view in Chapter Three above.

24. E.g. Met., 1019b6, 1032b4, 1033a10ff., 1069b34. See also Brentano 1862, p. 37f., Eng. p. 25 and Twardowski 1894, p. 36, Eng. p. 34.
real object which could serve as truth-maker for sentences about the (putative) entities in question. And in regard to these entities, too, it is clear that, if they are accepted as existents at all, then only as non-real objects, for they neither have nor suffer effects.

To put some order into the superficial chaos of Martian irrealia, consider a second Brentanian argument against entities of the given sort. This argument was directed specifically against states of affairs, necessities, impossibilities and the like, and thus also against Bolzanian ‘Wahrheiten an sich’ and other entia rationis. Bolzano, as is well known, believed that ‘truths in themselves’ are required in order to guarantee the objectivity of knowledge. Meinong, similarly, believed that non-existent and various other special kinds of objects are required in order to guarantee the objectivity of certain sorts of intentional reference. All theories which purport to embrace such supposed classes of entia rationis are, Brentano claims, absurd. For let us suppose that we were to hold that there exists not only a thing A, but also the truth that A exists. Then of this latter, too, we could truly say that it exists, so that there would exist also the truth that this truth exists, and so on in infinitum. Similarly if A were not, then there would exist also the truth that A were not, and also the truth that this truth existed, and so on in infinitum. And neither in the positive nor in the negative case would this regress come to an end:

there would exist, from eternity to eternity, infinitely many entia rationis, and in particular an infinity of impossibilities, of beings of impossibilities, non-beings of the non-beings of these and countless other impossibilities, further infinite totalities of non-beings of objects, and so on. All arguments against the infinitely many can therefore be turned against this doctrine, which clearly manages only to create invincible embarrassments without performing any sort of service. (Kastil 1951, pp. 104f., paraphrasing Brentano)

We are not concerned here with the validity of this Brentanian argument against irrealia. (We pause only to note that, among Meinong and his associates in Graz, the regress in question was accepted without qualms as entirely non-vicious. Bolzano had earlier used it as the basis of a famous proof that there is an infinity of truths in themselves.25) The argument is of interest, rather, because it suggests the rationale underlying the apparent pot-pourri of Martian

25. 1837, § 32; 1851, p. 13.
irrealia. For the latter seem all of them to have in common the possibility of becoming associated with an infinite hierarchy of the given sort. This is most obviously true in the case of collectives (or of sets), where the hierarchy in question is that which results when we admit as objects not only collectives of things but also collectives of collectives, collectives of collectives of collectives, and so on, *in infinitum*. But it applies also to values, where we have the hierarchy which results when we recognize not only the goodness of A but also the goodness of the goodness of A, the goodness of the badness of B, and so on.\(^{26}\) We similarly have a hierarchy of possibilities, of necessities, and even of lacks (lacks of lacks), and so on.\(^{27}\)

In each case we have one or more operations \(O\):

- the existence of ( )
- the possibility of ( )
- the necessity of ( )
- the value of ( )

applied recursively to a certain class of objects \(a, b, c, \ldots\) – the ‘basis’ of the operation – together with an infinite hierarchy which is generated in virtue of the fact that the results of applying this operation:

\[ O(a), O(b), O(c), \ldots, O(O(a)), \ldots, O(O(O(a))), \ldots, \] etc.,

which are assumed to be distinct, are themselves such as to fall within the basis of the operation and therefore capable of serving as starting-point for further applications of \(O\) *in infinitum*.

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26. This iteration of ethical characters plays an important role in the objectivist ethics defended by Brentano in his 1889, e.g. pp. 84ff., Eng. pp. 90f. See also Chisholm 1986.

27. See e.g. 1930, p. 96, Eng. pp. 86f.; Srzednicki 1965, p. 32. Cf. also 1930, pp. 126f., Eng. pp. 111f., where Brentano’s regress argument is applied to ‘part’ and other related operations.
A regress of this sort is illustrated already by the familiar Bradleyan argument against external relations. If we write ‘R(a,b)’ for ‘the relation between a and b’, and if we allow ‘R(a,b)’, wherever it is defined, to refer to an object belonging to the basis B of the operation R, then B threatens to include also what we might call the Bradleyan objects R(a,R(a,b)), R(R(a,b),b), R(a,R(a,R(a,b))), etc. – objects of which (if Bradley’s argument holds) it could in truth be said that they ‘create invincible embarrassments without performing any sort of service’.

When once a regress of the given sort has been set in train, however, then, it seems that we can get off the train at whichever point we please (or can reasonably justify). The later Brentano, given his rejection of the actual infinite and his new-found abhorrence of all *entia rationis*, chooses in almost every case to disembark before the journey has even started: he typically disallows entirely the capacity of operations of the given sorts to generate separate or categorically distinct objects. There are no values, relations, judgment-contents, but only valuable things, relative things, judging things, etc., and where no suitable thing presents itself (‘possible thing’, ‘lacking thing’, ‘past thing’, etc.), then the associated adjectives are analyzed away as ‘modifying’. Marty, on the other hand, chooses to disarm the regress by stopping it after the first round. This he does by defining, for each operation O applied to realia, a new and separate category of irrealia which is to comprehend the results of applying the given operation to realia as basis. Because the O(a) need themselves no longer belong in the basis of O, the possibility of a harmful iteration may be excluded. A bicategorial ontology can in this way forestall an infinite regress.

This is a somewhat speculative reconstruction of Marty’s reasoning. As we shall see, he himself gives distinct arguments to support the recognition of

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29. Compare the way in which the different systems of modal logic represent different coherently defensible solutions to the problem of how far the iteration of basic operators like ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’ is to be allowed to go in generating new modal operators.

30. See, on the parallel case of relations, his 1910, p. 66.
distinct classes of putative irrealia in each separate case. The reconstruction will, however, serve to give some overall sense to Marty’s apparently disconnected deliberations. Moreover, it will point to certain affinities between Marty’s ontology on the one hand and parallel work by his contemporaries and successors on what one might call the theory of object-generation on the other.

We can distinguish two opposed types of attitude to that *embarras de richesses* to which operations of the given sort may seem to give rise. On the one hand are the sceptical-reductionist attitudes of those who seek to call into question the supposed ontological fertility of the operations at issue, or who seek to show that the objects they generate belong to categories already recognized. The later Brentano, as will now be clear, falls squarely within this sceptical-reductionist camp. On the other hand are the attitudes, found particularly among mathematicians, of those who seek to nurture and at the same time to regiment the productive capacities of such operations in ways which will allow them to yield objects of new sorts – not merely at random, but in such a way that the objects in question will be capable of controlled manipulation within the framework of a formal theory. The clearest illustration of the latter is provided by the case of Cantor, whose development of the theory of sets rests on a series of powerful strokes of generalization, each involving the stripping away of restrictions on set-formation previously taken for granted by mathematicians, in such a way as to give rise to an ever stronger formal instrument for the manipulation of an ever more comprehensive domain of *sui generis* collective objects.31

Cantor’s work is however merely one representative of a more widespread ontologizing current in the later nineteenth century, illustrated also in the work of Frege and in Husserl’s work on the theory of ‘collective combination’ in his *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, a work which was itself in part inspired by Cantor.32 Ontologization is illustrated further by the theory of Gestalt qualities put forward by Ehrenfels, by the ‘production theory’ of the Meinong school in Graz, and also by successively more sophisticated theories of intensional objects (possible worlds, *qua* objects, arbitrary objects, etc.)

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31. See the discussion of this aspect of Cantor’s work in Dauben 1979.

