Structure and Gestalt
Philosophy and literature in Austria-Hungary and her successor states

EDITED BY Barry Smith

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STRUCTURE AND GESTALT
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Volume 7
edited by
Barry Smith

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PREFACE

The majority of the papers in the present volume were presented at, or prepared in conjunction with, meetings of the Seminar for Austro-German Philosophy, a group of philosophers interested in the work of Brentano and Husserl and of the various thinkers who fell under their influence. One long-standing concern of the Seminar has been to trace the origins of present-day structuralism and related movements in the thought of nineteenth-century central Europe. This task has been admirably performed by Elmar Holenstein for the specific connections between Husserl and Jakobson and the Moscow and Prague Linguistic Circles (see the bibliography to Holenstein's paper below). But the (broadly) structuralist currents exhibited in, for example, the work of Meinong's Grazer Schule and, before that, in the writings of Herbart, Bolzano and Zimmermann, in the early psychological writings of Ehrenfels, or in the works of Austrian economists and political theorists, art historians and novelists, have remained almost wholly unexplored. The papers in this volume touch more or less obliquely on this theme.

The preparation of the volume was made possible by the grant of a research fellowship by the University of Sheffield, for which I should like to express my thanks. I am
especially grateful to Professor Peter Nidditch and to the staff of the Department of Philosophy in Sheffield for their toleration and encouragement, and to Peter Simons and Kevin Mulligan, without whose help the work could not have been brought to fruition.

Colloquia organised by the Seminar for Austro-German Philosophy in the sessions 1977-78 and 1978-79.

March 1977. Senses, Propositions and States of Affairs. (Held in Sheffield.)
Prof. P. Geach (Leeds), "Facts, Thoughts and Propositions".
B.F. McGuinness (Oxford), "Wittgenstein, Moore and the Tractatus".
T. Baldwin (York), "Causality, Identity and Events".
P.J. Fitzpatrick (Durham), "States and Opacity".

December 1977. Ontology and the Philosophy of Number. (Held in Sheffield.)
Prof. P.H. Nidditch (Sheffield), "Empiricism, Ontology and Number".
T. Karmo (Oxford), "Disturbances".
P.M. Simons (Bolton), "Countability".
K. Mulligan (Hamburg), "Sortalism and Numbers: Burkamp vs. Frege".

January 1978. Wittgenstein and the Background of Austro-German Philosophy. (Held in Balliol College, Oxford.)
D.A. Bell (Sheffield), "Frege, Wittgenstein and the Problem of Propositional Unity".
B.F. McGuinness (Oxford), "Wittgenstein and Moore".
B. Smith (Sheffield), "Palaeontological Reflections on the Tractatus".
K. Mulligan (Hamburg), "Formal Concepts and Formal Operations in Husserl and Wittgenstein".

February 1978. Phenomenology and Logic. (Held in Sheffield.)
Prof. P. Winch (London), "In the Beginning was the Deed".
W. Kühne (Hamburg), "Criteria for Abstract Entities: The Ontologies of Frege and Husserl against the background of Classical Metaphysics".
Mrs. M. Lewis (Sheffield), "Hintikka's Aesthetics".

March 1978. Philosophy, Literature and the Arts in Austria-Hungary. (Held in London at the Institute of Contemporary Arts.)
W. Domingo (Oxford), "The Architecture of Otto Wagner".
G. Muckenhausen (Aachen), "Robert Musil's Aesthetics".
B. Smith (Sheffield), "Brentano, Ehrenfels and Kafka".
E. Swiderski (Fribourg), "Contemporary Marxist-Leninist Aesthetics".
Prof. R. Wollheim (London), "Recollection, Repetition and Working Through in Freud".

(Held in Balliol College, Oxford.)
W. Domingo (Oxford), "Prolegomena to any Future Anti-Realism".
C. Peacocke (Oxford), "Causal Modalities and Realism".
P.M. Simons (Bolton), "The Phenomenological Syntax of Language".

(Held in Sheffield.)
Prof. C. Lejewski (Manchester), "Łeśniewski's Mereology and Russell's Paradox".
P.M. Simons (Bolton), "The Formalisation of Husserl's Theory of Wholes and Parts".
W. Degen (Erlangen), "Rational Grammar and Ontology".
Prof. F.G. Asenjo (Pittsburg), "Mathematical Treatments of the Part-Whole Relation".

(Held in Oxford.)
Prof. W.H. Walsh (Edinburgh), "Ways of Taking Kant".
Prof. G. Null (Wisconsin), "On the Problem of Ideation: Aspects of the Theories of Manifolds, Groups, Synthesis and Material Analyticity".
R. Lüthe (Aachen), "Kant, Husserl, and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy".

(Held in Sheffield.)
H. Philipse (Leiden), "Wholes, Parts and the Immortality of the Soul".
D.R. Steele (Hull), "On the Marxian Theory of Value".
F. Dunlop (Cambridge), "The Objectivity of Values in the Writings of the Munich Phenomenologists".

January 1979. The Origins of the Twentieth Century (on the Culture of fin-de-siècle Vienna).
(Held in Manchester.)
P.D. Knabenshue (London), "The Art of Vienna".
Prof. N. Gier (Idaho), "Wittgenstein and the Lebensphilosophen".
P.M. Simons (Bolton), "Reflections on Music and Philosophy in Austria-Hungary".
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(Held in the London School of Economics.)  
J. Shearmur (L.S.E.), K. Mulligan (Hamburg), B. Smith (Sheffield):  
Symposium on the concepts of social rule employed by philosophers,  
psychologists and social scientists, with special reference to the  
work of Ehrenfels, Wittgenstein, and Hayek.

(Held in Sheffield.)  
Prof. P. Pettit (Bradford), "Methodological Individualism (Part I)."  
H. Steiner (Manchester), "Menger and Nozick on the Origin of Money".  
G. Sampson (Lancaster), "On linguistic methodology and the concept  
of hierarchy".  
J. Shearmur (L.S.E.), "On Austrian Methodology".

(Held in the Institute of Contemporary Arts, London.)  
A. Janik (Wellesley), "Wittgenstein, Weininger and Therapeutic Nihilism".  
B. Smith (Sheffield), "The Law and the Prophets: The Idea of an Inner  
Tribunal in German Literature from Kleist to Kafka".  
K. Mulligan (Hamburg), "Against Representation: Kleist, Weininger,  
Wittgenstein, Kafka".  
M.-A. Lescourret (Paris), "Wittgenstein and Music".  
W. Degen (Erlangen), "The Psychology of Nietzsche".  
F. Field (Keele), "Karl Kraus and the Last Days of Mankind".  
C. Oliver (Sheffield), "Schnitzler and Freud".  
R. Kavanagh (Sheffield), "The Optimum Velocity of Approach: Some  
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(Held in Manchester.)  
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Prof. C. Thiel (Aachen), "From Leibniz to Frege".  
R. White (Leeds), "Function and Argument vs. Subject and Predicate".  
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P. M. Simons (Bolton), "Unsaturatedness".  
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§1. Introduction

The scientific works of the Prague linguistic circle on linguistics and literature are usually found under the heading 'structuralism'. The rival term 'functionalism' is frequently used, but more in the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union than in Western Europe. For American linguistics it is the functional approach which is the truly distinctive feature of Prague linguistics, that which sets it apart both from post-)Bloomfield structuralism, which limited itself to the formal classification of linguistic utterances, and from the transformational grammar of the Chomskyans, which dismisses the functional perspective as inessential for the expla-
ation of language and of linguistic competence. In early accounts of their own position members of the Prague school habitually used simultaneously both the expression 'functional' and the expression 'structural' to characterise their works.

In fact, functional analysis was the point of departure for the two main concerns of Prague linguistics, phonology and poetics. What distinguishes a linguistic sound, a phoneme, from a mere noise is the function it has of discriminating between meanings. What marks the difference between a poetic text and an ordinary linguistic text is the fact that the communicative function — through which language comes into being and which shows itself in the concentration on what is said — is overlaid by the aesthetic function — which shows itself in a turn of attention (or set) towards the structure of the means of communication, i.e. of the linguistic utterance as such.

Functional analysis led directly to structural analysis. Once function had been discerned the question arose what effect the function of discriminating between meanings has in the sound-system of a language and how the aesthetic function, the focus on the linguistic medium as such, is brought about. In phonology questions like these led to the discovery of a hierarchically ordered system of binary distinctive features. A system of binary oppositions can be conceived as the most rational procedure for decoding information. In poetics the attempt to determine the underlying structural base of the aesthetic function issued in the thesis that the principle of equivalence, which in normal speech is constitutive of the paradigmatic axis of selection (for the selection of a linguistic unity as a member of a linguistic chain from an arsenal of unities which are
meaningful in a similar way), also determines the axis of combination in a poetic text (Jakobson, 1960). Poetic texts are marked by a complex and varied network of relations of similarity and contrast between their components which gives them the character of a dense unity (Dichtung).

Within the theory of science the teleological approach has been conceded a heuristic value ever since Kant. It serves as a guiding thread for research which aims to set out in a systematic way the mechanisms which are the basis of a process oriented about some goal. One thinks of the way Harvey systematically set out the mechanism of the circulation of the blood in discovering the functions of the heart. In the linguistics of the last sixty years the heuristic fruitfulness of the teleological approach has shown itself in the way teleological explanation has complemented not so much causal analysis but rather structural analysis. When teleology and functional analysis is discussed in contemporary literature in the philosophy of science any reference to the extremely successful linguistic research in this direction is missing. Examples are limited to material taken from anthropology, psychology, sociology and biology, although only in the case of biology are recent examples dealt with, while in the other sciences the old examples, to be found already in the classic works by Hempel and Nagel of the '50s, continue to be traded back and forth. The absence of linguistics is all the more regrettable in view of the fact that, quite apart from the combination of teleological and structural analysis, this discipline has brought to light a second original feature, the phenomenon of plurifunctionality.

Literature in the philosophy of science proceeds as though an object or a process could have only one function.
Even in the case of the single venture in the direction of a plurifunctional perspective in the anthropological distinction between manifest and latent function, the former is characteristically dismissed from the start as a pseudo-function. On this point analytic philosophy of science concurs with the functionalism of the '20s in the areas of art and architecture, which indulged in a pronouncedly extreme and, as can be shown, literally infantile monofunctionalism. The phenomenon of functional equivalence (one end, many means) has indeed been dealt with at length in the theory of science. A sentence can be emphasised not only by being written in capitals, but also by means of italics, by letter-spacing, or by underlining. The four techniques are functionally equivalent. The other alternative (one means, many ends) remains however unnoticed and unevaluated. Yet the (potential) plurifunctionality of an object is a factor which should not be underestimated if we want to talk about its survival, its future existence, something which is as important for a pragmatically oriented philosophy of science as is the explanation of its present existence. An explicit thematisation of the phenomenon of plurifunctionality is a contribution of the Cercle Linguistique de Prague to the general philosophy of science which has still scarcely been acknowledged. It thereby anticipated by forty years in linguistics and, what should attract just as much attention, in the science of folklore, a movement which has only gained prominence in recent years in architecture. After functionalism had stripped away so many functions people are today trying to give back to buildings, streets and whole cities ('multi-purpose user-facilities') something of their lost wealth of functions.

Before turning to some problems posed by plurifunctionality it would seem to be a good idea to provide the begin-
ning of an explanation of the word-field 'function'.

Especially in German-language literature, talk of an 'aesthetic' or 'poetic' function of language may be bound up with scientific and technological connotations, from which one would like to see both they and one's self dissociated.

Talk about a goal is much less likely than talk about function to lead to the suspicion that linguistic phenomena are being distorted: yet function and goal are two correlative concepts. Goals are normally ascribed to independent entities, functions to non-independent entities. What counts as independent and non-independent is to a certain extent a matter of one's perspective. If one considers a speaker as independent, one asks about the goal he has in mind when speaking. If on the other hand he is considered as non-independent, as in the case of the spokesman for a corporate body such as a government, one asks about his function.

Assigning the concept of function to a non-independent part of a more inclusive whole has also established itself in the metonymic use of the expression 'part' for function.

Cultural entities, such as language, and actions, such as speaking, are per se non-independent. With reference to languages and speech acts one therefore asks not about their goal, except in the case where these are made independent through personification, but about their function. One only speaks about the function of an object or process when these are either used by a subject in the service of a goal, or when they are integrated in a system which is goal-directed in the cybernetic sense. Functional analysis (of a non-independent part) and a final or teleological analysis (of the independent whole whose part it is) therefore presuppose each other. It is this intrinsic connection of functional analysis with the relation between a part and its wholes which yields the common denominator of functionalism and structuralism. In coining the slogan
'structuralism' in 1929 Jakobson had put forward the exposition of the inherent lawful relations of an arbitrary group of phenomena, which were to be dealt with not as though they were a mechanical heap, but as a structural whole, as the specific interest of a science which could properly call itself structuralist.

While the concept of a goal is only used when something is a means for a subject, 'function' can be used both for something which refers to a subject and for something which is integrated in a system. If not (only) the goal-oriented entity, but (also) the means is a subject, it is best to speak about its role. Talk about its function is also usual, while talk about its goal is used only in special cases where objectualisation is involved.

§2. From Bühler's three-function schema to Jakobson's six

A characteristic tray of Prague structuralism in general and of Roman Jakobson's theory in particular is the fact that poetics is treated as a component of linguistics which cannot be anything other than integral. One can go still further and put forward the view that the most important principles of structural linguistics have their starting point in the study of poetical language and are marked by this (Holenstein, 1975). This holds not least of functional analysis. This was neither an abstractly formulated functional principle nor a schema of functions which was first of all discovered and tested in ordinary language and then subsequently extended to deal with poetic texts. It was, rather, precisely the other way round: the search for the essence of poetical language, poeticity, that which makes a linguistic utterance poetic, had led to the distinction
between different linguistic functions and to the discovery of changing hierarchies of functions.

The earliest moves in this direction come from the period of Russian formalism. Already in 1916, L.P. Jakubinsky, like Jakobson a founder member of the Petersburg "Society for the Investigation of Poetic Language" (Opoyaz), had described the difference between ordinary and poetical language in a teleological perspective:

Linguistic phenomena should be classified by taking account in each particular case of the intention of the speaking subject. If they are employed for the purely practical aim of communication then what is involved is the system of everyday language (of verbal thought) in which the linguistic components (sounds, morphological elements, etc.) have no autonomous value and are only a means of communication. But one can imagine other linguistic systems (and they do in fact exist) in which the practical aim takes second place (although without disappearing completely) and where the linguistic components then take on a value of their own (Eikhenbaum, 1927, p.39).

Three years later in his famous lecture on "modern Russian poetry" to the Moscow Circle of Linguistics Jakobson distinguished poetical language additionally from emotional language in the process of arguing against a psychologistic interpretation of poetry. Whereas practical everyday language and emotional language are defined by their communicative function, poetry is determined as 'language in its aesthetic function'. Poetry is 'simply an utterance with a set (Einstellung) towards expression' (1921, p.31). Here words have, in Chlebnikov's formulation 'a power and value of their own' whereas they remain indifferent to any relation to the object of discourse (the reference) towards which one is normally turned (eingestellt) in practical uses of language. Poetic language has this in common with emotional language, that there is in both a close connection between the phonic moment and the meaning.
In the programmatic "Theses of the Linguistic Circle of Prague" on the occasion of the first Slavists' conference in 1928 these approaches were taken over from Russian formalism. The section on the functions of language which, in accordance with the interests of the Prague audience, culminated in a paragraph about 'the poetic function', stresses throughout the variety of different functions. These were indeed listed, and again - as was typical for the Prague group - in binary oppositions: inner and manifest, intellectual and emotional (including the speaker-centred expressive and the hearer-oriented appellative function), practical and theoretical, as well as language with a communicative and language with a poetical function. The prominent position of inner language, which has such an interior position in analytic philosophy of language, may likewise be due to Russian influence. At the IXth International Congress of Psychologists the two Russian psychologists of language, Vygotskij and Luria had put forward the specific function of internal speech, and this, together with its specific structure, were dealt with by Vygotskij in 1935 in his book Thought and Language which has since become a classic of the psychology of language: its specific function consists in the solving of problems and in the organisation of the pursuant actions. It is important for the next stages that the "theses" (1929, pp.14, 21) assigned the two central functions, the practical communicative and the poetic function to the constitutive components of the speech event. This is completely in line with Jakobson's Moscow lecture mentioned above. In the communicative function the intention of the speaker is directed towards what is designated (le signifié), in the poetic function towards the sign itself (le signe lui-même), the linguistic expression as such.
In the early '30s Karl Bühler, building on an earlier sketch (1918), published his famous scheme (1934, pp.24ff.) of linguistic functions (Fig.1):

![Diagram of linguistic functions](image)

It was natural for the Prague Circle to take up this so-called Organon model. There was first of all a historical reason for this: Bühler was well-known to them through lectures he gave to their circle and through his Viennese colleague Trubetskoy. And also two substantive reasons: on the one hand there was a gap in Bühler's approach, with its claim to being systematic, namely the poetic function - which for the Prague Circle was a cornerstone of linguistic functional analysis. Bühler connected poetic language with the function of expression, as was then quite common, and in any case not unexpected in the case of a psychologist. On the other hand the approaches of the Prague group and of Bühler had in common the attempt to assign functions to the constitutive components of the speech event, and to anchor the former in the latter. Bühler limited himself to three
extra-linguistic bases (Fundamenta) of the speech situation, the speaker, the hearer and the object of discourse. The linguistic components proper on the other hand he did not take into account, although his famous schema should have brought him to realise the importance of these. He does not make any use in his functional analysis of the central factor in his schema, the sign %, although at the same time it is noticed and discussed by him in a differentiated way. Rendering the linguistic sign by means of a triangle overlaid by a circle and the incongruence of the two figures is intended to indicate the apperceptive complementation which the sensible sound-material acquires in linguistic use. The model and the accompanying text directly invite one to pick out the code as an independent component - the code of the linguistic system, which is decisive for the apperceptive Gestalt of the sound-material; the apperceptive Gestalt being represented by the triangle, the sound-material by the circle. The physical channel which connects speaker and hearer is clearly distinguished from the merely intentional or symbolic reference to the objects of discourse by the continuous lines. In other words it was to be expected that it would only be a question of time before there arose an immanent linguistic complement of Bühler's model (and not merely an external ad hoc accumulation as is the fate of most scientific models). The poetic function of language corresponds to the sign as a whole, the meta-linguistic function to the code, and the phatic function to the channel.

Bühler's Organon model was filled out in two stages. The first step consisted in bringing together the two approaches, the Bühlerian trichotomy and the Russian formalist/Prague structuralist dichotomy between the practical and the poetic function. It was first set out explicitly and in
a fourth function, unmentioned in Bühler's scheme, emerges. This function stands in opposition to all the others. It renders the structure of the linguistic sign the center of attention, whereas the first three functions are oriented toward extralinguistic instances and goals exceeding the linguistic sign. By means of the first three functions the use of language achieves practical significance. The fourth function, however, severs language from an immediate connection with practice. It is called the aesthetic function, and all the others in relation to it can be called collectively the practical functions. The orientation of the aesthetic function toward the sign itself is the direct result of the autonomy peculiar to aesthetic phenomena (Eng. trans., p. 68).

The metalinguistic function was added in 1952 as a fifth function. (See Jakobson, 1953, pp. 556ff.) It was the heyday of communication theory and of the logical analysis of language. Communication theory led to a strengthened and more precise attitude towards the linguistic code as an independent factor of the speech event and the replacement of the ambiguous Saussurian opposition of langue-parole through the more concise opposition code-message. The systematic distinction between object- and meta-language was urged from the side of logic (Tarski, 1944) as a means of avoiding the antinomies (of the liar, of heterological terms, etc.) and in order to make possible a definition of truth. In the case of Jakobson (cf. his 1962) a different priority stands in the foreground: the indispensability of metalinguistic utterances for the acquisition and understanding of language. New and strange linguistic unities are acquired and made understandable through differentiation from and paraphrased by means of units which are already familiar.
Finally in 1956 came the integration of what was now a six-member schema of functions of the phatic function, which had first been described by the functionalist Malinowski. Certain linguistic utterances have as their function only to bring about, confirm or extend contact with someone without conveying information with any content. (Jakobson, 1960, pp.355f.) The text of the 1956 Presidential Address to the Linguistic Society of America (first published in 1976) combined into a single diagram (Fig.2) the six components of the speech event and the functions assigned to these (which four years later in "Linguistics and Poetics" were to be displayed in two figures: 1960, pp.353,357):

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{CONTEXT} \\
\text{(referential)} \\
\text{MESSAGE} \\
\text{(poetic)} \\
\text{ADDRESSER} \quad \text{ADDRESSEE} \\
\text{(emotive)} \quad \text{(conative)} \\
\text{CONTACT} \\
\text{(phatic)} \\
\text{CODE} \\
\text{(metalingual)}
\end{array}
\]

Fig.2
§3. From formalism to structuralism - from the separation of the work of art to the autonomy of the aesthetic function

In the early phases of Russian futurism and formalism there was proclaimed and indeed there began the creation of a poésie pure and, as an extreme form, a poésie concrète. The poetic text was celebrated as a pure sound-formation which, when it pointed to anything outside itself at all, pointed not to objects which it designated clearly and about which it made propositions with a truth-value, but rather pointed - synaesthetically - to neighbouring sensations such as odours and colours. It was in this way that Ossip Brik analyses parallelism - an eminently grammatical procedure - as a mere repetition of sounds (Pomorska, 1968, pp.28ff). Those formalists who were acquainted with the philosophy of language were nevertheless soon making use of the Frege-Husserl distinction between the reference and the meaning of linguistic signs, particularly in order to specify the nature of poetic language. As a particularity of poetic language an inner connection between sound and meaning was described, one indifferent to the object and to the truth-value of the proposition (and to its emotional potential). Jakobson's pronouncement at that period has often been quoted (1921, p.41):

Let others superimpose upon the poet the thoughts expressed in his works! To incriminate the poet with ideas and emotions is as absurd as the behavior of the medieval audiences that beat the actor who played Judas and just as foolish as to blame Pushkin for the death of Lensky.

Later the thesis to the effect that the objectual reference retreats into the background, that there is in the extreme case a complete lack of objects for (also fictionality of) poetic propositions was corrected. It is not the lack of an extra linguistic reference which is characteristic of
poetical texts, but the way in which meaning and/or reference is made ambiguous (Jakobson, 1960, p.370). The move towards greater differentiation went hand in hand with the discovery of phonology, particularly with the discovery that the expressive material is inseparable in its Gestalt from its sign-function. Sound associations were experimented with, not only the associations with other sounds and with colours and odours and with varieties of sense-data but also with meanings. Sounds turned out to be phonemes, 'i.e. accoustic presentations suited to associate themselves with meaning-presentations' (Jakobson, 1960, p.94). Certain sounds become associated at all only because they have meaning in common. The association owes its poetic attraction to the (semantic) unity in or underlying the (sensual) contrast between the two sound-formations: 'He is naked and bare'. Other sounds have a poetical effect, because they are ambiguous: 'The kosa ("braid" or "scythe") sometimes adorns the head, hanging down to the shoulders; sometimes cuts the grass.' In short: 'the contents are part of the structure of the poem.'

Language has a multi-dimensional structure and is plurifunctional. The poeticity of the text consists not in the exclusion of one of the relations which are constitutive of language, but only in a re-orientation of these relations. Having defined language with a communicative function in their "theses" (Thèses..., 1929, p.14) as 'dirigé vers le signifié' the Prague linguists, with their keenness for binary oppositions, described language with a poetic function with good reason not as 'dirigé vers le signifiant' but as 'dirigé vers le signe lui-même'. Signs have, on the Saussurian view, two sides. They consist of a signans and a signatum. Both components surface in poetry.
Nor, however, does the poeticity of a text consist in the exclusion of all practical function in favour of an isolated poetic function, but only in the presence and - in the optimal case - in the dominance of the poetic function. In opposition to tendencies in early formalism Prague structuralism did not concentrate on isolating poetic language, the pure poetical text, but on the isolation of the poetic function. 'What we emphasise is not the separatism of art, but the autonomy of the aesthetic function' (Jakobson, 1934, p.412). There is no opposition to the view that a poetic text can also have functions other than the purely aesthetic: it can be propagandistic, therapeutic, documentary, informative, for example. What is opposed is simply, on the one hand the reduction of the poetic function to other functions of language, the psychologistic reduction to its emotive function, the spiritualistic reduction to the idea of disclosure of some sublime theme, the revelation of otherwise inaccessible truths; and on the other hand the reduction of procedures which owe their development primarily to the poetic function, to procedures with a merely utilitarian function such as the reduction of parallelism, an almost paradigmatic procedure, to humdrum mnemotechnical procedure (Jakobson, 1966, p.423). 'The poeticity ... is an element sui generis, an element that cannot be reduced mechanically to other elements' (1934, p.412). With the conception of an autonomous yet isolated poetical function Prague linguistics, - for which is characteristic the dialectical unification of the opposites which Saussure and Russian formalism had split apart: synchrony-diachrony, form-content, langue-parole, etc. - has gone beyond the false antagonism of those who would play poésie pure and poésie impure (engaged literature) off against each other. Simultaneously they have provided their most original contribution to functional analysis, the themati-
sation of pluri- or multi-functionality and of variable hierarchies of functions. This was decades ahead of discussions in the theories of science and of art (in particular of architecture).

§4. *Multi- versus monofunctionalism*

What makes the works of the Prague Circle so extraordinarily fruitful is their concrete approach. Their programmatic theses were immediately followed by analyses of prototypical examples. After their insight into the necessity to semiotics and aesthetics of perspectives which take into account the theory of action, they began with a sure instinct the analysis of those works of art in which action appears most directly, that is to say drama and in particular that sort of drama in which the 'recipients' are most actively involved, people's theatre. They developed an insight of theirs of great importance for functional analysis - that a thing is rarely given with only one function, but more normally with a whole bundle of functions - for the case of two illustrative multi-functional phenomena: dress and architecture, of which they gave detailed descriptions. As soon as multi-functionality as such comes into the centre of attention the question arises of the relation between the functions. Is it a matter of affinity, of implication, of subordination, of incompatibility, of aversion? And what is the sort of possible change of function? This change does not consist in one function giving way to another which has nothing in common with the first, as is still assumed in a somewhat unreflective way in the actual German work on aesthetic reception (i.e. the Rezeptionsästhetik). A more likely form is a change in the ranking (dominance) of functions and in the varying degrees of manifestation or
latency of the individual functions (Jakobson, 1935b).

A first function of objects of use consists in the fact that - given their relation to a cognitive subject - they do not merely exercise their practical function but also - semiotically - express it. In the technical terminology: 'The object not only performs, it also signifies its function' (Mukařovský, 1937, p.236). A 'natural device' in architecture is the way in which building-elements, rooms, etc., are given a form which indicates their specific function. Aesthetic architecture is distinguished from merely utilitarian architecture through the way the practical function of furniture and rooms is secondary, and serves primarily to give a semiotic form to space by directing the attention and the movements of the visitor. Of course the practical and the semiotic function may also part company. There are entire stylistic movements which set their heart on concealing practical functions behind architectonic constructions. Such a split is artistically attractive only when it is experienceable as something intentional or when the distracting form stands in some other connection with the building, such as for example the case where, with its monumentality, it signals its importance or signals aesthetically its outstanding qualities. Only in bad architecture do function and form stand in a relation to one another which says nothing, neither in a positive nor in a contrastive way, nor so as to present consciousness with additional aspects through amplification.

Certain functions are regularly supported by specific other functions. Thus the magical function of verbal as well as non-verbal rites is bound up in a striking way with the aesthetic function. Aesthetic effects are frequently the same as those intended by magic. Aesthetic works are
able to enchant. Their characteristic attractiveness pre-
destines them regularly to accompany the erotic function,
which is likewise out to capture the senses. According to
Bogatyrev (1937, p.75) the aesthetic function of clothes
frequently has the subsidiary function of concealing the
erotic function, precisely because of this affinity of
effect. Today, where the erotic function no longer has to
be hidden but at most justified, it is possible that the
aesthetic function is merely an alibi. Bogatyrev's analy-
sis of national costumes shows that there are indeed com-
binations of latent and manifest functions in which the
manifest function is by no means a pseudo-function, as is
supposed to be the case in the examples of the Hopis'
rain dance which is so popular in analytic philosophy of
science. Here the manifest magical function is dismissed
as a pseudo-function and the true function which is all
that needs to be taken seriously by science - the strength-
ening of the group identity of the Indian tribe - is said
to be latent. This function is claimed to be something the
Indians are not aware of, but is noticed only by anthro-
pologists (Stegmüller, 1969, p.564).

Apart from explanation, analytic functional analysis
aims at the prediction of the existence of an object on the
basis of a function which the object possesses in some sys-
tem. It ignores the fact that frequently secondary func-
tions guarantee the survival of an institution which has
since lost the primary function to which it perhaps owes
its origin. Magical rites, particularly, survive a ration-
alising period of enlightenment in virtue of a strong
secondary aesthetic function, often too in virtue of a
religious, regionalist-nationalist or even merely commercial
transformation, which is often very easy to bring about.
An example which is closer to home than the rain dances of
the Hopi Indians is our own Christmas tree. Here a cycle of functions can be observed which is also to be found in poetry. 'When, that is, products of literary poetry, themselves based on folk poetry, in turn penetrate back through to the people' (Bogatyrev, 1932/33, p.257). The Christmas tree owes its wide popularity in Eastern Europe to an aesthetic and/or status function, which caused it to be introduced by the mobile intellectual upper classes into the villages in which, then, its original magical function again gained the upper hand.

It is however by no means always the case that when a primary function disappears, secondary functions continue to ensure the existence of a phenomenon:

It happens that the loss of one function also involves the loss of other functions. Thus when national costumes disappear old clothes simultaneously lose their aesthetic value and are felt by the peasants to be less comfortable, less practical, etc. (Bogatyrev, 1930, p.335).

Certain functions can dominate so strongly that they are able to conceal functional injury or breakdown in secondary respects. The dysfunctionality, the imperfections in the latter come to be realised only when the dominating function falls away. The aesthetic function in particular seems to be such that it induces secondary justifications of additional functions. Mukařovský (1936, p.34) also sees in the aesthetic function a guarantee of the further development of a cultural phenomenon which has lost its practical function. Its aesthetic character is retained for future periods in which there occur possibilities of its being used in another practical function.

Secondary functions can also serve for the classification of a domain of phenomena defined by the dominance of
another function. Thus literary genres can be characterised to a certain extent on the basis of a function which for them is of only secondary importance. At least in the case of classical examples the referential function is of great importance for epic poetry, the emotive function for lyric poetry (Jakobson, 1960, p.357) and, one might add, the appellative function for dramatic poetry with its moralising and didactic tendency.

The fate of whole artistic genres and stylistic tendencies, their coming and going, seems often to be bound up less with their aesthetic quality as with secondary functions. A work of art which is emotionally no longer moving loses its topicality. It is in any case striking that aestheticians who see delectare et movere as an essential property of works of art (cf. Jauss, 1977) frequently belong to the proponents of a relativistic historical point of view. For Jakobson, who defines the aestheticity or poetics of a text in structural terms, being moved, which shows itself in pleasure, is secondary, something which varies according to the historical and biographical situation. One can appreciate a poem by Goethe as a work of art without having any pleasure in it.\(^6\)

Not only can different functions be compatible with one another, complement each other reciprocally, they can likewise stand in conflict with one another. The aesthetic function suggests itself once again as a prototypical example of such conflict. For in a certain sense the aesthetic function turns out to be the 'dialectical negation of functionality' (Mukarovsky, 1937, p.244), in so far as the subject's attention turns from causes and effects, and hence from the practical use of a work, to its structure in all its proud autonomy. The fact that a piece of
furniture is outstandingly beautiful can be an obstacle to its use. One experiences the tendency to put it on show instead of using it. In the same way the artistic form of a poem can distract from its content and its communication — unless it is a perfect poem in which content and concrete realisation (in audible recitation) are themselves structural elements of the artistic whole. An object of use can also be constructed in like manner, i.e. such that its beauty is only fully displayed when it is used. In the case of a car the streamlined design stands out only when the car is driven. There is no aspect of reality and hence no function of language which cannot be employed as an aesthetical structural element. This is a first answer to Jauss's criticism (1977, p.168) of Mukarovsky that he leaves unexplained 'how the aesthetic function can be a dialectical negation of the communicative as well as the emotive function and is simultaneously supposed to be communicative'. A second answer involves referring to the attractiveness of the aesthetic structure, which directs the attitude or set of the subject to the work of art, certainly no longer only to its content — as is the case where the communicative function dominates — but also the interplay of formal and material factors which make of a text a whole valuable in itself ('selbستwertiges' Ganzes). Thirdly Mukarovsky's semiotic principle, 'an object not only performs but also signifies its function', holds not only for objects with a practical function but also for those with an aesthetic function. A work of art performs not only the aesthetic function it is intended to perform, it simultaneously signals it also. Fourth, the truly dialectical possibility that precisely because in poetry 'communication is not really important' (Jakobson, 1934, p.406) and the truth content of a poem is secondary, the censorship exerted by one's own unconscious and by authority —
and how many poets have not used this opportunity, often unadmitted but highly consequential - is weaker, so that (prima facie fictive) poetry is often more faithful to the truth than a diary, more informative than a newspaper report, and more provocative than a handout of a professional agitator.

With a little less pathos and a little more sarcasm one might quote here an example which is today more than well known: the disclosure of 'what we always wanted to know about (or see of) sexuality' occurred first on film and then on stage, step by step, in that exceedingly aesthetically sensitive directors, first and foremost Ingmar Bergmann, proclaimed each successive stage in this stripping away as an imminent aesthetic necessity. This somewhat sarcastic excursus should not be taken to deny the close affinity between the erotic and the aesthetic. What leads to the mutual involvement of art and the erotic is their common sensual attractivity (see discussion of Bogatyrev, 1937, above). While the sexual-erotic function in many contemporary films is nothing more than a substitute for the lack of any aesthetic function, the reverse is often true for dress. The aesthetic function may be a substitute for the weak or absent erotic function of clothes which have nothing attractive to reveal.

So much concerning Jauss's problem of how an aesthetic work can be both communicative and emotional in spite of its dialectical negation of and its distraction from communication and emotion. The relation between functions is particularly complicated in the case of linguistic sounds (cf. Jakobson and Waugh, 1979). The phonic materiality of sounds is such that they function immediately both synaesthetically and associatively. There is a correlation between
the sound-opposition \( i \) and \( u \) and the visual opposition \( \text{light} \) and \( \text{dark} \). The strikingly discrete structure of linguistic sounds, however, also makes them mediately suitable for the construction of an exceptionally rational system of discriminations. The thirty phonemes of an average language permit the formation of for example a repertoire of signs of \( 30^4 = 810,000 \) combinations of four sounds. In natural language this bi-functionality of sounds leads to different constellations. The immediate latent function can be used in a subsidiary fashion, in that for certain semantic fields only particular phonemes, which directly symbolise these fields phonetically, are admissible. It can also censor selectively: it is statistically demonstrable that lexemes, the meaning of which coincides with the immediate symbolism of the sounds, have greater chances of survival in the course of linguistic development. But the immediate meaning (that which is natural, latent and directly pertinent to sound-symbolism) and the mediate (artificial, manifest, arbitrarily assigned) meaning can also come into conflict. In everyday language, where attention is normally directed to what is said, this conflict usually goes unnoticed. In poetry on the other hand, with its set towards (\text{Einstellung auf}) the sign as a whole and its tendency to make manifest all the relations which contribute to the latent make-up of this sign (cf. Jakobson, 1960, p.373), this conflict is more than noticeable. The poet can exploit the conflict as a means of estrangement, but he can also try to balance it out by paying particular attention to the context. Thus French poets, faced with the relation between the dark sound of \( \text{jour} \) and the light sound of \( \text{nuit} \), compensate for this by means of a phonological and/or semantic context which fits more neatly the sense-content of day and night (Jakobson, 1960, p.373). Finally, the conflict can also be heuristically effective by directing
the attention of sensitive language-users to other less dominating components of the signatum, which agree more readily with the latent sound-symbolism.

Instead of perceiving a contradiction between the signata and the phonetic peculiarities of the corresponding signantia, I unconsciously assign to the various signata differential natures. Thus jour, in conformity with its dark vowel, presents the durative aspect of continuing action, nuit, with its light vowel, the perfective aspect of completed action. For me the day is something which endures, night something which sets in, or comes to pass (night falls, as we say). The former connotes a condition, the latter an event (Lévi-Strauss, 1976, p.17).

The Prague theorists of aesthetic reception of the '30s are ahead of their descendants in Konstanz in explicitly thematising the complexity of changes of function. In particular Bogatyrev's semiotic analyses of folk-costume and customs (1936 and 1937) are a mine of information and insight about the manifold aspects of functional analysis. The dynamic form of the phenomenon of plurifunctionality, which involves a continuous change in the hierarchy of functions and a dominant function which determines the mode of appearance of all the other functions, is here clearly presented in what is one of the earliest phases of the investigation of these matters. Bogatyrev (1937, p.43) sets out the following order of ranking for everyday dress (ranked in order of power):

1) practical function (best suited to protection from cold and heat, dirt, injury);
2) indication of social status or class;
3) aesthetic function;
4) indication of regional background.

Sunday and holiday costume on the other hand shows the following re-distribution of values:
1) holiday or ceremonial function;
2) aesthetic function;
3) ritual function;
4) nationalistic or regionalistic identification;
5) indication of social status or class;
6) practical function.

In the exchange of the dominant function, individual subordinate functions are strengthened, others recede into the background or are eliminated, new ones are added, certain forms become obligatory, others optional. For example, if clothing associated with work or with a profession advances to the status of holiday costume, it becomes binding on a whole age or gender group (think, for example, of the growth in popularity of naval attire as Sunday clothes for children). Functions change with the transition from one bearer to another. Galoshes, whose dominant function in the Russian cities in which they first came into use was the practical one of protection from dust and dirt, acquire a largely aesthetic function in the countryside, where they are worn by young people sauntering through the streets on holidays in fine weather. Songs and costumes, where at first the aesthetic function dominated, come to lose this in favour of indication of age when they become reserved for children.

The reality of the function of the identification of region and religion so heavily emphasised by Bogatyrev can be illustrated by a moralising gloss of the Freiherr von Knigge:

The calvinist merchants of Emden set out their gardens in the Dutch style; now I once heard one of them say of another merchant of the same confession who had however taken it upon himself to include in his garden certain alterations shocking to the reformed community, that this garden had a distinctly Lutheran stripe.
Characteristically, Knigge objects to this hypertrophy of the identification function because it is detrimental to what is for him the more important function of supra-regional communication in society.

I am of the opinion that these differences in the customs of the German states make it very difficult, in foreign provinces outside one's own native area, to start up friendships, to please in society, to have an effect on or win over other people.