32. See also Mulligan 1980 on the role of the concept of operation in other early writings of Husserl, and on similar ideas in the work of Wittgenstein.
which have been developed within the province of formal semantics in recent years.\textsuperscript{33}

In each of the cases mentioned we have some operation or collection of operations, more or less formally specified, giving rise to a family of entities in some new category when applied recursively to some basis of more or less familiar entities. Through his theory of the set-forming operation, Cantor tamed (or thought he had tamed) the notion of collective. Early proponents of the ontology of facts, including Stumpf, Meinong, Russell and Wittgenstein, with their theories of fact-forming operations like the existence of or das Bestehen von, supposed themselves to have tamed the notion of fact or Sachverhalt. Bolzano, Frege and others, with their theories of operations like the sentence in itself that, the judgeable content that, and so on, held that they had similarly tamed the notion of a proposition or bearer of truth. In this way they set in train a process which gave rise to that special sort of rule-governed object-manipulation we now call ‘propositional logic’.

The importance of the work of Brentano and his followers lies on the one hand in the fact that they contributed in a positive way to the developments in question. Thus Twardowski, as we shall see, exerted a decisive influence in this respect on the early development of propositional logic in Poland. On the other hand however they preserved in relation to the ontologizing tendencies of their day the attitude of the psychologist, seeking to bring the newly unveiled families of objects (propositions, states of affairs, collectives, etc.) down to a level where their role in cognition could become apparent. They asked questions, for example, about the dependence of generated objects upon associated mental acts, striving thereby to hold a balance between a reductionistic psychologism at the one extreme and a formalism or Platonizing objectivism at the other.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{33} See above all in this respect the work of Fine, esp. his 1977, 1982, 1985.

\textsuperscript{34} See Willard 1984 and the treatment of Husserl and Twardowski in Chapter Six below.
4. Collectives and Relations

In his *Theory of Categories* Brentano canvases a way of rendering harmless a regress of the sort described in the case of collectives (Mengen, sets, Inbegriffe) by identifying the given entities as special sorts of things. The threat of proliferation *in infinitum* is, he argues, averted by identifying all collectives of the second and higher orders with the corresponding first-order collectives obtained by cumulation. Thus the first-order collective of all currently existing red things is that dispersed and discontinuous thing whose parts are all and only the red objects now existing in the universe. The harmlessness of first-order collectives is in turn guaranteed by the fact that the latter are not viewed as supernumerary abstracta or ‘sets’ in the technical sense. Collectives are not _extra_ entities at all:

> It would indeed be a strange kind of arithmetic if one were to add to the two things which are individual oxen that thing which is two oxen, and then speak of three things. This would be just as misguided as it would be if, in reflection of the fact that an apple can be halved in arbitrarily many directions, someone were to answer the question ‘How many half apples do I have?’ by saying ‘More than a thousand.’ (Brentano 1933, p. 50, Eng. p. 46.)

Marty, too, sees collectives as behaving differently from sets as conceived by Cantor. Thus both Martian and Brentanian collectives differ from Cantorian sets in being truncated at the first type, in the absence of an empty set, and in the fact that they may be subject to the vagaries of time (may come into and go out of existence in reflection of the vicissitudes of their members – recall, once more, the case of stellar constellations). Marty and Brentano differ from each other, however, in the fact that the former refuses to allow that collectives can be real – and here, paradoxically, Marty exploits just that argument which Brentano had directed against his own earlier commitment to judgment-contents and other irrealia. ‘To be sure’, Marty writes, ‘no one is going to deny that the being together of that which is collected ... is in a certain sense something new in relation to the members’. But it is not a new _reality_, for otherwise ‘one would be led to a multiplication of reality _in infinitum._’ (1908, p. 320)

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35. Brentano’s generalized notion of ‘collective’ thus corresponds to Leonard and Goodman’s ‘fusion’ (1940). His views are similar also to those of Lesniewski and Kotarbiński, dealt with in Chapter Seven below.
Why, then, could Marty not accept collectives as real in the way that this was done by Brentano? As we have noted, all real entities for Marty, fall into one or other of the two interrelated classes of substances and accidents, conceived more or less after the fashion of Aristotle and the Scholastics. A collective of substances cannot be real, since if it were, then it would have to be either a substance or an accident. It is not the latter (for which substance should it be an accident of?); but it cannot be the former, either, for then unified accidents (states or processes) would have to be capable of being ascribed to it, and Marty finds unacceptable the idea that collective substances should have unified accidents. A supposed ‘unified will of the people’, he insists, is merely a qualitative identity of will on the part of each one of a number of individual persons. The case is similar, on Marty’s view, with the relation of similarity. That two white horses are similar in colour may certainly be true; but this similarity is, from the point of view of what is real, nothing new in addition to the absolute colour-determinations of each horse – ‘otherwise we should once more stand before the impossible assumption that a multiplicity of things should be the carrier of a unified real property’. (1908, p. 332)

It is difficult to know what to make of arguments such as this on Marty’s part, arguments which seem to rest on the peculiarities of certain well-chosen examples. (Thus it would be interesting to know how Marty would deal with apparently irreducibly collective accidents such as surroundings, quarrels, battles, and the like.) There may, however, be a grain of truth in what he has to say, in that we do, at least in many cases, have a strong temptation to regard talk of collective things as reducible, in some way, to talk of single parts or members. Collectives are conceived, in this sense, as ‘nothing real’. On the other hand, however, we are not disposed to regard collective nouns as merely empty. Collectives, accordingly, might most appropriately be classed as irrealia, a view which may raise echoes of Leibniz’s conception of aggregates as non-real \textit{phaenomena bene fundata}. They will then belong neither among the substances nor among the accidents. They will have realia as parts, but will be, as it were, relatively isolated from these parts, being affected only by those changes in the latter which consist in a ceasing to exist (and any such change is such as to bring about the destruction of the collective also). In this sense we

can say that the Martian collective necessitates the existence of its parts, or, equivalently, that it is existentially dependent on these parts.

Intentionality for the early Brentano is in every case a relation in the genuine sense, relating the act of a subject to an immanent content of this act, both of which exist in the fullest sense, though only one of which is real. Later, Brentano grafted onto this theory of intentionality a theory of two ‘modes’ of directedness towards a thing. On the one hand is the ‘recto’ mode, which conforms to the earlier notion of intentionality in the sense that its object must always exist. On the other hand is the ‘obliquo’ mode, which may relate us (in the weakest possible sense) even to what does not exist.

To see what is at issue here we must recognize that the later Brentano’s preferred account of relations takes the form of a theory of relative things or ‘things with relative determinations’. This theory may be summarized as follows. When we think of one thing in relation to another, this always involves a certain sort of complex of presentations. One thing is thought of directly (in modo recto), the other is thought of merely obliquely (in modo obliquo). When, for example, one thinks of a thing that is taller than Socrates, then one has the thing as object in modo recto, Socrates as object in modo obliquo.

That which is presented in modo recto must exist, if that which is relative is to exist. But that which is presented in modo obliquo need not exist except in quite special cases, such as e.g. that of an evident affirmer, who cannot exist unless the thing that is affirmed by him exists. (1933, p. 169, Eng. p. 127)

It is for this reason that it is possible for us to think – though at most modo obliquo and in the absence of evidence – about that which (for Brentano) does not exist, for example ghosts, demons, fictional characters, and objects in the past or in the future. This account applies also in relation to colours and tones and to the other physical phenomena described by Brentano in the Psychologie, for the later Brentano denies the existence of such entities in anything other than the relative sense. What exist are acts of colour- and tone-sensation. Colours and tones themselves, on the new dispensation, exist neither outside consciousness nor as immanent parts thereof. Thus also they cannot be ‘experienced’. The property of being experienced in fact applies only to the acts (the ‘mental phenomena’) of sensation. These have colours and tones as their

37. The idea goes back to Ockham; see e.g. Adams 1987, vol. I, p. 321.
objects, but the ‘have’, here, is to be understood merely in the sense of a relative
determination.\(^{38}\)

Marty, in contrast, finds something unsatisfactory in an account of
relations purely in terms of relative determinations. It has the effect, he argues,
of making relations into something subjective, into a mere special way of
treating or presenting the objects involved, objects which might be, in
themselves, entirely unrelated. A subjectivist view of this sort was held, again,
by Stumpf,\(^{39}\) but it is rejected out of hand by Marty, who holds that nothing
could be more wrong than to suppose that relations exist only in and through
our acts of presentation or of noticing.

We find them there before us, and if this were not so, if they were a product of our
psychic activity, then how would things stand with regard to the objectivity of our
entire knowledge of nature? For the latter of course relates only to relations, not to
the absolute determinations of place, mass, magnitude, etc. (Marty 1908, p. 468)\(^{40}\)

Relations must be objective, then, for otherwise science would be impossible.

The elimination of relations in favour of complex presentations provides
at best an account of those putatively relational structures captured by relational
sentences of which it is not necessary that both termini of the relation exist.
Where the existence of both termini is necessary, however – for example in the
case of correct judgments (where act and object must both exist) and in the case
of causal relations (where cause and effect must both exist\(^{41}\)) – then Marty
speaks of \textit{correlations}, insisting that these require a different treatment.

Brentano himself provides the germ of a non-subjectivistic account of
relations of this sort in a series of passages in the \textit{Theory of Categories} which
seems to contradict his official theory of relative things and of \textit{recto/obliquo}
modes. The fact that a plurality of things is itself a thing is taken by Brentano
here to imply the possibility of recognizing relations as \textit{accidents of collectives}


\(^{39}\) See his 1907, p. 37.


\(^{41}\) For Marty and Brentano cause and effect must exist both at the same time, in the sense that they must border on each
other temporally. The two philosophers are at odds, in this respect, with Aristotle (e.g. at \textit{Anal. post.}, 95\textsuperscript{a}1ff). See
Brentano 1976, Part II, Ch. II, Sect. 6.
(in the Brentanian sense of ‘accident’). As we saw, accidents in this sense can be accidents of a collective as such. Such accidents will themselves have parts, each of which holds of some part-substance within the collective as a whole. Thus an egg, for example, has the accident *multicoloured*, in virtue of the fact that one part is red, another blue, and so on.

Whether I say that the egg is multicoloured or say of one of its parts that it is of a different colour from another it comes to the same thing. From this one sees that in the case of relations we are dealing with what might be called collective determinations. We are dealing with a plurality of things which are united into one thing, and where a certain determination applies to the whole in virtue of its various parts. (1933, pp. 57f., Eng. p. 50)

Following the diagrammatic conventions introduced above, a relational accident in this Brentanian sense would look like this:

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Such an accident – a Brentanian ‘correlation’ – is a special kind of thing, and is no less real, and no less consciousness-independent, than things of other sorts.

For Marty, on the other hand, correlations, like collectives, are non-real – despite the fact that, as just mentioned, they are such that we ‘find them there before us’. This applies first of all to correlations such as likeness, difference, contrast, etc., whose non-reality may be taken as unproblematic. But it applies also to the correlation of causality itself (which does not change the fact that only what is real can be a cause or an effect).

Consciousness or intentionality, too, is understood by Marty primarily in terms of a correlation. Consciousness, as Marty conceives it, is ‘an actual or possible ideal adequation to something that we call its object or content’. Moreover consciousness is an assimilation whose existence is given with
immediate evidence.\(^{42}\) And it must be non-real: ‘For to which class of realia would the ideal conformity between psychic functions and their contents belong? This can, after all, be neither psychical nor physical.’ (Marty 1908, p. 333) We shall have more to say about relations of this sort below.

5. **Space**

According to Brentano’s first theory of space in the *Theory of Categories*, a place is a mutually dependent moment of a quality. There is no quality that is not at some place in space, but also no place that is not also corporeal, i.e. filled with some quality: ‘the determination of place is so intimately unified with the determination of quality, that they individuate each other mutually.’ (Brentano 1933, p. 89, Eng. p. 72)

This first view of space recalls that of Descartes: not only is there no mind that is not thinking, for Descartes, so also there is no place without an extension that would fill it. Descartes’ extension is however filled by quantity – and not by quality as on the Brentanian view – so that Brentano is in fact closer to the doctrine defended, for example, by Berkeley, for whom it is evident that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in my mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. (Berkeley, *Principles*, Part I, 10)

Similarly on the first Brentanian view: just as the determination ‘red’ contains the determination ‘spatial’, so the determination ‘is at place L’ contains the determination ‘qualitative’, so that:

If we ascend from the concept of that which is red to the concept of that which is coloured and from there to the concept qualitatively-determined, then we come to the same concept – the concept of that which is corporeal, as qualitative and spatial, i.e. to the concept qualitatively-space-filling. (1933, pp. 35f., Eng. p. 36)

According to Brentano’s later view of space, in contrast, places are themselves substances which may, but need not, be comprehended by qualities as their accidents. In this way places, as we saw, have the primary job of

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42. Marty 1916, p. 166.
individuating the accidental determinations with which they are associated, and Brentano took so seriously the view that places individuate things that he was prepared to swallow the consequence that corporeal motion is impossible, as is any change of size or shape.

Here, as elsewhere, Marty seeks a position more straightforwardly commonsensical than that of his master, even at the price of a certain sort of theoretical inelegance. In order to save the view according to which bodies can move from place to place, he develops a conception of space as something non-real, as a ‘non-real possibility of local determinations’. (1908, p. 320n.) Thus for Marty, too, space can exist even in the absence of bodies and of all qualitative determinations. Because, however, substances are both actual (as opposed to merely possible) and real, it follows that the places which make up this Martian space cannot be substantial. They are rather what Marty calls subsistents; they are like substances in that they inhere in nothing, but unlike substances in being non-real.

Space, then, on Marty’s view, is a non-real continuum of places. A body does not stand to the place it occupies in the relation of accident to substance: bodies do not inhere in space, and a body and its place are not bonded together, as are a substance and its accident, to make the real unity of a thing. Rather, a body stands to its place in what Marty refers to as ‘the relation of a conditioned continuum to a conditioning continuum’. (1916, p. 182) Which region of the conditioning continuum (space) conditions a given conditioned continuum (a body) is then a contingent matter. Bodies can be conditioned by different space-continua, and the change from one conditioning continuum to another is what we call movement. Thus while Marty accepts, with Brentano, that accidents are individuated by their substances, he cannot accept that it is along these lines that we are to understand the relation between body and space. Space does not individuate body, precisely because movement is possible:

The body gets not its individuation from space, but the very possibility of being – and more particularly the possibility of manifesting those specific differences which


44. Marty uses the term ‘subsistent’ to characterize that which exists in such a way that there is nothing in which it inhere. He then defines substance as that which subsists and is real, accident as that which inheres and is real. Space thereby belongs to that which subsists but is non-real. (1916, p. 177)
we call quantitative. The latter are only possible through participation in the conditioning continuum and in its analogous quantitative differences. (1916, p. 191)

Now, however, we can see that the cost of Marty’s revision of Brentano’s theory is the recognition of two sorts of space, the one related to the other by analogy. Marty is prepared to swallow a consequence of this sort. That is, he is prepared to accept that a body possesses a continuum of space-like qualities which is always and necessarily superposed on some structurally isomorphic but non-real continuum of places, the latter having been more or less temporarily filled by the former.

Marty’s approach here is not new. It revives a dualistic conception of space (in origin theological), that was developed especially by Augustine in reaction to the monism of the Stoics, a conception according to which space is ontologically prior to the world of bodies.45 The dualist doctrine was refined by the Dalmatian philosopher Francesco Patrizi (1529–1597), with his distinction between mathematical and physical space; it was taken up also by Gassendi, and above all by Hobbes (with his distinction between ‘imaginary’ and ‘real’ space in chapter VII De corpore), influencing also Newton’s distinction between absolute and relative space. In this respect, though not in others, Brentano sides with proponents of a relativistic conception of the nature of space, where Marty sides with Newton.46 It is, incidentally, in Gassendi that we find an early refined form of the view that ‘being is not exhaustively divided into substance and accidents’: space and time, too, exist and are neither the one nor the other.47

45. See the valuable discussion of “Der Raum und die Weltvernichtung” in Sect. 3 of Schuhmann 1986. Cf. also Bolzano 1851, “40, 63 and Brentano 1976, Part II, Ch. I, Sect. 16.