In view of this multifunctionality which one soon comes up against when one pays a little attention to the phenomena themselves, the question arises how both on the one hand analytic philosophy of science and on the other hand the architectural current which as 'functionalism' has entered into the history of art were able almost simultaneously to arrive at their naive unproblematic monofunctionalism. Monofunctionalism is typical of machines, of highly developed biological organs, of formalised languages and—strikingly—of an early stage in the development of children's intelligence. The architectural monofunctionalism of Le Corbusier and of the Bauhaus may in part go back to the fascination with machines: the house as machine à habiter, the chair as machine à s'asseoir, etc. The unreflected monofunctionalism of analytic philosophy of science may well be conditioned by too one-sided a concentration on biological examples, on the highly developed individual and collective studied in physiology and ethology (cf. the specialised organs of 'higher' animals and the division of labour in communities of bees and ants; on this Mukařovský, 1966, p.121), as well as by the logical ideal of univocal—and in their own way also unifunctional—terms of scientific language. One forgets too easily that the higher development consists not necessarily only in the formation of specialised organs but also conversely in a
plurifunctional adaptation of what was a monofunctional organ. Think of the role assigned to the human hand in the process of hominisation, its polyfunctionality in contrast to the hands of the other primates which merely scratch and seize. In the realm of sociology the experience of plurifunctionality, at least of that of members of human societies, is formulated most impressively by Max Frisch in what he says about the problems which have arisen in connection with foreign works (Gastarbeiter) in Switzerland: 'We called for labour power, but what we got was human beings'. In the third area of examples, the language of science, it has likewise become common knowledge that the survival value and the chances of survival of natural languages vis à vis formalised languages consists precisely in their plurifunctionality (including context-sensitive ambiguity).

Monofunctionalism is, above all, as was remarked at the beginning of this paper, infantile. The child in the process of acquiring language is for a long time unable to assign two different meanings to one linguistic form. Thus initially a French child uses the article *les* exclusively (as a pluraliser) to signalise a plurality. In order to signalise a totality (as a totaliser) as this article can simultaneously be employed in adult language, the child resorts at this early stage ostentatiously to an additional morpheme: *toutes les voitures*. Occasionally it will even take refuge in ungrammatical forms in order to keep apart two functions, such as indefinite reference and numerical indication which can simultaneously be expressed by the indefinite article in the adult language. Thus in order to indicate that what is in question is a single cow, it creates the ungrammatical expression *une de vache* (Karmiloff-Smith, 1976, pp.300ff.). The child is unable simultaneously
to express two functions such as a wish and a piece of factual information, as this is normal in adult language by means of constative forms such as it is cold, when what is principally intended is the demand to close a window (cf. Halliday, 1977, pp.42, 71).  

§5. On the plurifunctionality of the poetic text

A consequence of the plurifunctionality of language is that the linguistic analysis of a poem cannot restrict itself to the poetic function (see Jakobson, 1960, p.357). It has to take into account the other functions of the text, not in an additive fashion but in an integrative way in relation to the dominating poetic function which transforms and unifies them into a structural and functional whole. Conversely, every study of linguistic phenomena has to analyse the role played in these phenomena by the poetic function. It plays a not inconsiderable role in propaganda texts, in rhetoric generally and, as Jakobson has pointed out, in the acquisition of language.

The obstinate prejudice to the effect that structural poetics limits itself to a text-immanent, if not merely phonological-grammatical analysis of poems, is a complete misunderstanding of its intention and scope. It is a misinterpretation of the dominance of the poetic function (with its primarily phonological and grammatical means) to take this function to be exclusive. The failure to recognise the central role played from the beginning in Prague linguistics by semantics, as well as pragmatics - in the form of functional analysis - in contrast to contemporary tendencies in American linguistics and analytic philosophy
of language, is probably due to a fixation on the revolu-
tionary one-sidedness of Russian formalism and on posi-
tivist/anti-mentalist one-sided emphases within currents of
thought which likewise claim for themselves the term
'structuralism'. Against the tendency to reduce linguistics
to mere combinations, Jakobson (1949, p.38) coined the
phrase: 'The primary function of the sign is to signify and
not to figure in certain given constellations.'

The same prejudice passes over the programmatic theses
and theoretic reflections about just this theme (Jakobson
and Tynjanov, 1928; Jakobson, 1935b). It passes over the
exemplary studies in which interpretations are given of the
poetry of the Hussites in its historical and sociological
context (Jakobson, 1936) and of the poems of Pushkin and
Mayakovsky in their biographical and psychological context
(Jakobson, 1930, 1937). Finally it overlooks Jakobson's
interdisciplinary cooperation with a specialist on myths,
Lévi-Strauss, in one of his best known poetic analyses, that
of Baudelaire's Les Chats (1962). As a linguist, and in
view of the dominance of the linguistic medium as such
Jakobson does indeed limit himself, in most of his analyses,
to displaying immanent linguistic structures. The occasional
moves in the direction of the extra-linguistic context may,
when considered independently of his theoretical reflections
and studies of examples, make an anecdotal impression, as
when Yeats' geometrical symbolism in which the number 3 and
its exponents ($3^2, 3^3$) plays a central role, is discovered
not only in the number of word-categories of his poems but
also in a confession in his 27th ($3^3$) year (1977, pp.42,51).

Considerations of the extra-linguistic context are fre-
quently and consistent enough to enable one to recognise the
relation which, according to Jakobson, characterises the
relationship between a poetical text, its author, and its period of genesis. The relation is a double one. It is poetic and/or functional. In the first case the historical situation is a context for the relation of which to the poetical text as such the same principle of equivalence is decisive as is constitutive of the poetical text in the narrower sense, that is, an equivalence principle in the form of multiple relations of similarity and contrast (cf. 1937, p.162). This continued relevance of the principle of equivalence is valid primarily for the verbal context of a poem, consisting of contemporary poetry, of which an individual text is a part, and of the traditional poetry which precedes it.

Certainly we do not want simply to deduce the work from its context. On the other hand we are not allowed in the analysis of a poetical work to ignore disguised and repeatedly occurring correspondences between the work and its context, especially regular connections between certain traits common to many works of a single author and some specific place, time or biographical detail which in their origin they all share. Context is one of the components of speech: the poetic function transforms it as it transforms every other component (Jakobson, 1937, p.154).

The poetic attraction of Pasternak's metonymic style is doubled when it is contrasted with the metaphorical style of Mayakovsky. Both styles also have their correlates in the authors' respective biographies, and in the artistic and scientific Weltanschauung of the time, in which relations as such are more important than the atomistically considered objects they connect (Jakobson, 1935a).

Beyond this relations of equivalence play a role not only in poems but also in the interpretation of poems. Jakobson's analysis of Brecht's party poem (1965) is dedicated to the East German linguist and folklorist Wolfgang Steinitz, a dedicated adherent of the communist party. Jakobson had got to know him in 1940 during their common
exile in Sweden. While they were bidding each other farewell at the station in Stockholm, just before Jakobson was to start his hazardous voyage to New York, Jakobson remembers Steinitz replying to his offer to help him settle in America as follows (1975, p.xii): 'I am a communist, my place is here...and after the war I intend to continue my work in a revolutionary Berlin.' Brecht's poem contains a repeated demand to those who are 'wise' not to leave the party:

\begin{quote}
Gehe nicht ohne uns den richtigen Weg  
Ohne uns ist er  
der falscheste  
Sei bei uns weise!  
Trenne dich nicht von uns!
\end{quote}

One fails to grasp the intention of structural poetics and the essence of the aesthetic as such if one (cf. Jauss, 1975, p.148) fails to see more than the classical theory of reflection in the setting out of positive or negative (or contrastive) relations of equivalence. The theory of reflection fails to take into account the specific hierarchy of linguistic functions in a poetic text. For the idea that the poetic text functions as a depiction - whether typified, alienated or whatever - of reality accords far too much importance to the cognitive function. Reflections, i.e. equivalences between literary text and surrounding context have no (or only a secondary) cognitive function, but rather a (dominating) aesthetic function in that they turn the attention of the subject to the artistic medium as such. Reflection is, like any content, part of the structure of the work of art and not its cognitive aim. The relation between the work of art and reality is pointed to in a direct indeed crude way (\textit{ad usum delphini}) by wall paintings of the kind where there is a continuous transition from
painting to its surroundings and where one barely notices when the illusion of the picture stops and the palpable reality of the surroundings begins, or which objects (flower pots, windows, flights of steps, etc.) are real and which are merely painted. Thanks to such continual equivalence relations, reality becomes part of the work of art.

What both structuralism and functionalism are opposed to is an exclusively causal-historical explanation of cultural phenomena, a one-dimensional, uni-directional relation between a work and its time. The correlation between the literary and historical series has its own structural laws which need uncovering (Jakobson and Tynjanov, 1928). More important than the causal relation which points back to the past is the teleological and functional relation which anticipates the future. A work has to be understood both on the basis of its genesis and on the basis of its character as a project. The futurists had declared the future to be the tense appropriate to poetry. Only weak poets wait on events, as Mayakovsky put it, in order to reflect them or, in the extreme case, to reflect about them; strong poets run ahead of their time, pulling it after them. In his obituary article for Mayakovsky Jakobson (1930) inquires into the literary anticipation of suicide by its most famous representative which, during the lifetime of the poet, was taken for a literary stunt and whose realisation was then evaluated not as a 'literary fact' but as an absurdity. Before the effect upon the reader, which is placed in the foreground by the historians of the effects and of the reception of literature, there comes the (reflexive) effect upon the author himself.

The poet lives in a myth which he himself creates and consequently directs his life - more or less subliminally - towards the pattern created. In short, according to the results of Jakobson's
analysis, not only is the life situation active in the process of literary creation, but the product created is likewise active and often decisive in the poet's actual biography. Thus one cannot draw a sharp borderline between the two, nor can one generate one from the other unequivocally. Both sequences are in a relation of complementarity and form a kind of feed-back system (Pomorska, 1977, p.373).

In the words of the poet Yeats (quoted by Jakobson and Rudy, 1977, p.8):

The friends that have it I do wrong
Whenever I remake a song,
Should know what issue is at stake:
It is myself that I remake.

§6. On the plurifunctionality of the poetic device

The analysis can be taken further. Not only is the poetic text plurifunctional but so also is the poetic texture, the poetic device involved in lending shape to a text. The device to which a text owes its aesthetic character - the projection of the principle of equivalence, of relations of similarity and contrast belonging to the axis of selection, onto the axis of combination, has many other consequences. The first of these is the much remarked plurivocity of poetic texts.

First however a word about the 'structuralist' definition of poetics in the terms of Jakobson's notion of projection. One can get a grip on what has value - beauty, goodness - or on what is dynamic - force, causation, intention - only by setting out invariant presuppositions and/or entailments of a structural sort. It is important to give metonymic definitions (to use Jakobson's terminology) e.g. of force as the product of mass and acceleration, of
causality as the invariant sequence of two events given additional boundary conditions to be more closely specified, of intentionality as the dependence - in the form of a feedback system - of a process on a plan. It is to metonymic definitions such as this that modern natural sciences owe their striking success. Attempts to provide metaphorical definitions, on the other hand, lead to open or hidden tautologies, as when causation is defined as production, or beauty as brightness, elegance, etc.

The same structural property (a network of relations of equivalence in the syntagmatic axis of combination) which makes a text 'beautiful' is, we can say - modifying words of Kant⁹,- conducive to its plurivocity. For every linguistic unity a distinction can be made between an invariant core-meaning and variable context-meanings. 'Coach' has quite different connotations when uttered in a station and when uttered in a garage, although the two referents have many common properties, a fact that is decisive for the use of a term. The context determines which are the connotations which the core-meaning acquires. If the context to which a term is related is manifold then the term, too, will be ambiguous. The context is decisive for the over-determination of the term.¹⁰ In poetry, because the linguistic sequence is submerged under relations of similarity and contrast (at all linguistic levels), the context in which a term is experienced is at one and the same time made manifold and acquires its own distinct profile. Relations of similarity and contrast have an associative effect, that is, they form contexts, and hence determine meaning. 'In poetry, any conspicuous similarity in sound is evaluated in respect to similarity and/or dissimilarity in meaning' (Jakobson, 1960, p.372). The most transparent examples of plurivocility from poetically formed contexts are to be found in examples
of parallelism. In parallelism individual sentence-parts are made to approximate to one another through metrical and grammatical parallelisation and in their way their meaning is modified either metaphorically or, in a suitable context, antonymically (cf. Holenstein, 1976b, p.11f.). Particularly illustrative is a triplet from the Song of Judith (16.9) in which the beheading of Holophernes is described in song:

Her sandal ravished his eyes,
Her beauty captured his mind,
The sword severed his neck.

Through the immediate context, their object (eye and mind), the verbs of the first two lines acquire a metaphorical meaning, whereas the additional context which is the parallel relation to the third line works to dissolve this metaphorical meaning. It becomes mixed with the original concrete meaning. At the same time to ravish and to capture take on a metonymic connotation. They appear as a preparation for the beheading (cf. R.A.P. Roberts, 1977, p.988).

The plurivocity of poetic texts is not something which is or should be resistant to inquiry, something for a romantic, anti-scientific 'symbolist' or 'hermeneuticist' to accept devoutly as a gift of grace or fate. Plurivocity is an automatic consequence of the mechanisms of language which the poet brings to emphasis (cf. Jakobson, 1960, p.370f.).

The poetic device which makes a text beautiful functions both cognitively and emotively. Psychobiological investigations of aesthetic experience (Berlyne, 1971; quoted by Bock, 1978, p.192), yielded the result that linguistic and non-linguistic material of medium complexity is felt to be pleasant whereas a degree of complexity which is too high or too low is experienced as unpleasant. An optimal degree of
complexity for some material is present when the recipient succeeds in grasping a unifying principle in the variety of what is offered. Invariance in what is variable and hence unity in multiplicity is just what the projection of the principle of similarity onto a linguistic sequence achieves.

The same poetic device can, finally, function in yet another way - namely as a device of disautomatisation and as a mnemotechnic device. These are two functions which are cultivated by pragmatists among theoreticians of literature, the first by those with a sociological interest, the second by those whose orientation is psychological. The relations of similarity brought into being by the poet do indeed create not only unusual but also what, for the laws of everyday speech, are anomalous connections. The simplest example is the metaphor 'a laughing meadow'. Laughing and meadow are instances of incompatible word-categories according to the laws of linguistic combination. Only an animal, or even perhaps only a human being, can laugh. The unusual connection hinders understanding and calls forth the attention of the reader until he discovers the property which gives the connection a sense (cf. Hörmann, 1973, p. 320ff).

Jakobson (1965; 1966, p.423) has objected in quite striking terms to the two theses of disautomatisation and mnemotechnics. His opposition to the disautomatisation thesis in particular, which followed his own early work on deformation as a poetic device (1921, pp.90, 92, 103) to which his Prague colleague Mukařovský had paid so much attention, may well surprise. But all that Jakobson is really objecting to is the elevation of disautomatisation of experience of the world and social life to the essence of poetic language, to the primary function of poetic
language. The same holds of the function of making memor­able (the mnemotechnical function) which people have tried to employ to give a genetic account of grammatical parallel­ism, the more so as parallelism is the prototype of the poetic principle of the projection of relations of equivalence onto the syntagmatic axis. The easy memorisability of poetic texts can be explained as much in terms of the psychology of association (based on relations of similarity and contrast) as in terms of the cognitive psychology which is based on meaningful organisation. Poetic texture may, after all, serve memorising and disautomatising functions. But the pragmatic-utilitarian view that the primary function lies in such use is perverse. For the primary function consists in what the tradition called beauty and what nowadays is called aestheticity, a term no less rich in problems of its own.

(Translated by Kevin Mulligan and Barry Smith.)

Notes

1. An exception is the biologist E. Mayr (1974, p.114) who makes reference to Jakobson's analyses.

2. Already in his 1928 (pp.109f.) H. Dempe had extended Bühler's three basic functions (after the version of 1918) with 'secondary functions', and therewith also, referring to Croce and Vossler, mentioned too the aesthetic function, though without any further development.

3."The first of these languages is that 'about which we speak'.... The second is the language in which we 'speak about' the first language, and in terms of which we wish, in particular, to construct the definition of truth for the first language. We shall refer to the first language as the object language, and to the second as the meta­language." (Tarski, 1944, p.21f.)

4."Phatic communion - a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words... They fulfil a social function and that is their principal aim, but they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener... Phatic communion...serves to establish bonds of personal union between people brought together by the mere need of companionship and does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas." The stock example of phatic language is provided by gossip: "...this
atmosphere of sociability...achieved by...the specific feelings which form convivial gregariousness, by the give and take of utterances which make up ordinary gossip." — "Always the same emphasis of affirmation and consent, mixed perhaps with an incidental disagreement which creates the bonds of antipathy." (Malinowski, 1923, p.314ff.)

5. Jakobson in a lecture given in Louvain in 1972; cited by Holenstein, 1975, p.34.

6. The acceptability of sentences like 'That is beautiful, but it doesn't please me' is a favourite topic of linguistic analytic aesthetics: cf. the discussion in Strube, 1980. Incompatible with Jauss's aesthetic experience are utterances such as, 'Oui, cela est parfaitement beau, mais il me fait bâiller' (Madame de Longueville); or, 'I admit that Raphael is a great painter but I do not like his work; it does not move me' (M. Macdonald). — Precisely such a running together of the pleasurable and the unpleasurable is characteristic of 'new art': 'The impression which is made by living art is...rather that of something hard and strict...than of something elegant and smooth - it distinguishes itself sharply from the conventional and from the agreeable comfortableness of the artistic expression with which one is familiar.' (F.X. Salda, cited by Mukařovský, 1936, p.46). A running together of this kind is especially typical of those cases where beauty is sought for dialectically in something that is prima facie ugly.

7. "Partout on voit des machines qui servent à produire quelque chose et qui le produisent admirablement, avec pureté" (Le Corbusier, 1928, p.233). "Architectural functionalism proceeds from the premise that a building has a single, precisely delimited function given by the purpose for which it is built. Hence Corbusier's well-known comparison of a building to a machine, a typically unambiguous product from a functional point of view." (Mukařovský, 1942, p.37).

8. In industry too monofunctionalism is something infantile, characteristic of an early phase of industrialisation. Machines are, it is true, monofunctional (and with advantage); the energy with which they are driven however, and the raw materials which they transform, are both distinctively polyfunctional. The failure to take account of this fact leads to uneconomic wear and tear which does justice neither to the material of the economy nor to its needs.

9. "...For this reason the same property which makes a building beautiful also contributes to its being good (to its bonitas), and a face would also have to have for its purpose no other form than for its beauty." This sentence, from Kant's Nachlass (1923, p.628), may serve as a guideline for this section and especially as a historical support.

10. Bock (1978, pp.186ff.) distinguishes a threefold semantic effect of context. It works in an integrative way - the context clarifies or reveals from the first the connection between individual parts of
the text which, without this additional information, remain unintelligible. It works in a selective way - the context determines which of the possible meanings of a linguistic unity become actualised. It operates in such a way as to expand the meaning, activating potential connotations which without it would have remained unremarked. An example of the integrative effect: 'Franz, enraged, is tearing the mirror to pieces.' A mirror is not torn but rather broken into pieces. The sensefullness of the connection between 'tearing to pieces' and 'mirror' is revealed only with the addition of the sentence: 'The shreds of paper flew about wildly in the wind', which tells us that we have to deal with a London newspaper and not with an article of bathroom furniture. The not wholly adequate example, which I use for the sake of its brevity, derives from me, and not from Bock. In itself it serves as a more suitable example for the selective effect. The context, the verb and the second sentence, indicate which of the possible meanings of 'mirror/Mirror' is to be selected. Of quite special importance for poetics is the third effect, that of extension of meaning. Bock and his co-workers discovered that plurivocity of textual passages is most often realised where the context - the relevant experiments deal with visual contexts - is also plurivocal. Thus the ambiguity of 'Dorfkapelle' (village chapel/village band) was most frequently noticed where the accompanying image showed a man by the side of the group of musicians and in front of a small country church. The different meanings of a term are not, as a rule, equal in value. The less common remain latent in the absence of an appropriately stimulating context. The sense-modificatory effects of the changing context surrounding a work is the subject matter of the theory of (literary) reception (Rezeptionsästhetik).
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Alois Riegl was the most distinguished member of the Vienna School of Art History which consisted of several generations of professors at the University active from the turn of this century. Important nineteenth-century precursors of the school include Rudolf Eitelberger, founder of the Museum for Applied Art and Theodor von Sickel, founder of the Institute for Research in Austrian History, both of whom engaged in archeological and philological research. Later, a number of intellectual currents converged which shifted interest towards the visual morphology of art. For example, Franz Wickoff's analysis of individual forms is the result of his interest in the techniques of connoisseurship.
devised by Giovanni Morelli.¹ Riegl's more profound conception of style is informed both by Herbartian psychology and by Karl Schnaase's Hegelian treatment of art history.² More recently the adoption of Gestalt psychology has sustained the formalist tradition. Another of the School's abiding concerns is with the rehabilitation of styles formerly regarded as degenerate. Wickoff and Riegl were both concerned to provide early Christian art with an aesthetic value different in kind from the classic ideal, and Max Dvořák, another important figure in this tradition, devoted himself to the study of Gothic art.³

Riegl's work is an under-valued contribution to art-historical thought which has suffered lamentably at the hands of popularisers and apologists, like Hans Sedlmayer and Wilhelm Worringer, who have interpreted his theory in psychological terms,⁴ and from critics who have too often dismissed it as a revival of Hegelian aesthetics, that is, as a romantic vision of human spiritual development reflected in the history of styles. Ernst Gombrich, a product of the Vienna School, levels this criticism against Riegl in the introduction to his Art and Illusion:

There is a touch of genius in the single-mindedness with which Riegl tries by one unitary principle to account for all stylistic changes in architecture, sculpture, painting and pattern making. But this single-mindedness, which he took to be the hallmark of a scientific approach, made him a prey to those pre-scientific habits of mind in which unitary principles proliferate, the habits of the mythmakers. The 'will-to-form', the Kunstwollen, becomes the ghost in the machine, driving the wheels of artistic developments according to 'inexorable laws'.... It is not difficult to see in this picture of world history a revival of those romantic mythologies which found their climax in Hegel's philosophy of history.⁵

This characterisation of Riegl leaves us with the false impression that he, like Hegel, considers the history of art as evidence of our gradual ascendency over the con-
constraints imposed by alien nature and of our self-recognition as spiritual beings.

The concept of the *Kunstwollen* is certainly to some extent vulnerable to this interpretation. Riegl does envisage the history of styles, the history of the *Kunstwollen*, as a series of transformations in the way we organise our perception in art. The Egyptian *Kunstwollen*, for example, is an aesthetic ideal which values a visual clarity and objectivity analogous to the certainty afforded by the sense of touch. This 'haptic' or 'objective' ideal is set in opposition to the impressionist's 'optic' or 'subjective' ideal of the world as visually experienced, as suspended in the mind of the beholder.

The haptic and optic ideals are the extreme poles of a scheme for a universal history of stylistic development. The scheme ultimately derives from Hegel's aesthetics, but Riegl excludes two fundamental features of that doctrine:

Firstly, his theory does not, like Hegel's, hold that the history of styles displays progressively higher levels of awareness. Hegel sees in the rigid configurations and grotesque motifs of Egyptian art signs that external material had not yet been spiritualised, that is, transformed into an object in which Mind can decipher itself. This goal is more fully realised in Classic art, but Hegel claims that a higher level of self-recognition is reflected in seventeenth-century Dutch paintings. These imitations of transient nature and the 'prose of life' display Mind's proper recognition that thought can have no adequate sensuous embodiment. Riegl, on the other hand, admires the constructive freedom of archaic ornament and regards nineteenth-century Naturalism and Impressionism as too subject-
ive in character. Riegl makes use of Hegel's very subtle visual morphology in order to formulate a complex typology of equally valid styles.

Secondly, while Hegel sees style as an index of our general spiritual development, Riegl provides the history of art with a sense of autonomous development.

This autonomous history of art is formulated in such a way that non-classical styles such as late Roman, Baroque and seventeenth-century Dutch art, are seen to contribute to the continuous history of styles. The conviction governing his early work - that placing a style within a continuous developmental series, secures for that style aesthetic validity - is later supplemented, and even superseded, by a procedure which confers aesthetic value by formulating self-validating artistic ideals specific to particular styles. His last book, *Holländische Gruppenporträt,* is of special interest because it represents a shift away from universal historical schemes. In it Riegl attends to the characteristics and relationships of elements peculiar to group portraiture in Holland during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The theoretical importance of this shift of focus is best appreciated when it is compared with contemporaneous developments in the field of linguistics. Riegl's adjustments to his own early practice resemble those of the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure, originally an historical grammarian, changed the course of linguistics by arguing that the primary object of linguistics is not the evolution of forms of language, as his predecessors had supposed. Instead he understood language as a system of interrelated signs in which the value of each element
results from the simultaneous presence of the other elements. The system is available to synchronic analysis which determines the relationship of co-existing elements within a single linguistic state. Similarly, in Riegl's *Holländische Gruppenporträts*, (hereinafter 'HG') the exclusively diachronic perspective of his early *Stilfragen*, is replaced by a synchronic procedure which understands a particular style as governed by its own purpose, its own grammar or principles of design. The method treats individual works of art as manifestations of an underlying system or structure. Art historians' interest in such guiding structures need not, as Gombrich fears, lead to 'totalitarian habits of mind' and the abolition of the individual. Rather, it can be understood as an acknowledgement of a principle which in the study of language is a truism: that in order for individuals to produce and convey meaning they must comply with a system of rules and conventions shared by the community.

§2. *The Dutch Kunstkollagen*

Riegl's treatment of early sixteenth to mid-seventeenth century Dutch group portraiture is so complex that it is difficult to make any generalisations prior to an analysis of the text. What we have to do is to define the concept of the *Kunstkollagen* as it appears in this book, showing how it serves as the basis for Riegl's procedure. He divides the period into a succession of three stages. The question posed at each stage is, 'by what methods has coherence been achieved?' The general ideal of coherence is one dependent on the imaginative projection of the perceiver, but the type and degree of projection varies within the period.
The *Kunstwollen* of the Dutch style is said to be the representation of 'attention' (*Aufmerksamkeit*). The concept has a double use: the engagement of attention is attributed, on the one hand, to depicted figures and, on the other, to the spectator. A group portrait represents attentive attitudes and also demands these attitudes from the spectator.

Riegl describes attention as a deep concern for the world and an attitude which combines both humility and self-esteem.

Attention is passive, as it permits itself to be impressed by external objects and does not try to subdue them; at the same time it is active as it searches for objects without intending to make them subservient to inner satisfaction (*HG*, p.14).

This relationship of mind to things involves a delicate balance: the object remains independent and intact insofar as the mind is receptive, yet the subject also retains his independence or autonomy - he is free from the constraints of appetite and desire and free to direct and focus his attention.

We have said that the *Kunstwollen* of a stylistic period is a particular ideal of coherence. Attention, then, which refers to a psychological attitude also refers to a means of making a picture cohere. According to this interpretation of Dutch group portraiture, it is the union of the figures brought about by their attentiveness, plus the imaginative projection and attentiveness of the spectator, which renders these paintings coherent. Riegl sets this principle of coherence in contrast to the Italian device of making action and the will serve as a basis of unity. In order to appreciate Dutch art we must recognise that its basis of unity is different from the Italian and that in it,
emotion and attention play a much greater role than action and the will.

Riegl distinguishes between different modes of attention. So-called 'objective attention' in early Dutch art describes the attitude of isolated figures absorbed in contemplation and yet united by the transcendent focus of their undirected gaze. Later group portraits are united by a 'subjective attention' which is an attitude directed toward objects which are determined in space and time. This distinction is best understood if we recognise that Riegl is making use of Schopenhauer's sense of the terms 'objective' and 'subjective'. In Schopenhauer's scheme of things, one is exercising a form of objective apperception when contemplating objects transcending space and time — his Platonic Ideas. The engagement of subjectivity, on the other hand, involves spontaneously constituting the objects of experience (ordinary perception as described by Kant) and the expression of feelings and the will. Riegl extends this sense of subjectivity to include the spectator's activity of imaginatively completing the picture's world.

Although group portraiture was common in the Netherlands during this period, Riegl's exclusive treatment of it seems to exaggerate its importance vis-à-vis painting of religious subjects, genre and landscape. Riegl focuses on group portraiture because he thinks that it is the most complete expression of the Dutch Kunstwollen: a portrait conveys an impression of inward psychic life and personality. The artistic problem presented by the Kunstwollen to depict the specifically Dutch ideal of inwardness is clear. The psychic attitude of attention involving suppression of the will is not one which manifests itself in action but merely in
a gaze. This is a difficulty even for single portraits but with group portraits the problem is multiplied, for the motionless figures must somehow be brought into relation with one another. Riegl thinks the central problem confronting the painter of group portraits is that of finding a means of uniting the group without diminishing the individual inwardness of its members.

Another essential characteristic of portraiture is the way in which depicted figures are presented to a spectator. Unlike narrative painting, which depicts action contained within the picture space, the portrait figure is actually addressed to us. By its very nature, portraiture establishes an intimate relationship with the viewer, openly acknowledging his presence. This feature poses another problem for group portraiture: how can the individual figures relate to the spectator and yet form a coherent group with the remaining figures? Riegl recognises this as a problem, but also sees that communication both between depicted figures and between the depicted figures and the viewing subject is part of the solution to the problem of coherence in group portraits. He isolates two types of coherence:
1) internal coherence, which involves the relationship of elements within the picture, and
2) external coherence, which includes and depends upon the spectator to complete the scene. According to Riegl's theory, it is possible to compensate for the diminished internal coherence needed to preserve the quality of portrait-likeness, by augmenting it with external coherence, making a painting cohere by implicitly including the spectator.
We said Riegl's theory of art leads him to pick out those features of group portraits which produce coherence. He generates quite a catalogue of concepts, which include matters of content, formal configurations, and treatments of light and space. Each of the features is given a value in terms of its relative objectivity or subjectivity, i.e. some features tend to make a painting appear more self-enclosed, complete in itself, while others tend to open the painting up to the subjective projection of the spectator. For brevity's sake, I will refer to features as either 'objectivising' or 'subjectivising'.

§ 3. The typology of styles

What follows is a systematic elucidation of the stylistic types which emerge from Riegl's study of Dutch group portraiture. These and their associated descriptive notions are organised under two dichotomies - 'Italian' as opposed to 'Dutch', and 'objective' as opposed to 'subjective'. The first, the national classification, is importantly not congruent with the objective/subjective dichotomy. Furthermore, each of the paintings Riegl considers is described in terms of (a) its concept (Auffassung) and (b) its composition. The 'concept' underlying a work of art specifies something about its content, and like most of the features which Riegl isolates, it is a way of rendering a painting coherent.

Riegl observes a number of different unifying concepts at work in Dutch group portraits which in practice sometimes overlap. The unifying concept which unites a multiplicity of figures may be (1) the utilisation of symbolic attributes which signify common membership in a corporate
body, (2) the figures' common participation in some shared activity, (3) the representation of a dramatic scene which both subordinates the figures to some action or some dominant figure, and also sets the depicted figures in relation to the spectator. The different types of Dutch group portrait are compared and contrasted with the Italian ideal. On Riegl's view, Italian art is fundamentally narrative in conception and is, so to speak, acted out on the other side of the proscenium arch, while Dutch art deliberately oversteps that boundary.

According to the theory, there are three stages in the development of group portraiture which roughly correspond to the three concepts listed above. He calls these three stages or types the 'Symbolic', the 'Genre-like' (Genre-mässige), and the 'Dramatic'. Riegl's analysis of these types will presently be discussed in some detail. We shall see that his understanding of the stages of Dutch artistic development hinges on Dutch adaptation of certain features of the Italian ideal.

Riegl nowhere gives us an independent formulation of the Italian narrative type, but his frequent references to it amount to a description of the High Renaissance ideal. This ideal demands a coherence which is internal, complete within the pictorial space. It contrives a unity which, unlike Dutch art, is independent of the spectator. Subordination, action, and narrative completeness are the key unifying concepts. Instead of co-ordinated, mutual independence of depicted figures characteristic of Dutch group portraiture, the Italian type represents either a dominant figure whose expression of will subordinates the others, or an action which equally subordinates the multiplicity of figures to a single end, or both of these. In any case
what is represented is an explicitly enacted narrative which emphasises outward action, rather than inward sentiment.

Riegl observes both objective and subjective tendencies in Italian art: it depicts objective reality, but it does this in accordance with the subjective conditions of perception, that is, in accordance with the laws of linear perspective.

(Italian art) strives mainly to render the three-dimensional spatial appearance of individual things (figures) in conformity to our subjective experience: hence its development of linear perspective which adheres to shapes, and of symmetrical, triangular composition, which groups the objects together in the plane and brings them to a strikingly obvious, objectively normal whole (HG, p.23).

Perceptual clarity is achieved not only by perspective, which establishes measurable relationships in space, but also by distinctly outlined isolated figures set in a plane-metric, symmetrical composition.

It is interesting to observe the kinds of relation which hold between the different unifying concepts and compositional features. Riegl's treatment of these relations, which overcome problems associated with the form and content distinction, seems particularly subtle and acute. He appears to hold a theory of ideal types which combines 'naturally' correlated pairs of concept and composition. For example, the Italian type with its subordinating concept most readily combines with compact, pyramidal compositions; Dutch co-ordination calls for planometric composition and vertical axes. More interesting, however, is the way Riegl sees these ideal types as decomposed and reassembled into hybrid forms. An artist can 'mismatch' a pair in order to serve his ends, balancing the subjective
valency of the one against the objective valency of another. For example, in The Anatomy of Dr. Tulp, a dissolving atmospheric effect is compensated for by a subordinating conception and pyramidal composition. This might be called the theory of compensation - an advance in one aspect of painting is balanced by conservatism in another, so that the general character and continuity of the Kunstwollen is maintained.

We have seen that the Italian type conflicts with the character of portraiture: engagement in action distorts features and attracts attention to physical form and movement, rather than to personality, thereby weakening the portrayal. But it is also true, and this is a crucial point, that Dutch colouristic space, Freiraum, can equally be detrimental to portraiture if figures are allowed to blur and melt into the atmosphere. Riegl remarks that the Dutch tendency toward subjectivity needed a curb in order to prevent its degenerating into compositional arbitrariness and that group portraiture provided just such a disciplined norm.

One might say that the Dutch group portrait exerted an objectivising and thereby a retarding and conservative influence in composition, but that it was generally beneficial and regulating (HG, p.25).

§4. The symbolic type

The theoretical framework just outlined is highly complex, yet it seems to have grown out of Riegl's perception of individual works of art. His detailed and illuminating observations of paintings support the theory without being forced or eccentric. This will become apparent in the following survey of examples drawn from each type of group
One of the early group portraits which Riegl describes as Symbolic in conception is Dirck Jacobsz's *Militia Company* of 1529. The figures stand in two rows, engaging in no activity which would connect the work with medieval narrative painting. There is little interplay between the figures and there is no dominant subordinating figure. How then are they brought into relation with one another? What makes it a group portrait and not an aggregate of single portraits? Riegl claims that the militia men's gestures are to be read as having symbolic significance: they point to their rifles and their captain or rest a hand on a neighbour's shoulder. The spectator must interpret the meaning of these symbols, i.e. that this is a militia company both subordinate to a captain and bound by comradeship. The painting's coherence is 'external', that is, dependent on the spectator to interpret these signs. As though to acknowledge this dependence all but one of the figures look out of the picture and one even gestures in the spectator's direction.

On Riegl's view, insofar as the presence of a captain provides a dominant figure, the painting betrays traces of the Italian conception, but he observes that while the dominant figure in an Italian painting actively subordinates the others, the men in Jacobsz's painting subordinate themselves to the captain with their pointing gestures. Riegl's explanation of the inclusion of a captain in terms of Italian influence on Dutch art is an example of his unfortunate tendency to be over-systematic. The presence of a captain in a militia company needs no explanation; how or where he is depicted may be stylistically significant. For example Jacobsz's captain does not occupy the central position, a
fact which argues well for the case that Dutch artists were not seeking the type of coherence valued in Italian art.

The quality of attention in early Dutch art is reflected in the quiet, transcendent, 'objective' gaze of Jacobsz's figures. Objective attention, in Riegl's sense, is characterised by a lack of personal emotion. The figures, detached from immediacy of feeling and external objects, stand in motionless vertical postures. Although their positions seem quite rigid and formal, Jacobsz has avoided full face and profile. Instead he paints three-quarter profiles with eyes turned directly outward, deflecting the direction of the gaze from the direction of the body. This position expresses both the will-less self-containment of the figures and their receptivity to objective reality - the attitude discussed earlier with reference to Schopenhauer.

Riegl indicates what objectivising compositional devices are employed in Jacobsz's *Militia Company*. The wooden barriers and upright postures of the figures effect a composition crossed by architectonic horizontals and verticals. This strict regimentation is combined with unifying devices typical of the Italian style - symmetry and a dominant centre. The figures are locked in a plane inaccessible to the spectator. It is thus pictorially expressive of the kind of attention which regards its objects as fundamentally independent and self-contained.

Despite its pronounced objective quality, Riegl sees in Jacobsz's painting the seeds of a style which, one hundred years later, is to surpass the level of subjectivity achieved by the Italian High Renaissance. He points to its
subjectivising features. The jagged bottom row of heads breaks architectonic clarity and highly modelled heads and hands protrude from the plane. The painting completely lacks perspectival space, but according to Riegl, the dark, uniform background is an attempt to represent the homogeneity of free space between figures and, as such, it prefigures the seventeenth-century Dutch method of representing space which renders a painting coherent by suspending the figures in an optically homogeneous atmosphere.

§5. The genre-like type

According to Riegl's account of Dutch stylistic development, between the years 1580 and 1624 group portraiture assimilated genre elements. Since the term 'genre' is fraught with confusion we must spell out what force it has in Riegl's terminology. He suggests that a change in religious attitudes was accompanied by a change in the treatment of religious painting. During the sixteenth century, particularly in northern Europe, morality came to be considered an attribute of the individual conscience instead of an objective norm. In Holland this change resulted in a tendency to represent religious scenes as though personally witnessed by the spectator instead of as alien, objective events. This 'intimate' representation of historical events stripped of grandeur, Riegl calls 'genremässig' (genre-like) and he associates it with the tradition of paintings of country folk and low life stemming from Breughel the Elder.

In this type of painting the focus is turned from the objective historical fact or outward event and toward the
inward spiritual life of the individuals depicted. Part of that inner life is the feeling and emotional exchange between people, das Gemüt. Accordingly, while the Kunstwollen of the symbolic group portrait is the depiction of gefühllose Aufmerksamkeit (attention without feeling), the type influenced by genre conceptions seeks to express aufmerksames Mitgefühl (attentive sympathy). The qualifying adjective 'attentive' is important; it preserves the continuity between the first and second phases and, at the same time, conceptually guards this type of painting against confusion with paintings which make the outward, physical manifestation of emotional exchange (e.g. lovers embracing) the basis of a completely internal coherence.

One way the Genre-like group portrait coheres, then, is by the representation of figures expressing fellow feeling through their gestures. It also makes use of the Italian devices of centering activity around an event and of making figures subordinate to a dominant figure. An important feature of the Genre-like type is the special quality of this event which forms the basis of its coherence. It is not an historical event nor an immediate dramatic event, but a typical, oft-repeated happening like a meal or ceremony (eine genremässige Handlung). Riegl's stress on the recurrent, almost ritualistic nature of the occasion depicted is, I believe, connected with his notions of a development within the history of representation towards depiction of an immediate, instantaneous moment. While the earlier, symbolic type locates both the depiction and the spectator outside time, the later, dramatic type determines both of these at an immediate moment; the Genre-like type has a temporal value between these poles - a generalised time. Here we observe typical, exemplary postures which characterise the action. We will want to see exactly what formal-
visual features of this type give it this curious exemplary quality.