46. For Brentano’s criticisms of the Einsteinian cosmology, especially in regard to the supposed curvature of space, see his 1976, part 3, III.12f., and also part 1, I.16f.

47. See Syntagma, Bk. 2, Ch. 1, as cited in Schuhmann 1986, pp. 275f. See also Bolzano 1851, ‘17.
6. **States of Affairs**

Marty’s most important reason for embracing an ontology of irrealia relates however not to space but to the category of states of affairs or ‘judgment-contents’ and to the problem of developing a defensible correspondence theory of truth. The Martian opposition between reality and non-reality is after all no more than an elaboration of just that Aristotelian distinction between *being in the sense of the categories* and *being in the sense of being true* with which this chapter began.

Marty’s theory of states of affairs or judgment-contents – we shall use these terms interchangeably through the rest of this chapter – is similar in many ways to the theory of *Objektive* set forth by Meinong in his *On Assumptions*. Both judgment-contents and objectives are in a certain sense entities intermediate between judgments on the one hand and objects on the other. Moreover, both are divided into the two classes of ‘judgment-contents of being’ and ‘judgment-contents of so-being’, the former corresponding to existential judgments, the latter to predications. The theory bears some similarity also to Bolzano’s theory of truths in themselves: both judgment-contents and truths in themselves are as it were the measure or standard to which an actual judging, if it is to be true, must conform. Marty’s judgment-content differs from the Bolzanian truth in itself, however, in the fact that the former is a truth-maker, i.e. it is that in virtue of which a judgment is true, where in Bolzano’s case we are dealing with something that is able to serve also or primarily as a bearer of truth. Entities cognate with truths in themselves may therefore serve also as bearers of falsehood. Martian judgment-contents differ from Bolzanian truths in themselves also in that they are not ideal or extra-temporal: a judgment-content, like everything else, exists in time (exists now, or not at all).

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48. On the evolution of Marty’s theory of judgment-contents see Brentano 1930, p. 209, n. 145, Eng. p. 177, n. 44. In a letter to Kraus of 14 September 1909, Brentano wrote: ‘it is true that at one time I treated the contents of judgments, as Marty does now, as though they could be the objects of presentations, judgments and emotions, just as things can be.’ (Brentano 1924, vol. I, p. XLV, Eng. p. 383). This remark must, however, be taken with a pinch of salt, since Marty’s judgment-contents, unlike those of the early Brentano, are not immanent to the mind of the judging subject.

49. See Morscher 1986 and 1990 for further clarification of this point.
Judgment-contents are, for all that, not real however, for a judgment-content does not have or suffer effects. Further, it is not dependent on any associated judgment. The Aristotelian formula ‘*adaequatio rei et intellectus*’ is to be read always in such a way that it is the *res* ‘which serves as authority or standard [as *das “Massgebende”*]’ for the relevant *intellectus*.\(^{50}\) The judgment-content is that which ‘objectively grounds the correctness of our judgings; or, more precisely, that without which such judgings could not be correct or adequate.’ (1908, p. 295) The judgment, therefore, must bend itself to the whim of the judgment-content, which itself exists autonomously, depending only on those realia which form the subject-matter of the judgment. As Aristotle puts it: ‘It is not because we think truly that you are pale that you are pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth.’ (*Met.*, 1051b7) Descartes, Spinoza, Locke and Leibniz are all Aristotelians in this respect. It was only with Kant that matters here came to be twisted around, in such a way that it would be as if the mind were somehow prior to (or ‘constitutive of’) its objects.

The concept of reality is for Marty simple. Like *red, tone, place, presentation*, it can be elucidated only by means of examples.\(^{51}\) The concept of existence, on the other hand, is a complex concept, gained through a special process of what he calls ‘reflexion’ on the concept of *true affirmative judgment*. Marty does, therefore, recognize one sort of relativity of objects to judgments. For while the former are in themselves prior in relation to the latter, in regard to our knowledge of the relevant concepts the dependence is reversed. We gained our concept of existence, Marty holds, ‘only through reflection on the correctness or truth of certain acts of judgment’. Marty sees the principal advantage of the term ‘judgment-content’ – as opposed to Meinong’s ‘*Objektiv*’ or Stumpf’s ‘*Sachverhalt*’ – in the fact that it makes clear that the thought of the judgment-content is impossible without the thought of the judgment (1908, p. 318).

This implies no sort of idealism or psychologism on Marty’s part. It is a *mark* of the concept of the existent that it is that which can be acknowledged in

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\(^{50}\) Marty 1908, p. 312. Interestingly the term ‘*Massgebende*’ was employed also by the Munich phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, who developed a correspondence theory of truth similar in many respects to that of Marty; see Schuhmann 1990 for further details.

\(^{51}\) 1908, p. 318.
an evident judgment. But this does not imply that the absence of evident judgment would imply the annihilation of what exists.

Our knowledge of the concept of truth, similarly, is dependent on our knowledge of the concepts of judgment and judger:

When Husserl says that the sentence ‘A is true’ does not speak of anyone’s judging, not even of anyone quite generally,\(^\text{52}\) then this is correct, if what is meant thereby is that it is not at all asserted that someone now in fact judges in this way. But the presentation of some judger or other is undoubtedly involved in the thought ‘A is true or existent’. (Marty 1908, p. 307n.)

The reason for this priority lies in the fact that presentings, judgings and phenomena of interest are all real mental processes. They can therefore serve as objects of direct, intuitive inner presentations, something which, because we can have intuitions only of what is real, is ruled out for judgment-contents and other irrealia. The general concepts of judging, of phenomena of interest, etc., can thus be grasped through abstraction from intuitions of the corresponding real mental processes themselves. Thus, for example, to gain the general concept of judging we present to ourselves a succession of judging acts and attempt to pick out what they have in common. But how do we explain the origin of concepts like existing thing, thing that is good, thing that is preferable, etc.?

Given the quite general importance of this problem of the origins of concepts, not only for Brentano and Marty but also for the other Brentanians, including Stumpf and Husserl,\(^\text{53}\) it will be useful to look more carefully at what this quest for ‘origins’ comes down to, i.e. at the different ways in which the Brentanians saw general concepts as being derived from the intuitive experiences which form – and this is the core of Brentano’s much-mooted ‘empirical standpoint’ – their necessary basis.

Note, first of all, that the term ‘concept’ itself means different things in the writings of different Brentanians. For the more orthodox Brentanians, talk of concepts is very much an abbreviated form of talk about certain kinds of presentations. For someone like Stumpf, on the other hand, a concept is an

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\(^{52}\) LU I, A184, Eng. p. 190.

\(^{53}\) See e.g. Brentano 1889, Stumpf 1873 and Husserl, “The Analysis of the Concept of Number according to Origin and Content” (ch. IV of his 1891).
entity in its own right: it is the immanent content of an act of presentation, as a judgment-content is the immanent content of an act of judgment. Husserl, similarly, regards the concept as an entity, not, however, as an immanent content, but rather as the ideal content of an act of presentation, as a proposition is the ideal content of an act of judgment. Concepts and propositions on the level of ideal meanings are thus clearly distinguished by Husserl both from what is immanent on the side of the act and also from things and states of affairs on the side of the object.

Common to all Brentanian views of concept, however, is the implication that, in order to understand the origin of concepts, it is necessary to look at the various ways in which presentations may occur. Concepts originate via a process of abstraction from sensory presentations. Echoing, in this respect, not only Aristotle, Boethius and the medievals but also Descartes and Locke, the Brentanians point to a hierarchy of different types of presentations of different orders of abstractness or generality. The process starts, as we have seen, with *intuitive presentations* , i.e. simple sense experiences (∙simple ideas‘, in an older terminology). Intuitive presentations may belong either to external or to internal perception. In the latter case they are directed to our presentations and judgments themselves (as also, for example, to our feelings or acts of will).

Whether intuitive or non-intuitive, presentation is characterized by the Brentanians as a relation not to the object as such, but to the ‘what’ of an object – to the object as red, bulbous, feline, etc. Hence the close relation between presentations, on the one hand, and concepts, on the other. Thus, once intuitive presentations have been gained, what we called above the process of *abstraction* can take place: we can move from a presentation of some given individual (as red, bulbous, feline, etc.), to a general presentation (of something red, something bulbous, something feline, and so on), i.e. to a presentation that is directed equally to many things. All mental acts, as we shall see, are conceived by Marty in terms of a certain kind of similarity between act and object. Presentations gained through abstraction are accordingly such that the act in question is in the relevant sense ‘similar’ to all objects falling within a


55. See e.g. Marty 1908, pp. 425f.
certain general class. Such presentations are achieved by fixing on some particular property or properties of the objects in question, in such a way that variations in the other properties of these objects become irrelevant for the ‘similarity’ at issue. Thus we can move by abstraction from the intuitive presentation of a group of differently coloured things to the abstract presentation of a coloured thing as such; we can move from the intuitive presentation of ourselves as currently judging to the abstract presentation of a judging thing as such; and so on.

‘Synthetic’ presentations are gained by putting different presentations together, and then some presentations are ‘individual through synthesis’ – as for example in the case of presentations like *tallest blonde spy*. Clearly, synthetic presentations provide a basis for new sorts of abstraction. Thus we can move from presentations of colours or tones taken together to the abstract presentations of, say, the relations of likeness and difference; from there we can move on to the general concept of relation as such; and so on.

The movement to what Marty calls *reflexive presentations* is skew to the above. Reflexive presentations are presentations of the *contents* of mental acts, which is to say, from the Brentanian point of view, presentations of the relevant objectual correlates. What Marty calls ‘reflexive abstraction’ thus continues to take real mental processes as its (evident) starting point, but it moves not vertically, to the general concepts under which these processes fall, but rather laterally, to their objects. We can form a concept of existence or value, or better: of an existing thing, or of a valuable thing, not as it were directly – by staring out into the object realm, as if objects would present themselves to us of their own accord as falling under concepts of the given sort – but only indirectly, by subjecting to a process of reflexion the acts of true and false judgment or of correct and incorrect emotion that are directed to these objects. We must, in fact, combine presentations of act and object in such a way that we apprehend the former as adequate to the latter; we shall then be in a position to apprehend the object itself as *existing*, as *valuable*, as *preferable*, and so on.\(^{56}\)

Once reflexive presentations have been gained, then they, too, can join in synthesis with other sorts of presentation to provide the starting point for further processes of abstraction. The concepts of existence and non-existence, of

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necessity and impossibility, of truth and falsehood, and the concept of something outside us,⁵⁷ are all gained through abstraction from reflexive presentations founded in this way on intuitive presentations of our own mental processes. In this sense, too, therefore, psychology for the Brentanians, leads the way to ontology.

7. A Correspondence Theory of Intentionality

What does all of this imply in regard to the origin of the concept judgment-content? This concept is anchored in our ability to present and reflect upon our own mental processes of judging. More precisely, we cannot acquire the concept of judgment-content unless we have a prior adequate concept of ourselves as correct judgers. This relativity of judgment-content to judger holds not merely in general, but in each particular case: ‘It is in grasping a given evident judging, and only thus, that we grasp also the judgment-content adequate thereto, and grasp it as adequate.’ (1908, p. 314) We have here what we referred to above as a correlation, i.e. a relation both of whose relata must exist. The grasping (intuitive presentation) of the correct judging, i.e. of the real fundament of the correlation, is at the same time a grasping of the state of affairs, i.e. of the non-real fundament, and of the relation between the two.

Presentation, for Marty, can relate either to what is real or – via processes of abstraction and reflexion of the relevant sorts – to what is non-real. The concept of an object is then the concept of anything that is ‘able to stand in the relation of ideal adequation to a presenting.’ (1916, p. 152) Consciousness, for Marty, is itself just a variety of assimilation of mental processes to (real or non-real) objects in the world. Moreover it is an assimilation whose existence is given with immediate evidence.⁵⁸ Marty’s doctrine here will recall again the Aristotelian assimilation theory of cognition according to which cognition in general and sensation in particular are processes which consist in making the soul in some way similar to the object perceived:


What has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end of the process the one acted upon has become assimilated to the other (*De anima*, 418a2ff.).

And again:

Within the soul the faculties of cognition and sensation are *potentially* these objects, the one what is knowable, the other what is sensible. These faculties, then, must be identical either with the things themselves, or with their forms. Now they are not identical with the objects; for the stone does not exist in the soul, but only the form of the stone. (*De anima*, 431b26ff.)

Similarly for Marty, all psychic activity is a process which has as its consequence that the psychic activity comes into a certain *sui generis* sort of conformity with something other than itself.

Presenting is a real process in the mind. In case there exists that which one calls the presented, then as a non-real consequence of the process there follows that the presenting mind stands to this thing in a peculiar relation, which might be described as an ideal similarity or adequacy. (1908, p. 406)

‘Ideal’, here, does not mean ‘abstract’ or ‘extratemporal’. It signifies rather ‘aspiring’ or ‘hopeful’. For the relation of ideal similarity does not of course coincide with what one normally calls similarity or likeness. We have to do, again, with an analogy, with a modified or somehow extended use of ‘similarity’:

What really exists within us is not a peculiar, modified double of the real object, but only the real psychic process to which in certain circumstances there becomes attached as consequence an ideal similarity with something other, existing independently of this process. (Marty 1908, p. 415f.)

This aspiration to similarity is not always fulfilled. Thus explorer Jack undergoes real processes of presentation directed (as he thinks) to the golden mountain which he seeks. In such circumstances there is not a correlation of similarity between Jack’s presentations and a certain object, but a *relative determination* in Brentano’s sense, which lacks an object-pole.59

The relation of adequation presupposes for its existence only the coexistence of a presentation and its intended object. The fact that this relation is

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itself a correlation implies that its existence necessarily brings with it the existence of its termini. Hence the relation of adequation stands to that whole which consists of a presentation and its object in a relation of mutual dependence, which we might illustrate as follows:

![Diagram](image)

The upper and lower halves of the complex represented here are complements: neither can exist except in the context of that sort of whole in which it is bound up with the other.  

Intuitive presentation we can now redescribe as a matter of ideal similarity or adequation with a single real individual; abstract presentation we can redescribe as a matter of ideal similarity or adequation with many individuals, which may be either real or non-real. Thus abstract presentation is a matter of what we might call *indeterminate* assimilation. An abstract presentation corresponds not to some single, abstract or general object – as for example on Twardowski’s or Meinong’s theories – but to many real objects. Moreover, its correspondence to these real objects is not that of an arbitrary token or representative, but that of something that stands in a relation of ideal similarity thereto, a condition which Marty sees as a further necessary presupposition of science in the strict and proper sense:

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60. The diagram leaves out of account the fact that the given presentation is itself one-sidedly dependent upon some presenting mind or subject.

61. See Chapter Six, Section 3, below.
it were ruled out in the case of abstract thoughts that they in some sense pictured
that which is thought about or conformed to, then this would in my opinion have to
hold of concrete intuitions also, and then we would face an extreme nominalism or
semanticism which would make out of presentations as a whole something which
would be in no way similar to or in conformity with that which is presented but a
merely non-similar and in this sense arbitrary sign of the latter. And such a doctrine
seems to me – when consistently maintained – to destroy any possibility of
knowledge of reality. (1908, pp. 421f.)

Wittgenstein, too, held a doctrine of assimilation of this sort: ‘It is
obvious’, he says in the *Tractatus*, ‘that a proposition of the form “aRb” strikes
us as a picture. In this case the sign is obviously a likeness of what is signified.’
(4.012) Wittgenstein, however, seems content to suppose that a coherent
understanding of the pictorial character of propositional signs is provided
already by the notion of a structural isomorphism between concatenations of
names and of what he calls ‘simple objects’. Thus his principal efforts are
invested in working out the way in which an assimilation theory built up on this
basis can be extended to cope with logically compound judgments of various
sorts, where isomorphism no longer obtains. Marty, in contrast, concentrates his
efforts on a concept of assimilation that he sees as being characteristic of all
activity in the psychic sphere, a concept that is therefore analogous to the
concept of ‘fit’ that is used by Searle in his *Intentionality*.