One genre-like group portrait is *The Company of Captain Dirck Rosencrans*\(^{14}\) (1588) by Cornelius Ketel. Riegl notes that a new unifying concept is operating which allows, for the first time, the representation of full figures. Movement rather than the face alone is expressive, and what is expressed is not pure attention but also feeling, which permeates the whole body. The fact that each figure holds a weapon is significant. In Jacobsz's *Militia Company* only a few weapons are displayed to serve as symbolic attributes signifying the nature of the group ('objective, absolute attributes'). Here weapons are distributed amongst the men as if for an actual occasion ('momentary, individual attributes'). The chief unifying device, subordination, is effected by the prominence of the three figures in command. These three form a group which together confronts the spectator. Through the captain's gesture the company is presented to the spectators thus indicating that full genre-completeness includes persons outside the picture. The motif of presentation, in Riegl's view, is specifically Dutch because it is an action whose completion depends upon the implied presence of spectators; its coherence is external, for the act of presentation consists in making the spectators attentive. Riegl regards the exaggerated mannerist postures as expressive of Dutch co-ordination: the men, rather than following a uniform impulse emanating from the captain's command, preserve a degree of autonomy and independence.

The Genre-like phase of Dutch group portraiture is compositionally the most Italianate of the three types. In Ketel's picture the full figures, the checker-board floor,
and the projections and indentations of the architecture behind, clearly indicate an intention to represent tactile, three-dimensional forms 'springing out of depth' (HG, p.113).

Riegl says that the painting is still basically objective in character; meaning that the subject takes his stand-point from the demands of the object, not \textit{v	extsuperscript{i}c	extsuperscript{e} v	extsuperscript{e}r	extsuperscript{s}a}, as strict subjectivity would require. For example, the point of view is very high, making the more distant figures appear to be on a higher plane. From a subjective, eye-level point of view, the back figures would appear behind, not above, the front row. There is no impression of free space moving between figures. This is because, like the Italian type, emphasis is placed on the figures and shapes themselves. Space is represented by perspective construction, overlapping and foreshortening - all haptic means of representing space.

The painting's stress on physicality damages its portrait character, but Riegl believes that a phase of group portraiture strongly influenced by Italian concepts and compositions was necessary in order to arrive at a more advanced form of attention and coherence determined in space and time. His analysis of Rembrandt's development is couched in these terms. Rembrandt, and the third phase generally, first tightens internal coherence through subordination and close grouping and then uses this strong base as a springboard for a kind of external coherence which sets the depicted figures in an immediate temporal and spatial relationship with the spectator.
§6. The dramatic type

Riegl argues that Rembrandt's famous group portraits are Dramatic in conception. This means that the figures participate in some activity which simultaneously subordinates them into an internally coherent group, and brings them into dramatic interplay with the spectator. The spectator is singled out and called upon imaginatively to participate in the space, time and action of the dramatic event. This new demand on the spectator is announced by a depiction which encourages the illusion that the scene is immediate and instantaneous.

In Rembrandt's *Night Watch*, 1642, it is impossible to tell exactly how many figures are represented, indicating how far this painting departs from the traditional norm of group portraiture. Its coherence is effected by subordination - the captain is ordering his lieutenant to have the company march out. The captain makes commanding gesture and the lieutenant responds, turning his head in the direction of the captain. The militia men show their subordination to those in command by preparing for the moment when the order will be given. Subordination and the resulting internal coherence is made clear not so much by action in response to a command, but by the treatment of the company as a more or less uniform background against the officers. This, in Riegl's view, is the ultimate consequence of the principle of subordination - a lack of co-ordination, of attention, of personal characterisation, in short, the denial of group portraiture.

Despite the emphasis on action and subordination, Rembrandt expresses his fundamentally Dutch *Kunstwollen* in the choice of the moment depicted. He does not paint action
itself, but the preparation for it or the psychic intention. Action serves to express the men's attentive attitude. 'Die Malerei der Aufmerksamkeit', Riegl affirms, is still the true artistic end. By depicting intention rather than action itself, Rembrandt's painting demands greater imaginative projection on the part of the perceiving subject. Connection with the spectator is heightened by another, new conception: the appearance of forward movement. Riegl says that the colouristic handling is the visible expression of an imminent movement toward the spectator. This movement is the master stroke: it transforms subordination and internal coherence into a means of creating external coherence - the potential thrust of the action is out of the canvas toward the viewer.

The Night Watch is a great step toward the modern ideal of art as the subjective experience of accidental, momentary action in space. Rembrandt has taken great pains to depict half-completed gestures and includes children 'accidentally' dashing through the crowd. The scene is littered with the partial, fragmentary and contingent - even a barking dog. Also, very nearly disregarding the demands of portraiture, he has used chiaroscuro to its ultimate effect of immersing the figures in vibrating light and circulating space. The figures seem arbitrarily scattered, brought together only through the consciousness of the beholding subject to a purely subjective unity. Nothing, it seems, could be further from the haptic ideal of perceptual clarity and freedom from contingency.

Yet Riegl observes that objectivising features still remain. Close analysis of the painting reveals a highly organised composition. Rembrandt retains, for instance, the plane-adhering and integrating effects of symmetry
both in colouring and in formal composition. The dark
captain in the middle of the composition is flanked by the
brightly costumed lieutenant to one side, and by the chil-
dren caught in a sunbeam on the other. The company behind
them is made up of a horizontal middle row with inclined
wings at either end.

Riegl speculates interestingly on the different meanings
of classic symmetry and that symmetry found in Rembrandt's
art. Classic art, he says, grouped things symmetrically
because symmetry was thought to be a feature of the essen-
tial, objective nature of things unobscured by perception.
Rembrandt's conception is the extreme opposite of this: in
his compositions, symmetry signifies a recognition of the
presence and the position of the beholding subject. Adher-
ence to the plane, another feature of classic art, would
seem to be incompatible with Rembrandt's subjectivising
tendency. Riegl resolves this apparent contradiction by
distinguishing two types of appearance in the plane: the
haptic, in which things are seen from a near view arranged
next to one another in their tangible height and width, and
the optic, in which things distantly perceived appear in
the plane even though they are dispersed in different spa-
tial depths. Riegl believes that in the early paintings
Rembrandt sought to break the haptic plane. Accordingly
he dispersed figures in depth. Later he realised that this
resulted in emphasising physicality. He learned that a
union of figures with free space is only brought about by
the use of optical symmetry and plane composition. In order
to create an optic plane, the interval between figures must
not have the appearance of relief ground, but of freely cir-
culating space. Riegl observes that Rembrandt perfected
this effect in the last decade of his life with the *Syndics.*
§7. Conclusion

Throughout this discussion of *Holländische Gruppenporträt*, I have been concerned to elucidate Riegl's typology of style and to demonstrate its descriptive power. The concept of the *Kunstwollen* has been interpreted as a set of interlocked variables which specifies matters of content and composition. These fundamental elements include methods of making a picture coherent, the spectator's relation to the depiction, and the organisation of the picture in relation to space and time. Various stylistic types manifest and combine with these elements in different ways. Some treatments indicate an artistic ideal which preserves the integrity and isolation of the depiction; others indicate an ideal which values the spectator's contribution.

This very general framework need not be limited in its application to Dutch group portraiture. It is comprehensive enough to provide the basis for a structural description of style. Riegl's historiographic theory imposes a restrictive pattern of development on the history of art, but at the same time it generates a set of descriptive notions which are available for the synchronic analysis of stylistic types. This is its value.

Riegl was aware of the paradoxical consequence of his theory of artistic development: an increasingly subjective conception of the relationship between mind and things eventually dissolves into arbitrary chaos, non-art. He perceived signs of this danger in Impressionism and welcomed the archaic stylisation of some works exhibited by the Vienna Secession. In Hegel's view, the ultimate destiny of art is its own obsolescence. When Mind finally recognises its own purely spiritual character, art is superseded,
becoming discursive thought, philosophy. Riegl, on the other hand, insists to the end on the constant conflict (Auseinandersetzung) between the subject and things. Complete absorption of the object in subjective consciousness means the end of art.\textsuperscript{17}

\textit{Notes}


2. Riegl studied under the Herbartian Robert Zimmermann who taught philosophy at the University of Vienna from 1861. He was also indebted to Adolf von Hildebrand's aesthetic theory based on Herbartian psychology (cf. Hildebrand's \textit{Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst}, Strassburg, 1893).

On Schnaase see his \textit{Niederländische Briefe}, Stuttgart: Cotta, 1834.


6. G.W.F. Hegel, \textit{Aesthetics, Lectures on Fine Art}, trans. T.M. Knox, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. On Egyptian art Hegel writes: the works of the Egyptians 'remain mysterious and dumb, mute and motionless, because here spirit itself has still not really found its own inner life and still cannot speak the clear and distinct language of the spirit' (vol.I, p.354). On Classical and Romantic art: 'In classical art, spirit dominated empirical appearance and permeated it completely because it was in this that it was to acquire its complete reality. But now the inner life is indifferent to the way in which the immediate world is configurated, because immediacy is unworthy of the soul's inner bliss. External appearance cannot any longer express the inner life, and if it is still called to do so it merely has the task of proving that the external is an unsatisfying existence and must point back to the inner, the mind and feeling as the essential element' (vol.II, p.527). On Dutch art cf. vol.I, pp.168-70.
7. See, for example, Alois Riegl, *Historische Grammatik der bildenden Künste*, eds. Karl M. Swoboda and Otto Pächt, Graz-Cologne: Böhlous, 1966, p.76:
Only in his inorganic creations is man fully equal to nature, creating purely from an inner impulse, without external models; as soon as he transgresses this limit and begins to recreate the organic forms of nature, he falls into external dependence on nature and his activity is no longer autonomous, but imitative. Also Alois Riegl, *Stilfragen: Grundlegungen zu einer Geschichte der Ornamentik*, Berlin: Schmidt, 1923 - a book which attempts to demonstrate that ornament has the same cultural significance as the other arts.

8. The subjects of two books: Alois Riegl, *Spätösterreichische Kunstindustrie*, 1927 and *Die Entstehung der Barockkunst in Rom*, 1908, both Vienna.


10. This analogy is more fully explored in my article "Style as Structure: Alois Riegl's Historiography", *Art History*, March 1979.


13. The discussion of this painting is in HG, pp.40-50.

14. The discussion of this painting is in HG, pp.111-124.

15. The discussion of this painting is in HG, pp.192-206.

16. See "Über antike und moderne Kunstfreunde", p.205, where mention is made of the Dutch artist Toorop whose work was exhibited by the Vienna Secession, (printed in Riegl, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*: see footnote 4).

17. HG, p.189.
§1. Kant and the subjectivisation of aesthetics
§2. Bolzano and the theory of the beautiful
§3. Appraising Bolzano's aesthetics

Bolzano is most widely known for his outstanding work in mathematics, philosophy of science, and the philosophy of logic. In this paper however I want to look sympathetically yet critically at the major feature of his most important reflections on aesthetics, his theory of beauty. In order to situate these reflections in the development of modern aesthetics and to make their expression more understandable, I propose in the first section of the paper to review briefly several of the central difficulties in Kant's aesthetic. In §2 I will then make use of Bolzano's criticisms of Kant as an initial means of presenting Bolzano's own philosophical concerns, before sketching further those themes which are peculiar to Bolzano's work alone. Finally in . I will suggest critical questions about Bolzano's theory which call for further attention on the part of his interpreters and also on the part of those interested in a
certain strain of post-Kantian aesthetics.

Although my purposes here remain largely critical ones, I have tried to call attention to textual, historical and interpretative points in some of the accompanying notes. My larger purpose is to suggest in a general way only that Bolzano's aesthetics, specifically his investigations into the concept of the beautiful, represent more than just an important and almost completely overlooked criticism of Kant's well-known views; these investigations provide the basic link between Kantian aesthetics and the work of the later Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, and Ingarden. In short, Bolzano's aesthetics include the initial elements of what might be called the realist tradition in modern aesthetics.

§1. Kant and the subjectivisation of aesthetics

In this section I want to recall in a general way several of the central difficulties which arise out of Kant's analytic of the beautiful in his Critique of Judgment. These difficulties will help us establish the philosophical context in which Bolzano's reflections on aesthetics are situated.

There are a number of controversial elements in Kant's analysis of the nature of aesthetic judgment. One problem is the ambiguity in Kant's account of judgment as presented in the Third Critique and elsewhere (most notably perhaps in the distinction in the First Critique between analytic and synthetic) between the act of judging, the contents of that act, and a spatio-temporal correlate for these contents. Although Kant takes great pains in his account of aesthetic judgment to draw on the analysis
of mental acts which he develops in his previous two critiques, nowhere does he remove the ambiguities which continually play around his use of the word 'judgment'. This is unfortunate. For unless we can determine, in each of the four moments of his analysis of those judgments which deal with the beautiful, just which of these different senses are preeminent, we continually run the risk of either, at one extreme, reading Kant's account as hopelessly psychologistic, or, at the other, of taking Kant's account as nothing more than a prelude to some more adequate linguistic treatment of the same matters. Are we, in other words, to construe aesthetic judgments as empirical events in individual minds, or are we to understand them as a species of mental sentence? In the first case any claims about universality and necessity would be definitively excluded, while in the second, whatever necessity which might at least be claimed, could be argued away by those unsympathetic to it as analytic only. When we re-read the Third Critique with this question in mind, then I think we must conclude that neither of these interpretations does justice to Kant's aims here. His analysis of aesthetic judgment, that is, must be taken neither as merely psychologistic nor as merely linguistic. But exactly how we are to mediate between these extremes while giving Kant's own expressions their proper due is not at first glance obvious.

For a second, and related difficulty pervades Kant's account. Kant, as we may have noticed, is not uninterested in developing arguments against opposed interpretations of the nature of aesthetic judgments. It is striking that so many of these arguments turn on Kant's insistence that aesthetic judgments are indeterminate. In other words, as reflective judgments aesthetic judgments do not function with the help of antecedent concepts. This doctrine is
central to Kant's treatment of the basically disinterested character of aesthetic judgments. The difficulty here of course is in trying to account both for the lack of any determinate control exercised over aesthetic judgments by clear and perspicuous concepts and at the same time for the nonetheless somewhat specific nature of aesthetic judgment.

Here once again Kant's way of making his point can be importantly confusing. Thus he speaks as if there were no conceptual control at all in aesthetic judgment, while still recognising in the practice of art the role of what Plato construed as exemplary causes. Kant provides us with no graduated range of conceptual possibilities to draw on here as an effective means for dealing with his puzzling talk. We are not sure at places if Kant wants us to think of pre-conceptual rather than non-conceptual modes of thinking. And more specifically in the case of conceptual thought itself, Kant allows us here no distinction between concepts that are confused rather than clear, complete rather than incomplete, justified rather than non-justified, and so on. In short, we are left just as in the case of his talk about judgments with no more than our own rough approximations to Kant's intentions as a way of arguing our felt conviction that Kant wants to retain at least some pre-conceptual control over the contents of aesthetic judgments. Some conceptual control is thus necessary for the well-foundedness of aesthetic judgments. But just what kind of control remains inexplicit.

A third difficulty in Kant's account is the link between the feelings of pleasure and displeasure and the nature of aesthetic judgment. For Kant the link is essential. And of course in holding that there is some sort of
relation between pleasure and aesthetic judgment Kant is doing no more than following a remarkably consistent pattern in the history of aesthetics. For not only do Plato and Aristotle both insist on this connection, although each is careful to draw different conclusions from such a conjunction, Augustine and Aquinas, too, award a central place to pleasure in their respective aesthetic theories. The problem is, rather, that unlike his classical and medieval predecessors in this matter, and most curiously unlike his habitual practice with almost all of his other cardinal concepts in the Third Critique, Kant takes virtually no interest whatsoever in explaining to his readers just what he understands by his very varied uses of the word 'pleasure'.

This practice once again is seriously disconcerting. For one of the cornerstones of Kant's doctrine of aesthetic judgment is the idea of disinterested pleasure. And it is from the well-foundedness of this idea that Kant wants to derive, in a loose sense of this logical term, his further characterisation of aesthetic judgments as judgments having universal import. To make this point Kant even varies the usual order of the four moments as he expounds them in the First Critique, electing in the Third Critique to begin with the moment of quality rather than with that of quantity. If, then, we are unclear as to the sense underlying Kant's use of the term 'pleasure', we must remain equally if not more unclear about the sense of his term 'disinterested pleasure'. And if confusion remains on this point, then how are we to comprehend the connections which Kant repeatedly insists on between disinterested pleasure and universalisability?
It is critically important to note that such reflections are not simply quibbles about a certain inevitable degree of obscurity which is characteristically involved in attempts to define central philosophical terms. Kant's various uses of the word 'pleasure' here - some commentators such as Coleman have described at least seven distinct senses of the term - leave us in a quite peculiarly difficult situation if we are to assess the validity of his arguments for the necessity of the connection between pleasure and aesthetic judgments. This defect in Kant's analysis is all the more consequential to the degree that, without such clarification for his defence, even sympathetic critics are left with too few resources for resisting the conclusion that Kant's insistence on a necessary connection is quite simply misplaced. Thus, many would hold that we can properly speak of aesthetic judgments not only in those cases where feelings of pleasure or displeasure accompany such judgments, but just as well in those other cases where the putatively beautiful object leaves us either indifferent or with no feelings of pleasure or displeasure at all. Consider the indifference and sometimes complete and utter lack of feeling that often assails even the careful critic who spends too long of an afternoon in a particularly outstanding museum.

This important point is well put in Coleman's comment on this topic:

Like many other objects in the world, a work of art can hold the attention without likes or dislikes being summoned to the scene...aesthetic judgment is broader than feeling pleasure or displeasure, judgments of aesthetic mediocrity or indifference are no less aesthetic judgments for being concerned with what is neither pleasurable nor unpleasurable. Moreover, aesthetic judgment is often engaged in discernment or detection just as much as in enjoyment and delectation. If one is interested in
something — even 'disinterested' in Kant's sense — it does not necessarily follow that we must be interested hedonically.

How are we to deal with appraisals such as these when Kant himself foregoes defining more carefully one of his most central terms?

A fourth difficulty which is raised by Kant's doctrine of aesthetic judgment has to do with the provocative account he provides of the free play of imagination and understanding.\(^9\) Kant holds that it is precisely the harmony of this play of our intellectual faculties which generates the feelings of pleasure which are said to be the necessary concomitants of aesthetic judgments. We need not here of course insist on the easily remedied confusion which Kant's habitual talk of faculties involves. Like his predecessors and his contemporaries Kant continued to speak of the mind in terms of separate faculties regardless of several apparent consequences of his epistemology as to the existence or non-existence of such entities. Moreover, in the case of aesthetic judgments, Kant never tired of formulating his views in terms of the faculty of taste,\(^{10}\) instead of addressing the nature of aesthetic judgment without appeal to any such intermediary. We need not follow Kant in these practices however; when Kant speaks of the faculties of understanding, imagination and taste, we need only talk of understanding, imagining, or judging something to be beautiful.

But a difficulty does arise just as soon as we try to pin down exactly what it is that Kant means by the 'free play' of understanding and imagining and part of this difficulty is related to the earlier problem as to whether or not all aesthetic judgments unify their contents in terms of concepts, and if so in terms of just what kinds of concepts. For the 'freedom' Kant has in mind here, at least
in the case of imaginings, has to do basically with a freedom from at least some kinds of clear conceptual constraints. But this is not all of the difficulty. For what needs still further sorting out is Kant's perspective here. When he speaks of 'free play' and 'harmony', does he have in mind the aesthetic judgments of artists in the throes of creation or audiences in the tangles of artistic appreciation? The difference here is important. For it poses little problem for Kant's account if we focus our attention on the role that exemplarity plays in artistic conception. In fact, this case seems to be the central one for Kant. But when we turn to the vagaries which accompany the making of aesthetic judgments on the part of an individual patron or an audience as a whole, then there seems to be little if any role for exemplary causes at all. And if we set such entities aside, then just which features of the audience's experience are relevant to Kant's 'free play of understanding and imagination'? Kant assumes, I think, the relevance of his analysis to the case of the artist. But in leaving on the margins of his account the appeal to the free play of imagination and understanding in the aesthetic judgments of an audience, he invites criticism of the universality which he claims for this feature. In short, more than just artists make aesthetic judgments. And in the case of non-artists Kant leaves obscure whether there too we can speak of a harmony of the faculties generating feelings of pleasure or displeasure in those making aesthetic judgments.

A fifth and perhaps the most important difficulty with Kant's account has to do with his analysis of form. Kant wants to distinguish between temporal forms which he calls 'play' and non-temporal (mostly spatial) forms which he calls 'figure'. Unlike the immediately perceived features of non-temporal form, the features of temporal form require
the work of the imagination to produce some kind of synthesis for the operation of judgment. Kant takes pains to insist that the aesthetic use of the word 'form' is not meant to include 'shape' as such, or even a particular 'fixed form' such as that which is a necessary feature in certain genres of, say, the literary arts such as the sonnet. Rather, although each of these may be associated with aesthetic forms, what is peculiarly distinctive of aesthetic form is its connection with the individuality of the object which as judged as beautiful. For this reason of course Kant holds that aesthetic judgments are singular even though they are universalisable. A further point which needs notice is that Kant does not construe this individual form with the help of abstraction from the material contents of aesthetic judgment. Aesthetic judgments have content and some of this content includes what Kant wants to call aesthetic form. This aesthetic form, as Coleman has noted, 'arises out of the interplay' of the different ways in which the contents of the aesthetic judgment are organised, of the varieties, we might say, with which certain aesthetic constraints within a given medium are interrelated.

Kant goes on to distinguish between pure form as opposed to mere form. Mere form is linked with Kant's idea of dependent beauty. That is, like dependent beauty, mere form relies upon a concept of what the beautiful thing must be in its perfected state. Pure form on the other hand is linked with Kant's idea of free beauty. Like free beauty, pure form does not involve this dependence on a concept. Again this talk of concepts is disconcerting because Kant does not make the notion any more specific. The basic problem however is making sense of what Kant means here by pure form or aesthetic form properly speaking.
Some have suggested that aesthetic form '...is either what the artist imparts by the workings of his own subjective schematism, or what the perceiver, in aesthetic judgment, recognizes as what would be an expression of his own subjective schematism.' But this interpretation is complicated by the additional problem of sorting out Kant's earlier and difficult doctrine of the schematism.

The basic idea of a schema is the capacity to articulate in a temporal mode categories and concepts, a capacity to articulate models which include categories and concepts. Although the schemata of sensibility,' Kant writes in the First Critique

first realize the categories, they at the same time restrict them, that is, limit them to conditions which lie outside the understanding, and are due to sensibility. The schema is, properly, only the phenomenon, or sensible concept of an object in agreement with the categories.

In the 'Analytic of the Sublime' in the Third Critique Kant applies this doctrine to the imagination. He holds there that the imagination involves a kind of spontaneity which is associated with our feelings of pleasure and displeasure. This spontaneity appears to impose an individual form on the central contents of the aesthetic judgment. The idea then seems to be this: the artist in making aesthetic judgments does so in the light of his own previous experience of styles, conventions, traditions, and what not - in short, in terms of a schema. It is this standard which the artist continually calls on individually when he comes to make particular judgments about beautiful things. The schema is thus a general, partially indeterminate framework or open set of regularities which functions as a principle in accordance with which aesthetic judgments are made. Such an influence on the contents of the aesthetic judgment might then be construed as an imposition of form. The form
imposed on the contents however is not at all the classical correlate of matter in the Aristotelian and later scholastic metaphysics. Rather, it is a subjective schematism to which contents of individual aesthetic judgments are spontaneously referred through 'free play of the imagination'. A similar schematism may be taken as operative in aesthetic judgments made by audiences. Such schematism Kant holds to be produced by the pure categories when they are subsumed under space and time.\(^\text{17}\)

When we reflect again on at least these five kinds of difficulty which threaten the final satisfactoriness of Kant's aesthetics in the Critique of Judgment, on the difficulties, that is, with such major themes as judgment, concept, pleasure, harmony, and form, then I think it not unfair to talk of a 'subjectivisation of aesthetics'. The subjectivisation of aesthetics in Kant's work is nothing more nor less than the preeminence of the form and contents of aesthetic judgments over their spatio-temporal correlates. The central theme of early modern aesthetics is not the transformation of the theory of beauty into the theory of the aesthetic. Nor, either, is it the gradual eclipse of the cognitivity of the art-work. The subjectivisation of aesthetics calls out for a systematic inquiry into those essential ambiguities which Kant leaves finally untouched in his account of the nature of aesthetic judgments. I want to suggest in this paper that Bolzano's analysis of the concept of the beautiful, whatever difficulties it may have of its own, is one essential step in carrying through such an inquiry.
§2. Bolzano and the theory of the beautiful

With these five difficulties in Kant's discussion of the beautiful in the *Critique of Judgment* in reasonably clear view, I want now to turn to Bolzano's aesthetics.18 My initial purpose here will be to situate Bolzano's own discussion of the beautiful in terms of his account of Kant.19 Having made this transition, I want then to enlarge upon what he shows us of his own views in his discussion of Kant by paying closer attention to what he himself has to say about each individual theme.

Bolzano's most important work on aesthetics is his *Über den Begriff des Schönen: Eine philosophische Abhandlung* which first appeared in Prague in 1843 as a separate publication and was then reprinted in the *Transactions of the Royal Bohemian Academy of Sciences* in 1845, three years before his death at the age of 67.20 This essay of little more than a hundred pages made up of 57 sections of unequal length can conveniently be divided into roughly six parts: an introduction (section 1), an initial characterisation of the beautiful (sections 2-13), a formulation of the concept of the beautiful (sections 14-15), consequences and corollaries of this formulation (sections 16-18), objections (sections 19-25), and finally a long historical discussion (sections 26-57) which accounts for more than half of the essay's length. Bolzano's discussion of Kant occurs, as might be expects, at the centre of this lengthy historical survey. It consists almost exclusively of an exposition of Kant's treatment of the four 'moments' of quality, quantity, relation and modality.

Bolzano begins his discussion on a critical note. For he observes that Kant, far from providing us with a single
definition of the beautiful as Bolzano himself does in section 14, has left us with four definitions. Moreover, each of these is supposed to represent the beautiful in terms of the respective four categories in which any object whatsoever, whether beautiful or otherwise, can be exhaustively described. Bolzano is ironic here ("Aus Liebe zu seinen Kategorien...beschenkte uns Kant...") about the doctrine of the categories. But he is also plainly dissatisfied with several of the proposed definitions for three substantive reasons. The last three definitions seem, like the first, to describe a quality of the beautiful, and hence are not clearly separate definitions at all. The second definition deals with universality rather than, as Kant claims, with 'quantity'. And the third definition Bolzano reads as relevant to the 'relation' in only the narrowest of senses. Difficulties of this sort lead Bolzano to examine each of the four definitions more closely.

The first definition Bolzano paraphrases from Kant's Third Critique as 'the beautiful is what pleases disinterestedly', and reminds us us that what Kant means by 'interest' here is the feeling we associate with the representation of the existence of an object. In the case of something beautiful the feeling we have is bound up with the representation of the object only and not with the representation of its existence. Bolzano however finds this account unacceptable. He points out that Kant's use of the term 'interest' does not correspond to any of our everyday uses of the term - which Bolzano goes on to describe:

When we find something interesting we usually mean (1) that the thing merits our attention, or (2) that we can expect for ourselves some advantage from this thing. But in neither sense must we say that when we find something 'interesting' we must find in ourselves some kind of feeling
related to the existence of the object.

Specifically, Bolzano wants to say, when what is at issue is a beautiful object, then it is surely false to claim that we have no interest in the beautiful when 'interest' is understood in either of its two usual senses. In short, Kant's first definition would seem to be persuasive only if we are willing to follow him in adopting his peculiar and unusual sense of this term. But not only does Kant give us no reasons to make this adoption, his unargued construal of this term seems indeed in some of the centrally interesting cases to result in a false account.\(^{23}\)

The second definition Bolzano paraphrases as 'the beautiful is what without concepts pleases generally', which is supposed to be a consequence of the first definition.\(^{24}\) Bolzano carefully cites a number of other texts in order to follow, if he can, the precise relation which Kant sees between the two definitions.\(^{25}\) But he does not succeed. What pleases generally is what pleases everyone, Kant says. Bolzano tries to clarify the sense of this '\textit{jedermann}' employed by Kant and concludes that not only God but many other persons must be excluded from it. For Kant has in mind here every person of a certain level of cultivation. Kant's definition thus is too broadly construed and hence, Bolzano concludes, the purported general proof of this definition must break down because it would have to prove too much.

A more interesting objection is Bolzano's distinction between concepts which are required for the effecting of certain judgments and concepts of which we are conscious when effecting such judgments. Bolzano uses this distinction to challenge the first reason Kant adduces for his
claim that judgments of taste are judgments without concepts, and cites against him both his own repeated remarks about the imagination and the understanding in B 28 as well as his example in B 49. The second justification which Kant provides for his claim that there is no transition from concepts to feelings of desire or lack of desire (B18), Bolzano also finds inadequate. For he cites as a counterexample the feelings which arise in someone who becomes acquainted with a particular kind of object solely by means of theoretical concepts. Thus, since neither justification withstands criticism, Bolzano concludes that the second definition must also be set aside.

The third definition is paraphrased as 'the beautiful is what seems to us purposeful without our having nevertheless a representation of its purpose'. Kant holds that something beautiful which is the object of a judgment of taste cannot have either a subjective or an objective purpose and yet may and must have a form of purposefulness. Bolzano rejects this doctrine because he claims that it depends, in the end, on two previous contentions which he has already rejected, namely that the feeling of beauty has to be connected with the representation and not the existence of an object and that there can be no transition from any kind of a concept to a feeling for something beautiful.

Again however there is a more interesting objection. Bolzano holds that Kant's doctrine of a 'form of purposefulness without purpose' involves substantive and not just verbal contradictions. Precisely in the many circumlocutions Kant employs to convey this doctrine, the question arises as to just how, if there is no purpose, the form of purposefulness is to be recognised. For Bolzano 'the perception of purposefulness...always presupposes perception of a
definite purpose."\(^{27}\) Hence for Bolzano if there is no purpose there can be no form of purposefulness. What we find in beautiful things, Bolzano holds, is not purpose at all, but rules and concepts. When we consider a rose as something beautiful, we find a series of regularities which leads to our taking a kind of pleasure in the rose which we then go on to judge as something beautiful.

And the final definition Bolzano paraphrases as 'the beautiful is what without concepts is recognised nonetheless as an object of a necessary feeling of well-being'.\(^{28}\) Bolzano concurs with Kant's view that the necessity at issue here is not an objective necessity so long as the judgments of taste under discussion have empirical objects (like, for example, this rose). But in those cases where the objects at issue are pure concepts (such as, for example, virtue), then Bolzano thinks that we cannot get away from objective necessity. Moreover, although Bolzano is willing to follow Kant in speaking of a distinction among objective, theoretical and practical necessity,\(^{29}\) he finds Kant's talk of 'exemplary necessity' almost incomprehensible as also his talk of certain kinds of universality.\(^{30}\) Most interesting perhaps is Bolzano's criticism here that Kant's peculiar use of the word 'feeling' indicates clearly that he is not talking about feeling at all but about a kind of knowing.\(^{31}\)

Now this, or something like it, is the substance of Bolzano's critique of Kant. It provides several indications of the approach which he himself would follow, but just what, then, is the gist of Bolzano's own view?

Bolzano's aim in his short treatise on the beautiful is to provide a clarification, or a definition in the broad
sense of the term, for the concept of the beautiful. His main concern is to determine whether what we usually call the beautiful refers to something simple or to something complex. If the latter, then an additional task is that of determining which of several conceivable referents is the most appropriate one.

In order to help his readers understand just what is to count as a clarification Bolzano sets out four preparatory points. He begins by recalling that philosophers often change their minds about what they mean by certain key words and phrases. What Bolzano himself is aiming at here, however, 'objective propositions and truths' and 'objective concepts and representations', do not allow of any subjective changes in their meanings at all. This contrast between objective and subjective is worked out in great detail in the first two volumes of Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre to which he here alludes. But the point of the distinction may be seen more succinctly in his example in the present text of a contrast between objective concept (Begriff an sich) and concept or idea (Begriff oder Vorstellung). The word 'God' in philosophy, Bolzano claims, signifies a single objective concept only, even though there may well be an indefinite number of individual concepts and ideas or presentations of God. In the case of the beautiful then Bolzano's clarification consisted in the attempt to formulate the objective concept of the beautiful, the unchangeable sense, Bolzano adds (in a reference to the practice of his own times, which still retained the schoolbook tradition of Leibniz, Baumgarten, Wolff and Kant), which is and should be found in university manuals in aesthetics.
A second feature of what Bolzano calls a clarification is the rule that each objective concept is to be provided with one definition or clarification only. Not only, then, are the same words to be used in the same senses, but above all the same objective concepts are not to be defined in more than one way. What Bolzano wants to reject are examples such as I.H. Fichte's definition of the absolute, while he wishes to retain examples like the mathematician's definition of a square.\(^3^4\)

A third point about clarification is the need for a certain kind of simplicity. Bolzano concedes that some objective concepts may indeed be complex. He insists however that each complex be clarified in such a way that it can be seen just how the complex is built up from the connection of simple components. This procedure Bolzano thinks not only contributes to clarity but in important respects reflects both some of the ways we actually use objective concepts and some of the ways this usage has been learned. Yet Bolzano is caution here also, for he does not want to commit himself to the false view that any component which can be found in objects of a concept would have to be an actual component of the concept.\(^3^5\)

If the beautiful is an instance of a complex concept, then a clarification of the beautiful must include all of the components of this complex but not all of the properties which its objects have.

Finally, Bolzano raises the question of just how a putative clarification is to be justified and thereby made persuasive both for oneself and for others. If the clarification is of a simple objective concept, then the only final justification consists in showing the inadequacies
of alternative suggestions. If however a complex objective concept is at issue, then both the component parts and their relations must be specified and the concept shown to be neither too narrow nor too broad. This second case Bolzano underlines as much more difficult than the first. For finally the justification of a putative clarification here is to be found through repeated acts of introspection only. Bolzano does not speak explicitly of intuition. But he insists on the need for repeated attempts to direct our attention to those mental acts which both consist of and accompany our thinking of the beautiful.

When Bolzano proposes, then, to formulate a clarificatory definition of the beautiful, he aims at providing one and not several articulations of an objective concept which, if complex, must include all and only those components and relations which are proper to it alone.

Once these four preliminary points have been made, Bolzano begins his analysis of the beautiful by making several exclusions. The beautiful, he holds, is not to be confounded with either the good or the pleasant, or the charming. So far as the good is concerned, although many good things can rightly be called beautiful, not all beautiful things are properly to be called good; they often are called good simply on the basis of custom. As regards the pleasant, so long as we use the word in its habitual sense as what gives rise to pleasurable feelings and therefore refuse to follow Kant's usage which Bolzano considers unjustified, we can agree that there is a connection between the pleasant and the beautiful. But Bolzano finds an asymmetry here: everything beautiful either gives or can give pleasure, but not everything pleasureable can be considered beautiful. Some things are rightly judged beautiful, moreover,
which do not affect the senses at all.

As regards the charming, which Bolzano takes as what arouses a certain desire in us, a further asymmetry is to be found. Again the beautiful turns out to be the broader concept in that whilst all beautiful things are charming, not all charming things are beautiful.

Bolzano's comments here are all too brief to be truly convincing. But once we recall that the point of these exclusions is to allow a more unobstructed view of the concept of the beautiful and not to enter into the kind of detailed investigation of the peculiar overlaps between the beautiful and other, less general concepts already carried out by Kant, I think his brevity here is not objectionable.

Bolzano's next move is to isolate the relevant characteristics of the beautiful. His initial question is not: to what features of the object are our thoughts directed when we perceive it as beautiful? He is concerned rather with the question of how something beautiful brings about a feeling of pleasure in the perceiving subject, about the kind of considerations going on in the perceiving subject's consciousness which result in - as opposed merely to being accompanied by - a feeling of pleasure. And the phenomenon he settles on is the lightness and rapidity with which certain thoughts occur, such that we experience no need to make ourselves clearly conscious of these thoughts in any strictly conceptual manner. Bolzano's point is that considering something beautiful is accompanied by a sequence of thoughts moving so quickly and lightly that we are able to follow them through without needing to explicate their contents in any fulfilled way as concepts. A contrasting
case might be the consideration of a complex mathematical proof where the sequence of thoughts must be explicated conceptually if the proof is to be grasped at all. In both cases there is pleasure, but only in the first case, Bolzano holds, are we properly dealing with pleasure in the beautiful. Two components of the beautiful can therefore be signified as follows:

We call an object beautiful if its mere consideration provides us with pleasure, a consideration which we carry out with such a facility that not even in a single case do we need to become conscious of its accompanying thoughts.36

In order to find further components of the beautiful Bolzano now returns to the question which he had earlier postponed, namely to the question as to precisely what it is to which our thoughts might be directed when we find ourselves considering something beautiful. Whatever this feature or features may be, Bolzano, like Kant, wants to hold that our judgment that something is beautiful includes a certain kind of claim of universality. Bolzano tries to specify in a different way than Kant however just what kind of universality is involved here. And he insists on the observation that persons differ in their receptivity to what is beautiful as a function of their education, their powers of understanding, and the relative practice they have in exercising these powers. These qualifications he holds must be kept in mind if we are to answer the question about what our thoughts are directed to in the consideration of something beautiful.

When we consider something beautiful, Bolzano claims, we are involved in asking what kind of thing this something is. In other words we are looking for a particular concept or a particular representation or a particular rule which would allow us to deduce the properties of the thing in
question. Since intuitions here are insufficient by themselves, the kind of representation that is being sought cannot be a simple one but must be complex. When something is considered as beautiful, then, not just intuition but all our intellectual powers must be involved. And as remarked earlier, memory, imagination, understanding, judgment, and reason, must be all of them already developed to some degree and antecedently exercised on beautiful things.

Besides the content of our considerations - namely particular concepts, representations or rules - Bolzano tries to specify also the source from which our pleasure in the consideration of beautiful things arises. Here Bolzano holds that whatever increases our natural powers is perceived as pleasure - whereas whatever decreases these powers is perceived as pain. Even our becoming conscious of some natural powers is to be considered as pleasure. The stronger a particular natural power is, the more pleasure we derive from its increase. The pleasure we derive from the consideration of something beautiful, Bolzano continues, does not arise from its utility but from the activation of our various natural and especially intellectual powers. Something beautiful sets these powers to work in such a way that they are neither too little nor too much engaged for no not to be able to notice their growth in power. What we fell then is the increase in our natural intellectual powers. And this feeling brings about pleasure.

Bolzano is especially careful to support this part of his theory as if he were ready to acknowledge just how important a role his analysis of the source of aesthetic pleasure will play in his clarificatory definition of the beautiful. Thus, besides providing an interesting descrip-
tion of how this pleasure process is supposed to work, and besides detailing three extended examples which aim to exhibit why we find a spiral, a fable and a riddle beautiful, Bolzano offers what he calls two proofs for his view. The first\textsuperscript{37} is simply the assertion that our pleasure in the beautiful can be explained on no other general grounds than the case he has cited, for there are numberless cases where no other explanation can be found. Bolzano challenges us to explain his previous examples in an equally satisfying way with the help of some other theory than his own. And the second proof he offers\textsuperscript{38} is that the degree of pleasure which the consideration of something beautiful allows increases directly in proportion to the demands it makes on our intellectual powers. Although each of these 'proofs' invites closer attention and although the apparently psychologistic character of parts of his description needs examination, nonetheless when placed alongside Bolzano's individual formulations and examples they do serve will as reinforcements for the well-foundedness of his views.

With a series of components worked out, and after having reassured himself that the synthesis of just these features will lead to a concept that is neither too narrow nor too broad, Bolzano now moves to formulate his definition of the beautiful. His conclusion might be paraphrased as follows: a beautiful object is one whose consideration by any person with developed intellectual powers results in pleasure. The basis of this pleasure is that it be neither too easy nor too difficult for such a person – who at the moment of perception does not in fact take the trouble to reach conceptual clarity, – once some of the object's properties have been grasped, to form such a concept that would eventually allow him to work out through further consideration its remaining perceptual properties. In the given moment
however the readiness of his intellectual powers allows the individual to arrive at a 'dark intuition'.

This account is of course a highly condensed one. But once we recall the earlier reflections which led Bolzano to his formulation I think even some of the more obscure elements become reasonably clear.

Bolzano now completes his account with two further steps. He first draws certain consequences of his definition, and then tries to anticipate the objections his definition may provoke. I will deal here with the first only and leave the second for closer scrutiny in the final section of this paper where I raise the question as to just how adequate Bolzano's theory is.

The major consequences, then, are four. This theory is said to allow us to account for the fact that we often cannot express why we find something to be beautiful. For it is the very facility and alacrity of our thinking when considering the beautiful object which in part gives rise to the pleasure we experience. Moreover, the theory is also said to allow us to account for the fact that it is especially our two highest senses, of sight and of hearing, that provide us with representations of perceptual beauty. For the senses of smell and taste are too uniform to allow us to observe the workings of a particular rule whose discovery sufficiently engages our intellectual powers. A third consequence, Bolzano thinks, is that this theory allows us to understand why a beautiful object can bring us pleasure by offering aspects of itself which we have not previously noticed. For some beautiful things - Bolzano mentions paintings and long poems - require varied, prolonged, and repeated consideration if all their relevant parts and
relations are to be grasped in an appropriate way. And finally, the theory is said to allow us to understand why different individuals are responsive to different kinds of beautiful things. For an individual's response to beautiful things is a function of the development of his or her intellectual powers.

So much for the major elements of Bolzano's theory of the beautiful.

§3. Appraising Bolzano's aesthetics

If these are the main lines of Bolzano's investigations of the concept of the beautiful, when then are we to make of them? I want to look first at the criticism which Bolzano himself anticipated of his work, then at the adequacy of his own criticisms of Kant, and finally at two general features of his theory of the beautiful.

Bolzano takes some pains to anticipate a number of objections against his theory and to respond to each in turn. Since one of these turns on the topic of the ugly which I have not had time to consider in this (abbreviated) consideration of Bolzano's theory, I will deal briefly with the remaining six objections only.

The first objection is that the theory presupposes that all beautiful objects are complexes comprising dependent parts and their interrelations. But some beautiful objects such as a single tone or a colour are simples. Hence the theory is too narrowly construed. Bolzano's replies include a number of incidental remarks about perception and the science of his day. Although, as he points out, whether or
not there are simples was a controversial topic for his contemporaries, in any case neither a single note nor a colour can be taken as without parts. So since the examples fail the question remains open whether the theory is in fact too broad, as alleged. There is however another issue concealed here, to which I shall return later on.

A second objection is that Bolzano's theory presupposes that some complexes are so difficult to grasp that they cannot count as beautiful objects. Yet the history of the humanities - of, say, classical scholarship - shows that some understanding (for example of the proper sense of archaic lexical items in Greek epigrammatic poetry) allows us finally to perceive this poetry as an instance of something beautiful and yet may require several generations of arduous scholarly work for its realisation. Again, the theory seems to be too narrowly construed in taking only those objects to be beautiful which can be grasped without too much difficulty. Bolzano replies with a distinction between those considerations which lead up to an apprehension of the object as beautiful and those which accompany that apprehension. The first indeed, as his favourite examples from mathematics show, may require prodigious and protracted effort, but the second he insists must be neither too facile nor too difficult if the object is to be apprehended as beautiful.

A third objection turns on the claim that Bolzano's theory confuses the beautiful with the regular. But although many rule-governed things, such as complicated astronomical clocks, may indeed be beautiful, some beautiful things are not regular at all. Again, the theory seems too exclusive. Bolzano replies that not every kind of regularity is a condition for beauty but only that kind which can
be grasped in an anticipatory way without going through with the complete conceptual analysis of the object in question. Consequently, the theory does leave room for some kinds of beautiful complexes which will, after analysis, show themselves finally not to be rule-governed in the sense specified. What is necessary is an initial apprehension of the possibility of rule-governedness such that a person's intellectual powers are sufficiently engaged to arouse feelings of pleasure at the idea of their being augmented through continuation of their present activity.

A related objection holds that Bolzano's theory would necessarily construe the beautiful object as the result of the rule-governed activity of the artist or creator. Since however art must arise out of the free interplay of the artist's perceptual, emotional and intellectual powers, Bolzano's theory effectively subjects all artistic activity to the exaggerated constraints of determined rules. And any object which as the result of such activity exhibits this determination will displease rather than please. Bolzano replies once again with a distinction, this time the familiar one between the production of a beautiful object and the properties of the object produced. He argues that what is at issue in the definition of the beautiful is not the first but the second only. Nonetheless he grants that however much rule governed activity goes into the production of the beautiful object, those norms must not be exhibited as such in the object itself. But this point demands a certain caveat. For there must, according to Bolzano's theory, be regular relations subsisting among the parts of the beautiful object. These regularities however must not be manifest in such a way that they detract from the perfection of the work as they might well do, for example, were one series of rules to be abandoned for another
series half way through the completion of a work. This ob­
jection then, although it raises several important issues,
is basically irrelevant; for what is at issue is now an ob­
ject appears to us, and not, in the end, the related but
different question as to how the object has been produced.

A fifth objection focuses on the key terms facility and
alacrity in Bolzano's theory. Here the claim is that the
theory leads if not to an absurd at least to an unwelcome
conclusion to the effect that the more easily and the more
quickly we grasp the regularities which govern the beauti­
ful object, the more beautiful that object must be. The
eexample cited is that of a play: the more easily and quick­
ly we can anticipate its conclusion then, according to the
theory, the more beautiful the play. But, to stay with this
example alone, such a consequence is unwelcome just because
it would privilege the most pedestrian of dramas, say early
nineteenth century sentimental comedies, and devalue the
best of our tragedies, such as Sophocles' Oedipus, where
an unforeseeable turning point is part of the essence of
the play's success. Bolzano replies with a simple denial
that this consequence follows from his theory. To the con­
trary, he argues, such a result could not follow from a
theory which requires above all that a person's intellectual
powers first be sufficiently engaged. But dramas whose
opening scene allow us infallibly to predict their outcome
are insufficiently complicated to allow of the particular
kinds of pleasure which arise from our considerations of
beautiful objects.

Finally, a last objection (given our limitations here)
is that the concept of the beautiful is too widely employed
for its definition to include so many elements organised in
such a complicated way. For it would seem that virtually
all human beings employ some kind of a distinction between the beautiful and the ugly. Moreover this distinction is learned by almost all human beings at an early age. So either the beautiful is in fact a simple concept, or it is one which is at least less complicated than the definition which Bolzano has elaborated so painstakingly must suggest. Bolzano replies by conceding that the concept is used by almost all persons, but he denies that from this fact alone we must conclude that the concept is less complicated than his theory makes it out to be. And he cites, in support of this denial, the even more widely employed concepts such as horse, dog, bird and so on, whose definitions are at least as complicated as the concept of beauty.

These, then, are the objections and the replies which Bolzano imagines with regard to his own theory. Before commenting on the well-foundedness of these criticisms however, and upon the adequacy of Bolzano's replies, I want to make several points about his criticisms of Kant in the light of what we have now seen in some detail about his own theory.

Recall, first, that Bolzano criticises Kant generally for offering more than one clarificatory definition of the beautiful. We know of course from what Bolzano says at the outset of his own treatment of the beautiful that, unlike Kant, he aims instead to provide a single account only. For the beautiful, as Bolzano would have it, is an instance finally of an objective and not of a subjective concept. And objective concepts are to be provided with one, not several definitions. Now this criticism is perhaps more instructive for what it shows us about Bolzano's intentions than for what it calls attention to in Kant's own theory. In either case however Bolzano is relying here on compli-
cated discussions of both the nature of concepts and the
nature of definition to be found in the *Wissenschaftslehre*. But when we reread the appropriate materials there, bearing
in mind contemporary discussions of such difficult matters,
it is not self-evident that Bolzano himself has provided
an ultimately satisfactory account either of the distinction
between subjective and objective concepts or of the nature
of definition. So his general criticism of Kant, in the
absence of a more acceptable account of Bolzano's own assump-
tions, remains inconclusive.

More specifically, we need to recall Bolzano's critic-
ism of Kant's use of the cardinal term 'interest'. The
point of that criticism was that Kant's discussion of dis-
interestedness depended on an idiosyncratic use of that
term for which he nowhere convincingly argued. But Bolzano
is here using a two-edged sword. I think his criticism of
Kant on this point is indeed well-founded. But it is a
criticism that cuts also in the opposite direction. And
the result is that a further question arises as to just how
representative Bolzano's use of his own key terms really is.
Freshly scrutinising his own definition of the beautiful,
we quickly find ourselves stumbling on such unfamiliar and
unexplained terms as 'dark intuition' or, perhaps more im-
portantly, the critical phrase which keeps turning up in
the objections which Bolzano himself anticipated: 'die Mühe
des deutlichen Denkens'. I have tried to shed some light
on both of these terms by using the freedom of paraphrase
instead of resorting to direct quotation when providing Bol-
zano's formulation of the beautiful. But it must be observ-
ed that the result is not wholly satisfactory, as can be
noted even by simply rereading the paraphrase itself. For
with all his insistence on tying down his own technical
terms and for all his criticism of Kant and others in
precisely this respect, Bolzano does not, at least in the case of his definition of the beautiful, seem finally to have done the job that needed doing. Unlike the first criticism then, Bolzano's second criticism of Kant does seem well-founded: but it suggests thereby at least one serious difficulty with Bolzano's own theory.

Recall further Bolzano's criticism of Kant's repeated references to 'jedermann', to 'everyone', in his discussion of the judgment of taste and universality. Bolzano's basic claim we remember is that Kant cannot mean what he says, for what he says does not seem to be true. It is false that everyone ought to find beautiful what is correctly judged to be beautiful since children and, as Bolzano does not but could have added, mentally disturbed persons, are not always able to concur and indeed cannot be described as persons who should concur. Hence Kant must have meant by 'everyone' only those individuals who have the full use of their natural and especially intellectual powers. And this provision of course is just the one which Bolzano builds into his own theory.

But there is some question here whether Bolzano has correctly understood Kant on this point. I say 'some question' because we need to be careful before ascribing a mistake of this kind to such a careful and thoughtful reader of Kant as was Bolzano. Kant surely does not mean that something which is correctly judged as beautiful will in fact always be correctly judged as beautiful by anyone whomever. In fact, then, Kant does make room not just for erroneous judgments of taste but also for some persons' not being able to concur with proper judgments of taste. The point of Bolzano's remarks then should be taken here not so much as criticism, but - especially where he talks
of 'developed intellectual powers' - as an explication of something which Kant had already seen.

More interesting however than the question as to how Brentano's reading of Kant on this point is to be understood, is the question whether Bolzano's insistence in his own theory of 'developed intellectual powers' as a prerequisite for finding something beautiful does not preclude in at least some cogent sense the Kantian requirement of universality. The problem, as I see it, is with the ambiguity in Bolzano's but not in Kant's use of the term 'developed'. If Bolzano, with Kant, simply means the proper function of all the intellectual powers in the mature or potentially mature individual, then the claim of universality for the correct judgment of taste cannot be rejected in principle. If however Bolzano means, as Kant does not, not only this first sense of 'developed' but also the additional sense of mature intellectual powers which have been formed, exercised and refined in the various activities associated with the knowledge, practice and pursuit of the arts, then it is very doubtful whether Bolzano can register a claim to universality here at all. On this second sense of 'developed', which Bolzano - at least on the evidence of his own repeated discussions of how necessary the use and exercise of these powers are for finding something to be beautiful - would seem to hold, no one except the cultivated individual will be able correctly to judge something to be beautiful.

Recall, finally, Bolzano's criticism of Kant's discussion of purposefulness. We remember that according to Kant we find purposefulness in the beautiful object, whereas Bolzano plainly denies this claim and asserts to the contrary that we find not purposefulness but regularities and rule-
governedness. Bolzano's criticism of Kant's talk of the form of purposefulness is cogent. What calls for reflection however is just what additional reasons there may have been, if not these only, for Bolzano's abandonment of a quite similar view. For in an 1818 definition of the beautiful as well as in a published academic talk to his students discussed by Svoboda, Bolzano himself talked of purposefulness, whereas in his 1843 definition all trace of this talk has gone. This is, however, a largely historical question and, though interesting in its own right for our understanding of the development of Bolzano's philosophical views, it need not detain us here.

Before concluding with a brief general assessment, I want to take up two further critical points against the background of these questions about the adequacy of Bolzano's own theory of the beautiful.

One general difficulty with Bolzano's theory, I believe, arises out of his initial discussion of the four preparatory points he wants us to keep in mind when judging his own efforts to provide a clarificatory definition of the concept of the beautiful. This discussion is of course a particularly interesting one, not only because of its manifest opposition to idealism, the then overwhelmingly dominant school in German philosophy, but also because of the succinct form it imposes on several of the key ideas of the Wissenschaftslehre of 1837. Thus there is the untimely insistence on clarity, the aim itself of trying to articulate a definition, and the suggestive but hardly explicated contrast between two kinds of concepts, subjective and objective. Each of these features can be taken to generate some critical questions in their own right. But most, if not all such questions can be resolved by closer attention
to related discussions in the Wissenschaftslehre.

What does not allow of such a quick resolution however is a theme which is found not only in the preparatory discussion but throughout Bolzano's major exposition of the concept of the beautiful and even in his extended and critical review of other previously propounded theories of the beautiful. This theme is the distinction between simples and complexes.

We recall that this distinction lies at the basis of Bolzano's insistence that a clarificatory definition of the beautiful must be subjected to different evaluatory criteria depending on whether the beautiful turns out to be a simple or a complex. And ultimately of course Bolzano will hold to the second of these possibilities, namely that the concept of the beautiful is the concept of a complex. And we recall also Bolzano's appeal to this distinction in a more complicated context when he tries to show that one claim that his theory is too narrowly construed, - that it cannot account for pure tones or pure colours - is mistaken. But there is a problem here as indeed the second case suggests. And the problem is whether there are any simples at all.

Bolzano intimates, in his discussion of the colour case, that the empirical issues involved here remain open, at least for him at the time of writing the treatise in question. But whatever importance the empirical issues might finally have, the philosophical point that such a distinction can indeed be made out in some sense remains controversial. And this claim, it should be noted, is not a bare assertion but follows from Bolzano's own hesitations. Some evidential backing for this hesitation is provided, for example, in Bolzano's discussion of André, Hutcheson, and
several followers of the Leibniz-Wolff school. There Bolzano criticises their various uses of the terms 'manifold' and 'unity'. 'Even the simplest object,' Bolzano writes, 'has an endless set of characteristics...'. But then, if Bolzano is right on this central point, the question inevitably arises whether there exist any simples at all. If Bolzano has a serious doubt about the answer to this question, as I think we must assume, then the various and especially the cardinal uses of the distinction between simples and complexes become themselves questionable. Since however this very distinction stands at the foundations of Bolzano's theory of the beautiful, final judgment on that theory must be reserved until closer scrutiny of Bolzano's understanding of just what simples are can clear up the present doubts.

Here, then, is one general difficulty with Bolzano's theory: the uncertain ontological status of simples.

A second general difficulty, I believe, concerns the content of a correct judgment of the beautiful. Recall that Bolzano is adamant in his criticism of Kant's discussion of purposefulness as the content of the judgment of taste. The content of this judgment, Bolzano asserts, is rather rule-governedness. He is however careful to add that this kind of regularity is not apprehended in the judgment of taste with any clarity; rather it is apprehended confusedly, or 'darkly'. The problem of course is understanding just what it is to which Bolzano is referring in his metaphorical talk of dark apprehensions.

Some help may be found in two places: in the early definition of the beautiful to which I have already alluded, which provides an interesting contrast to Bolzano's defi-
nition in the present work; and in a critical discussion of a similar concept in Mendelssohn's *Briefe über die Empfindungen*.

Bolzano's earlier definition of the beautiful is to be found in the unpublished note from 1818 which served as the now lost source material for the entry on 'the beautiful' in the 1821 glossary, 'Bolzano's Begriffe 1821', now available as a lengthy appendix to E. Winter's paper, 'Die historische Bedeutung der frühbegriffe Bolzanos'. The relevant passage reads as follows:

> the beautiful object is one whose purposefulness is of such a nature that it can be recognised even confusedly. This purposefulness is objective. It is related to just what we think of as what brings to the fore the same thoughts which possess this purposefulness...[but] purposefulness must not be too deeply hidden, because otherwise it would only be recognisable through a strenuous reflection which would result in clear judgments.42

What should be added here is a gloss from Bolzano's early letters on the notion of a confused or dark judgment.

> A confused judgment is one which cannot be recalled even after the smallest interval and which one could not, even in the very moment of making such a judgment, say 'I have it.' Briefly, a dark judgment is one which is not accompanied by the consciousness of having it.43

In other words, the judgment of taste is unclear or confused in the sense that when this judgment is made no consciousness of having made the judgment is also present.

But there are a number of problems with this dark doctrine. We are not clear, to begin with, as to whether or as to the sense in which Bolzano, like Kant, wants to attempt a clear distinction between the form and the contents of judgments of taste. Further, we are not clear as
to whether and if so then just how the contents of a judgment of taste require for their completion an accompanying act of consciousness, that is, a simultaneous awareness, on the part of the individual making a particular judgment of taste, that it is indeed just this judgment which is being made. And of course what contributes to our uncertainty concerning the sense of Bolzano's doctrine here is our lack of knowledge as to whether the substitution of rule-governedness in the definition of 1843 for purposefulness in the definition of 1818 entails still further changes in what is to be understood as a 'confused judgment'.

If we turn for further help to the second set of materials, the discussion of Mendelssohn, some clarity does emerge, but not quite enough. There Bolzano suggests that Mendelssohn, when speaking of the unity of the manifold which is apprehended in the judgment of taste, would have better served the truth of the matter had he referred to 'a clearly recognisable unity', rather than to a 'darkly recognised' one. The suggestion here, then, is that the judgment of taste has as its contents not purposefulness but the rule-governedness of a unity whose components precisely in their unity could be grasped in a discursive way were one to take the trouble. But since one does not in fact assume this task of analysis, the relevant unity in its rule-governedness is said to be apprehended confusedly, i.e. in a not completely explicated way.

This kind of talk, although difficult enough, is, I think, an improvement over the 1818 doctrine; yet it should still fall short of convincing even the most sympathetic of Bolzano's readers. For we are back again with the difficulties which confound our attempts to talk of simples. The clear assumption in this doctrine of the 'dark judgment'
is - as is clearly spelled out in one of Bolzano's own objections - the view that something beautiful is always a complex, a manifold, a rule-governed whole whose regularity we apprehend in a confusing but ultimately explicable way. But the spectre keeps coming back of the thought that some beautiful things, despite Bolzano's disclaimers, may well turn out to be if not simples then certainly not rule-governed manifolds of just the type his theory must presuppose. And this possibility is not too difficult for us to entertain, especially today, given a large amount of significant work in the philosophy of science on different models of explanation, when we have become almost instinctively chary of unargued assumptions to the effect that talk about regularity, or about law-likeness or rule-governedness makes sense as it stands. We still, in other words, wrestle with just how to reach agreement about what rule-governedness ultimately amounts to. And part of our difficulty is not just the familiar one, which Bolzano above all would recognise, involved in any attempt to construct what he calls an 'objective concept' or, in effect, what would today be called a satisfactory account. Part of the difficulty rather is with our still obscure but persistent presumptions that, just as there may well seem to be things with more than one essence, or with no essence at all, so too there may well be things which, whilst being ordered in some way, cannot yet be characterised as rule-governed. And why should not some of these things be the objects of judgments of taste?

Thus despite recourse to additional passages in which Bolzano tells us more about these matters I am afraid that we must conclude here, as in the case of his talk about simples and complexes, that Bolzano's doctrine of the dark judgment is itself a dark doctrine.
I would like to end with the suggestion that Bolzano's aesthetics, for all its difficult terms and distinctions, represents a different reading of Kant from those which have been provided either by analytic philosophers such as Beardsley, Dickie, Coleman or Guyer, or by hermeneutic philosophers such as Gadamer, Ricoeur, Biemel or Apel. On the one hand there is an extraordinarily persistent concern for conceptual clarity, argumentative thoroughness and systematic development, qualities often claimed by analytic philosophers. And on the other hand there is a reliance on a dark doctrine of intuition, apprehension, judgment and finally consciousness, which finds certain echoes in hermeneutic philosophy. In no way do I wish to suggest that Bolzano's work is in some way characteristic of the best of these two philosophical worlds. Rather, I want to open up for more considered discussion the idea that Bolzano's reading of Kant, which in many ways generates the peculiar features of his aesthetics, is importantly different from either of the two dominant current interpretations of what is after all the formative period in modern aesthetics: the eighteenth century and its watershed in the work of Kant. It is this other reading of aesthetic theory, the other tradition, if you will, which begins in Bolzano's theory of the beautiful and which leads on to further investigations to be found in Brentano's posthumous works, in Meinong's analyses of emotional presentation, in Husserl's preoccupations with various versions of psychologism, and finally in the aesthetics of Roman Ingarden.

But this is another story, one which both moves beyond the limits of and also - it should be plainly said - loses some of the philosophical fascination of Bolzano's dark doctrine.


9. Coleman, p.76.


15. KPR, A 146, B 185-86.


17. On the complicated doctrine of the schematism and the imagination see especially W.H. Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics, Edinburgh, 1975, pp.72-77.

18. Bolzano's aesthetics, although under active preparation, have not yet appeared in the Gesamtausgabe. My discussion here will be limited to his most important work in aesthetics, Über den Begriff des Schön­ en: Eine philosophische Abhandlung, which is to be found in a modern­ ised edition in B. Bolzano, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der Ästhetik, ed. D. Gerhardus, Frankfurt, 1972 (hereafter cited as "Bolzano"). Besides his other essay, "Über die Einteilung der Kunst", which is also reprinted in Gerhardus, there is virtually nothing else of great importance. Very little has been written about Bolzano's aesthetics and what has been written has been overly sketchy. The one exception, the best work so far on the aesthetics, is the thorough survey article by K. Svoboda, "Bolzanova estetika", Rozpravy Českoslonské Akademie Věd, Ročník 64, Řada sv, Sešit 2, 1954, 1-62 which includes a German translation.


20. Besides the works mentioned in note 18 above, there are a number of manuscripts in the National Literature Archives in Prague. A complete catalogue of the Bolzano mss., mainly mathematical, in the Austrian National Library, has been prepared and published in the Gesamtausgabe by Jan Berg. Similarly, a complete catalogue of the Prague mss. has been completed by P. Křivský and M. Pavlíková, also for inclusion in the Gesamtausgabe. The present Czechoslovakian government authorities have however repeatedly refused permission for the publication of this catalogue. Bolzano's other incidental references to aesthetics are discussed very helpfully by Svoboda, pp.27-33 and 44-56.


22. KU, B 17.
23. Bolzano adds here further interesting comments of 'good'.

24. From KU, B 32, in Bolzano, section 38, p. 68.

25. KU, B 17, B 21, and B 18 respectively.


27. Bolzano, p. 75.

28. From KU, B 68, in Bolzano, section 39a, p. 78.

29. See KU, B 62.

30. See, for example, KU, B 65 and B 67, and Kant's talk of 'universal communicability'.


33. The *Wissenschaftslehre*, Bolzano's masterpiece, first appeared (after many vicissitudes) with the sub-title *Versuch einer ausführlichen und größtenteils neuen Darstellung der Logik mit steter Rücksicht auf deren bisherigen Bearbeiter* in four volumes, outside of his own country in Sulzbach (Bavaria) in 1837. It has been reprinted three times, Vienna 1882, Leipzig 1914-31, Aalen 1970. Two different selections have been translated into English, one by R. George, Oxford, 1972, and one by B. Terrell, Dordrecht, 1973. Jan Berg's introduction to the latter is an excellent overview. A summary of the first two volumes by one of Bolzano's collaborators, probably but not certainly Prihonský, *Kleine Wissenschaftslehre*, has been published in an edition by J. Louzil in the *Sitzungsberichte der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 299, Vienna, 1975. A shorter summary of the main points by Bolzano himself can be found in the rare book, published anonymously under the title *Bolzanos Wissenschaftslehre und Religionswissenschaft in einer beurtheilenden Übersicht*, Sulzbach, 1841, which can be consulted in the Prunksaal of the Austrian National Library.

34. Bolzano polemicises often against German idealism. See especially his criticism of Hegel's aesthetics in section 54, pp. 98 -108.


36. Bolzano, p. 16.

37. Bolzano, section 12, p. 31.

38. In section 13, p. 32.


40. Bolzano, p. 55.


42. Glossary, p. 76.
43. Glossary, pp.89-90.

44. Bolzano, section 29, p.56.

45. Work on this paper and related materials has been made possible in part by the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
§1. Introduction

In the biography of Kafka's early life by Klaus Wagenbach there is reprinted, as an appendix, an official list of the members of the final class of the German State Gymnasium in the Prager Altstadt for the year 1901. Besides the name 'Franz Kafka' this very remarkable list contains the names of three class-mates, all of whom were admitted to the German University in Prague in the same year and remained in close friendship with Kafka in the subsequent period, and all of whom distinguished themselves thereafter in their respective fields. They were: Hugo Bergmann, who went on to make several important contributions to philosophy (it was he who wrote the first substantial book on the thought of the great Bohemian philosopher Bernard
Bolzano after the latter's work had lain in almost total oblivion for several decades); Emil Utitz, a subsequently distinguished aesthetician; and Oskar Pollak, a prodigious historian of art, who was closest of all the members of the class to Kafka (it was Pollak who received and criticised Kafka's earliest literary experiments).

Kafka himself, of course, studied law (and six years later he achieved a doctorate in that subject) - though as Bergmann has suggested, law was selected under the pressure of financial considerations as a second best choice. Indeed we know that Kafka, too, had originally intended to study philosophy. In fact a certain number of classes in philosophy were compulsory for law students at that time, yet it seems clear that we can rule out the suggestion that Kafka attended these courses with his friends Bergmann, Utitz and Pollak, merely in order to satisfy the university regulations. Indeed convincing evidence has been produced to show that Kafka, at that time and for a number of years afterwards, exhibited a great deal of positive interest in philosophy and - what is more important - that the philosophy which he absorbed expressed itself in his literary work. This was, of course, in combination with many other influences, including those deriving from his awareness of his own Jewishness, from his experiences in the insurance offices where he spent most of his professional life, and more generally from his absorption of a wide range of disparate ideas and values in the highly intellectual climate of early 20th century Prague. Further all of these influences are fused together in complex ways to an extent which makes it impossible to isolate those of decisive importance from those which belonged merely to the background noise of Kafka's life. I hope to show, however, that there is at
least some historical interest in drawing attention to philosophical elements which may have contributed to Kafka's development, leaving it to the reader to make his own decision as to their ultimate importance.

Before considering these elements in detail it is useful to make some remarks concerning the general nature of university education in Germany and Austria at that time, Kafka's own experience of which was by no means untypical. In his six years at the university he attended courses in chemistry, in law and legal history, in the histories of art and architecture, in German literature, in economics and political theory, in forensic medicine, - and in philosophy. It is not just the relative breadth of a central European university education in comparison with its English and American counterparts - something that has contributed to the characteristic cosmopolitanism of European cities - which needs to be stressed. There are important differences also in the way in which the spectrum of disciplines was demarcated into subject-units, and in the way in which the relationships between these units were cultivated institutionally. One absolutely crucial factor was the relative dominance, in central Europe, of the discipline of law. Thus where economics, for example, was associated in most English and Scottish universities with the study of philosophy and in America with the study of mathematics, in continental universities it was associated with Jura. One consequence of affiliations of this kind was a highly specific type of conceptual and terminological cross-fertilisation e.g. between chemistry and association-istic psychology, between legal theory and logic, or, particularly as illustrated in the work of Meinong's Graser Schule, between economics, value theory and ontology. Such
cross-fertilisations have done much to make European philosophy so impenetrable to present-day Anglo-Saxon philosophers.

The philosophy courses for which Kafka enrolled in his first year at the University were as follows:

- **Winter Semester 1901/02.** Ehrenfels: Praktische Philosophie (4 hours/week)
- **Summer Semester 1902.** Ehrenfels: Ästhetik des musikalischen Dramas (1 hour/week)
- **Summer Semester 1902.** Marty: Grundfragen der deskriptiven Psychologie (3 hours/week)

I have provided, in an appendix to this paper, a more detailed discussion of Ehrenfels' work. Both he and Marty had studied at Vienna under Franz Brentano, a philosopher and psychologist heavily influenced by Aristotle and by the scholastic tradition. Brentano had a wide influence on intellectuals throughout central Europe at that time. His students included, besides (briefly) Freud, also Thomas Masaryk (subsequently founder and first president of the Czechoslovak Republic), Meinong, Husserl, Stumpf and Twardowski. He himself was treated very badly by the political authorities in Vienna. His students however were able to obtain posts in universities elsewhere in Austria and to propogate Brentanian philosophy to such an extent that it acquired the status of a semi-official philosophy of the Empire.

The most orthodox Brentanians congregated around Anton Marty in Prague. Marty's group, which included other former students of Brentano, including Oskar Kraus and Alfred Kas-til, took up with an almost religious fervour the task of developing and disseminating Brentanian doctrines. In particular, the members of the group had organised a circle of devotees which met regularly for 'training' in Brentan-
ian modes of thought and for philosophical discussion and argument. Hugo Bergmann, Emil Utitz and Oskar Pollak were all rapidly initiated into this circle by their teacher Marty, and they, in their turn, seem to have recruited Kafka: there is evidence from several independent sources testifying to the fact that at least between the years 1902 and 1906 Kafka frequently attended meetings of what was called the 'inner circle of Brentanists', especially those sessions which were held in the Café Louvre in the Ferdinandsstrasse.

As Utitz describes it, the Louvre circle was a community of thinkers

in a common struggle, who would meet frequently for evenings of endless discussion. Franz Brentano, of course, was not himself present. But his powerful shadow fell upon every utterance, whether this expressed a correct interpretation of his teachings or some objection to them.⁶

In the biography of Kafka written by Max Brod, as of course in the Diaries which begin only four years later, there is no mention of the Louvre evenings, nor is there mention of Kafka's having attended philosophy courses given by either Ehrenfels or Marty. From Brod's later writings however we know that he himself participated in these evenings. We can deduce that he began to attend some time after Kafka himself, and probably before their close friendship had established itself. But Brod, unlike Kafka, seems never properly to have belonged to the 'inner circle' - and he was in fact ceremonially excluded from all dealings with the group after publishing in a Berlin literary magazine a short story which included a caricature of the religious Brentanian. He himself has provided a description of his expulsion:
As I entered the back room of the Café Louvre everybody was gathered together in a talkative mood, and a copy of Gegenwart which had come out shortly before the meeting lay on the table. I had arrived with Kafka. It was Emil Utitz who first made the accusation...which was debated for some time. A series of deliberations followed, as if what were taking place were something like a student's court of honour.... And I had no one who came to my defence, although all the participants had by then (October 1905) known me for two years. Suddenly one of them took my side - Kafka. Normally he was so quiet in company, giving the impression of being almost apathetic... - But now Kafka whispered across to me...that it would be best if we both left, and quit the Brentano circle for ever. And this we did.7

- which may well be true insofar as Brod himself was concerned; but we know that Kafka resumed his contacts with the Louvre circle. Two months later he, together with Pollak, Utitz and, among others, Bergmann's mother-in-law, Berta Fanta, signed a dedication to a book on theoretical psychology8 which was presented to Hugo Bergmann 'in memory of our common struggles' on the occasion of the latter's birthday.9

As Neesen, in his excellent book on Kafka and Brentano has argued,

It would be inexplicable if Kafka had, over a long period, attended meetings of a circle of philosophers whose subject-matter was of no interest to him.10

As I hope to show in what follows, not only Brentanian psychology but also Brentanian ethics contributed at least something to determining both the form and content of Kafka's literary work. More specifically, I shall argue (1) that through his participation in the Louvre group Kafka acquired certain techniques which helped towards the development of the peculiar mode of portrayal of consciousness which is, as I shall claim, the most characteristic feature of his most successful literary experiments, and
(2) that the philosophy underlying this process of representation of conscious experience is a version of the philosophy of Brentano.¹¹

§2. The evidence of inner perception

To understand Kafka's view of consciousness - under the interpretation to be defended here - it is necessary to go into some details of Brentano's theoretical psychology, the most important thesis of which, from our present standpoint, concerns the primacy of inner perception. Before we can state this thesis it is first of all necessary to follow Brentano in recognising a fundamental distinction between two sorts of phenomena, which he called physical and psychical phenomena respectively. Examples of physical phenomena, Brentano tells us,¹² are:

- a colour, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, an odour which I sense, as well as similar formations appearing in the imagination.

Psychical or mental phenomena, in contrast, are simply our mental acts themselves:

- the hearing of a sound, the seeing of a coloured object, feeling warmth or cold, as well as similar states of imagination
- the thinking of a general concept (if such a thing actually does occur),...every judgment, every recollection, every expectation, every inference, every conviction or belief, anger, love, hate, desire, act of will, intention, astonishment, admiration, contempt, and so on.

Brentano now distinguishes inner from outer perceptions by reference to their objects: acts of inner perception are those perceptions which have psychical phenomena as their objects, acts of outer perception those which have physical phenomena. But this leaves unclear what precisely it might mean to 'perceive' a psychical phenomenon. Brentano did not
intend thereby, as we shall make clear below, anything like an introspection of one's own inner states of consciousness. He wished, rather, to draw attention to the fact that every consciousness is bound up with a self-consciousness, that a mental event or state which did not meet this condition would not be a 'consciousness' at all. But it is not as if - as Brentano's terminology of 'inner' and 'outer' perception may unfortunately suggest - this element of self-consciousness is conceived as an additional act which would exist in the mind somehow alongside the original consciousness. It is, rather, a merely abstractly distinguishable moment or constituent part of the original consciousness, a moment of a type that can of necessity exist only as embedded within such a larger, circumcluding whole.\footnote{13} The act-moment of inner perception may best be conceived, perhaps, as an act of living through its object (the corresponding psychical phenomenon), without any transcendent target object of the type which is typically possessed by acts of both outer perception and (if these exist) of introspection.\footnote{14}

Brentano's thesis of the primacy of inner perception, now, is a claim to the effect that it is inner consciousness alone which can yield certain knowledge, that the only objects of which we can have an absolutely secure apprehension are psychical phenomena, i.e., roughly, the acts and states of our own consciousness. Of these alone can we assert with an absolutely evident knowledge that they are in reality as they appear to be in our perceptions of them. A consequence of this is that our outer perceptions, that is our experiences of physical phenomena, may always be deceptive. This thesis represents a form of Cartesianism, in that Brentano's arguments for the dubit-
ability of outer perception rest on the same kind of intuitions as do Descartes' discussions of perceptual illusions in the *Meditations*, and Brentano's claims for inner perception as a source of absolutely secure knowledge recall Descartes' arguments in regard to the truths impenetrable to systematic doubt he believed himself to have isolated.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus whilst, when we are perceiving something outside us, we cannot know with absolute evidence that the object of our perception is as it seems - we could e.g. be hallucinating - we can know with absolute evidence that this and this particular state of consciousness exists, and that it is structured in such and such a way. Illusions and hallucinations of a kind with which outer perception is indelibly plagued are, Brentano claimed, alien to the world of inner perception.

What he means by this can I think be explained as follows: absolute evidence is obtained only if a judgment and that which is judged, i.e. for Brentano, that object whose existence is affirmed, are somehow united in a single whole which is available to consciousness in such a way that the correctness of the judgment can be grasped directly. Our experiences of perceptual illusion tell us that such a unity is impossible for judgments of outer perception. Consider, however, judgments of reflexive self-awareness such as 'I am thinking' or 'I have a visual image of a red surface'. Judgmental contents of this sort are, as we have seen, merely abstractly isolable moments of more inclusive act-wholes (of thinking, having such and such a visual image, etc.). Thus the desired kind of unity between judgment and that which is judged is here so to speak
already to hand: our experiences of psychical phenomena are already of themselves experiences having the character of absolute evidence. We can be deluded in supposing that there is a cat (an object of outer perception) inside a room in which we are sitting, but we cannot be deluded in supposing that we are undergoing an experience of seeming to see a cat (this experience as a whole constituting an object of inner perception the existence of which is given with absolute evidence in the very experience itself); the concept of delusion here can gain no foothold.\textsuperscript{16}

We are concerned, first of all, with the consequences of Brentano's position for our understanding of the external world. Note, most importantly, that Brentano himself does not deny that the objects of outer perception exist outside our consciousness. And nor does he deny that they are as they appear to us. He asserts only that we have no unconditioned evidence that they do so exist. The existence of the external world is reduced to something that is merely probable, as compared to the absolute certainty of the existence of objects of inner perception. From this it follows that the external world acquires a certain plasticity: Brentano, like Descartes, countenances modes of experience in which the external reality projected by the conscious subject is blurred or malignantly deformed in the light of the standards of correctness assumed in our ordinary everyday experience.

As we shall see in more detail below, it is precisely such variant frameworks of experience which are exploited in Kafka's novels for the realisation of what we shall argue is his larger task of exhibiting, in literary form, the characteristic structures of inner perception.
§3. The representation of the self

When Gregor Samsa wakes up in the morning he doesn't just feel like a noxious insect, he is a noxious insect: that is to say, everything in his external reality is such as to lend support to his belief that this is his new form. For the external world (reality), which is normally taken for granted, there has been substituted a quite different world, having peculiar qualities. At the same time, however, Kafka/Samsa's inner reality is seen to have hard and firm outlines which are normally unnoticed. From the perspective of our accepted standards of reality, of course, a cleft threatens to open up in the fabric of Samsa's experience, due to the fact that the mode of appearance of the constituent objects of his outer world (including that of his own physical body) does not gear into the reality which seems continually to threaten to break through whenever he has dealings with what we think of as the outer world. This cleft is however prevented from making itself felt by continual shifting reinterpretations on Samsa's part of the data which comes in. (From the point of view of the Brentanian sceptic, now, a cleft of this kind is potentially capable of appearing in the experiences of every individual; for most of us it is as if the cleft were securely and, as we assume, rightly papered over once and for all by our adoption of naturalistic assumptions concerning external reality. Our adoption of these assumptions consists, in effect, in this: that at least in principle every datum which emanates from the outer world will be given precedence over our inner expectations, over connections amongst mental contents whose motivation derives exclusively from internal factors.)
It is of course extremely difficult to give a clear account of the 'cleft' mentioned above, since the characteristic features of the 'real' and of the 'subjective' have been switched around. For Brentano it is the inner world alone which truly has the character of being real; and the outer world, which we normally take as our standard of reality, has lost all its former claims to absoluteness - even though at the same time it is not simply denied that it exists. If Kafka's project was to exhibit this inner world, to allow its characteristic features to show themselves in a literary presentation, then it might be thought that he could appeal directly for this purpose - leaving out of account, for the moment, his association with Brentanian ideas - to some process of introspection or direct observation of the inner world of 'psychical phenomena'. But as we have intimated, the very idea of such a process is, within the Brentanian framework, a spurious one. Certainly Brentano's use of 'inner perception' should not be taken to imply any kind of turning of the attention to one's own psychic experiences. Observation or attention, or any other mental processes involving our deliberately directing our gaze towards an object can, of course, arise in the field of outer perception. But Brentano argues that direct, attentive self-observation, observation of one's own anger, say, or of any other psychic phenomenon, is impossible. For of course as soon as our attention were turned to such phenomena, as soon as we were truly living in the gaze of observation, the original phenomena would have disappeared: we would no longer be properly angry or afraid, but rather attentive. The attempt at introspection thus begins to look very much like the attempt of a dog to catch its own tail. Whenever we suppose that our own psychic states have become the objects
of our attention - that we have succeeded in the attempt to observe them discriminatively - we are, Brentano argues, involved in a delusion, which derives from our having foolishly assumed that psychic phenomena correspond to objects in the same way as do physical phenomena, objects which will stand still, as it were, as our attention is focused on them.