Marty’s treatment of assimilation or adequation is, however, overly
metaphorical. For a somewhat clearer understanding of this matter it is
necessary to turn to Husserl, who defends a view which could be said to
combine and to clarify elements of both Marty’s and Wittgenstein’s positions.
What Husserl calls ‘empty intentions’ are intentions which involve mere
arbitrary signs of their objects; here any similarity is lacking. Fulfilled
intentions of what is real, in contrast, where signs have been substituted by
intuitions of the relevant objects, do have a sort of ideal similarity, a similarity
which may be understood, for our present purposes, on broadly Aristotelian
lines. Where we are dealing with acts directed towards what is non-real, or
towards such ideal entities as similarity, difference, number, truth, set, and so
on, Husserl then points to a certain higher-level analogue of that perceptual
intuition by means of which our intentions towards realia are fulfilled. More
specifically, he provides an account of that process by means of which our
empty intentions in this sphere are turned into what he calls ‘categorial
intuitions’. Husserl, too, saw the fulfilment of all categorial acts, the movement from signitive intentions to categorial fulfilment, in terms of something like the reflexive turning inward to which Marty adverts. 62 We fulfil an act of mere reference to a set, for example, by going through an appropriate process of colligation, of bringing together in our minds the several members of the set. Hence fulfilled categorial intentions have a ‘similarity’ to their objects in the sense that their processes of fulfilment mimic the processes by which ideal or categorial objects are constructed.

In relation to the fulfilment of judgments, Husserl’s account implies a two-step process. On the one hand the individual terms within the judgment as signitive act must be individually fulfilled in corresponding intuitive acts. On the other hand the judgment as categorial act directed towards a state of affairs must be fulfilled on this categorial level by a process of construction or remaking of the state of affairs as it is in reality. This amounts to a mental fitting together of the relevant intuitively given objects in a pattern (‘Sachverhaltsform’) of the relevant sort. Where there is a possibility of moving to fulfilment both at the level of individual nominal expressions and at the level of the entire judgment, then we have in Husserl’s eyes what is otherwise called ‘truth’ or ‘correctness’. 63

8. The Martian Theory of Truth

As the early Brentano sees it, true judgments are divided into two groups. On the one hand are judgments which enjoy a direct relation to something real, judgments which are ‘such that the presentation which is at their basis has a real content’, and whose truth is thus ‘conditioned by the existence, the coming into being, or the passing away, of the reality to which the judgment pertains.’ (1889a, § 55) On the other hand are judgments whose underlying presentation does not have a real content. Here we have to distinguish between:

62. See Mulligan 1990a, and compare LU VI § 44, where Husserl criticizes the thesis of ‘reflexion’ as the origin of the categorial concept, defending instead a view according to which the purported turning inwards is in fact part of a special sort of outwardly directed act.

63. See 39 of his 6th Logical Investigation and my 1989.
(a) Judgments which, so far as their truth is concerned, are not at all dependent upon any reality. ‘This holds of all those judgments whose objects are in themselves simply necessary or impossible. Here belong for example the law of contradiction and with it all analytic judgments.’ \textit{(loc. cit.)}

(b) Judgments which are indirectly dependent upon a thing, i.e. judgments which, even though the relevant presentation has no real content, are nevertheless such that their truth is

consequence of the fact that a certain reality (or realities) and not others exist, have existed, or will exist. Consider an empty space, any kind of lack, deficiency, or privation, a capacity, a thought object, or the like; these exist, and come into being and pass away, in connection with and in dependence on real changes. \textit{(Loc. cit.)}

In the course of time, however, Brentano came to embrace an account of truth based on the purely subjective or epistemological notion of ‘evidence’. To say that a judgment is evident is to assert of that real event which is a judging that it has a certain real character – a character whose absence we express by saying that the judgment is ‘blind’. The character of evidence is something ultimate, to be clarified only by means of examples of evident judgments given in one’s own experience. The later Brentano in fact identifies evidence with truth,\textsuperscript{64} so that the truth of a judgment is conceived in such a way that it ceases to involve any relation to anything extra-mental at all. A judgment is true, very roughly, if and only if it agrees with an evident judgment, i.e. is itself capable of being judged with evidence. Evident judgments are then of two kinds: ‘axiomatic judgments’ (such as the judgment that \(1 + 1 = 2\)); and empirical judgments, all of which relate to objects given in inner perception (I am judging, I am willing, I am presented to in such and such a way, etc.). The class of empirical judgments so conceived is then all that remains of Brentano’s earlier conception of judgments made true, directly or indirectly, by some reality.\textsuperscript{65} Regarding true judgments about external objects, we are therefore left in the position where we are unable to say how it is that these objects play a role in determining that the given judgments are true – a consequence which can however be swallowed by

\textsuperscript{64} See above all his 1930, Part IV.

\textsuperscript{65} Husserl shared the same menu of privileged examples, and thus he, too, was led to propound a theory of truth in terms of purely immanent relations, e.g. in § 51 of the “Prolegomena” of LU. The more important § 39 of the 6th Investigation seems not, however, to support a view of this kind: see my 1989.
Brentano, for whom our customary talk about external objects is in any case at best a fiction.

For Marty, too, truth is a matter of bringing the experiences of the soul into correspondence with the things. Now one might be tempted to suppose that the correctness of a judgment could consist in an ideal adequation to things, to objects in the world, as in the case of Aquinas and some other medieval defenders of the correspondence theory. Like Bolzano and Meinong, however, Marty points to the already-mentioned case of correct judgments in which the existence of something is denied. Here there simply is no thing with which the judgment could be said to stand in a relation of the given sort. Bolzano, Meinong and Marty therefore put forward doctrines according to which the truth or correctness of a judgment consists in an ideal adequation of the relevant act to a certain non-real object, an entity whose existence is independent of consciousness.

It is more than anything else in his defence of a relational theory of truth along these lines that Marty can be said to have surpassed his master Brentano. As Marty himself points out in regard to the possible ‘agreement between judgments’ on which Brentano’s theory rests, this can itself be conceived only as a correlation of irrealia, i.e. as one further sort of assimilation in Marty’s sense. Further, when Brentano speaks of possible agreement with a corresponding evident judgment, ‘then the question arises: in what must one judgment agree with another, evident judgment in order to be marked thereby as correct? If one replies: in its content, then one is after all making just that distinction which leads to the recognition of judgment-contents’ (1916, p. 156). Moreover, Marty’s theory is to be preferred to the account defended by Brentano, because for Marty even judgments not capable of being made evident may be true (where there is the unfortunate suggestion in Brentano that such judgments can at best be probable).

A judgment is true, from Marty’s point of view, where there obtains an adaequatio cogitantis et cogitati in the sense of an actual correlation. For the case of a positive judgment affirming the existing of an object A, whether real or non-real, the structure in question may be represented as follows:

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66. Brentano responded to this move by denying that ‘adaequatio’ or ‘correspondence’ must designate a correlation in every single case. Indeed the idea of adaequatio seems to demand precisely that the object of the negative judgment does not exist, in reflection of the fact that the one who judges denies its existence. Cf. Brentano, 1930, p. 134, Eng. p. 118.
Here again, the single lines connecting broken to solid walls of adjacent frames signify relations of one-sided existential dependence (a judgment cannot exist unless there exists also an associated presentation, a positive state of affairs cannot exist unless there exists also the associated object). The double lines represent the relation of mutual dependence. The diagram could be extended to include also that assimilation which correlates the presentation of A with the object A itself, a correlation on which the correlation of judgment and state of affairs would then itself be dependent.