Kafka, too, I suggest, was aware of this impossibility of a non-delusory self-observation. In his diary for 9th December 1913 we find the following passage:

Hatred of active introspection. Explanation of one's soul, such as yesterday I was so, and for this reason; today I am so, and for this reason. It is not true, not for this reason and not for that reason, and therefore also not so and so. To put up with oneself calmly, without being precipitate, to live as one must, not to chase one's tail like a dog.

And again (10th December 1913)

It is never possible to take note of and evaluate all the circumstances that influence the mood of the moment, are even at work within it, and finally are at work in the evaluation, hence it is false to say that I felt resolute yesterday, that I am in despair today. Such differentiations only prove that one desires to influence oneself, and, as far removed from oneself as possible, hidden behind prejudices and fantasies, temporarily to create an artificial life, as sometimes someone in the corner of a tavern, sufficiently concealed behind a small glass of whisky, entirely alone with himself, entertains himself with nothing but false, unprovable images and dreams.

Inner perception, then, is resolutely to be distinguished from any kind of introspection.

To see the relevance of this, let us recall Brentano's definition of inner perception as a perception of psychical phenomena. Such phenomena he demarcates into three classes which are seen as exhausting all mental experience: presentations, judgments, and phenomena of love and hate.17 Thus
psychical phenomena are either presentations - of landscapes, of colour- and tone-Gestalten, and so on - or they are judgments - *that* such and such is the case, - or phenomena of love and hate (a category which includes, for Brentano, all emotions and feelings, including feelings of will) - or combinations of these. It is the category of judgments that perhaps most clearly illustrates what is involved in inner perception. In judging something, e.g. that this paper is white, we have before us first of all psychical phenomena, the objects of our external perception (in this case, the whiteness and feel of the paper); but then also we are aware of what is taking place, we are conscious - obliquely, as it were - of the judgment itself, as a psychical phenomenon, as something which can be more or less deliberate, more or less appropriate to its context, more or less warranted by the evidence, and so on. Similarly in seeing, directly before us, a table, we are conscious, obliquely, of our seeing of the table. And it is this *oblique consciousness*, present in all mental experiences whatsoever, which is what Brentano means by inner perception.

This realisation will indicate to us why a second seemingly tempting short cut to the realisation of a project of the sort here ascribed to Kafka has to be dismissed as spurious. This would begin, rightly, with a recognition of the impossibility of inner observation of psychic phenomena. But it would go on to develop the view that there might exist something like a lowest common denominator of experience, in which only inner perceptual constituents are given credence, in which no phenomena emanating from the outer world are awarded the kind of evidential weight due only to the inner. Kafka's project, from this point of view, would
be seen as the attempt at a literary representation of this
reduced mode of experience.

The idea is spurious because inner perceptions are al-
ways of their nature dependent moments of more inclusive
act-wholes, from which it follows that it is impossible to
convey the data of inner perception except against the
background of some cohesive framework of outer perceptions.
It is solely on the basis of the latter that associated
psychical phenomena can present or show themselves in any
intelligible sense of these terms. We could of course
appeal simply to ordinary experience for such a framework -
but given the established habits and tendencies of mind,
this would be to abandon the goal of bringing to represen-
tation specifically the data of inner perception. The
attentions of the reader in such circumstances would
follow their natural course, would be directed, in effect,
to the external unfolding of the plot.

It would seem however that the peculiar forms and struc-
tures of inner consciousness could begin to be made acces-
sible, be brought to representation, if the mind of the
reader can somehow be deflected from his settled interest
in that which is unfolding in a represented outer world,
without however this resulting in its being directed inward-
ly in a futile attempt at introspection. This can be
achieved, I suggest, if the expected order of the outer
world is presented matter-of-factly and in a step-by-step
fashion, but is in some way disrupted.

The relevance of these remarks will I hope be obvious.
I believe, indeed, that a strong case could be made to show
that the peculiar aesthetic unity of Kafka's mature works
is to a very large extent an unintended consequence of an attempt on his part to meet the conditions for partial isolation of inner consciousness by means of techniques of disruption of a sort which rest on the Brentanian 'plasticity' mentioned above, that he thereby succeeded, perhaps uniquely, in evolving a type of writing which would allow the peculiar forms of inner consciousness to be revealed. Thus the narrative in his later works is almost completely a matter of the portrayal of experience from the point of view of the main protagonist, never in such a way as to resort to the expression of any kind of active introspection on his part, but always in such a way that the structure of his inner world is displayed in virtue of some contrast with an expected or somehow typical order in external reality, of some breakdown of the expected intermeshing of the inner and the outer. The world is depicted in such a way that the associated psychical phenomena can show themselves as completely and as nakedly as possible. The character of dogged literalism of Kafka's writings is a device to catch the reader off his guard when the expectations of a natural or reasonable order in the external world which it arouses are upset. The depictions of bare reality which they contain are never superfluous, never introduced e.g. for merely ornamental purposes. Nor does Kafka, except to the precise extent that this is needed for his specific purpose, take great pains to achieve any particular social or psychological realism in his depictions of the outer world, especially in regard to his subsidiary protagonists. His outward descriptions serve the always predominant end of allowing some particular aspect of oblique consciousness to show forth. In this sense, then, Kafka can be said to have developed a characteristically Brentanian mode of representation of the self.
§4. On our knowledge of right and wrong

Brentano's reputation in Austria in the first decades of this century, outside the narrow circle of philosophers and theoretical psychologists, was principally as an ethicist. His *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* was as familiar in Vienna as, say, Moore's *Principia Ethica* (which it in some ways resembles) in Bloomsbury or Cambridge. This popularity was certainly at least partly a reflection of the fact that Brentano succeeded in that work in capturing the tenor of the world view shared by many central European intellectuals of his day, and hence it is not surprising that we should find echoes of Brentano's ideas in Kafka's writings. Once again, however, the possibility of a direct influence, through the Louvre circle, should not be underestimated.

As already pointed out, three fundamental categories of psychical phenomena are recognised by Brentano: presentations, judgments, and phenomena of love and hate. Each of our everyday actions is accompanied by or is fused together with one or more of these phenomena: for example an act of beheading may be accompanied by an inner perception on the part of the executioner of his presentation of the victim, of his disgust, etc. Now it is easily supposed that it is to the last of these categories that ethical questions will relate. Thus the criteria which have been offered by philosophers in terms of which conduct should be apprehended as ethically correct or incorrect have tended to consist in assertions to the effect that ethical correctness is to be measured in the light of certain considerations pertaining to feelings and emotions: that is good which is felt to be good, or which is conducive to happiness, or which is
Brentano however denied that phenomena of love and hate alone could provide a criterion of ethical correctness. In order to understand his view on this issue it is necessary to return once more to his treatment of evidence. Brentano, as we have seen, asserted the possibility of an absolutely evident judgment. His argument for this assertion rests, in the end, on an underlying belief in the existence of variations in the quality of evidence in general, and thus also in the quality of the mental acts which are the carriers of evidence. This belief on Brentano's part is empirical, in the sense that it is a product of simple common sense. Consider, for example, in relation to the simplest category of psychical phenomena - the category of presentations - the fact that we can perceive a distant tower more or less clearly, and that our perception may have a greater or lesser degree of intuitive content, or that we can be aware that we remember the face, or the telephone number, of an acquaintance with a greater or lesser degree of distinctness; or that we can imagine, say, the future furnished state of an empty room with greater or lesser completeness and consistency, and so on. In each of these three types of presentation there are obvious and undeniable variations in quality of the associated evidence. It will be important when we move over to the sphere of ethically relevant psychical phenomena to note that whilst these variations may depend in part upon native ability (good eyesight, for example), they may also depend upon acquired habits or skills (on various forms of training) which may in their turn be encouraged by particular forms of cultural or institutional arrangements in society.
The possible variations in the quality of evidence are equally familiar in the sphere of judgment. Thus we may be aware, on the one hand, that a particular belief which we have held for many years rests merely on authority or on custom, on information inadequately checked, or on an emotion or feeling whose grounds have never been explicitly thought through. On the other hand we may be aware that a belief rests on factual data which we have subjected to the most thorough checks, or that it rests on immediate evidence (the evidence of inner perception), either directly or via deductive steps which themselves rest on immediate evidence. The idea of absolute certainty, of the greatest possible evidence of a judgment, is obtained by considering, on the basis of the examination of all the various axes of variation in quality of evidence, what kind of judgment would, in suitably propitious circumstances, exhibit the maximum conceivable evidence along each such axis.

Brentano wishes to defend the thesis that for a judgment to possess the character of being capable of absolute evidence, of being executed with absolute certainty, is objective. Again this thesis is 'empirical' (in Brentano's sense): there is, he claims, nothing in our ordinary everyday experience, nor in the experience of the scientist, which might reasonably lead us to doubt that such a character were something objective. Thus although some of the axes of variation which we have considered rest on the presence or absence of subjective features (for example strength of emotional commitment), this presence or absence itself is not something subjective in its turn. The character of certainty is objective also in that it does not rest on the particular distribution of dispositions to check one's premisses, to examine arguments, etc., across
a given population, nor upon the techniques of theory construction, etc., in existence at any given stage. That a judgment has the potentiality for absolute evidence or certainty is something which pertains to the judgment alone, and would remain true even if, as a matter of fact, the corresponding acts of insight on the part of judging subjects were never executed.

Another way of expressing the fact that a judgment has, in itself, the capacity of being executed with absolute evidence is to say that the judgment is true. For Brentano, of course, the only judgments whose character of absolute evidence is capable of being realised by thinking subjects such as human beings are judgments relating to psychical phenomena - but this need not imply, as we have already seen, that these are the only judgments which are true.

What does all this have to tell us about the standards of ethical correctness? Brentano points out, first of all, that there is an analogue in the ethical sphere to the phenomenon of experienced variations in quality of evidence in the judgmental sphere: just as judgments may be executed with a greater or lesser concern for attestation, statements made with a greater or lesser degree of honesty, etc., so phenomena of love and hate, of approval and disapproval, may exhibit a greater or lesser degree of clarity and distinctness, may to a greater or lesser extent be clouded by alien or conflicting elements, etc. And thus here too we can isolate an analogue to the notion of absolute evidence - a notion of an act of love, for example, carried out in such a way as to partake of the highest possibly purity, immediacy, etc. Whether factually executed acts ever
exhibit this character is not here at issue: we are concerned only to establish the coherence of the notion and the consistency of the picture of the ethical world which it dictates. The ethical analogue of truth, now, is the quality of correctness thus determined: those actions are **ethically correct** which rest or which could in principle rest on acts of love or of approval partaking of the given character of maximal purity.

The range of actions whose evident character of goodness is yielded in an immediate fashion by such a criterion of correctness is unfortunately very slight indeed (we are confined to examples such as: achieve knowledge of the truth, encourage friendliness, bring about the best within the widest area you are capable of influencing, etc.). There is clearly no possibility of manufacturing anything like a pair of ethical spectacles which would enable us to grasp immediately the degree of correctness of an action in those highly complex circumstances where ethical difficulties normally arise. How, then, is the range of Brentanian ethics to be extended from such simple truisms to the level where it can cope with full-blooded ethical dilemmas?

An initial perspective on this question is provided by the analogy between *truth* and *correctness*. This indicates to us that the status of complex ethical problems need be no different in principle from that of correspondingly complex factual problems. Thus in the practical world the continuous need for resolution of problems from both spheres - as faced by judges, censors, political officials, ... - has led to the evolution of complex networks of rules of thumb on different levels, to the acquisition of habits
and skills of varying kinds and to the gradual entrenchment of associated customs and conventions in a number of associated spheres. The framework of law as a whole itself constitutes, from one point of view, a slowly evolving instrument for the pragmatic resolution, given prevailing boundary-conditions, of ethical or near-ethical dilemmas in society.

What expedients of this sort mask, at least to some extent, is that at any given stage in the development of our knowledge and understanding there is something like a threshold beyond which no apodictically evident resolutions of judgments can be achieved. And what applies to the sphere of judgment applies also to the sphere of phenomena of love and hate. That expedients have here to be accepted for practical purposes does not, however, imply that the rigorous thinker should not properly consider how the threshold might in principle be extended, or, more importantly, how in individual cases immediate evidence might be substituted for expediency. Here the role of judgment in the ethical sphere is absolutely crucial. That an action could in principle rest upon acts of love or of approval partaking of the character of 'maximal purity' signifies, in effect, that even if it is impossible to establish any direct link between, say, an act of love and a given slice of behaviour, it might still be possible to verify the correctness of that behaviour by indirect means, namely by chains of (evident) judgments - subject to precisely the criteria of sufficient attestation, clarity, etc., - established above. Now there is an obvious analogy between the processes which are involved in establishing such chains of evidence - gathering and sorting of data, testing of conclusions, passing of judgments, etc., - and
the processes of a court of law. Since the former processes are turned, within the framework of a Brentanian ethics, towards the realm of inner perception, this implies that appeal is being made within that framework to what is, in effect, something like an inner trial.

§5. The inner tribunal

Brentano's ethical views are by no means to be confused with the position, equally widespread in his time and also involving a certain running together of the ethical and the legal, of legal fanaticism. This consisted in the view that the practical expedients discussed above, to the extent that they are legitimately arrived at and securely established in society, themselves attain thereby a character of maximal ethical correctness. This implies a respect for the law and for all genuine authorities for their own sakes, and dictates a point of view according to which revolutionary convictions of whatever kind appear to be immoral.21

For Brentano, in contrast, the framework of law and convention in society was conceived as standing in need of an independent, more deeply-rooted justification, resting on individual insight (the evidence of inner perception). The briefest possible statement of a Brentanian ethics might run as follows: given a system of absolute ends (derived e.g. from some specific set of religious convictions, or from direct evidence relating to phenomena of love and hate) ethically correct action is action which is supported by an evident judgment to the effect that you yourself in given circumstances are fulfilling those ends in what is the most
appropriate way. Kafka's ethics also, we shall suggest, were in this sense Brentanian. Kafka shares with Brentano an overwhelming emphasis on the role of judgment (and specifically of evident judgment) in the resolution of ethical dilemmas and on the importance of self-knowledge for ethically correct action.

Perhaps the most important thesis implied thereby is that only if you know the extent of your physical and mental capabilities, and if you apprehend completely the extent of your own limitations, and only if you are blessed with the patience not to want to break through those limits, do you have the possibility of leading a moral life:

Only in stillness, in the consciousness of one's own capacities and possibilities and in patient modesty, can one lead a contented life (Neesen, 1972, p.143).

We find traces in Kafka's Diaries of a view of this kind. Consider, for example, the following passage:

Complete knowledge of oneself. To be able to seize the whole of one's abilities like a little ball. To accept the greatest decline as something familiar and so still remain elastic within it. (8th April 1912)

Once again, we wish to suggest that Kafka, whether consciously or not, began with Brentanian ideas or modes of thought and took them to extreme conclusions.

Brentano's own ethical masterpiece, The Origins of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, began as a lecture before the Vienna Law Society, and the doctrines it contains were in fact formulated as a philosopher's reply to views of the jurist Rudolf von Jhering on the nature of the Rechtegefühl. Kafka, as already mentioned, studied law in the University of Prague, and frequently had to deal with legal problems as part of his job in the Prague Workers' Accident Insurance
The concepts of punishment, sentence, judgment, trial, guilt, recur over and over again throughout his published works. We can now begin to see why both Brentano and Kafka should have defended or exploited ethical positions which rest crucially on a conceptual cross-fertilisation of ethics with the discipline of law. Further given the view that a criterion for the ethical correctness of an action is a judgment apprehended with absolute evidence as being true, then the ambiguity of the term 'judgment' as between a mental act and a legal process springs immediately to the eye, implying a further conceptual cross-fertilisation between law, logic and psychology. (Here our opening remarks on the structure of continental university curricula should be borne in mind.)

The ambiguity between judgment as mental act and as legal process is indeed exploited by Kafka in *The Trial*. Here a certain set of psychic phenomena - in this case Josef K.'s constant need for justification of all his actions - are allowed to determine in the manner discussed in the sections above a reality of their own, which has been, in effect, projected upon or merged with or folded into ordinary external reality. K.'s continual trial within himself becomes a real trial in this hybrid 'outside world'. But since this world is itself, in part, a fabric of delusions, this 'real' trial in the outside world is one which can attain its sanction only from the mental acts of Josef K.

Thus at the beginning of *The Trial* we are told that the authorities standing in judgment over K. are not there to make their inquiries in order to discover guilt, rather 'as it is stated in the law', they themselves follow in the
path of guilt. K. is arrested; but it is made clear that his arrest should stand in the way of neither his profession nor of his everyday mode of living. As K. searches for the court he has at first no idea where he is supposed to go. But then he suddenly remembers the statement that the court would 'follow in the path of guilt', and he sees that from this 'it immediately followed that the investigation room had to lie at the top of the flight of steps that he had chosen by accident'. The court, therefore, is there, where K. himself has ordained that it should be. And as he is sitting in the court-room he realises that the trial itself is a trial only if he recognises it as such. Furthermore any kind of defence before the court is not actually permitted, but only tolerated - although there is some dispute even concerning that. And in general the proceedings are not only closed to the public, but also to the defendant. For it is not the evidence which is actually brought forward in the court that is decisive, but that which is passed about in the deliberation rooms, and in adjoining corridors. Indeed there is some probability that the innocence of the defendant may play some role in any acquittal which may actually take place - though an acquittal is of course something which rarely happens, and it is never to be achieved by somehow influencing the judge. When it does happen, however, not only the summons and all the other documents of the trial are to be destroyed, but also the acquittal and indeed the trial itself are to pass completely out of existence.

In the end K. is told that he himself must come to a decision whether or not to recognise the court. 'The court doesn't want anything of you. It will admit you if you come, and it will set you free if you go.' And as K. is
being led to his execution he knows that he himself must be his own executioner. Who, then, as K. himself asks, was the judge, whom he had never seen, and where was the court, at which up to the very end he had never arrived? Our answer: the judge, the court, and the trial itself are projections of K.'s own inner experience, projections from the world of inner perception out into the world of external affairs. The shaping force behind this projection is K.'s conviction that morally correct action demands of him that he somehow attain to an absolutely evident judgment. Because he thinks that this is something which he can achieve only as the result of some deliberative process, a process which would presuppose a whole series of investigations and other activities, and because, as he is dimly aware, he is himself incapable of realising such a process, he brings about a series of events having the nature of a complex, obscurely perceived legal trial which would do the job for him.

As Neesen puts it (op. cit., p.205):

Since one becomes clear about oneself by means of a judgment, and since this judgment must be passed in the centre of the self, this self itself becomes a kind of tribunal ...

Thus since the court is inside Josef K. himself, it becomes understandable that it need not interrupt the ordinary course of his life. And for the same reason the court is everywhere where K. searches for it, and also there where he does not expect it.
It has been impossible, in this brief survey, to present more than a sketch of some ideas which might prove relevant to the understanding not only of Kafka's works and of the interplay between philosophy, psychology and literature in central Europe, but also, perhaps most importantly, of the crucial role played by the law and by the study of the law in this period as a determinant of continually recurring modes of thought. The notion of an inner tribunal, in particular, seems to be of the utmost importance as a key to the understanding not only of Kafka but also of Karl Kraus, of Freud, and even, perhaps, of Husserl. A full treatment of even this single notion would however lead us far too far afield.
Notes


2. Philosophy is indeed given as Kafka's intended profession in the list mentioned above.

3. This evidence has been assembled most convincingly by Wagenbach, op. cit., especially pp.106-14, and by Neesen, 1972. The latter, in particular, contains a wealth of detail on the activity of philosophers in Prague in Kafka's day.

4. See my 1978 and the references there given.

5. An interesting account of the institutional background of Brentanian philosophy in particular and of Austrian philosophy in general is given in Haller, 1978.

6. See Utitz, 1954 (cited by Wagenbach, op. cit., p.107). Further material on the almost religious devotion of the Prague Brentanists to their master is provided by Neesen, op. cit., ch.2.


8. The work was Busse, 1903, a study of psychophysics (essentially a survey of then-current treatments of the mind-body problem).

9. Cf. Wagenbach, 1958, p.216 n.426. Berta Fanta had established in her home a regular salon for Prague intellectuals frequented by many of the members of the Louvre circle. Amongst the guests at the Fanta gatherings were not only Kafka, Bergmann, Brod, Oskar Kraus, and Ehrenfels, but also Albert Einstein, who was for a time professor of physics in Prague, Philipp Frank, another physicist and subsequent member of the Vienna circle, and the mathematician Gerhard Kowalewski, who has described the Fanta evenings in his autobiography (1950). It was not only philosophical issues which were discussed; Brod, in one of his writings, tells us that on successive Fanta evenings through the winter of one year a certain Herr Hopf, also a professor in Prague and a friend of Einstein, gave a course combining an account of relativity theory on the one hand with an introduction to Freudian psychoanalysis on the other (cf. Wagenbach, op. cit., p.174).


11. Other works on Kafka and European philosophy, for example the works by Emrich and Bense, Demetz and Pondrom listed below, almost completely ignore the peculiarly Brentanian background in Prague and its quite specific relation to Kafka. Emrich and Bense content themselves with certain parallels between Kafka's thought and the Heideggerean Fundamentalontologie, and Demetz's essay is an interesting but far too brief historical account of the peculiar Jewish background of Bohemian intellectuals such as Husserl, Freud and Kafka. Even Pondrom, who presents some useful parallels between Husserl - otherwise Brentano's most important student - and Kafka, centering around the notion of
(Note 11. cont.)

putting the world on trial, misses completely Kafka's relation to Brentano.

A much wider issue, not here further discussed, pertains to the importance in the works of European intellectuals of the period of issues deriving generally from the newly blossoming discipline of experimental/theoretical psychology - of which Prague, home, successively, of Purkinje, Hering, Stumpf, and Ehrenfels, was an important centre. Compare, in passing, the entry in Kafka's diary for 21st October 1913: 'Ehrenfels' seminar at Weltsch's' with the content of Brod and Weltsch, 1913.


13. The theory of such moments and the associated theory of whole/part (dependence/independence) relations in general, which was developed by Stumpf and Husserl (both students of Brentano), is presented from a number of different points of view in the papers collected together in Smith, ed., 1980.

14. This interpretation of Brentano's theory of inner perception is sketched by Küng in his 1978.


16. A useful interpretation of Brentano's arguments here is given by Chisholm in his lectures on The First Person, especially his discussions of empirical certainty (which corresponds to what we have here called absolute evidence) and of direct attribution (e.g. of our seeming to see a cat, etc.).

17. See ch.6 of Brentano's Psychologie.

18. Cf. Walser, 1961, e.g. pp.22, 35, etc.

19. Wagenbach, indeed, sees Brentanian ideas on ethics as constituting a quite specific influence on Kafka's later thought:

The influence of the Brentano circle upon Kafka...can at this stage be hardly underestimated, especially as an element in the development of his later ethical rigorism founded on a kind of judgmental necromancy (Urteilmagie) (op.cit., p.116).

20. To recognise this one need only note the distinction among judgments between being true, i.e. being capable, at least in principle, of being executed with absolute evidence, and being realised to be true, i.e. being in fact executed with absolute evidence.


22. This summary of the events in Der Prozess is derived from Neesen, op.cit., p.202.

23. I am indebted to Erling Eng for what seems to me to be a revealing conception of Husserl's 'die Sachen selbst' as issues of an unending trial.
Bibliography


Further light may perhaps be thrown on the Brentanian theory of inner perception if we consider briefly the work of Kafka's other teacher of philosophy in Prague, Christian von Ehrenfels, the titular father of Gestalt psychology. It is Ehrenfels' classic paper of 1890 which will particularly hold our attention, a profound and highly influential work which can be shown to stand in direct line of descent to Meinongian object-theory, to the work of Bühler, Selz and the later Würzburg school, and both to the Gestalt-psychology proper of Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffka and to the Ganzheitspsychologie of Krueger, Volkelt, Wellek and Sander.\footnote{It also stands in an interesting parallel with the early thought of Wittgenstein, especially to his theory of Sachverhalt-combination and to his view of melodies and propositions as complex wholes which share a common ontological structure.}

Ehrenfels was not a native of Bohemia, though he held a chair in philosophy in the German university in Prague for more than thirty years. During this time he played a prominent role in Bohemian intellectual life, and his thought reveals many of the features characteristic of the German Czech (Bolzanian) tradition.\footnote{He distinguished himself not only in theoretical psychology, but also as a philosopher of mathematics, as a prolific poet and dramatist, as an exponent of the Mengerian subjectivist theory of value - Ehrenfels was probably the first to apply the notion of marginal utility to value theory in general, including the theory of ethical value, - as a social and educational theorist and sexual ethicist, as a pioneer advocate of sexual education for women, of eugenics, of Darwinism}
and Wagnerianism, and, most notoriously, of polygamy, which for a period he believed would offer a means of saving European civilisation from an otherwise inevitable collapse. Whilst it will not be possible for us to deal here with these aspects of Ehrenfels' thought, it has seemed useful - particularly in the light of the relative lack of attention to Ehrenfels by post-war philosophers and psychologists - to append a bibliography of his works insofar as this has proved capable of being assembled.

Ehrenfels' 1890 paper, entitled "On Gestalt Qualities", begins with a criticism of the account of melody which had been presented by Ernst Mach in his Analyse der Empfindungen of 1886. As both Mach and Ehrenfels recognised, a melody is not the sum or aggregate of the tones which constitute it, since the same melody can be constituted out of quite different tones, e.g. when it is transposed from one key to another. Mach's suggestion was that the melody itself is a direct object of sensation, that we perceive the melody in a series of 'sensations of time-form' which accompany our sensations of the successive tones.

But this account fits very inadequately with our experiences in listening to music. It seems that we do not have sensations of tones plus melody-sensations, but rather that, as the sequence of tone-sensations develops in our consciousness, the melody comes to be apprehended in a way quite different from the way in which the individual tones are apprehended. The melody, Ehrenfels' concluded, is not an object of outer sensation at all. It is, rather, something like an inner template or, in his terms, a complex quality adhering to the sequence of tone-sensations and experienced in an inner perception bound up with these. He argued that
such a quality is involved wherever there is the possibility of variation in sensory elements whilst a correlated form or structure can be grasped in inner perception as remaining the same. Gestalt qualities exist, then, only insofar as the experiences of individuals exhibit consciously apprehended organisation or articulation of a specific type.

Perhaps the simplest means of conveying the nature of these peculiar entities distinguished by Ehrenfels is to consider in turn the various types of Gestalt quality which he acknowledged. Melodies themselves are clearly temporal Gestalt qualities. Qualities of this type are associated also with temporally unfolding processes of other types, such as reddening or coolings. As in the case of melodies, so also in these examples the existence of the correlated quality rests, according to Ehrenfels, on the possibility of our grasping through internal perception a certain structure embodied in a sequence of (outer) perceptual experiences: the act of inner perception in which the quality is as it were *ambulando* grasped can be regarded as an act of higher order in relation to the latter.

It is perhaps important to stress this characteristic feature of the perception of Gestalten, that it involves no additional deliberate act on the part of the perceiving subject but takes place rather automatically. As in the work of Brentano, so also here, the act of inner perception is merely a determinately formed part or moment of a more inclusive perceptual experience. Thus, as Ehrenfels noted, 'a Gestalt quality is presented simultaneously with its founding elements without there being any activity directed specifically towards it' (1890, p.288).
Besides these examples there are also non-temporal Gestalt qualities, for example: shapes. The shape of a square is a purely spatial Gestalt quality experienced in (or as a dependent moment of) our sensations of the lines and points which constitute it; the Mona Lisa smile is an example of a spatial quality founded on our sensations of certain pigment-elements in combination. Flavours were regarded by Ehrenfels as non-temporal Gestalten founded on perceptions of food-taste-elements in combination. These and Ehrenfels' many similar examples suggest a relationship between his concept of Gestalt quality and the Aristotelian concept of individual accident, something which once more calls to mind the profound influence of Aristotle and the scholastics upon Brentano and his followers.

Ehrenfels also pointed to examples of mixed Gestalt qualities such as, for example, the qualities associated with Wagnerian operas, scientific experiments, and military drills. The Imperial procession held every year in Vienna on Corpus Christi day is the realisation of a mixed Gestalt constructed in a highly precise way from a complex sequence of interreticulated saluting- and marching-Gestalten, musical sound-Gestalten, horse-, coach- and flag-display-Gestalten, and so on. This example points in an obvious way to two further distinctions, that between relatively simple qualities, such as individual melodies or individual clinical symptoms, and relatively complex qualities built up from these (symphonies and diseases or diagnoses), and that between what might be called 'free' and 'bound' Gestalten, i.e. between those qualities which can be realised, in principle, at any place and time (for example melodies, colour-arrays, etc.), and qualities whose realisation is tied to a specific concrete individual (e.g. the city of
Vienna) or moment in time (as e.g. in the case of the funeral of the Kaiser Franz Josef).

It will already be clear that the concept of Gestalt quality has an extremely general application. It was in fact conceived by Ehrenfels as an indispensable tool for the understanding of any kind of apprehended form or articulation in complexes of experience, whether these be experiences of objects or of events and processes unfolding in time, and whether through a single sense or through a number of senses. The phenomenon of language, in particular, he conceived as being founded upon a totality of perceptual (visual and aural) complexes exhibiting Gestalt structure. This is because any linguistic complex can of course be recognised as the same even though the printed or phonic material on which it is founded should change in successive uses or utterances. Complexes of spatial or aural material are linguistic, Ehrenfels would argue, in virtue of the possession by the associated sequences of sensations of Gestalt qualities of particular kinds. (It would be interesting to compare with this account the use of the concept of *innere Sprachform* by Ehrenfels' colleague in Prague, Anton Marty.) This theory, as we shall see, has a number of quite specific consequences for our understanding of the nature of the typical objects of human experience and thus also of the experienced world which these objects together constitute. It is a truism that the latter, i.e. the world as experienced, is structured in certain ways, not only by the physiological properties of human sense-organs but also by our language, beliefs, expectations, skills, etc. Ehrenfels himself succeeded only partially in determining the nature of the structuring processes which are involved, for he continued to assume, in
line with the dominant psychological elementarism of his
day, that the perception of a Gestalt quality must in every
case rest on the perception of a set or complex of indepen­
dent elements (separable sensory pieces: for example the
separate notes of a melody, or the separate constituent
lines and points of a geometrical figure; cf. op.cit., pp.
262f). Only with the work of Wertheimer, Köhler and
Koffka was it recognised that in many areas of our experi­
ence we perceive structured wholes for which the notion of
founding element is out of place, wholes which are epist­
emologically prior to any set of elements which may be
distinguished abstractly within them.

One step towards this contextualist view was made by
the Munich psychologist Cornelius. In an important gener­
alisation of Ehrenfels' theory, Cornelius pointed out that
certain kinds of feelings and emotional phenomena can be
recognised as satisfying Ehrenfels' criteria for Gestalt­
hood. Thus returning, for the moment, to the examples of
temporal process Gestalten (such as redenings or coolings)
which, as we saw, are typically founded upon a series of
outer perceptions of successive colour-states of an external
object, we can ask what holds of the case in which the
object undergoing a given temporal process is the perceiving
subject himself, as, say, in the experience of an embarrassed
blushing or in a becoming-red-with-anger? These are, clearly,
examples of temporal Gestalt qualities, but they do not, as
in the case of a reddening of the setting sun, rest on any
complex of outer perceptions. They rest rather on complexes
of both inner and outer perceptions entangled with each
other in multifarious ways and only abstractly resolvable
into elements. (Such a complex will normally include certain
perceptions of physiological changes of state in the subject
involved, which are outer perceptions in Brentano's sense, even though they are of course literally directed inwardly, i.e. towards the bodily interior of the subject.)

This points to the existence both of phenomena which exhibit a purely 'external' organisation and also of phenomena which possess a two-fold (both internal and external) Gestalt structure. Consider, to take another example, the phenomenon of saluting. This can be seen to be associated with two distinct types of Gestalt quality, the first experienced by the saluter himself in a complex inner perception founded upon his outer-perceptual awareness of his own bodily movements, bound up together with inner perceptions of associated volitions, feelings of respect or of resentment, etc., and the second experienced by an observer in a complex inner perception founded upon his exclusively outer sensations of the movements of the saluter. Typically of course such distinct groups of qualities will have become fused or merged together in various ways in tandem with our advancing familiarity with both sets of phenomena as occurring in regular association and with the entrenchment of our assumption of their intrinsic and intelligible correlation. A result of such fusion - which will have its correlates in the physiological organisation of the perceiving subject⁵ - is that we do not experience two distinct Gestalten (an 'inner' and 'outer' saluting, for example); rather, we experience the world itself as containing one saluting-Gestalt, independently of our (inner or outer, first- or third-person) mode of access to it. Hence it is as though concrete experiential material were fused together into abstract units of various kinds, and it is these abstract units which can be seen to form much of the data of our experience.
By far the most important example of such fusion is of course that which occurs in the linguistic sphere. Linguistic units exhibit on a number of levels a double or multiple aspect, resting on a variety of systems of fusion which it is the business of the linguist to determine. Thus, to take the simplest possible example: we can experience a given packet of concrete sound material, ink-distributions, thinking events, and even silent mouth movements, as one and the same word or sentence.

There are however many other spheres in which we bypass that which is concrete in our experience of concrete objects and events and perceive, instead, meaningful abstract structures of specific types. The same basic theoretical model was indeed used by Ehrenfels in the development of his theory of ethical and economic value, in his writings on aesthetics, and in his many works in the field of what would today be called sociobiology.

The picture of the experiential world which he presents, a world of concreta which have become, as it were, fused together to form abstract units or abstract features in experience, is determined further in having a stratified structure. This can be made clear as follows. We have seen that inner perceptions of Gestalt qualities can be directed not only towards complexes of outer perceptions (as e.g. in the case of the perception of a melody), but also towards complexes some or all of whose constituents are inner perceptions. Such complexes of inner perceptions of Gestalt qualities may now themselves serve as the basis for further inner perceptions of Gestalt qualities of a higher order. Thus for example the Gestalt qualities which are possessed by e.g. our articulation of individual units of language
can yield Gestalt qualities of their own, as when two sentences are grasped as having a common grammatical or logical form, or when two ordered sequences of sentence units share an identical poetic form (they may both be sonnets, for example). That is to say, there are not only Gestalt qualities of the first order, founded upon sequences of relatively unarticulated sensation-elements (as melodies, say, are founded upon sequences of tone-sensations); there are also Gestalt qualities of second order founded upon perceptions of first order qualities; qualities of third order founded upon perceptions of second order qualities; and so on, as far as our powers of recognition of form can be extended. Thus, for example, the classical sonata form may be a second order quality founded upon our perceptions of the melodies, polyphonic interrelationships, etc., of which individual sonatas are constituted. The distinction of orders should not however be confused with that between relatively simple and relatively complex qualities. For the opposition between simple and complex can be made also amongst higher order qualities: classical symphonic form, for example, may perhaps be conceived as a complex second order quality built up from simpler second order qualities such as the rondo, minuet, sonata form, etc.

The world of inner perception, then, at least as Ehrenfels conceived it, exhibits an architectural structure no less complex than the world of outer perception. Of course the most serious flaw in Ehrenfels' work arises precisely here: it seems counter-intuitive to suppose that the sensory elements of experience are the exclusive objects of outer perception and that in the cases where we seem to perceive, outwardly, a structured whole, we are in fact perceiving in inner perception a quality of some specific
complex of elements. This issue could only be raised, however, and the associated theoretical refinements developed, particularly by members of the Grazer Schule and by Stumpf and his associates, as a result of Ehrenfels' pioneering work.

Notes

1. In this regard it is useful to note how many post-Herbartian psychologists had tackled the problems of language hand in hand with investigations in the psychology of music. For a more detailed account of Ehrenfels's influence see W. Witte, "Zur Geschichte des psychologischen Ganzheits- und Gestaltbegriffes", Studium Generale, 5, 1952, 455-64.


5. A useful account of this correlation and of its development through time with the cumulation of experiences is provided by Hayek, particularly in his "Rules, Perception and Intelligibility", Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London: Routledge, 1967, esp.pp.46f.

Towards a Bibliography of Christian von Ehrenfels

Of Ehrenfels' vast output it is probably fair to say that only his work in theoretical psychology and in subjectivist value theory is of lasting value. The latter, in particular, is of interest because it represents an attempt by a student of Carl Menger, founder of the Austrian school of economics, to generalise Austrian economic value theory into a philosophical theory of value-phenomena in general. In regard to Ehrenfels' works on racial morphology - consider for example the series of articles published in the Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie - there is little that can here sensibly be said. It is true, certainly, that like so many eugenicists of his day, Ehrenfels had a high regard for 'Jewish' genes, an opinion which he acknowledged in public. Ehrenfels' reputation, like that of other thinkers of the period, has suffered unreasonably by association with thinkers of inferior intellect who enjoyed so immense a political influence in the subsequent decades. Certainly it is true that in his case, and perhaps also in that of others, a number of important scientific contributions have been allowed for too long to lay fallow.

1. The most important of these have been signified in the bibliography which follows by an asterisk.
2. This periodical was co-founded by the ethnologist Richard Thurnwald, another student of Menger with impeccable liberal credentials.
3. The following passage from Kafka's diary for 4th February 1912 may be of some interest:
   Amusing scene when Professor Ehrenfels, who grows more and more handsome and who - with his bald head sharply outlined against the light in a curve that is puffed out at the top, has hands pressed together, with his full voice, which he modulates like a musical instrument, and a confident smile at the meeting - declares himself in favour of mixed races.
4. One might mention the works of Burkamp, Linke, Selz and Grelling.
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(Compiled with the assistance of Dr. Reinhard Fabian of the University of Graz who bears no responsibility for any errors it may contain.)

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§1. Introduction

There is very little to say about any direct influence between Brentano and Freud. Freud as a medical student attended two courses on philosophy given by Brentano but in the index to his collected works there is only one passing reference to him. Freud thought that philosophy insofar as it was not scientific in his sense was neurotic, for it clings to the illusion of being able to present a picture of the universe which is without gaps and is coherent ... and it goes astray in its method by over-estimating the epistemological value of our logical operations and by accepting other sources of knowledge such as intuition. (Freud, 1940, pp.160f.)

A favourite quotation of his about the philosopher was
Heine's derisive comment:

Mit seinen Nachtmützen and Schlafrockfetzen Stopft er die Lücken des Weltenbaus.

As was characteristic of Freud, his more magisterial remarks were reserved for subjects he knew and cared little about. There is no evidence that he studied any philosophy with care.

Similarly Brentano had very little interest in Freud. He mentions him only in passing in his discussion of the possibility of an unconscious consciousness (Brentano 1874, p.105) and concludes that this notion is incoherent. There is little doubt that Brentano found Freud's manner, particularly his elbowing his way to the top in scientific matters, antipathetic. For Freud treated psycho-analysis as a cause - he always used the expression 'die Sache' for it. Brentano on the other hand hindered the development of a Brentanian school in Vienna as he felt that truth in philosophy and science is not the possession of any man or alliance of men and is not likely to be furthered by pressure groups.

However Brentano and Freud were contemporaries in the Austro-Hungarian empire and both spent much of their lives in Vienna. The roots of their thought was in the German psychologism of Herbart, Helmholtz and Fechner which was prevalent at that time in Europe. This trend of thought opposed idealism and metaphysics of the Hegelian variety, basing itself on scientific thought and method which it saw as fundamentally empirical. It asserted that experience possessed a double aspect. It faced internally giving rise to psychological experience and externally in the ordinary sense. To the first kind of experience was ascribed a superiority in virtue of both its immediacy and
its certainty in relation to the second. Consequently it was regarded as having not only a greater illuminating power but even provided a foundation for the physical sciences which were seen as sciences of external experience, which is mediate and indirect. Accordingly, psychology was regarded as the science of the elementary concepts of all the sciences. It was therefore qualified to enlighten the whole domain of knowledge and to constitute in particular the core of a new logic and ethics.

I propose therefore first to examine Brentano's and Freud's views on the nature and methods of psychology, especially their views on the role of observation, description and language, and then in the second half of the paper I will discuss how they tried to develop an empirical ethic which had, as they thought, no metaphysical foundation but was rather based on psychology.

§2. Brentano's views on psychology

Brentano defined psychology as the science of the soul. By 'soul' here, he meant a substance which has sensations such as perceptual and fantasy images, acts of memory, acts of hope or fear, desire or aversion. And by substance he understood an entity in which other things subsist but which does not subsist in anything itself: the ultimate subject. (Brentano 1874, p.5). We discover the properties and laws of our souls immediately by means of inner perception and we infer by analogy that these properties and laws exist in others.

This psychological knowledge has a high theoretical value because the phenomena of inner perception are given to us just as they are in themselves: as they appear to be, so they are in reality. It is by inner perception that
we learn what a thought or a judgment is and it clarifies
the basic concepts of psychology.

Inner perception must be clearly differentiated from
introspection, or inner observation. Inner perception can
never become inner observation, for we can never focus our
attention upon an object of inner perception as to do so
would change the object. To observe one's own anger, for
example, is to change it. Furthermore, inner perception
has the distinguishing characteristic of being immediately
and infallibly self-evident which of course inner or outer
observation is not.

Thus the observation of external physical phenomena
offers us a basis for our knowledge of nature but at the
same time it can become a means of attaining knowledge of
the mind via the inner perceptions which are bound up with
it, i.e. via the oblique presentation of the activity which
is actually present in us.

We can observe the sounds we hear but we cannot observe
our hearing of the sounds; the latter can only be apprehend-
ed concomitantly, in the hearing of sounds. Indeed every
mental act is accompanied by a concomitant cognition which
refers to it in this oblique manner: every mental act has
two objects, a primary and a secondary one. The act of
hearing has as its primary object the sound and for its
secondary object, itself; and it is this latter object which
is internally perceived.

The truths of inner perception are a priori in character
and Brentano, according to Kraus (Brentano, 1874, p.370),
pointed out later in his life that they are not about matters
of fact; they are 'vérités de raison' rather than 'vérités
de fait'. Thus they have no existential import because, like all a priori judgments, i.e. judgments whose truth is evident from the very concepts involved, they are negative.

To put it another way, truths derived from inner perception, such as that consciousness is a unity and that nothing is an object of desire which is not an object of presentation, are grammatical remarks. They are a coherent set of grammatical prescriptions relevant to talk about mental activity. Of themselves they are not descriptive of any internal entity - the mind. So they cannot be verified empirically; but they do yet guide our thinking. For the form of articulation displays the formal features of mental activity without in fact describing them. We get at these truths by close attention to the logic of talking rather than by observation and induction.

Finally I should point out that Brentano distinguished descriptive psychology, which I have been discussing here, from genetic psychology. The latter is concerned with the laws according to which psychological phenomena come into being and pass away, so it depends on observations and is basically inductive in uncovering the causal laws governing mental phenomena. Its method therefore is that of the natural sciences, in contrast to descriptive psychology which arrives at general truth directly 'at one stroke and without hesitation'.

Brentano thought that psychology had very great theoretical and practical significance. Thus the phenomena of inner perception are given in themselves with completely adequate evidence, which is not so of the phenomena of the natural sciences. He felt that psychological phenomena 'are incomparably more beautiful and sublime' than physical phenomena.
He held that from the practical point of view psychology contains the roots of aesthetics and of logic. It provides the scientific basis for a theory of education, both of the individual and of society; ethics and politics also stem from it. The use of psychology is 'the fundamental condition of human progress in precisely those things which, above all, constitute human dignity.' It is the 'science of the future...the science to which, in the future, other sciences will be of service and to which they will be subordinate in their practical application.' Even that is not enough, for Brentano goes on to say that 'the question concerning the hope of a hereafter and our participation in a more perfect state of the world falls to psychology.'

§3. Freud's views on psychology

Freud had a no less elevated view of psychology, especially his own version of it - psychoanalysis. This was to serve as the most scientific basis for curing neurosis and for understanding and sometimes curing psychosis and many psycho-somatic diseases. It was to provide a fundamental critique of philosophy, ethics, logic, religion, aesthetics, and anthropology. In his own words,

> I perceived ever more clearly that the events of human history, the interaction between human nature, cultural development and the precipitates of primeval experiences (the most prominent example of which is religion) are no more than a reflection of the dynamic conflicts between the ego, the id and the super-ego, which psycho-analysis studies in the individual - are the very same processes repeated upon a wider stage. (Freud, 1925, p.72.)

Psychoanalysis showed, Freud thought, that religion is but an illusion and philosophy a paranoid delusional system. Logic is but obedience to the biological rules for the passage of thought - 'the existence of biological rules of this kind can in fact be proved from the feeling of
unpleasure at logical faults' (Freud, 1895, p.386). A very odd remark to make, I might say, as I have never noticed that people are miserable when they make logical mistakes and logicians are not notable for being particularly happy.

Freud was careful to point out that psycho-analysis does not provide us with a Weltanschauung, which he defined as an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our existence on the basis of one overriding hypothesis (Freud, 1933, p.158). But he did claim for psycho-analysis a special right to speak for the scientific Weltanschauung, which he thought was concerned simply with investigating and establishing facts. Its endeavour was to arrive at correspondence with reality, that is with what exists outside us and independently of us. It works by observation, now at one point and now at another. It puts forward conjectures, constructs hypotheses until the scattered findings fit themselves together. He never saw that this was but one view of scientific activity. He did not appreciate that science is not just concerned with facts but with systems of concepts which may redefine what a fact is. Good science asks new questions of nature which requires an extension of language to answer them and so our notion of the universe is widened. Thus the general theory of relativity showed that the belief in the absolute independence of space, time and motion is false and it required many refinements in mathematics to express this. Science not only needs observation and experiment which give data that have to be interpreted, but it needs also logic and mathematics which give new possible ways of representing what we find in nature.

Freud never appreciated the role of logic and mathematics in science, and this had serious consequences on both
his theory and his practice. Science, Freud thought,

asserts that there are no sources of knowledge of the universe
other than the intellectual working-over of carefully scrutinized observations (Freud, 1933, p.159).

This formed the basis of psycho-analysis, reemphasised by
Freud on many occasions. The patient had to observe himself too, for in analysis the patient 'must relate everything that his self-observation can detect' (Freud, 1912, p.115). He must observe and report his thoughts without reservation in a spontaneous manner.

Freud believed in what he called endopsychic perception, that is to say, a kind of perception which gives indubitable knowledge of objects and their relations in the mind. He never differentiated between inner perception and inner observation (introspection) as Brentano did, a failure having many consequences. It led him to believe that the mind had contents which could be observed. Thus in discussing myths he says,

The obscure recognition (the endopsychic perception, as it were) of psychical factors and relations in the unconscious is mirrored - it is difficult to express it in other terms, and here the analogy with paranoia must come to our aid - in the construction of a super-natural reality, which is destined to be changed back once more by science into the psychology of the unconscious. One could venture to explain in this way the myths of paradise and the fall of man, of God, of good and evil, of immortality, and so on, and to transform metaphysics into meta-psychology. (Freud, 1901, p.258.)

Thus with one twist of his hand, like a conjuror, he takes most of philosophy, ethics and religion and puts it into the hat of psycho-analysis. Freud if nothing else was a master rhetorician.

Freud's failure to differentiate between perception and observation led him to believe not only that metaphysics
deals with observable objects somewhere 'outside' the mind, but also that the contents of the mind must likewise be located in some place: inside the head. Now, as Wittgenstein remarked,

One of the most dangerous ideas for a philosopher is, oddly enough, that we think with or in our heads. The idea of thinking as a process in the head, in a completely enclosed space, gives him something occult. (Wittgenstein, 1967, para.605f.)

Wittgenstein goes on to show that this leads to the belief that we have a prosthetic organ of thought which is so to speak in our heads. Freud called this organ of thought the psychical apparatus:

We assume that mental life is the function of an apparatus to which we ascribe the characteristics of being extended in space and of being made up of several portions (Freud, 1940, p.145).

This is the central concept of Freudian metapsychology which concerns itself with discussing the arrangement and parts of this apparatus, the temporal order in which it works and the transformations of energy which it undergoes. He was of course clear that this apparatus was a fiction or a myth, but he was never clear as to what this myth represented and why his myths were scientific and rational whereas all other myths were in his opinion irrational and signs of superstition.

Freud was, I want to claim, fundamentally confused as to the nature of theory in science. He did not realise that there is no such thing as a pure observation. There is a vast amount of psychological evidence to show that what we perceive depends partly on our past history, the society we live in and so on. And this is even more true of scientific observations. Take Duhem's description of an experiment in physics:
Go into the laboratory, draw near this table crowded with so much apparatus.... An observer plunges the metallic stem of a rod, mounted with rubber, into small holes; the iron oscillates and, by means of the mirror tied to it, sends a beam of light over a celluloid ruler, and the observer follows the movement of the light beam on it. There, no doubt, you have an experiment.... Now ask the physicist what he is doing. Is he going to answer, 'I am studying the oscillation of the piece of iron carrying the mirror'? No, he will tell you that he is measuring the electrical resistance of a coil. If you are astonished and ask him what meaning these words have, and what relation they have to the phenomena he has perceived and which you have at the same time perceived, he will reply that your question would require some very long explanations, and he will recommend that you take a course in electricity (Duhem, 1914, p.145).

The upshot of which is that we must learn some physics before we can see what a physicist sees. Observation in a science depends on the theory of that science. Even non-scientific self-observation depends on the society and on the expectations of the observer, etc.

Furthermore, scientific theory is concerned with knowledge, that is knowledge of the objects that belong to the world of nature, objects which exist and act independently of us and of our thoughts. This knowledge it seeks to fix in statements which are true or false.

Now myths or models are not intended to be a series of statements containing judgments which are true or false. The point of them is that they are copies of the disposition of relevant elements in the original. Thus they can be said to be like or unlike their original, relevant or irrelevant, but not true or false: they are still objects and not judgments. Theoretical statements in science on the other hand do not stand for anything at all. They do not represent but rather state what is the case. They may not contain assertions, convey descriptions and give accounts, but none of
this depends on their possessing some property in common with that which the statement is about. Nothing in the equation \( E = mc^2 \) resembles anything in the material world. So theoretical statements differ from myths and pictures in that they are judgments rather than objects reflecting the physical world.

But Freud never saw this. He was firmly wedded to a representative view of language, and so in his theoretical work he personifies the mind with ego, id and superego and discusses how they act on one another without ever getting down to stating what a person is, or what an action is, or what is the nature of rule following and where can this go wrong, etc. His metapsychology is a series of objectifications consisting partly of a number of diagrams of what goes on in therapy and partly a drama, written to be read outside the consulting room, to represent what goes on inside it. It loses its meaning in the objectifications of the discourse and so invites innumerable interpretations.

He was in fact subject to one of the most deeply rooted prejudices of our culture. As Rota puts it:

Physical objects (such as chairs, tables, stars and so forth) have the same "degree" of reality as ideal objects (such as prices, poems, values, emotions, Riemann surfaces, subatomic particles, and so forth). Nevertheless, the naive prejudice that physical objects are somehow more 'real' than ideal objects remains one of the most deeply rooted of Western culture. (Rota, 1973.)

Freud never fully took into account that emotions, values and persons are what Rota calls ideal objects, and which it would be perhaps more appropriate to call (after Husserl) concrete or bound idealities. They can be thought about in different ways and from different points of view because they are not dependent on our thoughts for their
existence, and nor are our thoughts about them in any sense arbitrary. When we think about the structure of an emotion, for example, we are constrained by the nature of the object to direct our attention and thought to it in an appropriate way, any old thought will not do. Just as in the perception of real objects, so also here, we can distinguish various degrees of evidence in our perception of or awareness of the objects in question. And in certain circumstances we may find ourselves enriched by insight which is guided by evidence rather than blind compulsion (Brentano, 1930).

Freud, because he did not understand the objective character of scientific thought, was forced to distort the place of evidence in science. If someone disagreed with him he could write:

None, however, but physicians who practise psychoanalysis can have any access whatever to this sphere of knowledge or any possibility of forming a judgment that is uninfluenced by their own dislikes and prejudices (Freud, 1920, Preface).

If his opponent had been analysed and had practised yet still disagreed then he was either excommunicated or taken to have regressed to neurotic thinking. To Freud a correct judgment is simply a judgment dependent on a certain technique, the technique compels one to believe, whereas in science a judgment is true if no evident judgment about the same object could contradict it. In other words judgment and its truth is a matter of greater or lesser degree of insight, rather than of blind compulsion (Brentano, 1930).

Freud's theories represent what went on between him and his patients, they enable us to 'see' what went on, they are pictures, aids to understanding. If an analyst disagrees with Freud's theories it usually means that something different goes on between him and his patients than
went on between Freud and his. But if he puts forward his views in language like Freud, then this language, although containing different theoretical views, will merely reflect a different practice. It would not tell us what was the case.

A scientific theory, on the other hand, states or seeks to state what is the case. It is not merely a copy or reflection of some preconceived original. It refers to an object and seeks to characterise it as it is. This characterisation is not once and for all. However as we progress in our knowledge of the object it gets more into focus and becomes more precise. Our characterisations of it become more complex as we use what may be radically different techniques of observation and as people develop ever more refined theories about it, guided by the cumulating evidence. Our gradually increasing knowledge of micro-organisms and of the field of numbers are two examples. A properly scientific theoretical language enables us to do this, whereas a language which is merely a reflection of a practice binds us to the practice and blinds us to the object of the practice.

Freud's attachment to a representative theoretical language blinds him to the existence of concrete idealities of the type mentioned above; he is forced to pre-conceive emotions, conflicts, and so on, as being spatio-temporal events of peculiar sorts, which are, like other events involving material objects, located in some place: for example in the head, or in the psyche.

The same non-scientific presuppositions can be seen at work in Freud's discussion of superstition (1901, pp. 258f). He says there that whilst, on the one hand, the
superstitious person knows nothing of the motivation of his chance actions and believes in psychical accidental events, on the other hand he ascribes to external chance happenings a meaning which he sees as becoming manifest in real events. On this basis he then proceeds to elaborate various mysterious forces, omens, ghosts, occult powers, etc., which he conceives as occurring in the real world in order to explain this meaning.

Freud, who considered himself to be rational and scientific, takes the exactly contrary view, believing that an unintentional chance manifestation of his own mental activity disclosed something hidden, 'though it is something that belongs to my mental life (not to external reality)' (Freud, 1901, p.257). He of course believed in the universal application of determinism to both physical and mental events, a truth which he took to lie at the foundation of psycho-analysis.

It seems clear that Freud and the superstitious person are both equally irrational, for neither sees the part that logic plays in our life. They are both victims of the picture that the laws of logic are somehow inexorable, as if logic was something like a machine which is somehow an all-pervading ethereal mechanism (Wittgenstein, 1978, pp. 113-42). In the case of the superstitious person this machine would be an entity somewhere occult in the external world, while in Freud's view it is an occult entity somewhere in the mind, i.e. in the unconscious. They confuse necessity which is studied by logic with causal powers which exist in the real world and are studied by the methods of the natural sciences. Language about things is confused with the things language refers to. Everything has a cause but that does not imply that things are ruled
by logical necessity. Neither sees that we cannot think illogically — which of course does not mean that we are somehow causally compelled to think logically. Logical investigation enables us to see what thought is. As Brentano pointed out, it is of the essence of thought that it should be a thought of something. An illogical thought cannot have this relation to anything and so cannot be a thought. So a parapraxis does not express any thought but is a condition in which the person has slipped into a merely passive state and so has become subject to the purely associative forces of language. But by getting people to free associate after a parapraxis may enable them to start thinking again and so recover from the slip and perhaps obtain insight into thought and their lack of potency in thinking through matters which are distressing to them.

Freud has to elaborate various occult mechanisms in the mind because he, like the superstitious person, was unable to see that intentional inexistence, the reference to something as an object, is a distinguishing characteristic of all mental phenomena. So when he came to study concrete idealities such as emotions, complexes and parapraxes he merely used empirical methods instead of also paying close attention to the logic of thought and action.

Freud's inability to understand the abstract nature of thought is also shown in his discussion of religion and in his general inability to understand sublimation. He says with heavy irony

How enviable to those of us who are poor in faith, do those enquirers seem who are convinced of the existence of a Supreme Being (Freud, 1939, p.122).

He goes on in this vein throwing scorn on the superstition of religion. In fact it is Freud himself who is ignorant.
A Jew, Christian, Hindu or Buddhist who believed in the existence of a Supreme Being would not be true to his faith. For as many theologians have pointed out, God is not an object which is greater, more powerful, etc., than any other object. He is not an object at all. When God said 'I am that I am' to Moses (Exodus 3.14) the whole point is that He did not name himself or define Himself because Moses saw that God is not an object. 'I am that I am' in Hebrew is a name derived from the verb 'to be', which signifies existence. The whole secret of the phrase consists in the repetition in a predicative position of the word indicative of existence. So it states that the subject is identical with the predicate. This makes it clear that He is existent not through existence. He is not a being that exists. So God is the existent that is the existent, or the necessarily existent. A being endowed with intellect cannot but accept the truth of this demonstration. It is not a matter of proof or belief. (Maimonedes, 1963, p.154f.) The ancient Jews were forbidden to give God a name to stop people falling into the idolatry of thinking He was an object that could be believed in, named, and called upon. But Freud never confronts this way of thinking and can say only that religion is at best merely a historical truth, that is a true memory of what was believed in the past. But it is not what he called a material truth which to Freud is essentially a present true perception of a thing, this being the only other truth he recognised. Freud's thought here is more primitive than that of Moses.
§4. Brentano's views on ethics

I have shown so far that both Brentano and Freud put a very high value on psychology. Brentano however had a much clearer notion of the nature of scientific theory. Freud's theorising was so bound up with his practice that he was never free to see the place of evidence and abstraction in science. As he was blind to the crucial role of logic in science, his theoretical language tended to lose its meaning in the objectifications of the discourse so becoming wide open to innumerable interpretations. We will now turn to what Brentano called practical philosophy to see what the theoretician and practical man made of it.

Brentano sought to found ethics on empirical psychology; 'experience alone is my teacher' (Brentano, 1874, XV) he wrote. He wished, like Freud, to avoid metaphysics and speculation.

When Brentano spoke of the origin of moral knowledge he did not concern himself with explanations of its emergence, i.e. with providing a genealogy of morals which would be based on genetic psychology. He tried rather to discover the authoritative source of this knowledge which would lie, he argued, in descriptive psychology. This source he felt would be taught be nature itself, and so be independent of ecclesiastical, political and every other kind of social authority. So moral knowledge would be as incontestably certain and universally valid for all thinking beings as, say, the Pythagorean theorem (Brentano, 1889, pp.3-6).

The natural sanctions for morality should not be dependent on any external or internal 'will' or on any feeling
of compulsion or hope for reward or fear of retaliation. Morality he saw as being based on a natural superiority which is intrinsic to it just as correct reasoning is intrinsically superior to prejudice and muddled reasoning. Belief in this intrinsic superiority is an ethical motive and knowledge of it is the correct ethical motive and the sanction which gives validity to the moral law (Brentano, 1889, p.11).

Now what is this superior end which he should strive after? What is this good which is the best among the ends that are attainable? To find it we must turn to descriptive psychology, for our concept of the good has its origin in certain intuitive presentations having psychological content.

Every psychic act has a reference to an intentional object which is not part of its act. There are three ways of being directed upon this object - having it present to oneself, judging it, and making an emotional valuation of it. It is to this last way that we must look for the source of morality. Emotions involve love or hate, inclination or disinclination, which may arise from the mere thought of an object but also from the beliefs that we may have concerning it. Of these two opposing types of feeling, such as love or hate, in every instance one or other of them is correct and the other incorrect. It is this that gives us the source of the good and the bad. For the good is that which is worthy of love and we call a thing good when the love directed upon it is correct (Brentano, 1889, p.18).
But how are we to know that a thing is good? We know when we have evidence that it is good. Thus love or hate may be instinctive or habitual, here evidence plays no part and so we would not know if the object was good or bad. But some feelings are experienced as being correct because it would make no sense not to judge them so. Thus a person who prefers knowledge with joy to knowledge without joy prefers correctly, for it would be perverse to prefer knowledge without joy.

Now we must ask how we know that one thing is better than another, for there are many goods. We derive our insights about better, Brentano claims, from acts of preferring that are experienced as being correct. Thus we prefer joy with knowledge rather than joy alone or knowledge alone, because of our experiences of preference for joy and knowledge and the evidence of inner perception bound up therewith.

The principles of ethics can therefore, according to Brentano, be reduced to cognitions of feelings. But he stressed that these feelings must not be blind emotions or instinctive reactions; they must rather be feelings experienced with insight as being correct. The ultimate source of our knowledge of good is made up of inner perceptions of acts of love and preference which are experienced as being correct and may be directed either upon individual instances or upon universals (as when we know, for example, that joy as such, or knowledge as such, is good).

Brentano was very aware that ethics is a practical discipline and that its doctrines aim at winning favour. It investigates human character and concerns itself, in
particular, with what constitutes a good or bad character; it seeks to establish how to act rightly in spite of weak moral insight and thus it is concerned with moral guidance. Another of its objects is social relations and the place and value of friendship, of love, and so on. Indeed he believed that a fully developed ethics can absorb the entire philosophy of law and the state (Brentano, 1952, p.8).

But what were the details of Brentano's advice on moral questions? These were somewhat disappointing for he never brought his theory of evidence and of intentionality to bear on practical moral questions. He thought mastery of the will over the life of instincts was simply a matter of driving certain thoughts out of our mind when we are in a state of temptation, while at the same time stirring up and retaining others that foster the good (Brentano, 1952, p.343). Thus practice, training and example are the mainsprings with which we acquire virtue. We should act in moral questions like a skillful general who avoids those battles we may lose and ... face the enemy, temptation, only when we are certain of success (Brentano, 1952, p.348).

He recommended that we should be alone from time to time, read ethical works and poetry of lofty moral content. We should lead an orderly life. Idleness is a morass that should be strictly avoided. He thought the example of Maximillian II of Bavaria should be followed who made a note of a particular virtue each day so that he could practice it (Brentano, 1952, p.348).

§5. Freud's views on ethics

Freud did not recognise that he was doing ethics and had little interest in or knowledge of the classical texts of this discipline. He thought that all that was important in
ethics was absorbed by psycho-analysis which, he believed, threw a clear light on the origin of human imperfection and failings. As was usual with Freud, he falsified any traditional teaching which did not fit into his scheme of things. He assumed that the classical teachings on ethics were simply systems of doctrines to be blindly followed, rather than ways of thinking through to the grounds of ethics. So he could ask, rhetorically, which of the countless ethical systems should be accepted, and concluded that none should be. All are insecure except for the relative certainty of psycho-analysis which is based on science (Freud, 1922, p.269). Unfortunately this dream of Freud's that psycho-analysis would provide a monolithic, sure foundation for ethics proved short-lived for there are now countless different psychotherapies all claiming to be based on science, and the psycho-analytic movement itself has split into many groups. So we are still forced to think through to the basis of ethics for ourselves.

It is wish fulfilment, Freud claimed, that lies at the basis of ethics, and wishes were to him solely a matter of psychology. Thus

One thing only do I know for certain and that is that man's judgments of value follow directly his wishes for happiness - that, accordingly, they are an attempt to support his illusions with arguments (Freud, 1923, p.145).

The roots of conscience and guilt were thought by Freud to be revealed by his psychological methods. He defined conscience as 'the internal perception of the rejection of a particular wish operating within us' and guilt as 'the perception of the internal condemnation of an act by which we have carried out a particular wish' (Freud, 1913, p.68). He generalised these findings to religion and morality which he thought had been acquired phylogenetically out of
the father complex. Moral restraint in the individual was obtained through the process of mastering the Oedipus complex which requires renunciation of instinctual wishes. The male sex has taken the lead, he believed, in these moral acquisitions, and then transmitted them to women by cross-inheritance (Freud, 1923, p.37).

All these remarks, which are basic to psycho-analysis, were thought by Freud to be based on unprejudiced observation. Thus for example he held that wishes were processes in the mind that could be observed by him and by his colleagues. He did not realise he was not observing but rather working within a framework of pre-given definitions of civilised behaviour which suggested certain ways of looking at the development of religion and morality. Thus in our culture it is a definition of civilised behaviour to say that it is not instinct driven. The judgment as to whether a piece of behaviour is instinct driven or not requires intimate knowledge of the norms of our culture. Observation of the mind or knowledge of psychology will not suffice.

Freud himself made many moral judgments but he never questioned their basis. Indeed he thought morality is a repressing force and that the super-ego - the centre for morality in his scheme - is cruel, and needs to become impersonal for good mental health. He talked of the lower part of mental life, the instinctual part, as being more primitive than the ideal part, which he regarded as being somehow the highest in the human mind. He thought perversions were wrong and needed to be cured, because - as he held, - they were manifestations of sexual instincts which, having become freed from the primacy of the genitals, were in pursuit of pleasure on their own account, as in the
early days of libido development. Greed, envy, covetousness, violent aggression, were all thought of by him to be essentially undesirable. In all these statements ethical judgment is implied but Freud never acknowledged this and claimed his judgments were made simply on the basis of scientific observation.

He saw traditional ethics as being purely a matter of making demands. Thus he thought that the command 'Love thy neighbour as thyself' was absurd as it was impossible to fulfil, and makes an enormous inflation of love. This sort of ethics he thought has nothing to offer except the narcissistic satisfaction of being able to think oneself better than others (Freud, 1920, p.143). He seems not to have heard of Jesus' criticism of Pharisaism. He had no notion of happiness in fulfilling the law, to him law was necessary but always oppressive and demanding.

In his practice, on the other hand, he took what can be recognised as a very definite ethical stance. The patient in analysis was obliged to be as candid as he could be. The analyst must have an open mind as free from presuppositions as possible. He must have no theoretical interest in the case while treatment is proceeding, as that might distort his unconscious which should be like a receptive organ tuned into the unconscious of the patient. And he thought that the patient must learn above all from personal experience, and he was thus discouraged from reading books on psychoanalysis and was not to be given tasks such as exercises to follow that might make him better, as thinking things over or concentrating the attention could solve none of the riddles of neurosis. Analysts were enjoined to be tolerant of their patient's weaknesses and to be content to win back some degree of capacity for work and enjoyment (Freud, 1912,
§6. A comparison of Brentano and Freud on ethics

Both Brentano and Freud thought that the basis of ethics lay in psychology, in the sense that you have to look into the psyche to find it there and describe it. For example Brentano thought the concept of the good had its origin 'in certain intuitive presentations having psychological content' (Brentano, 1889, p.14). Rightness is an existent in the mind, which can be known.

As already stated Freud based ethics on the wish which was, he thought, a process of the mind. He thought the good was that which we wish to take into ourselves and the bad that which we wish to reject. All morality he regarded as being based on external coercion, i.e. on situations in which we are forced, under the threat of loss of love, to stop taking the good into ourselves and instead obey social and cultural authorities. Having done so we internalise these authorities which then punish us if we disobey them. So morality is at root an imposition, according to Freud, and he speculated on how much of this imposition mankind can bear.

Freud's psychologistic notions of ethics are based on his confusions as to the nature of wishes. He thought wishes were processes in the mind and so to account for morality he had to manufacture various agencies and processes in the mind which somehow took in or rejected prohibitions and laws coming from the outside world. Wishes in fact cannot be understood by psychology alone, for they are neither inside nor outside the mind. Their logic is extremely subtle: they must be differentiated from hopes, desires,
demands, yearnings and longings; and one must be familiar with the social and cultural world of the person wishing in order to understand the reality-basis of their wish. Neurotics, rather than having a disease of the mind, lack insightful knowledge, knowledge guided by evidence, into the logic of their wishes and desires.

Neither Brentano nor Freud acknowledged that we can experience the goodness of things as when we can see the goodness of an act of genuine love. For Brentano what is experienced is not the goodness of things but only the rightness of our judgments about goodness. For Freud goodness is a wish fulfilment, at root a delusion. Our search for it is determined by the psychical apparatus which is a homeostatic mechanism keeping the internal energy of the organism as low as possible. So goodness for the individual is purely an internal matter, rather than knowledge of the world. He never distinguished goodness from goods.

This belief that values are mere subjective phenomena, a matter for psychology, leads to the reduction of values to the feelings we experience in the presence of goods. Thus there is a widespread illusion today that if you have a good feeling then the object that gives you that good feeling is of value.

However a moral act does not have goodness for its content. A morally good act, such as a spontaneous act of love, is one which is directed towards an intended value - the loved one himself is seen to be of value. Goodness is not a content of an act but is carried by an act when the latter is directed to a value. If you feel joy it may make you feel good to feel it, but the value is in the joy not in the feeling good about the joy. A martyr being burned at the stake may feel joy and be good but he will not feel
good.

When goodness is seen as the content of an act it becomes idealised and so pursued as something to be grasped by thought, it being a representation somewhere 'in the mind'. But as it is not a representation it is inaccessible to grasping by thought. In fact it is thoughtless to try and grasp it. So the individual ends up in despair as to him, if goodness is not in the mind, it is nowhere. Much of Freud reads like the work of a man who was in despair over the ideal, for he never distinguished between the intentional object of desire and the external object referred to, which is objective and has value but is not in or of the mind.

Freud had a totally inadequate notion of the place of evidence in science. He believed that evidence in science is simply a function of what the knower has come to be. The evidence for psycho-analysis, for example, being determined by the application of psycho-analytic techniques. It depends simply on the experience of psycho-analysts who use these techniques. But scientific theory is not solely dependent on techniques and experience. Theory is crucial in science for theory enables us to refer to objects which are independent of our thoughts and techniques. The objects science seeks knowledge of belong to the world of nature which exists and acts independently of us and of our thoughts, whereas experiences and techniques depend on us and so are inseparably a part of the social activity of science. Theory enables us to see through these experiences to the autonomous objects of the knowledge they produce. Thus many different techniques are used to tell us of the existence of bacteria - but we know that bacteria are autonomous objects and would exist even if there were no men in the
world. It is scientific theory that enables us to state this knowledge. Similarly scientific knowledge of the mind cannot depend on any particular series of thoughts or techniques which compel us to believe. To follow Freud's notion of evidence would be to fall victim to the belief in the omnipotence of thought.

Another consequence of Freud's inability to understand that evidence in seeing is a 'free seeing' and not a determination of the knower, is that he saw rationality and ethics as being a curtailment of the person. He did not see that renunciation of instinctual identifications might enable new concepts to be acquired so that greater knowledge of the world may develop. Thus he thought that women, children and 'primitive' people are less moral than men, adults and 'civilised' people, because he thought that they could not control themselves so well. But control is only curtailment if the subject experiences himself as a determinate subject. If the world is lawful (science depends on this assumption) and ethics is knowledge of the laws pertaining to value, then the acquisition of knowledge of these laws by means of insight based on evidence can only be an enrichment as the subject freely sees these laws, whereas a life propelled by instinct is an impoverished life, one in which the subject is totally determined by drives.

In spite of the poverty of Freud's theorising and his false notion of evidence, his practice depended on an implicit theory of self-evidence. Thus it was evident to him and to his patients that ordinary human happiness is better than depression or manic excitement. It was evident that it is better to be free of envy and greed. He spent a lot of time in analysis showing patients through evidence what these states are, for people are not usually clear as to
exactly what it means to suffer from depression, envy or manic excitement. This is why Freud called his method analysis, for if a person has evidence that he is envious and has evidence as to exactly what object his envy intends, then he will choose not to be envious; there is no need to tell him what to do. It is because this evidence is required that analysis may take a long time. But Freud had no theory which threw light on why it is better to be free of envy and so his theories are open to the charge of being ideologically biased.

Freud and Brentano differed profoundly in their attitude to consciousness. Freud had a dogmatic attitude to it. Consciousness, he held, was an unexplained given,

a fact without parallel, which defies all explanation or description .... Nevertheless, if anyone speaks of consciousness we know immediately and from our most personal experience what is meant by it (Freud, 1940).

It is nothing but

a sense organ for the perception of psychical qualities (Freud, 1900).

It is associated with verbal images and gives them a quality which is the specific mark of consciousness. We cannot retrace the devious course of Freud's thoughts about consciousness here. But his ideas about it grew from his empirical notion of experience and were an unexamined dogma of his system. So, to account for the phenomena he came across in his clinical work he was forced to bring in the dogma of the unconscious, where everything happened which could not be explained by his notion of consciousness.

To Brentano consciousness was anything but simple. Even in the simplest mental state a double object is immanently present - that is to say we have something as our primary
object and at the same time the active subject is present indirectly. He was well aware that this notion was not an empirical matter depending on experience, but a matter of the logical analysis of experience and as such an extremely subtle notion. In fact one could say that Husserl's phenomenology (Husserl was a pupil of Brentano) was an attempt to explicate the notion of intentionality.

However he seemed to forget all this in his practical philosophy where he only gave advice to people. He did not see the enormous importance of intentionality and evidence in practical ethics. For persons involved in neurotic and ethical conflicts have false notions of evidence and so also of what is real. This has the effect of blinding the subject to evidence coming from outside his field of consciousness, since evidence is of value only to the extent that it shows itself via inner evidence. Giving advice and moral homilies is of little use as they will be interpreted by the subject in terms of those representations coordinated with his consciousness which he takes to be real. It was Freud's insight into this problem that forced him to develop his method of treatment and his notion of the unconscious. To transform the person one must, so to speak, slip past his consciousness.

Neither Brentano nor Freud adequately tackled the problem of authority which is crucial to ethics. They both tried to trace it to its source which for them was in the mind. Authority is linked with power and power is not a content situated in any place - as is indicated by its etymology: *dynamis, potestas, pouvoir*; to be able. Power in ethics is a potency and potency cannot be described or observed.
Freud's realisation of the crucial importance of sexuality in ethics was an attempt to understand the workings of authority and power, but he had inadequate intellectual tools to do the job properly. Sexuality can never be completely understood by individual psychology since here the reality of the other person is crucial. Insight into the referent of an act enables us to differentiate, for example, between whether an act of sexual intercourse is masturbatory or an act of loving the other person, and this requires close attention to the logic of the act rather than observation of the contents of the mind. Furthermore, as power is a potency which is not observable or describable, so the evidence for its presence cannot be inductive. We need a concept such as Wittgenstein's non-inductive evidence (or criterion) to guide us here.

Brentano and Freud thought deeply about psychology and ethics. They failed to get to the root of the problem because they were crippled in different ways by their empirical philosophy. This is best demonstrated by their inadequate notion of the relation of theory to practice, a question which is crucial to ethics and which empiricism fails to comprehend.

Freud's theories are a map or maze which reflects the neurotic world. They have immense suggestive power but are open to innumerable interpretations. So readers of Freud tend to become enmeshed in his theories, usually clinging to one interpretation of his work which can only be maintained against other interpretations by asserting a dogmatic authority. Scientific theory however is not suggestive in this manner but turns people away from the language it is written in to new ways of thinking about the world.
Brentano is especially disappointing in his divorce of theory from practice since he had a deep knowledge of ancient Greek thought which had not been guilty of such a split. Much of his psychology is a development of his insight into the pivotal position of the *nous poïētikos* (active intellect) in Aristotle's psychology (cf. Brentano, 1867). The *nous poïētikos* is the moving principle of thought, an unconscious active power associated with pleasure which enables potentially intelligible images to become actually intelligible. But Brentano never freed this notion sufficiently from a faculty psychology, and so he could not see its pivotal position in practical ethics. To Aristotle on the other hand the *nous poïētikos* was the basis for the capacity to act theoretically i.e. to act in such a way as to attend to something whilst forgetting one's own purposes. It is to share and be involved in what one is attending to, and so understand its nature, as opposed to any merely subjective attitude or empty application of a technique. Some such notion as this lies at the root of the Freudian 'technique', however, of listening to the patient with the unconscious. But Freud, being an empiricist, thought the analyst must *forget* his theoretical interests in his practice, where to Aristotle to listen in such a way, without personal interests, is precisely to act theoretically. The empiricist sees theory as merely a tool of construction, a means of gathering experience together in a unified way, as we construct theories so one theory succeeds another and has validity only until further experience and so new interests make us change our mind. The classical *theoria*, on the other hand, was the highest manner of being human, a transcending of subjective interests, and so was able to furnish the foundation of ethics.
References


The most useful commentators on Kafka have established a number of recurrent constructions and motifs in his works: the depiction of character as function; the peculiar accompaniers of the protagonist (Delamarche and Robinson in *America*, K's 'assistants' in *The Castle* - though these have no fully developed counterparts in *The Trial*; superficially Josef K. is the most independent of all three protagonists); the role of dress; that peculiar lack of efficacy which has led Beissner to declare that the real theme of Kafka's works is that of the 'abortive arrival and the missed goal' (in *The Trial*, Chapter II, Josef K. arrives at a hearing, but misunderstands its nature and in the following chapter returns in order to attend a further hearing, and presumably to put matters right, only to find that no hearing is being held that day); or, more generally, the peculiar treatment of time and space in all his mature writings. The purpose of this essentially brief paper is to explore some aspects of the description of motion within the text of Kafka's *Trial*, of the peculiar deformations in the coordinate structure of space and time which this reveals, in the hope that this might assist the understanding of K's experiences and of the gradual changes which is undergone by K. in the
course of that work.

In *The Trial*, as opposed to the other two novels, we know exactly the time span covered, for we are told precisely that K. is arrested on the morning of his thirtieth birthday and that he is executed late on the eve of his thirty-first. And yet if we leave aside the invariably brief direct or inferred references to the passage of time, we find that the text deals explicitly and apparently in great detail, even when we take into account the 'fragments', with not much more than a combined total of thirty hours in all. This treatment of time introduces one of the many imbalances or deformations into the text. As far as time is concerned the reader becomes simultaneously aware of detailed reporting of the passage of time - we note frequent references to quite specific clock time - while also being uneasily aware of the vast gaps in the flow of time described.

The treatment of *space*, whereby for instance the same area can appear both large and small, introduces yet another imbalance into the text. At the first hearing in Chapter II the room appears so small that the 'audience' is crammed in right up to the ceiling so tightly that cushions are needed to protect the head, but the same room seems vast in the next chapter. The 'small' lumber room in Chapter V can yet still accommodate K., the two warders, the whipper as well as the lumber, and still give the whipper plenty of elbow-room for his work. While in *America* corridors appear to grow in length as the novel proceeds and hotels sprout life-shafts and storeys, in *The Trial* this device is refined to allow 'known' space to suddenly reveal hidden recesses: the lumber-room, again, the previously unobserved side-chapel in the cathedral from which the chaplain addresses
K., or the unseen court official in the dark corner of Lawyer Huld's room, the door behind Titorelli's bed leading to the Court buildings. (In The Judgment we recall that the nightdress worn by Georg Bendemann's father appears suddenly to sprout pockets, hitherto unsuspected recesses, just as the father himself appears suddenly to possess unsuspected strength and resources.)