More complicated structures would be obtained in relation to predicative judgments. In order to produce a representation of negative judgments of existence it would be necessary to omit the frame here marked ‘object A’ and to represent the state of affairs non-existence of A as an independent entity, as if it were cast adrift in ontological space. For while Marty eschews a Meinongian realm of non-existent objects, he is none the less committed to a similarly munificent realm of negative states of affairs (non-existence of A, non-existence of a B which is C, etc.).

Truth is a species of correlation between real processes (judgings) and non-real states of affairs. When this correlation is realized, then we might say that truth itself is erlebt or ‘lived through’, as Husserl puts it. The instances of
the species *truth* exist only intermittently – reflecting the intermittent existence of the judging acts with which they are bound up. And the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such instances is the co-existence of a process of judging and a corresponding state of affairs. A world without judgings is also, for Marty, a world without truth.

A theory of truth and judgment in terms of assimilation to states of affairs is not without difficulties of its own. Problems arise for the theory above all in relation to false judgments, judgments about what is past, judgments of generality and judgments of necessity. With regard to false judgments there is no obtaining state of affairs with which such a judgment would be in conformity. A false judgment on Marty’s theory does not, however, correspond to a special ‘non-obtaining state of affairs’ of the sort that was admitted by Meinong. Only obtaining states of affairs are admitted by Marty into the domain of what exists. One can, however, admit a certain analogous extension of the concept of state of affairs or judgment-content, so that it can be said even of a false judgment that it ‘has a content’. This is, however, a ‘modified’ form of speech, which has its justification only with regard to the fact that the judgment in question enjoys the relative determination that it stands in harmony or conformity with a possible content.67 Such talk of ‘having a content’ boils down, however, to the somewhat trivial claim that if, besides the given psychic process of judging, there existed also that which we could call its content, then the correlation of adequation or correctness would of necessity obtain (i.e. that if the judgment in question were true, then it would be true).

Problems arise in regard to (true) judgments about what is past, since, on Marty’s conception, truth is a transitory relation presupposing the simultaneous existence of both judgment and judgment-content. And of course, when I judge that Napoleon won the Battle of Austerlitz, then my judgment is not simultaneous with the occurrence of the relevant event. Marty could get round this problem, however, by acknowledging that past (and future) objects exist *in the present* as irrealia. Hence here, too, as in the case of other true judgments about what is non-real, adequation is possible.

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67. Cf. 1908, p. 427. It is not clear how to extend an account of this sort in such a way as to cope with judgments that are necessarily false.
Problems arise in regard to judgments of generality, since all objects are for Marty (as for Brentano) individual – something that applies to non-real objects no less than to realia. Even a general state of affairs such as cats exist is a specific individual entity, which began to exist at a certain time and will cease to exist at some time in the future and is fully determinate in all respects. Moreover, even a general state of affairs such as the non-existence of round squares, which exists (obtains) at all times, is a specific individual entity. How, then, does Marty cope with the truth of general judgments, for example of the form: All As are Bs? It would take us too far from our main purpose to answer this question in full here. One can assume, however, that Marty here follows the official Brentanian theory of general judgments as judgments ruling out certain sorts of conceptual combination. The judgment ‘all As are Bs’, on this theory, is founded on the abstract synthetic presentation an A that is non-B and has the form:

An A that is non-B does not exist.

That which makes such a judgment true is then the negative judgment-content: the non-existence of an A that is non-B, exactly as in the case of the simple negative judgment.

In regard, finally, to the problem of necessary judgments, here Marty admits special judgment-contents of necessity, in addition to the four kinds of judgment-content – positive and negative objectives of being (A is, A is not) and positive and negative objectives of being-so (A is B, A is not B) – accepted, for example, by Meinong.68 Corresponding to positive and negative evident or apodictic judgments are, then, the positive and negative judgment-contents of necessary and impossible being (A is necessarily B, A is necessarily not B). To judge apodictically, Marty now argues, is to take something for necessary or impossible, and only judgment-contents of necessity are, he claims, completely adequate to judgments of this sort. Marty thereby wishes to resurrect the Leibnizian opposition between verités de fait and verités de raison: ‘there is, among that which is, that which is of such a kind that it is, taken in itself, merely factual, but also that which is such that it is to be acknowledged as a

68. See 1908, pp. 294ff. and compare Meinong 1902, p. 191, 2nd ed., § 9. In his later works Meinong accepted also hypothetical objectives: see the discussion of Mitseinsojekive in his 1918, pp. 44ff.
matter of necessity’. (Marty 1908, p. 297) Brentano, in contrast, had accepted a theory of evidence according to which the difference between apodictic and other judgments would lie exclusively on the side of the subject; indeed, there is a tendency in Brentano’s thinking to regard all truths as rational truths (so that all truths would in principle be capable of being judged with evidence).

9. On Value-Contents, Fictions and Linguistic Form

For Brentanists such as Marty and Meinong the experience of value, too, is an intentional phenomenon, and one test of the adequacy of an ontology of act and object is the extent to which it can deal with this and other more recondite varieties of intentional experience. Here we note first of all that the basis of the fundamental Brentanian division of psychic activities into the three classes of presentings, judgings and phenomena of interest is seen by Marty as lying in the relation of ideal conformity or adequacy discussed above. Just as ‘presenting is essentially an adequation to the differences in the what of an object’, so judging is a conformation ‘to its being or non-being, to its being-this or being-that, or to its necessity or impossibility’. But phenomena of interest, too, can be regarded as consisting in the ideal assimilation ‘to something which we could also analogously call a content, namely, where it is a matter of love and hate, of the value or disvalue of the object, or, where it is a matter of preference or avoidance, of its greater or lesser value.’ (Marty 1908, pp. 425f.)

The objectual correlate of a phenomenon of interest is accordingly a value-content or Wertverhalt – a new category of irreal object in the Martian ontology. Just as judgments strive, ideally, to stand in conformity with certain Sachverhalte, so we may say that phenomena of interest strive ideally to stand in conformity with certain Wertverhalte – the goodness or badness of this, the preferability of this over that, and so on. Value-contents, like judgment-contents, are not real. But they are nevertheless objective and independent of factually occurring processes of valuing or disvaluing. Value is in this sense an analogue to truth.

69. Compare Meinong’s doctrine of dignitatives and desideratives as objects of feeling and desire set forth in his 1917.

70. See Marty 1908, ’84, and cf. Brentano 1889, §§ 22f.
It is only because phenomena of interest involve a relation to something ‘objective and generally valid’, Marty argues, ‘that we can say that such phenomena are phenomena of consciousness at all, in a sense truly analogous to the consciousness of presentings and judgings’. For consciousness is an actual or possible ideal similarizing with something.\(^{71}\) And only thus, also, can we hold on to Brentano’s thesis according to which phenomena of interest may be objectively correct or incorrect (or a mixture of the two), irrespective of our beliefs about them, so that Marty is able to give a new account of the ethical objectivism that is defended in Brentano’s *On the Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong* in a way which does not rest on the subjective or epistemological notions of ‘evidence’ or ‘insight’ or ‘correctness’ to which Brentano appeals.

A final problem for the Martian theory of language concerns the phenomenon of fictionality. Here it will help to fix our ideas if we consider first the views of Meinong, who in the period from 1905 to 1910 became involved with Marty in a bitter polemic concerning the correct description of assumptions and their objects.\(^{72}\)

Meinong’s position may be summarized as follows. *Assumptions* are acts of a special, hitherto (according to Meinong) hardly recognized sort, which are in a certain sense intermediate between presentation and judgment. Assumptions share with judgments the properties of being directed towards states of affairs (of having states of affairs as their objectual correlates) and of manifesting the opposition between positivity and negativity. But they differ from judgments in that they lack the moment of conviction or belief: they lack what Frege called *assertive force*. It is assumptions, Meinong holds, which are primarily involved when we read a work of fiction, and he is in this way able to account for the quasi-judgmental character and apparent object-directedness of our fictional acts, and yet at the same time do justice to their peculiar lack of

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\(^{71}\) 1908, p. 427. It is this same understanding of intentionality that leads Husserl to his doctrine of objectifying acts as the basis for the theory of linguistic meaning (see e.g. LU VI, ch. 9), and it was the criticism of this doctrine on the part of Husserl’s disciples in Munich which led in turn to the development by them of the theory of speech acts. See Smith 1990, which also contains a discussion of Marty’s contribution to this development.