These observed recurrent motifs can be traced back to the peculiar narrative perspective created by Kafka: the text, while ostensibly an objective, simple, third person narrative, is in fact rigorously subjective - the anonymous narrator observes only what, in this case, Josef K. observes. There are however a number of important breaks in this perspective, in which the reader is afforded also a view of Josef K. from the outside. That many readers are not at first aware, or not fully aware, of this, introduces yet another deformation into the text.

The apparently obdurate and relentless concreteness with which the text appears to unfold, the grim absoluteness with which the events unfold exclusively around K. himself, have made this text, above all others, a hunting ground for Sunday interpreters - one hesitates before adding one's pebble to the pile. Whether philosophical, theological, psychological or political, interpretations and commentaries can be divided into two significant classes: those which accept the first sentence of the novel - and there is no argument about the position of that in the text - at face value, and those which do not. To insist that Josef K. is innocent does lead to rather different conclusions about, amongst other things, the nature of the text, than does the insistence that K. is, or might be, guilty of something or other.
The order of experience undergone by Josef K. within the text is also the subject of some commentary among commentators: for some the whole is dreamlike, nightmarish, others see these experiences, encounters and so forth given in the text as events which, for all their peculiarities, are external to Josef K.

As reader, it is necessary at first to take the networks of events in the text as they come. Only later does it become possible to decide whether all, or a significant proportion of the events are products of K.'s imaginings, whether the text, for all its detail and apparent concreteness, is transparent and so forces us to interpret events in certain ways in order to make sense of them.

At first glance there are certain differences between the various experiences undergone by K. For example, nearly one third of Chapter VII, the longest in the novel, is devoted to an apparently exhaustive and critical account of the endeavours of the Lawyer Huld. Yet, as we discover, this is a mere reverie of K.'s: he has dreamt two hours away (p.95). Here it is the very absence of motion that is stressed, for as K. daydreams at his desk, important clients of the bank are waiting in line outside, only to be completely abandoned as K. rushes off to see the artist Titorelli - all this at a time when K. begins to fear for his standing in the bank. Here the law of diminishing returns, so apparent in K.'s activities, is made clear; for as he daydreams he neither gets any work done, nor does he make any advance with his case. The exchanges with the manufacturer and the artist in this chapter, or with Frau Grubach and Fräulein Bürstner in the first chapter, with Fräulein Montag in the fourth, or even with the Italian businessman and the chaplain in the ninth seem concrete enough.
when compared with much of the material in Chapter V, *The Whipper*. What is common to all these episodes, however, they may be interpreted, is K.'s clear concern for his image, a concern underpinned by the description of motion. Indeed the description of motion is used by Kafka as a precise, though frequently unobtrusive cueing device giving assistance to the reader in his understanding of the behaviour of K., of K.'s thinking.

From the above it may be clear that Kafka has at call a range of identifiable narrative strategies which induce in the reader an impression of imbalance within the text, make the reader aware of certain disproportions if not contradictions within the text and, because of the overall narrative mode, these imbalances are seen to be ultimately localised in Josef K.'s thoughts and perceptions. But there are problems when we try to describe his thinking and modes of perception, and some progress must be made with these before we turn to such concepts as 'concern for image' and similar matters.

K.'s thinking is portrayed as hierarchic: we see him overbearing towards those he considers as inferiors. We see him overbearing towards the three bank clerks—he snatches a letter from one in a haughty manner and then accepts as his due the salute of the bank porter (p.172)—overbearing towards his mother (p.170ff.), towards Frau Grubach, Fräulein Bürstner—the little typist who 'won't resist him long' and upon whom he falls 'like a thirsty animal'—and above all towards Rudi Block. In this last case, in particular, the description of motion reveals K.'s mental attitude with striking clarity: K. treats Block like some sort of errant hen, shooing him about, dragging him along by his braces, quizzing him, until the precise
moment when he discovers that the despised Block, whom he has 'proved' knows nothing at all, may have some information which could be of use to him. At that point K.'s movements and physical attitude towards Block undergo a profound and sudden change.

Another, related aspect of this passage turns on the fact that K.'s initial appraisal of Block is based on the negative opinion he forms when he compares his own fine apparel with the poor dress of Block. And yet Block, like Bendemann's father, reveals hidden resources. As regards dress - an important issue in the text from the first few sentences onwards - it might be noted that K.'s most persistent complaint about the Court right up to the penultimate paragraph of the novel is that he never appears to gain access to the higher Court levels, with the strong implication that the lower officials are beneath him, yet the one complaint he makes against the Court which can be substantiated - one regarding dress - is punished severely by the Court: the two warders in Chapter I, denounced by him in Chapter II for attempting to make off with his finery, are flogged for this in Chapter V.

But K.'s attitudes to those above him are markedly different from context to context. He is very much aware that at the comparatively early age of thirty he had already reached the third highest position in the bank. His 'enemy' the Deputy Manager, receives far more deferential treatment than, say, Block, or indeed many of his clients, just as the petitioners in Chapter III (he has not noticed that Block was amongst them) are viewed by K. quite differently to the Court Attendant with his splendid uniform in the same chapter and the prison chaplain in the ninth.
We are frequently allowed to observe K. judging others, but his powers of judgment are no less frequently depicted as faulty. Here the theme of the abortive arrival and the missed goal, the theme of 'hidden recesses' are illustrated both in extended passages and in short phrases. We frequently encounter such constructions as 'K. looked...and saw...': he fails to recognise at first the three bank clerks in the room on the morning of his arrest, his assessment of the make-up of the audience at the first hearing proves, on closer inspection, to be incorrect. The 'ordinary' lumber-room, when he looks closer turns out to be quite different from what he expected, the carefully planned meeting with the Italian also takes one unforeseen turn, then another, and then yet another. This failure, to put it crudely, to 'see far enough', the simple motif of the hidden recess, underlines the general tendency of Josef K. to find himself in situations where it becomes necessary for him to take into account additional and unexpected factors. A clear gloss on K.'s powers of judgment is to be found in one of the deleted passages:

Before the house a soldier moved to and fro with the regular and heavy pace of a sentry. So there was now a patrol posted at the house. K. had to lean right out to see the soldier, since the latter was moving close to the wall of the house. 'Hallo there', he called to him, but not so loud as for the soldier to have been able to hear him. But soon it transpired that the soldier was only waiting for a servant girl who had gone into the inn opposite for beer and now appeared in the light-filled door. K. posed himself the question as to whether he had only believed in passing that the sentry had been assigned to him; he could not answer this question.

Whether or not these events are real in the sense that they include specific occurrences outside of K.'s own inner experience or whether they are merely coloured in by his imagination, they do have this in common: the persistently depicted faulty nature of K.'s capacity for correct judg-
ment and appraisal of situations does tend to undermine the credibility of his contention of innocence - given that there are also clear indications of some form of guilty conscience at work.

Throughout the first section of the opening chapter, K. is frequently distracted from his 'purpose'. The mention of the old woman opposite, who in the first sentences of the novel is said to peer at K. 'with a curiosity unusual even for her', and who appears no less than three further times in the same section, seems out of place until we read in the Appendices that K. had promised to visit his ageing mother every year on his birthday, and has not done so now for a number of years.

Descriptions of motion serve to undermine the position maintained by K., indeed are often used to contradict that position. In the first chapter we can read this fairly straightforward-sounding sentence: 'In the adjoining room, which K. entered more slowly than he intended, everything looked almost exactly the same as on the evening before' (p.8). The passage continues to gloss the 'almost the same' in the manner indicated above to include unexpected differences, but the subordinate clauses referring specifically to the type of motion involved, 'which K. entered more slowly than he intended', have odd implications: we have here the proposition that there is for K. an (unspecified) optimum velocity of approach for entering rooms containing situations of which he can have no possible knowledge. This passage has been referred to as a Fehlleistung on the part of K., a sort of Freudian slide, but to look on it merely as such may distract us from the importance attached by K. to the effect of his entrance. These clauses constitute an important cueing device, for what they imply is
borne out subsequently in the text: the very importance attached by K. to his mode of entry and — throughout this opening section — precisely to his entry into an unknown situation — he is prepared to show that he is a sport if the whole affair turns out to be a birthday joke, or, if needs be, to do the opposite, to treat the matter as an entirely serious affair — prevents him from coming to sensible terms with the situation, for his intent to show that he is in control, familiar with the unfamiliar, precludes the logical possibility of asking the most simple of questions about the reasons for his arrest. K. prides himself on being prepared for any eventuality (his 'calm, analytic powers of reason'), but is constantly surprised by 'hidden recesses', yet at the same time refuses to act surprised. This show of familiarity with the unknown inevitably cuts him off from knowledge. (That the same sub-clauses also imply an unwillingness to face the situation he is 'determined' to face is another matter.) Kafka leaves us in no doubt that K. is posing, the clue once again is given by a description of motion: once on his own, K. throws himself on his bed, has two swift bracers, quickly closes the drinks cabinet and resumes the staid pose.

Similarly in Chapter IX — though by this stage of the novel the self-assertive and self-assured pose has undergone at least some modification — we come to the passage which follows the chaplain's call:

'Josef K.!' K. faltered and gazed at the ground in front of him. For the moment he was still free, he could still continue forwards and make good his escape through one of the three small, dark wooden doors which were in front of him. That would just signify that he had not understood, or while he had understood, he intended to pay the matter no attention. But were
he to turn around, he was tied down, for then he would have
made the admission that he had understood really, that he was
the person addressed, and that he was willing to comply. Had
the priest called out once more, K. would certainly have left,
but since all remained silent, for as long as he waited, still
he turned his head a little, for he wanted to see what the
priest was now doing (pp.152-3).8

So K. risks an eye. Here, as in the opening scenes,
calculation of the image he presents becomes more pressing
than attempts to discover the actuality of the situation -
a position underlined a little further on when the priest
asks him what he intends to do next in his case:

'I wish to seek additional help', said K., and lifted his
head to see how the priest judged it.9

The concern with how his remarks are going down rather than
with the attempt to understand his true position is made
clear through the description of motion, and it is just
this concern which causes the exchange as a whole to be
inconclusive - just as a concern for his standing in the
bank causes him to slam shut the lumber-room door and beat
on it with his fists when bank employees approach in
Chapter V, rather than to reflect upon events.

At the beginning of the work overt and implied descrip-
tions of movement tend to convey the impression of purpose-
ful and independent action on the part of K. In the first
chapter we frequently find such verbs as 'leapt', 'hurried',
'ran', 'sprang', but we also see K. smoothing his hair and
adjusting his cuffs in front of the examiner despite K.'s
'disdain' for him. More importantly the handshake not
given by the examiner - a gesture that would have restored
K.'s standing - becomes of great importance within the
first transformation of the morning session in the exchange
with Frau Grubach (though the bank clerks behave 'correct-
ly'10), and the second transformation for the benefit of
Fräulein Bürstner has K. moving tables and chairs - less obstinate items than human beings - to prove to her (?) his central importance in the events of the morning.

And yet the attraction of the Court undermines such 'purposeful' and 'independent' action: within the Court buildings in Chapter III he is, literally, unable to stand. More subtly, we frequently observe that with precisely those persons towards whom K. has decided to adopt a very independent and standoffish line, for instance in the interview with Fräulein Montag, the latter part of the interview with Rudi Block, in the exchanges with Titorelli (before he weakens again at the mention of the proximity of the Court), we see K., for all his intentions of taking an independent line, standing back, etc., entering into a physical duet of motion with the other party. The initial pose is forgotten. No longer do we read 'K. did this or that', but instead 'both sat down...both drew closer'. This is particularly marked in the final chapter where indeed the two separate parties, K. and the executioners come to form one physical unit.

The attraction exerted by figures of authority, despite K.'s implied claims to independence and of rejection of that authority, is perhaps clearest in the ninth chapter when K. is beckoned closer by the chaplain whom he had a few moments before been set to elude:

since everything could now take place openly, he ran - this he did both out of curiosity and in order to cut short the affair - with long flying strides towards the pulpit (p.153).

As often before, the inserted clauses lend 'plausibility' to the obvious volte face, and predictably K. and the chaplain are soon to be seen walking up and down together.
The apparent independence of Josef K., the thrusting bank official who can scoff at the Court, who can shout 'You blackguards...you can keep all your interrogations' and rush off down the stairs at the end of the second chapter, is rather revealingly glossed by his re-appearance in the same rooms in the following chapter. In this way a fairly consistent pattern of attraction, rejection and acquiescence in the relationship between K. and others, and, because of the involvement of all in Court affairs, ultimately with the Court, is built up in the text, and the outcome, the eventual acquiescence, is made clear in the final chapter, which in turn consists almost entirely of descriptions of motion.

In this chapter there are, as has been frequently noted, clear breaks in the narrative perspective: the two gentlemen who are to accompany K. are seen by the reader in the street outside before being seen by K. who is in the process of carefully dressing himself. As this trio makes its way towards the place of K.'s execution, the pattern of attraction, rejection and acquiescence is made exceptionally clear — indeed at some stages K.'s behaviour is reminiscent of that of the person in the old music-hall joke who decided to make the driver of the breakdown truck earn his money by keeping the car brakes firmly on all the way to the garage (we read "I'll go no further", said K. as a test...but K. resisted.... 'The gentlemen will have their work cut out!", and revealingly the text continues without pause "but at the same time he had a mental image of flies tearing themselves apart to escape the fly-paper" (p.163)). Yet K. quite specifically prevents a policeman from intervening:
One [policeman] with a bushy moustache, his hand on the haft of his sabre, strode up as if deliberately quite near to the not unsuspicious group. The gentlemen faltered, the policeman appeared to be about to open his mouth, then K. dragged the gentlemen forward with force. He frequently turned round cautiously to check whether the policeman might not be following; but when they had put a corner between them and the policeman, K. began to run, and the gentlemen, despite their shortness of breath had to run with him too (p.164).

This stop-go cycle is repeated a number of times over in these final pages, mainly through the fifty or so indications of movement included in the text, and in the end, despite K.'s 'resistance', it is his acquiescence which determines the outcome of the situation. Even here however it is still concern for image which supercedes as the now disrobed K. is about to die:

'Like a dog!', he said, it was as if the shame should outlive him (p.165).

Largely through descriptions of motion K.'s professed indifference to the Court is revealed as a kind of defiance, which either gives way to or reveals attraction and eventual acquiescence - one recalls the independent stand that gives way to the duet of motion. As the novel proceeds the attempts by K. to block out thoughts of the Court become less successful. While in the second chapter we can read:

In the end, though he still climbed the stairs and in his thoughts toyed with a memory of what the warder Willem had said, that the Court was attracted by guilt, from which it necessarily followed that the examination room must lie at the head of those stairs which K. chose at random (p.31),

the discrepancy between his image of self and the reality of his situation, as the beginning of the seventh chapter intimates and the first paragraph of the ninth confirms, becomes increasingly difficult for him to overlook. But while Josef K. may initially be able to overlook this
discrepancy, we as readers are consistently given descriptions of motion in such a way that we in most cases see K.'s overt intentions or projections contradicted, and, importantly, these descriptions are narrated from a position outside Josef K., and so do not in that sense form an integral part of those lengthy stretches of the novel where the information is rigorously filtered through the (self-censored) perceptions of K. The descriptions of motion, then, allow us to discover the discrepancy, the imbalance between K.'s professed attitudes towards events and these events themselves. This is, of course, not the only method used by Kafka. Those sections in direct speech, the crucial exchanges in Chapter I, Chapter VII (with Titorelli) and Chapter IX allow us to reach objective conclusions as well, but it is these constant cues and pointers which, when overlooked, give the text its peculiar warp. The recurrent problem of K., formulated in the opening chapter - 'not that it had ever been his habit to learn from experience' (p.9) - and all that implies under the circumstances, including his death, together with his concern for his image which prevents precisely that learning process, become placed in an objective context in which it becomes possible for us as readers to reach those conclusions so strongly resisted by Josef K. himself. In short, what he is unwilling to admit is revealed through the description of motion.
Notes

1. All page references are to the Fischer paperback edition, 1976, which includes the various appendices. Chapter references correspond with those in the Penguin translation. All translations into English are by the author.


Eric Marsen, Kafka's Trial: the Case against Josef K., St. Lucia, Queensland University Press, 1975.


5. Fischer, p.188. As with other deleted passages, it is not always clear as to why they were to be excluded: certainly the operations taking place in the text in a more occluded fashion are here clearly exposed.

6. Fischer, pp.170ff. The figure of the mother may also be 'seen' in the cathedral.


8. Both Sokel, pp.236-37 and Smith, pp.120-21 seem to overlook the simple explanation for K.'s projected reaction to the unforthcoming second call by the priest. If the priest were to call a second time, he would be admitting a certain lack of authority.

9. p.153. It is clearly no accident that the passage includes terms such as 'free', 'make his escape', 'tied down', 'admission' (!), 'judge'.

10. Both Sokel, pp.236-37 and Smith, pp.120-21 seem to overlook the simple explanation for K.'s projected reaction to the unforthcoming second call by the priest. If the priest were to call a second time, he would be admitting a certain lack of authority.

9. p.153. It is clearly no accident that the passage includes terms such as 'free', 'make his escape', 'tied down', 'admission' (!), 'judge'.

10. The bank clerks do shake his hand, which gives back to K. some of the authority he has lost, but then they have also been defined by K. as worthless. See also Fischer, p.172, where his mother, to whom he clearly feels superior, is nevertheless valuable to him:

    And his mother believed him, even despite all (his) contradictions,
to be the director of the bank. In her estimation he would not sink, no matter how much his image had otherwise been dented.
THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS:
NOTES ON AUSTRIAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
FROM BOLZANO TO WITTGENSTEIN

Barry Smith

§1. The internal front
§2. Bernard Bolzano: logic and the theory of science
§3. On nationalities of a higher order
§4. The movement of human capital

The present paper takes the form of a series of sketches of 19th century Austrian political and intellectual history, allied with a number of reflections of a more general nature which it is hoped will contribute to our understanding of some of the peculiar characteristics of Austrian thought, particularly Austrian philosophy and economics, in the period in question. This concern with historical background should not be taken to imply sympathy with any view which would relativise the truth of a doctrine or the validity of an argument to the context within which it is produced. The suggestion is simply that it may be impossible to grasp, say, a philosophical theory which originated within an alien culture, without some understanding of that culture and of the forces within it which may have contributed to the development of the theory. All too often the temptation is simply to ignore this background in the belief that one may thereby produce an unprejudiced (context-free) understanding of the
theory in question, where what is obtained is often merely an interpretation, within the framework of one's own expectations, from which all but the barest trace of the original doctrine has been lost. This may - as, notoriously, in the case of Anglo-Saxon interpretations of the later Wittgenstein - lead to the development of a prestigious body of theory; but the task remains, in all such cases, to compare interpretation with original, and this leads back to historical investigations of the type attempted here.

§1. The internal front

As is by now well-understood, the citizen of a German state in Metternich's day inhabited a world bearing little resemblance to the scientifically conceived universe of the present day. He would feel himself subservient to a system of forces emanating from God, and permeating the world through God's chosen Emperor, Elector or Prince. He would take for granted a web of absolute limitations upon his freedom of thought and action, set by custom, by common opinion, and by the scaffolding of law, and this would determine his experience of the natural world as of a closed, finite whole. The citizen would conceive himself and would be conceived by those set in authority over him as having a proper business and a proper place and station within this whole, beyond which he was not expected, nor indeed allowed, to tread. Thus the prince alone was the locus of political authority; the people, either collectively or as individuals, played no role in the political life of the state. There was no suggestion that the citizen may properly seek to influence his ruler, for example, or that the ruler ought properly to seek the opinions of his citizens.
The rights of the citizen were exhausted, in effect, in this, that he was allowed to be the subject of the prince (though this, too, was a right which might at any time be rescinded and the individual banished from the state).

Perhaps the most convincing depiction of a world experienced as subject to this scaffolding of law is contained in Kleist's novel Michael Kohlhaas. Kleist reveals how deeply embedded was the assumption that the prince, as the representative of God on earth, was an intrinsically adequate guarantor of justice, that injustice in the society could therefore ensue only from errors of his agents, which could be rectified - if they could be rectified - without question, upon petition to the prince. Apparent injustices which could not be righted in this manner thereby proved themselves to be not injustices at all, but higher forms of justice, constituent elements of a larger plan, unintelligible to the citizen and therefore not, on any account, subjectable to question or criticism.

This state of resignation of the members of a society will not, of course, withstand all forms of behaviour on the part of their ruler. It calls, rather, for the conscious or unconscious adoption on his part of a quite specific form of conservatism, constructed around the idea of preserving this system of expectations. It demands, for example, the taking of measures against the growth in influence of liberal elements whose views would tend to call into question the edifice of relations of trust within the society, and it calls forth also political opposition to new ideas, to scholarship, and to science, all of which might undermine the world upon which the edifice is built. It would not be too much of an over-simplification to say that, largely thanks to the political skills of his chancellor
Metternich, the Emperor of Austria, still at that time the most powerful of all the German princes, was able to impose this kind of conservatism upon much of Europe for a period of three decades leading up to 1848. Specifically, the Empire was able to exert pressure upon the principalities of ausserösterreichisches Deutschland in order to gain their support for a policy which consisted, in effect, in the holding in place of everything on the map of Europe as it then stood, and particularly of the preservation of the patchwork of small German principalities which was believed to constitute an artificial check upon the expansion of any islands of liberal (or messianical or nationalistic) sentiment which might come to be established.

This constituted the external aspect of the Metternich-system - imposed jointly by Austria and Prussia upon each other and upon the remaining German states. The internal policy of the system was based upon the principle of establishing at all levels within the society what were called internal fronts against the growth of radicalism. Here it is not our purpose to reach a judgment concerning the rights or wrongs of this policy. Certainly it now seems, in retrospect, that Germany may have profited from the early growth of liberalism which Metternich perhaps prevented, since this might have enabled democratic institutions within that country to have become entrenched sufficiently to withstand the rise of fascism a century later. But what might safely have been risked within the German states, where all citizens shared a common language and a common background of traditions and institutions, might well have led to disaster in Austria, where the continually pressing need of those in authority was simply to hold together within the Empire a mixture of peoples at different stages of development and having conflicting interests and trad-
In practice, the internal policy of the Metternich-system consisted in the imposition of an elaborate system of controls of all public gatherings and associations, censorship of the press and of the mails, regulation of aliens, of travel, of place of residence, and so on. One predictable consequence of these overt controls was that such political groups as continued to exist were driven underground, and were constrained, where normal forms of political persuasion had been made impossible, to turn to subversion. After 1848 this was met by the authorities by the formation of new, political arms of the police, and the Empire came to be criss-crossed at all levels with a system of spies, granted powers which included blackmail, torture and assassination. Again, the granting of such powers expressed a deep-seated view of the relation between the Emperor and his peoples as something comparable to the relation between the father of a large family and his children: the father who may find it necessary, in times of need, to take measures for the protection of his children which might to them seem extraordinary. Thus arms of the police were established also with the task of preserving public health (Hygienepolizei) and morals (Sittenpolizei). In some states the police took upon themselves the task of maintaining emergency food-depots as a means of preventing uprisings which might be fomented by shortages of food. There was established an extremely complicated system of passports and registration of domicile, responsibility for which was exercised by the Passpolizei, and this enabled the authorities - again in their role as fathers of the people - to determine the precise whereabouts of any citizen at any time. (Those same authorities prided themselves upon the fact that no one could get lost within the Empire.)
A not incidental benefit of the fact that all journeys and all changes of address were subject to official approval and registration was that it became possible for politically suspect individuals to be isolated from those centres of population where they might do most damage.

To the members of such a family, accustomed at every turn to feel the protective hand of their paternal Emperor, the opponent of the state appears as something inexplicable. And not being capable of understanding the mentality which might lead certain types of individuals under certain circumstances to agitate or rebel, the authorities find it sufficient to conceive all such individuals indiscriminately as 'destructive elements' - and allow themselves to recognise no distinctions between those among them who were motivated by say liberalism or nationalism, and those motivated merely by some petty local or personal grievance. All such individuals were conceived in their totality as something partaking of the nature of a cancerous growth, against which all measures on the part of the civil and political police seemed justified.

But not only were the people shielded in this way from dissident or eccentric individuals. A ring of protection was constructed to shield them also from new ideas. Metternich's system involved not only the censorship of the press, but made room also for a policy of nurturing established and accepted opinions through a network of state information bureaux. Censorship was applied further in the arts, particularly the theatre, and there arose in response a tendency for artists to revert to classical forms, to that which had been tried and tested. But this ring of protection was applied with most serious effect to the universities, for even there, because of the danger of infection, new ideas
were to be prevented from taking root.

The principles of such Protektion were expressed by Franz I in an address to the professors of the newly founded University of Laibach:

Be faithful to the old, for this is also the good. It is not scholars that I require, but honest, rightly-formed citizens. Whoever serves me must teach as I command; whoever cannot do this, or comes with new ideas, can go - or I will see that he is removed.

Regulation of the universities was exercised in practice by administrators sponsored by the political police, and specifically by the use of officially approved textbooks or manuals, usually neither original nor scholarly, which presented their content within a framework designed primarily to draw out its practical (ethical) consequences. By various means, including the employment of spies among the students, it was ensured that individual teachers adhered rigidly to the content of the textbooks which had been prescribed. Not even the rapidly evolving natural sciences served as seedbeds of dissent, as had been the case in other parts of Europe. The majority of students were in any event engaged in the study of law, or of some related discipline, in preparation for an almost inevitable career in the imperial civil service.

The predictable result of all of this, of course, was a virtual stagnation of intellectual activity in the Empire. Almost no achievement of note in the pure sciences was produced in any Austrian university until Carl Menger's Grund- sätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre, which initiated new and important ideas in the field of economic theory. This was published in 1871, by which time many of the residual effects of absolutistic control of the universities had
been allowed to disappear. It should not however be assumed that the controls adopted are to be universally condemned. They enabled Austrian universities to withstand successively the Kantian, Hegelian, and various derivative metaphysical systems which had done so much damage to generations of students in German universities outside the Empire. Austria, indeed, served in many respects as the last intellectual outpost of the Latin renaissance tradition. She was thus able to preserve the insights and assumptions of classical and scholastic philosophers (particularly of Aristotle - whose works formed a significant part of the curriculum of the Austrian classical Gymnasien - and of the Spanish scholastics) and - I want to claim - this contributed greatly to the fertility of her thinkers in the subsequent decades. It is impossible, for example, to understand Menger's work, and to comprehend the nature of the opposition between Austrian economic theory and historicist economics as then practised in Germany, except by reference to the system of Aristotelian-scholastic assumptions which permeated the intellectual life of the Empire in the period.

§2. Bernard Bolzano: Logic and the theory of science

The ideas of the preceding section are well-illustrated by the case of Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848), another Austrian thinker profoundly influenced by Aristotelian modes of thought and perhaps the most brilliant philosopher to have been produced by the Empire as a whole. Bolzano made important contributions not only to philosophy, to theology and social theory, but was responsible also for significant insights in logic and the foundations of mathematics. Much of his work, however, consisted of largely ephemeral
contributions to the various religious and theological disputes pervading central Europe at that time. Despite the relative security of Prague, where Imperial surveillance was less effective and taken less seriously than in the capital of the Empire, Bolzano found himself the victim of frequent attacks from both the political and religious establishments, the suspicion of the authorities having been encouraged, for example, by his refusal to use an officially recommended textbook in his courses, and by the fact that he served as the spokesman for the more liberal wing in religious disputes. He was finally discredited officially by being blamed for student unrest which had broken out in a local theological seminary. He was dismissed from his chair by Emperor Franz in 1819 and in the remaining thirty years of his life he never again held a teaching position.

During this period Bolzano developed the philosophical ontology which is presented in his Wissenschaftslehre (1837), virtually the only major scientific achievement of the Metternich era in Austria. This work, although it partakes of many of the characteristics of the Austrian university textbook in the sense of §1. above,—including a pedantic concern for the correction of previous views on each of the topics discussed, an encyclopedic (Aristotelian) format, and an evident lack of concern for either stylistic sophistication or conceptual profundity for their own sakes—was far from constituting a typical representative of its species. It was much more itself the record of a scientific investigation of the concept textbook and a disquisition on the construction of textbooks and therefore also on the recognition and demarcation (by mortal man) of bodies of (eternal) scientific truths. Hence the central thesis of the work is the necessity of distinguishing between the
transient realm of human knowledge, of thoughts, impressions, and artefacts of language, and a further realm, consisting of eternal abstract intelligibilia, which Bolzano called 'propositions in themselves', 'theories in themselves', 'truths in themselves', 'falsehoods in themselves', and so on. Propositions in themselves, for example, represent the objective, intelligible content of actual and possible individual sentence-using acts (acts of judgment). Theories in themselves represent the objectively delineated totalities of propositions in themselves which would correspond to correctly constructed textbooks. Each entity in itself is held to exist (have being) outside both space and time, and absolutely independently of whether it is understood, recognised, acknowledged, or grasped in any way by any thinking subject. (Indeed Bolzano stressed that his originality in relation to 'platonist' thinkers who had preceded him consisted in the fact that whilst they had all of them regarded 'universals', or 'ideas', or 'forms' as standing in a relation of dependence upon or of necessary accessibility to our thinking (of) them, he himself had affirmed the existence of an absolute gulf between the realm of concrete thinking acts and the objective totality of intelligibilia which he conceived himself to have discovered.

What, now, can be said about the historical origins of Bolzano's ontology? Present-day thinkers may find it difficult to conceive the effects which a threatened collapse of one's nation, or of one's religion, may have on the range of theories and arguments which might seem meaningful or important. The fact that the associated ideas of national and religious consciousness are so unfamiliar to and are regarded so unsympathetically by modern intellectuals may hold them back from a complete understanding of a thinker whose work has been coloured, even in part, by the existence of such a
threat. Even in the case of Bolzano, I would argue, we have an example of a philosopher whose recognition of the religious and political instability of the society in which he lived, and of the impossibility of shoring up that society by means of practical reforms, determined his thought in a way which contributed to his conception of an idealised alternative world, freed of the possibility of conflict and of decay, a world which would serve as a substitute for the hitherto unquestioned Catholic intellectual world-picture the crumbling apart of which he and his contemporaries were beginning to experience through the schisms of the period. What is remarkable in Bolzano's case is that in developing this ontology he succeeded in establishing the foundations of a theory of logic which brought together very many highly original and fruitful insights, some of which have only recently, with the development of mathematical logic, been recognised for their true worth.

§3. On nationalities of a higher order

During the second half of the 19th century each of the four great German cities of central Europe (Vienna, Prague, Buda and Pest) experienced a severe decline in the political dominance of its middle-class German and German-speaking Jewish populations. The culture and intellectual effects of this decline in the case of Vienna have been well-documented by Schorske, Johnston, and others, who have demonstrated how, especially after the loss of their political power through abrupt re-establishment of authoritarian rule in the second half of the century, there arose a tendency amongst members of the Viennese middle classes to turn to literary, artistic and related fields, effectively in order to fill the resulting psychological and economic gap in their lives.
The German middle classes of Budapest and Prague however suffered no such sudden loss of power. They experienced rather a steady increase in the political activity of the various more or less anti-German communities about them, and a gradual recognition of the need to come to terms with these communities.

In Hungary this gave rise to an unparalleled merging or melting away of all that had been peculiarly German into the Magyar background. This submission of one culture to another - quite distinct from the more familiar phenomenon of an individual immigrant adopting the culture of a host country - is of much psychological and historical interest; indeed it might seem to offer a model, if only it could be repeated at will, for the solution of one particularly intransigent type of political problem. Of course the conditions which made it possible were by no means simple in character, and certainly not of the kind which can be artificially re-created. The success of Magyarisation depended first of all upon the guileless and single-minded resolution of the Hungarians themselves that it should be brought about, a resolution which expressed itself at all levels within the society, and even determined the strategy adopted by Hungary in its contribution to the formation of the Imperial foreign policy. It depended upon the readiness of the more chauvinistically German Germans to emigrate, even at the expense of abandoning ties and privileges acquired in Hungary; and it depended further upon the willingness of those who remained to fall into line, to accommodate themselves to the process of Magyarisation (which typically involved the adoption of both a Hungarian name and of the Hungarian language, at least for public use). This may in some cases have reflected a certain conformist strain in the German character, but it reflected also a desire on the part of many Germans to hold
on to status and possessions and to a familiar environment even at the cost of their national identity. Finally other, apparently quite independent factors also played a role: for instance the desire of some Austrians in Hungary - particularly after the 1914-18 war - to make a personal gesture of contempt for German (that is, in this context, particularly Prussian) ways.\textsuperscript{14}

The German-speaking communities of Bohemia and Moravia exhibited a quite different reaction to the withering away of their political power and administrative responsibility. Far from bringing about the submission of one culture to another, as in Hungary, there took place amongst the Czechs a peculiar splitting of cultures, poignantly expressed in the splitting of the University of Prague into independent Czech and German faculties in 1880. For with the growth in number and authority of the Slavs around them, the Germans in Prague seem to have adopted a peculiar cultural siege mentality and to have embarked upon a deliberate attempt at intellectual and cultural self-preservation.\textsuperscript{15} This led to the creation of a uniquely fertile intellectual environment within which a number of important philosophers, social theorists and writers found a home.\textsuperscript{16}

As already stated, our assumption is that it is sometimes necessary to consider a philosophy and its social and cultural background as more or less inseparable components (moments) of a single whole, that at least in some cases the two are, in the terminology of the phenomenologist, co-realising correlates. From this point of view the issues before us suffer complications of a special kind in comparison with what would be involved in an investigation of the philosophy or letters of, say, England or Russia, each of which is in an important sense both politically and culturally self-
sufficient. For the German-Bohemian community stood in an obvious relation of dependence upon the wider Austro-Hungarian culture, which was in its turn at least partially dependent upon the culture of the German Reich. Thus the German-Bohemian community was, so to speak, a nationality of a higher order in relation to both Austria and Germany.

Parallel complications are created also by the existence within each of these societies of more or less self-contained communities of Jews, who constituted a different kind of higher order national grouping (or system of such groupings) in the central Europe of the later 19th century. As we shall see, one important mechanism in the establishment and consolidation of political and cultural dependence-relations amongst national groupings turns upon the emigration from one region to another. In this regard it is interesting to note how many of the most important Bohemian and Moravian emigrants to Austria and Germany - among them Zimmermann, Husserl, Mahler, Böhm-Bawerk, Kraus, Freud, Loos, Kelsen, and Schumpeter - were Jews. It is unfortunately impossible to provide here even the briefest account of all the many conflicting religious, political, cultural and historical factors which led to the peculiar status of the Jew, and particularly of the Jewish liberal intellectual, in Europe at that time. We shall however claim that considerations such as those which follow apply no less to Jewish than to other communities of the period.

§4. The movement of human capital

Dependence-relations between nationalities and other groupings, whereby the politics and culture of one community is wholly or partly determined by another, are not, of
course, exclusive to Austria-Hungary. Indeed it would be possible to formulate certain principles pertaining to the correlation between political and economic subservience and cultural dependence amongst national groupings which would rest, in the end, upon the principles governing the formation of markets in human and intellectual capital in developed societies.\textsuperscript{18} Here we can do no more than sketch one or two of these principles and provide some indications as to how a complete account may be developed. We note, first of all, the existence of a network of motivations on the part of the individual members of such groupings which are, in the most general sense, economic in character. Individuals of talent tend, it seems clear, to be drawn to particular centres of high income and of concentration of population, simply because it is there that the tools and services of the artist or thinker - libraries and publishing houses, universities and galleries, newspapers and newspaper offices, theatres and concert halls, coffee houses and restaurants - are most readily accessible, and where his potential mentors and competitors, in the form of other artists and thinkers speaking an intelligible language, are to be found.\textsuperscript{19} This clearly serves to create a wide gulf between cosmopolitan centres and their surrounding areas, but it serves also to create conditions within which an order of ranking may come to be established amongst the centres themselves (and, derivatively, amongst the national groupings which they may represent).

The existence of such an order of ranking in Europe at the turn of the century is well-illustrated by the rise of Mahler up the hierarchy of his profession, from his first conductor's post in Bad Hall, through Laibach, Olmütz, Kassel, Prague, Leipzig, Budapest, Hamburg and Vienna, to his final winters in New York. The primary mechanism in
the creation of hierarchies of this kind is clearly the
ability of larger and more prosperous centres to bid away
talent from their smaller and less prosperous neighbours.
This brings about a range of secondary effects, as potential
audiences, students, disciples and other associated hangers-
on of such talent are attracted in its wake. A complex
network of systems of concentric circles of influence is
thereby established: Berlin, for example, predominates
over other Prussian centres; Vienna predominates over Prague,
which predominates in turn over Budweis and Brunn. And
whilst there are perhaps no strongly felt cultural dominance
relations between, say, Berlin and Vienna, it can yet be said
that Germany as a whole predominates over Austria as a whole,
as Great Britain, say, predominates over Ireland and its
other Imperial Dominions.

One powerful precondition for an intellectual dominance
relation between centres is a common language (a precondi-
tion which, for obvious reasons, has less force in the
visual arts; consider the position of Paris as a training
and marketing centre for painters in respect to, say, the
towns and cities of Spain and the Netherlands). Yet in
some cases a community of language may be established
artificially: compare the use of Latin, and subsequently
German (now also Russian?) amongst Hungarian writers, and
the virtual disappearance, to the benefit of English, of
Gaelic and Welsh as literary languages. Since transaction
costs amongst intellectuals are at a minimum when all the
workers in a given field accept and understand a common
language, there is a powerful tendency — at least in periods
of relative peace, when the relevant processes are not
hindered by other, divisive forces — towards the dominance
of a single language in all intellectual centres. (Again
Latin, which has of course until very recently remained the
official language of the Church, is an obvious example; compare also the role of German in the field of psycho-pathology, and of English, increasingly, in all remaining disciplines.)

A second precondition for such a relation is the possibility of more or less free movement of human capital between the centres in question. Thus dominance relations are established almost automatically between the cities of a single state, even of a multi-national state such as the Habsburg Empire. They will however be established only imperfectly, if at all, where freedom of movement across frontiers is impeded. Thus Switzerland has almost certainly cut herself off from the main currents of intellectual and artistic life of Europe by the rigid restrictions which she has imposed upon the employment of aliens within her borders.

What, then, can be concluded concerning the standards of intellectual and artistic production in the more dominant centres (that is, in the centres where both monetary and psychic incomes are relatively high)? Would it be correct to assume that there intellectual product is in all respects of a higher quality than in subservient centres? A moment's reflection upon certain obvious examples will show that this is not the case. Once again there are economic forces at work which will give rise, in the course of time, to a certain characteristic conformism in the former and to a high degree of innovation and experiment - accompanied by a large amount of noise$^{20}$ - in the latter.

An interesting comparison can be made with the opposition between mature and immature industries in the sphere of production of material goods. Mature industries are
characterised by high incomes and low profits, as specialists - who have reasons of their own for resisting non-trivial innovations in their respective fields - compete against each other in the production of well-entrenched ranges of goods of high surface brilliance which have evolved to the point where they are in fundamental respects identical. Immature industries, in contrast, are characterised by high risk, and thus also by high profits and losses, since they consist in the production by highly inventive or eccentric individuals of new and unfamiliar goods, often lacking in outward refinement. Many of these goods will prove unmarketable; some few, however, will serve to determine the mature industries of the future.