\(^{72}\) See Marty 1905, Meinong 1906, Marty 1908, pp. 274ff., and Meinong’s final word in § 64 of the 2nd edition of *Über Annahmen*. 
seriousness. He is able to account also, as we shall see in Chapter Five below, for the different sorts of real emotions (e.g. of aesthetic pleasure) and of phantasy-emotions (e.g. of make-believe sadness at the death of the heroine) which are involved in our experiences of works of art of different sorts.

Marty, however, can find no evidence for the existence of these peculiar ‘assumptions’, and he regards the Meinongian theory as contrived and artificial. Moreover, he is unwilling to depart from the tri-categorial psychology of presentings, judgings and phenomena of interest of his master Brentano unless or until it has been shown that an account of fictional and related forms of intentionality is impossible within this framework. He himself seeks to provide such an account by means of a piece of revisionary philosophy of language, somewhat as follows.

The three-fold division of psychic phenomena gives rise, Marty holds, to a corresponding division of uses of language, according to the sort of act which a speaker intends to insinuate into the hearer by using a given linguistic form. Uses of language are thereby capable of being divided into three classes of: (1) suggestives of presentings, (2) suggestives of judgings, and (3) suggestives of phenomena of interest. One fundamental presupposition of the Martian theory of language, which we might call the assumption of typicality, is that the different primary intentions are typically or standardly associated with different linguistic forms: presentings with nominal forms, judgings with sentential forms, phenomena of interest with forms such as are characteristic of commands, expressions of wishes, desires, etc. That is to say, it is not only psychic acts in general (and uses of language in particular) that can be classified into three broad categories in this way, but also corresponding linguistic forms. Uses of language in class (2) are also called statements, for it is clear, according to Marty, that in making a statement ‘the primary intention on the part of the speaker lies in this: to generate a judgment in the hearer analogous to that judgment which as a rule the statement expresses’ (1908, p. 362). Uses of language in class (3) Marty calls ‘emotives’. And again, the primary intention underlying an emotive consists in insinuating in the hearer a phenomenon of interest of a certain appropriate sort.

73. Marty’s resistance to the doctrine of assumptions follows in part also from the non-propositional account of judging which he had inherited from Brentano: see Mulligan 1988.
The author of a work of fiction is clearly not making statements; his aim is not to insinuate in his readers the judgments which would typically be associated with the sentences appearing on the pages of his work. Nor can we understand the author’s intentions as being directed primarily towards the suggestion of feelings, emotions or acts of will in the reader: for if, for example, the reading of a work of fiction gives rise to a feeling of aesthetic pleasure, then this is as a consequence of the fact that the reading has taken place and the text has been understood. Hence the pleasure is founded on the acts involved in the reading, and cannot itself be used to give an account of the intentionality of these very acts.

But now, Marty argues, nothing stands in the way of our concluding that the uses of language in a work of fiction belong to class (1), that the author of such a work is intending to bring about in the reader a special sort of presentation. Marty holds, in fact, that the apparent statements in a fictional work mean not that something is to be judged, but rather that certain judgment-contents are to be presented. It follows, therefore, that names are not the only ‘suggestives of presentation’, even though they are the standard or typical members of this class. Poetic narrations, too, are suggestives of this sort, as also are all the apparent exclamations, questions, expressions of wishes, commands, etc., introduced by the poet into his works. In each case, as Marty sees it, their principal intention is merely that of awakening in the hearer the presentations of contents of the relevant sorts. This explains also the peculiarly disinterested attitude with which we approach the contents of poetic works, the peculiarly abstract nature of the acts involved. For when reading a work of fiction we are dealing not with (putative) realia, with objects and events in the world of what happens and is the case (heroes and heroines, battles and deaths). Rather, we are dealing with (putative) irreal judgment-contents of a quite peculiar sort. We are, as it were, surveying a gradually expanding network of (putative) judgment-contents, without finding it necessary or possible to penetrate in our thoughts to the point where we might invest these judgment-contents with an attitude of sincere belief. Aesthetic pleasure then derives from the specific qualities of this network as it gradually unfolds itself before us.

74. See 1908, pp. 474f.
Meinong, for his part, could not have accepted a view of this kind, since he held that only objects in the proper sense (*Objekte*) can be presented, a view which bears comparison with Wittgenstein’s doctrine in the *Tractatus* according to which only objects can be named. In this light, however, it is a clear advantage of Marty’s account that it enables a much simpler conception of the meanings of certain sorts of complex sentences than is available on the basis of the Meinongian doctrine:

The difference between the sense of the sentence ‘A is’ ... and of the sentence ‘that A is, is true’ ... can be grasped in a simple and perspicuous manner when one sees that in the one case the presentation underlying the judgment is of ‘A’, in the other case it is of the judgment-content ‘being of A’ or ‘that A is’. (Marty 1908, p. 484)\(^75\)

If, however, fictional sentences are ‘suggestives of presentations’, and if the resulting presentations have judgment-contents as their objects, then it is important to stress that, precisely because we are dealing here with fictional sentences, there are in fact no judgment-contents which these presentations would be the presentations of. There are no objects of fiction, and there are no judgment-contents of fiction either. Once again we have to do here merely with an analogue of similarizing, with a ‘relative determination’ in Brentano’s sense. As we saw, if that which is relative is to exist, then that which is presented *in modo recto* must exist, though that which is presented *in modo obliquo* need not do so. Thus it is possible for us to think – though at most *modo obliquo* – about what does not exist, by thinking about something in relation thereto. I can present to myself Hamlet-involving states of affairs, or so the Brentanian might hold, by thinking about myself as a presenter of such states of affairs, or by thinking about the relevant text as triggering presentations of the given sort.

One consequence of this sort of view, as of related adverbial views of the intentionality of fictional acts, is that it becomes impossible to identify the objects of such acts, either from subject to subject or from act to act. That integrity or interconnectedness of our acts of reading a work of fiction which seems to be contributed by the objects represented in the work,\(^76\) comes to be reduced, like these objects themselves, to a mere illusion. Marty is not only

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75. Cf. Husserl’s 5th Logical Investigation, § 33.

76. Ingarden 1931, § 24.
prepared to accept a consequence of this sort. He also provides a theoretical framework within which the given illusion – an illusion provoked by certain pseudo-objectualizing properties of language – can be investigated. It is here that Marty’s central notion of *inner linguistic form* comes into play, a notion by means of which he tries to come to terms with that aspect of our understanding of language in virtue of which all such understanding gravitates towards one or other of a small number of typical forms or structures derived from our experience of what is real:

All names have as their inner linguistic form either the presentation of a substance or the presentation of an accident, i.e. of something real. We always designate the non-real (including the fully fictional) either through a substantive (‘the lack’, ‘the possibility’, ‘the impossibility’, etc.) – when the presentation of a thing is what is given figuratively as inner linguistic form – or through an adjective which is attached as predicate or attribute to a real or apparent subject, when it is the presentation of inherence which is at work, just as it lies before us in truth with real accidents in relation to their substances. (1908, pp. 354f.)

The theory of inner linguistic form can now be used to explain how, in an ontologically simple world, our experiences can manifest such a wide diversity of modes of intentional reference. For it can happen that language, through the power of the inner forms which its use instils within us, may seem to yield up for us one thing, when in fact it is some other thing that is to be acknowledged.77 This conniving power of language, according to which all the objects to which real or apparent reference is made seem to approximate to the condition of reality, is indispensable if the understanding of a work of fiction is to be possible. But it is something against which the ontologist must do constant battle, if he is not to be misled by the forms dictated by the expressions with which he deals.

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77. 1908, pp. 355f. This is the basis of Brentano’s notion of *Sprachkritik*: see e.g. his 1933, part 3, 1.A.