Putting this distinction to work in the sphere of intellectual and artistic production we can say that the associated communities and institutions in the relatively dominant regions - say England in relation to Ireland or Australia; Germany in relation to Austria or Denmark; Austria in relation to Bohemia or Slovenia - will tend to take on more of the characteristics of mature industries than will their counterparts in the more subservient regions. Individuals and publishing houses in the latter will tend to take more risks, to exhibit greater extremes of quality, and to place greater weight upon what, in the material sphere, would be called advertising. And the best such individuals may experience the pressure to migrate to the (relatively conformist and relatively secure) centres of high income, where their talents can, within certain limits, be more fruitfully employed.

Thus a Joyce, or a Wilde, or a Shaw, is unthinkable as a wholly English phenomenon. And we can perhaps begin to understand some of the reasons for the apparently cyclical
development of philosophy, and for the production in the great German universities of a homogeneous range of grandiose metaphysical systems. We can begin also to see why such a high proportion of the artistic and intellectual innovations produced within the German-speaking world—the good and the bad—should have had their origin in Austria, and not least in the peripheral cities of the Empire. And we can understand also why Austria should have gained the not wholly deserved reputation of having culpably mistreated her most distinguished sons—by allowing them to leave for more congenial or more prestigious climes, and by failing (through lack of appropriate specialists of her own) to recognize their greatness until this has been pointed out by others.

Notes


2. In a future paper I hope to show in detail how this frame of mind came gradually to be transformed into the exaggerated passion for the law which is characteristic of the work of Kafka or of Kraus. Provisionally it might be said that this transformation reflects the passage from a time in which a faith in the God-given order of the world is generally shared by all the members of a society, to a time when only the barest remnants of such a faith are possessed by certain isolated individuals.

3. There are Turkish drinking songs still to be heard in the bars of Istambul lamenting the loss of Sicily to the Italians. A mental shift from the cartographical provincialism of the late 20th century of almost equal magnitude is needed in order to understand this concept of 'extra-Austrian Germany'. For whilst Austria (i.e., crudely, the German-dominated regions of the Habsburg Empire) was not strictly speaking a German principality, it could yet look back to common ethnic, cultural and of course linguistic origins with the principalities, something which was exploited politically by the Pan-German movement in Austria in the half-century leading up to Hitler's Anschluss. The idea of a peculiarly Austrian culture or literary tradition was vehemently rejected by Kraus, for example, and it is only comparatively recently that the arguments for the existence of such a culture, as of a distinctively Austrian philosophy, psychology, or economics, could coherently and disinterestedly be assembled.
4. The idea of a universal state welfare or dole however gained little foothold in Habsburg Austria, where it would have been regarded as alien to the principles of Christian charity. It is interesting how many of the institutional proposals put forward by Hayek, for example in his 1979, recall features of Habsburg society. His suggestions for state provision for the improvident as an insurance policy against revolution springs to mind, as - somewhat more trivially - does his proposal for the establishment of 'associations of contemporaries', which surely derives from his experiences of the Geistkreise so common in pre-War Austria.

5. This tendency is discernible even in those, such as Grillparzer, who were willing to risk conflict with the censor.

6. A list of law professors at the University of Vienna in the 16th century given by Marcic includes, for example, a certain Michael O'Lynch (op.cit., p.122).

7. See the useful survey by Rothbard, 1976, and also Marcic, op.cit. It is useful to note also that the works of Pufendorf were extensively used as textbooks in the Austrian universities. The issues discussed here are somewhat complicated by the Thun reforms of the Austrian law faculties after 1848. It nevertheless remains true that the ontological (as distinct from ethical) framework presupposed within Austrian and even German jurisprudential writings in the period up to 1930 has predominantly Aristotelian features. See e.g. Engisch, 1953, esp. ch.5, and also the remarks in Smith and Mulligan, 1980.

8. Cf. e.g. Hutchinson, 1973, but note the criticisms in Bostaph, 1978. Austrians themselves have characteristically underestimated the importance of this Aristotelian background - since of course having shared in it themselves they take so many of its elements for granted. Thus Hayek reports (in conversation with the author) that he had initially reacted with ridicule to the suggestion that Menger's thought exhibited certain features of Aristotelianism.

9. Here, and elsewhere, I am indebted to Johnston's book (1972) for providing the starting point of my reflections.

10. Cf. also Nyíri, 1974, for a further development of this interpretation.


13. See especially Nyíri, op.cit., and also his 1976.

14. A number of interesting comments on these issues are to be found in the (unpublished) memoirs of Aurel Kolnai. See also the paper by Kolnai published in the present volume.

15. Thus in 1900 the Germans in Prague, who by then constituted as little as 7.5% of the population, retained for their own exclusive use several secondary schools, a university and technical college, two theatres, a concert hall, two daily newspapers, and a number of clubs.
16. Besides Kafka and Brod and the various groups of writers with whom they associated, and besides the various groups of (largely Brentanist) philosophers to be found in Prague (discussed in my paper on Kafka and Brentano in this volume), such important thinkers as Stumpf, E. Hering, Mauthner, Mach and Einstein had also made a home there, as well as, somewhat later, a number of linguists around R. Jakobson (cf. Holenstein, 1976 and 1979), and important economists such as Zuckerkandl and Engländer. The continued fertility of the German Czech community after the fall of the Empire was undoubtedly encouraged by the liberality of Masaryk, the first president of the Republic and himself a student of Brentano and former colleague of Husserl. The latter was indeed offered a brief refuge in Prague towards the end of his life (cf. Patocka, 1976).


18. On the economics of human capital see e.g. the work of G. Becker and a number of the essays in Alchian 1977. 'Economics', here, should be understood in a highly general sense, embracing not only all that pertains to monetary income and capital (commercial economics), but also all forms of psychic income and capital; see McKenzie and Tullock, 1978.

19. Hayek has shown convincingly, e.g. in his 1978, that there is an important sense in which competition in the market is a knowledge-discovering process. His arguments apply no less, of course, to the market in ideas.

20. Under 'noise' we are thinking particularly of the antics of certain Freudians, and of the lesser members of the Vienna Circle, especially Neurath.

21. The opposition between 'mature' and 'immature' applied to groups of scientific workers will recall the distinction between 'normal' and 'revolutionary' science put forward by Kuhn. Unfortunately he and his followers have drawn illegitimate conclusions as to the (truth-) content of theories from premisses which relate, in effect, only to their manner of production.

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If one prefers to use the word 'philosophy' in that all-embracing sense which includes any kind of reasoned discourse not properly scientific - the sense in which we say that every man has his own philosophy, or that scientific theories are bound to rest on some extra-scientific, i.e. philosophical, presuppositions, or that political acts should be guided by an over-all political philosophy, - then of course philosophy is not confined to particular cultures, countries or historical periods. There exists, however, a more restricted usage with respect to this term, the explication of which re-presents philosophy as a specific striving for a total and coherent world-view in the face of antinomic social-historical circumstances, a striving that will of necessity lead to conceptual contradictions and to continuous attempts to overcome the latter by yet again novel conceptual constructs. This is the sense in which Hegel used the term when he said that "estrangement is the source of the need for philosophy", or, more specifically, that

when the power of unification disappears from the life of man and oppositions have lost their living interrelation and mutual correlation and have acquired self-sufficiency, there arises the need for philosophy.
Philosophy in this sense is by no means an ever-present element in intellectual history. It was, in particular, conspicuously absent from Hungarian ways of thinking at the very time when cultural links between Hungary and Austria were very close indeed, and the Austrians' inclination for philosophy became quite pronounced.

The aphilosophical character of the Hungarian mind has often been explained by reference to the Hungarian language, i.e. by reference to the fact that in Hungarian nominalization - the forming of abstract nominal constructs out of verbal expressions - is far less natural than in, say, ancient Greek or German, and that, as a result, Hungarian is less suited for expressing abstractions, and more suited for suggesting images, than the Greek or German languages are. It can be shown, however, that even when writing in German, and deeply entangled in historico-political paradoxes, Hungarian authors preferred political or legal theory to philosophy - as was the case e.g. with Baron József Eötvös. The Hungarian intellectuals' persistent interest in politics has in fact, in what has been the most widely accepted explanation of the problem, been viewed as the reason for their aversion to philosophy. The Hungarians are, according to this explanation, a people who successfully tilled their land and defended it against enemies for many centuries, thereby developing a particularly strong sense of reality as well as a highly developed political talent. Naturally, then, they are not attracted to abstract, metaphysical speculation.

Now although this explanation certainly points in the right - namely socio-historical - direction, it is not, as it stands, sufficient. For although Hungary is indeed a politically-minded nation, this nation's interest in
politics has more often been inspired by political defeats than by political successes; its sense of reality becoming noticeable almost only during certain sobering intervals between long periods of dominance by political illusions. That is to say, the passion for politics as a reflection of political powerlessness more often led to a belief in historico-political fictions than to the minute investigation of existing realities. As far as their sense of reality went, Hungarian intellectuals in the 19th and early 20th century might well have developed any amount of philosophy. Philosophy in the sense here used is, however, a characteristically middle-class ideology. It is the member of the middle class, the bourgeois, who, having freed himself from his origins and from all natural bonds, eventually finds himself face to face with a reality that has become wholly alien and impenetrable to him: finds himself in a situation where fundamental questions as to man's place in the world press themselves upon him. Philosophy, as Hegel said, begins only where

the individual for himself knows himself as individual, as something general, something essential, which as individual has infinite value, or where the subject has attained the consciousness of personality, that is, wants to have validity simply for himself.\(^3\)

In Hungary however a bourgeois middle class did not really emerge until the last decades of the 19th century, and even after having emerged, it shared the world-view of the nobility. The development of the German-Austrian middle class, too, was a retarded and incomplete one, and quite a few curious features of Austrian philosophy can be related to this historical fact. By the 1850's however there certainly existed a German-Austrian bourgeoisie, whilst in Hungary it was the middle nobility, the nobile bene possessionati, who in fact came to perform some of the economic, cultural and political tasks traditionally
performed by the *tiers état*. As George Barany puts it, in Hungary from the third decade of the nineteenth century, the nobility began to play the role of the 'third estate' since a western-type bourgeoisie either was entirely absent or was lacking in social prestige and too weak numerically and economically to give leadership to the modernization of national life. To be sure, the most progressive elements of the nobility endeavoured to strengthen the middle classes, and the latter contributed to the westernization of Hungarian society and political life. Yet the dominant role of the nobility, unchallenged before 1848 and voluntarily accepted before 1867, left a lasting imprint upon the development of a Magyar intelligentsia...  

Indeed, it was the middle nobility which in Hungary became the representative of the predominant nineteenth-century middle-class ideology, *liberalism*. In the second half of the century liberalism, as is well known, underwent severe crises both in Austria and in Hungary. But whilst in Austria, as a result of, or in tandem with these crises, some most fantastic philosophies emerged, similar developments did not occur in Hungary. Liberal nobility, *qua* nobility, thereby of necessity preserved, even whilst its liberal world-view disintegrated, the consciousness of belonging to a class of historical continuity and coherence; of belonging to, indeed forming, the *Hungarian nation*, and thus possessing an unquestioned standard by which to interpret and judge the world.  

Across the Leitha, the Austrian middle class had of course to face circumstances entirely different from the socio-psychological point of view. At a time when in Western Europe national states served as the natural framework for capitalist economic development and for the establishment of bourgeois middle-class patterns of life, and in Eastern Europe the *ideal* of a national state reigned supreme (nationalism in fact taking over some of the
socio-political functions of religious belief), Austria was still a multinational state, demanding of its citizens anational dynastic loyalties. It has often been pointed out that Austrians, at least those outside the aristocracy, the higher bureaucracy, and perhaps - in the pre-1848 era - the Jewry, were constantly subject to a kind of national identity-crisis. 1806 was perhaps the year when the problematic nature of being an Austro-German for the first time became clearly felt, when the Emperor Franz had to renounce the Holy Roman throne - an act to which the Austrian poet Josef Weinheber in retrospect rightly attaches symbolic significance. Weinheber complains of the fact that in himself he constantly has to experience the tension between two languages, Viennese and High German,

and that along with this the fact that Viennese has lost its claim to linguistic (and therefore also to factual) harmony is a continual subliminal grievousness. It lost this claim already as long ago as around 1800, when the German classicists, from Lessing onwards, determined the victory of High German. The gesture of renunciation of the Roman Imperial successions which was made by Kaiser Franz is nothing other than the visible, if also unintended, expression of the fact that the Imperial dialect set about resigning itself to the status of a tribal patois.

Of the first decades following 1806, the poet and dramatist Grillparzer can be regarded as the representative literary figure. He was perhaps the first important representative of that peculiar Austrian traditionalism for which the sense of uprootedness was, at the same time, so characteristic. In his brilliant essay "Grillparzer's Vienna" J. P. Stern indeed argues that Viennese traditionalism (and who can tell, writes Stern, where Vienna ends and Austria begins) is but a consequence of uprootedness, of the absence or the conflict of traditions. Of the characteristic Viennese nostalgia for bygone times, Stern shows that it invariably seems to have been directed towards the recent
past; it was, in other words, related not so much to a specific period of past history, but rather to the lack of direction which was experienced by each generation in succession. Grillparzer's epigram: "Deutschland ist weniger, als es meint - Österreich ist mehr, als es scheint", expressed, perhaps, loyalty and confidence; but, more than that, it expressed also a sense of uncertainty as to what Austria's position in the world really was. In earlier centuries Austria had been said to be the bastion defending Europe against the Turks, as well as the bulwark of Catholicism against the Protestants. By the 1800's of course both of these missions had become history. In the century of laissez-faire capitalism, constitutionalism, individualism, and nationalism, Austria - a mercantilist, absolutist, feudal, multinational state - could definitely be viewed as being in need of justification. The question as to what the mission or "idea" of the Austrian Empire was, became a persistent one.

Somewhere in this state, wrote Musil in 1913 - there must lie a secret, an idea. But it is not to be identified. It is not the idea of the state, not the dynastic idea, not the idea of a cultural symbiosis of different peoples (Austria could be a world experiment). The whole thing is in fact probably nothing but motion created by the lack of any driving idea, like the reeling of a cyclist who is not moving forwards.  

A lasting interpretation of Austria's mission was given in 1848 by the Czech politician and historian František Palacký, who declared that, were it not for the Habsburg Empire, minor Central European nations would be defenseless against both German and Russian aggression. This view was, in essence, shared also by the Hungarian politician and writer Zsigmond Kemény, who regarded it as Austria's mission to preserve the balance of power in Europe as well as to mediate between West and East: a mission in which, as Kemény saw it, Hungary of course would have to play a crucial role.
This was also, incidentally, the view generally taken by the British press in and after 1867. Austria's mission, according to the British in this period, was to preserve and promote civilization in the countries adjacent to the Danube and to secure that territory as a part of European civilization. The cohesion of the provinces was seen to be in the interests of Europe since in the absence of a central power and severed from one another the parts of the Empire would be drawn into the orbit of Russia. And it was widely believed in the British press that in Austria-Hungary the Hungarians would have to assume the decisive, consolidating role. No wonder, then, that although the idea of Austria as mediating between western culture and eastern backwardness gradually became, as it were, a semi-official one, German-Austrians were not really happy with it. In 1848 even the possibility of joining national Germany was, hesitatingly, considered. "The poor, dear Austrians!" wrote the dramatist Friedrich Hebbel, a North German who found a second home in Vienna, "The poor, dear Austrians: they are scheming now about how they can unify themselves with Germany without unifying themselves with Germany!" 

The national identity crisis of the German-Austrians became particularly acute from 1866, when Austria was excluded from the German Bund, and took on tragicomic dimensions in 1867, from which time there was lacking even a feasible nominal definition of the non-Hungarian part of the dual monarchy. No one has given a better characterization of this situation than Robert Musil, in his *The Man Without Qualities*, in a passage which I cannot resist but to quote at length:

Austria-Hungary was, writes Musil, "kaiserlich-königlich (Imperial-Royal) and it was kaiserlich und königlich (Imperial and Royal); one of the two abbreviations, k.k. or k.u.k., applied to every thing and
person, but esoteric lore was nevertheless required in order to be sure of distinguishing which institutions and persons were to be referred to as k.k. and which as k.u.k. On paper it called itself the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; in speaking, however, one referred to it as Austria, that is to say, it was known by a name that it had, as a State, solemnly renounced by oath, while preserving it in all matters of sentiment, as a sign that feelings are just as important as constitutional law and that regulations are not the really serious thing in life. By its constitution it was liberal, but its system of government was clerical. The system of government was clerical, but the general attitude to life was liberal. Before the law all citizens were equal, but not everyone, of course, was a citizen. There was a parliament, which made such vigorous use of its liberty that it was usually kept shut; but there was also an emergency powers act by means of which it was possible to manage without Parliament, and every time when everyone was just beginning to rejoice in absolutism, the Crown decreed that there must now again be a return to parliamentary government. Many such things happened in this State, and among them were those national struggles that justifiably aroused Europe's curiosity and are today completely misrepresented.

Indeed they are, as Musil himself suggests at another place in the book. Nowadays, e.g., people talk as if nationalism were exclusively the invention of armaments manufacturers. But it would be worth looking for a rather broader explanation, and to this [Austria-Hungary] made an important contribution. The inhabitants of this Imperial and Royal Imperial-Royal Dual Monarchy found themselves confronted with a difficult problem. They were supposed to feel themselves to be Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian patriots but at the same time also as Royal Hungarian or Imperial-Royal Austrian ones. Their not incomprehensible slogan, in the face of such difficulties, was 'United we stand!' In other words, viribus unitis. But for this the Austrians needed to make a far stronger stand than the Hungarians. For the Hungarians were first and last only Hungarians, and counted only incidentally, among people who did not understand their language, as also Austro-Hungarians. The Austrians, on the other hand, were primarily nothing at all, and in the view of those in power were supposed to feel themselves equally Austro-Hungarians and Austrian-Hungarians - for there was not even a proper word for it. And there was no such thing as Austria, either. The two parts, Hungary and Austria, matched each other like a red-white-and-green jacket and black-and-yellow trousers. The jacket was an article in its own right; but the trousers were the remains of a no longer existent black-and-yellow suit, the jacket of which had been unpicked in the year 1867. The Austrian trousers since then were officially known as 'the kingdoms
and lands represented in the Council of the Imperial Realm', which naturally meant nothing at all, being a name made up of names: for these kingdoms, for instance the entirely Shakespearean kingdoms of Lodomeria and Illyria, no longer existed either and had not yet existed even at the time when there was still a whole black-and-yellow suit in existence. And so if one asked an Austrian what he was, he naturally could not answer: 'I am from the non-existent kingdoms and lands represented in the Council of the Imperial realm.' If only for this reason, he preferred to say: 'I'm a Pole, a Czech, an Italian, a Friulian, a Ladin, a Slovene, a Croat, a Serb, a Slovak, a Ruthenian, or a Wallachian.' And that was nationalism, so called. ... Since the earth has existed no being has ever died for want of a name. All the same, this is what happened to the Austrian and Hungarian Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy: it perished of its own unutterability.17

Twice, during the period here discussed, there arose conditions in Hungary under which the need for an abstract solution of concrete historical paradoxes made itself felt in a definitive way: in the decade beginning with 1848, and in 1905 and the immediately following years. And indeed both in the 1850's and in the years after 1905 important theoretical works were composed in which these paradoxes were quite clearly reflected - without, however, being presented in a philosophical guise.

Between 1850 and 1853 the major political and literary essays of Baron Zsigmond Kemény appeared. The two volumes of József Eötvös' A tizenkilencedik század uralkodó eszméi-nek befolyása az álladalomra (The influence of the prevailing ideas of the 19th century upon the state) were published in 1851 and 1854. And Imre Madách's The Tragedy of Man, a dramatic poem that exhibits striking conceptual parallels to Eötvös' book, was written in 1859/60. What these works all had in common was that they not merely expressed the disillusionment the liberal nobility had to experience during and after the 1848/49 revolution and war of liber-
atation, but in fact reflected, in the light of those recent historical experiences, the inherent antimonies of Hungarian liberalism. Liberalism invariably had to face, in the 19th century, the problem of *socialism*: it stood for political equality, but had to repudiate the most vociferously advanced set of demands for the realisation of its social preconditions. It stood also for capitalist progress: but it could not fail to take notice of the less attractive sides of that progress. These problems were not unknown to Hungarian liberals, especially since their liberalism was (or after 1848 became) a rather conservative one. In a series of articles written in the early 1850's, Zsigmond Kemény could, e.g., take over long passages (without naming the source) from Engels' *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*: the socialist theoretician and the conservative-liberal aristocrat were in agreement as far as the ill-effects of industrial capitalism were concerned.

Hungarian liberalism, however, had its own special problems too. Since the non-Hungarian nationalities of the Kingdom of Hungary in fact outnumbered the Hungarian population, and since the anti-Hungarian sentiments of the nationalities became obvious during 1848/49, the political emancipation of the masses was felt to present a danger to Hungarian supremacy in Hungary. Here the antinomies of liberalism and the antinomy of independence met up with each other. A Hungary independent of Austria could not, according to the general view of the post-1848 era, remain a Hungarian state; and could, perhaps, not remain an independent state at all, since it would become defenseless against Tsarist imperialism. In Kemény's writings, accordingly, the *Ausgleich* or Compromise with Austria is clearly foreshadowed. And his arguments are political, certainly not philosophical ones. Indeed he ridicules, in true con-
servative fashion, the typical philosophical approaches to matters practical. Baron József Eötvös, too, displayed in his magnum opus a definite aversion to philosophy. In this work the "prevailing ideas" were not examined in an abstract manner; it was their historical and popular meaning and influence that Eötvös investigated. The ideas of liberty, equality, and nationalism were shown to mutually exclude each other - not, however, in any purely logical sense, but in the minds of people. Eötvös' point of view was, one could say, political and sociological, rather than philosophical. The constructs of speculative philosophy, in particular of German philosophy, were alien to him - even if he happened to write his book in German. Instead of philosophising about the opinion of the people in general", one should rather, he suggests, "turn one's attention to the desires and prospects of the individuals out of which 'the people' are constituted." It will then turn out, for example, that the striving for absolute freedom exists only in philosophical speculations - and in the minds of those who belong in a mental asylum.

Madach held similar views. "There hardly is a mad idea", he wrote in his notes, "which has not been at some time advanced as a philosophical theory." And another remark: "Metaphysics is the poetry of those things we know nothing about." This formula in fact appears in the text of the Tragedy, too. Adam, in the role of Kepler, says in the second Prague scene:

Philosophy is just the poetry
Of all those things we cannot understand.
But it is still the gentlest part of science
Because it muses quietly, alone,
Inside its kingdom well adorned by nightmares.
The *Tragedy* is very often characterised as a "philosophical poem". This is however a misleading characterisation. There are no philosophical arguments in the work; the conflict of ideas displayed in it is not an immediate one, it is, rather, a conflict mediated through the representation of human destinies and historical processes. If there are arguments at all, they are psychological and sociological ones. Madách was not interested in the internal relations holding within the world of ideas; he was, however, very much interested in the connections between this world and the real one. And, most of all, he was interested in the real historico-political world itself. The poetic values of the *Tragedy* are not perhaps everywhere evident; but Madách's political speeches always fascinate. Indeed it was a speech he delivered in 1861, before the newly elected National Assembly, which made the celebrated poet Arany read the manuscript of the *Tragedy* and recommend its publication. There is, in these political speeches, no sign of an antinomical world-view, they are, rather, permeated by the unshakeable and unambiguous national consciousness of the Hungarian nobility. The cultural and linguistic rights of the non-Hungarian nationalities in Hungary were viewed by Madách merely as one obvious aspect of the individualist-liberal rights the Hungarian nation stood for anyway; he could conceive, within the borders of the Kingdom of Hungary, of one political nation only - the Hungarian. Although he had to realise that the situation of the nation was a thoroughly paradoxical one, in the mind of Madách, and in the mind of the Hungarian nobility and emerging bourgeoisie in general, national consciousness was, at that time, still powerful enough to suppress all cosmic doubt, all philosophical uncertainties.
After 1867, with the Compromise achieved, the predominance of this self-confident national consciousness became overwhelming, not only rendering philosophy superfluous, but also rendering impossible, as it were, the emergence of any adequate political or social theory.\textsuperscript{25} In his book \textit{The Magyars}, published 1869, the British writer A.J. Patterson pointed out that "in Hungary, religion, like everything else, is tinctured with politics. ... Hungary is the country above all others in which politics have the greatest influence on daily life, and are the most general topic of conversation. ... Nay, in that political and unscientific country, a grammarian or a philologist does not feel at ease until he either edits a political newspaper or obtains a seat in the Diet."\textsuperscript{26} Although a period of dynamic economical development, the era after the Compromise certainly wasn't one of "national rebirth"\textsuperscript{27}; it was, rather, an era of illusionary nationalism, moral decline, emigration and suicide. And it wasn't until the political crisis in 1905/06 - the electoral triumph of the so-called National Parties and their subsequent secret compromise with the Crown\textsuperscript{28} - that the illusionary streaks in Hungarian national consciousness became obvious. Even then, however, only a small minority took notice of them and experienced thereby a kind of national identity crisis, which led them to attempt to find a new and once more valid meaning for the word Hungarian. Two prominent members of this minority were Endre Ady, Hungary's foremost poet of the time - and the young Georg Lukács.

\textit{Ady's New Verses}, a book of poems in which for the first time his characteristic language and symbols appear, were published in 1906 and were, for the greater part, written in 1905 - actually under the influence of current political events. 1906 is the year, too, in which Lukács began
to write his *History of the Modern Drama*, whilst the essays collected together as *The Soul and the Forms* were composed between 1907 and 1909. These works of Lukács were not independent of current political developments, either; they, too, reflected a loss of ideals, and a longing for undoubted norms. But they also reflected the fundamental impact the *New Verses* had on Lukács. "Ady's poems" - he said in an interview published in 1967 - "meant Hungary for me at that time." Those poems, indeed, *did* mean Hungary: they expressed whatever important historical experiences the Hungarians, noble and plebeian, have accumulated over the centuries. In particular, they expressed the Hungarian's transitory and paradoxical situation between feudalist-traditionalist nationalism (Ady's symbol of which is the East) and liberal capitalism (the West) at a time when the world-wide faith in liberalism was definitely on the wane. Ady's response to the East-West antinomy was, of course, a poetic, not a conceptual one; the language and the symbols of his poems amalgamated, as it were, long-past history and modern experiences, providing thereby the emotional foundations for a possible new Hungarian identity. Lukács however, in the essays of *The Soul and the Forms* - some of the arguments of which show striking parallels to those in Lukács' studies on Ady - definitely strove for a conceptual, philosophical solution of the traditionalism/liberalism (or East/West) identity crisis. The crisis of a particular form of life he experienced as a universal problem of forms and of life in general. As Margarete Susman expressed it in her review of the German edition of the essays:

The desperate tragedy of the modern soul, after a goal whose content has ceased to exist to it, runs unexpressed through this book.
What Lukács in one of the essays said of the Austrian Rudolf Kassner, namely that he yearns "for certainty, for standards, for the dogma," could just as well be predicated of the author of The Soul and the Forms himself.

This was the book of a "Platonist" - a term used by Lukács as synonymous with, on the one hand, "mystic", and, on the other hand, "critic" and "essayist". The concept "essayist" Lukács defined by contrasting it with the concept "poet":

Poetry receives its profile, its form, from destiny, and form appears in it exclusively as destiny; in the writings of the essayist form itself becomes destiny, becomes a principle for the shaping of destiny.

The poet, that is, reflects the forms of a given pattern of life, whilst the essayist or Platonist strives to create, ex nihilo as it were, a form of life for himself.

Only the form can produce the genuine resolution. Only in the form...will music and necessity come of every antithesis, of every tendency. Life in Lukács' Budapest could very well serve as an example for one lacking essential binding forms; but Vienna, of course, was an even more striking example. The world of "the Viennese aesthetes" appears on the pages of The Soul and the Forms as the very world Lukács rejects, without, however, being able to escape from it.

Everything swirls about; everything is possible and nothing is certain; everything flows into everything else: dream and life, desire and reality, fear and truth, the riddance of pains with lies and the brave withstanding of sadnesses. What is there that remains? What is secure in this life? Where is the point, however bare and desolate and far removed from any kind of beauty or riches, where a man may put down secure roots? Where is there something which does not fall to pieces between the fingers of he who would lift it out of the formless mass of life and hold on to it, even if only for a matter of minutes? Where is the dividing line between dream and reality, self and world,
deeper substance and fleeting impression? ... This is the world of the Viennese aesthete: the world of universal enjoyment and of being able to hold fast to nothing, where reality and dream flow into each other, and where those dreams which might be forced upon life are violently suppressed, the realm of Schnitzler and Hofmannsthal.\textsuperscript{38}

The Soul and the Forms, then, reflected in a philosophical guise some main problems inherent in early twentieth-century Hungarian life. It was however a German, indeed an Austrian guise, rather than Hungarian. Although originally written in Hungarian, the essays of this volume did not at all have a Hungarian ring for Lukács' contemporaries: even the language sounded German, and not only the concepts used, but also the syntax. The book had very little influence in Hungary; it remained, as it were, an isolated experiment. Lukács' other book however, the History of the Modern Drama - written, incidentally, in a much more acceptable Hungarian, - was very well received. The History, of course, was not a work in philosophy. Exhibiting a definitely historical and sociological point of view it was, rather, a study on philosophy; or, more generally, on bourgeois culture.

In Austria during the time 1848-1918 there were two periods in which the interest in (often a love-hate relationship with) philosophy was intense: the 1870's, and the immediate pre-war decades. Subsequent to 1848 the need for philosophy does not seem to have been very great, and from the mid-1850's it was practically non-existent. The defeat of the revolution was not really experienced as a disaster by the Viennese middle class, whose liberalism had been (and for quite a time remained) a kind of Josephinism rather than some more radical doctrine.\textsuperscript{39} The economical opportunities and prospects of the German-Austrians were,
in the 1850's, not at all bad, and from 1861, with the issue of the so-called February Patent, their political powers, too, increased substantially. And although they naturally disliked the dualist solution, the establishment of the Bürgerministerium, itself a result of the Compromise, was welcomed with great and lasting enthusiasm. With their rise to power, however, the German Austrians inevitably embarked on a route which soon proved disastrous for them. Indeed, as Macartney writes, the February Patent itself, in establishing in Austria for the first time a genuine (if limited) Parliamentary system, marked the first stage in the downward path of its Germans. For once the principle had been established that the destinies of Austria lay in the hands of its peoples, its Germans had to take their place among those peoples, and it would be impossible for them to keep it indefinitely a privileged one. It was the Liberals' tragedy that their decline and ultimate fall were due to the developments which they had themselves done much to bring about.

The economic crisis in 1873 was perhaps the first major stage in the process of decline of the liberals. The paradoxes inherent in Austrian capitalism however, the co-existence of pre-capitalist and capitalist economic-political patterns, as well as the middle-class contempt for, and fear of, the demands of the lower classes were, as early as 1871, to some extent reflected in Carl Menger's *Grundsätze der Volkwirtschaftslehre*. The crisis itself was at least partly responsible for the socialist views which the members of the Leseverein der deutschen Studenten Wiens began to profess. The Leseverein consisted of young men quite a few of whom later became prominent antiliberal politicians and who, in the course of their Leseverein activities were among the first to introduce the cult of Wagner and Nietzsche to Austria. It was above all a German nationalist association, representative of a decade in which, under the rule of the liberals, the nationalities question became a major political issue in Austria. Not every people or group however came
to have a well-defined national programme in the 1870's: some amongst them came to have, or to be represented merely by substitutes in the form of philosophical theories. Thus the formidable difficulties inherent in the situation of the Galician Jew with Polish nationalist sympathies were reflected philosophically in the arguments of Ludwik Gumplowicz's *Rasse und Staat* (1875), whilst the antinomies of Czech nationalism, formerly expressed in the political and historical theories of Palacký, now found an expression in T.G.Masaryk's philosophical-anthropological work *Der Selbstmord als sociale Massenerscheinung der modernen Civilisation*, the first version of which was completed in 1878. And the anxiety and, sometimes, identity-crisis of the Germans of Bohemia can perhaps be seen as having been represented in Ernst Mach's *Analyse der Empfindungen* (1886).

In the 1880's and 1890's the political and ideological defeat of the German liberals, foreshadowed by the events of the 1870's, became absolute. As Schorske expressed it:

> Austrian society failed to respect...the liberal co-ordinates of order and progress. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the program which the liberals had devised against the upper classes occasioned the explosion of the lower. ... The new antiliberal mass movements - Czech nationalism, Pan-Germanism, Christian Socialism, Social Democracy, and Zionism - rose from below to challenge the trusteeship of the educated middle class, to paralyze its political system, and to undermine its confidence in the rational structure of history."

This loss of confidence is certainly reflected, on the one hand, in the arguments of *fin-de-siècle* Austrian Platonism or logical objectivism - as can be seen, say, from the writings of Alexius Meinong. But Freudian psychoanalysis, the image of man as guided by irrational psychic forces, is not independent of these developments either. In his fascinating paper "Politics and Patricide" Schorske suggests that "Freud gave his fellow liberals an ahistorical theory
of man that could make bearable a political world spun out of orbit and beyond control." \(^{46}\) This theory proved that liberal politics could not possibly have triumphed, since they were based on a false anthropology. In an essay written in 1917, Freud - in absolute harmony with views put forward as early as 1899 in his *Traumdeutung* - said that

> the human being, even when of a lowly status in the outside world feels himself sovereign in his own soul ... But the two-fold recognition, that the life of sexual drives in ourselves is not fully to be brought under control, and that psychic processes are as such unconscious and only accessible to and capable of coming under the dominion of the self only through an incomplete and unreliable perception, becomes equivalent to the assertion that the ego is not master in his own house. \(^{47}\)

This essay was originally written for the Hungarian journal *Nyugat*, and it is perhaps interesting to point out the contrast between Freud's views and those of his Hungarian pupil and friend Sándor Ferenczi. Although Ferenczi, in the pre-war period at least, was generally regarded as one of the most orthodox Freudians, in some respects his attitude to psychoanalysis from the very beginning differed markedly from that of Freud. For Ferenczi, intra-psychic dynamic forces were not at all independent from inter-psychic ones; there always was a touch of social psychology in his interpretations, and psychoanalysis he has always regarded as a means for changing society.

If systematic differences between Freud's views and those of Ferenczi very clearly reflected the difference between the commitments of the Austrian and Hungarian middle classes at the turn of the century, the differences between Freud's depersonalising theories and Alfred Adler's fantastic "individual psychology" represent the changes in political atmosphere of Austria by the early 1900's, i.e. with the return to absolutism. Parliamentary obstruction and political riots were put to an end by absolutist means; and the
German and Jewish liberal middle class rejoiced in the defeat of ideals it had worshipped for the last forty years. A false sense of security prevailed, a general atmosphere of historical dishonesty; falsities were handled as truths, and words invariably meant something different - if, that is, they still had a meaning at all. As the years I am now referring to were formative ones in the life of authors of such paramount importance as Kafka and Wittgenstein, it seems that it might be appropriate to dwell a little longer upon this atmosphere.

The period before the war, writes Hannah Arendt, has been adequately described as a 'Golden Age of Security' because only a few who lived in it felt the inherent weakness of an outmoded political structure which, despite all prophecies of imminent doom, continued to function in spurious splendor and with inexplicable, monotonous stubbornness. ... The Jews were more deluded by the appearance of the golden age of security than any other section of the European peoples. Antisemitism seemed to be a thing of the past... The phrase "Golden Age of Security" was coined by Stefan Zweig - in his nostalgic autobiography the objectivity of which has often been questioned. Even Macartney, who, rightly of course, points out that "it would be quite erroneous to suppose the general life of the Monarchy during these years as overshadowed by a sense of impending and ineluctable doom", regards it as being easy "to find Cassandra cries enough in the diaries and correspondence of men in a position to see below the surface of things." This era of premonitions, façades and falsities was, of course, the era of Hofmannsthal's Chandos-letter and the era of Karl Kraus; it formed, also, the socio-historic background of the Tractatus and of Kafka's literary experiments. The striking and important parallels between Kafka and Wittgenstein cannot, of course, be discussed here in any detail,
but I would like to mention some of them. Kafka and Wittgenstein were both Zwangstypen, with rigorous standards of cleanliness and rigorous moral standards, standards that were reflected in their striving for linguistic purity, and, eventually, for silence (the only available language, the language of their time appearing as impure and immoral). Both were, in a manner not easy to explicate, deeply religious (they believed that, even if immorality reigns supreme, there still are moral standards), without, however, having faith in God. What Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus, that "God does not reveal himself in the world", is certainly true of the world depicted by Kafka.

Notes


2. This is the view stated by e.g. Sándor Karácsony, in his A magyar öszajárás (The Hungarian Way of Thinking), Budapest, 1939, pp.120ff., or in his A könyvek lelke (The Genius of Books), Budapest, 1941, pp.66,71f.
Similar observations can be found in a profound work by the essayist and poet Mihály Babits, "A magyar jellemről" (On Hungarian Character), in Gyula Székfű, ed., Mi a magyar? Budapest, 1939, p.53.


6. "By freeing the Jews - writes A.J.P. Taylor - Joseph II. called into existence the most loyal of Austrians. The Jews alone were not troubled by the conflict between dynastic and national claims - they were Austrians without reserve." (The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948, p.17). Or, as Hannah Arendt put it, "as the Jews in nation-states had differed from all classes of society through their special relationship to the state, so they differed from all other nationalities in Austria through their special relationship to the Hapsburg monarchy." (The Origins of Totalitarianism, Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958, p.42). "The Jews - writes Carl E. Schorske further - were the 'state-peole' par excellence in Austria. They did not constitute a nationality ... The emperor and the liberal system offered status to the Jews without demanding nationality; they became the supranational people of the multinational state ... Their fortunes rose and fell with those of the liberal, cosmopolitan state." ("Politics in a New Key", Journal of Modern History, 39, 1967, p.353.)


weniger naher Vergangenheit liegt. Für Grillparzer hatte in seinem Alter die Welt, in der Beethoven gelebt hatte, eine Einfachheit und Reinheit, nach der er umsonst unter seinen Zeitgenossen Ausschau hielt. Bauernfeld, sein Freund und Biograph, sehnt sich in gleicher Weise nach dem Alt-Wien Grillparzers in den vierziger Jahren und ebenso geht es ein wenig später Ferdinand Kürnberger und Ludwig Speidel, die so könnte man sagen, geradezu eine Genre geschaffen haben - das Wiener Feuilleton -, um ihrer Sehnsucht entsprechend Ausdruck verleihen zu können. Sogar der ätzende Ton von Karl Kraus sänftigt sich zu lyrischem Schwelgen, wenn er von den 'heiteren achtziger Jahren' spricht. Ebenso geht es Josef Weinheber, wenn er sich an das alte Ottakring, seinen Heimatbezirk, in den neunziger Jahren erinnert...

Ibid., p.47.


12. See e.g. Joseph F. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", in Nationalism in Eastern Europe, p.182. See also Macartney, The Habsburg Empire, pp.352f. Palacký's 1848 position was, in essence, retained in his Österreichische Staatsidee, Prague, 1866.

13. Kemény's position is best formulated in his Még egy szó a forradalom után, 1851.


15. Cited by Ernst Fischer, op.cit., p.18.


17. Op.cit., First Book, ch.98. - There is a similar passage in ch.42 of the First Book, where Musil characterises the "Österreichisch-ungarische Staatsgefühl". "This sense of Austro-Hungarian nationhood", he writes, "was an entity so strangely formed that it seems almost futile to try to explain it to anyone who has not experienced it himself. It did not consist of an Austrian and a Hungarian part that, as one might imagine, combined to form a unity, but of a whole and a part, namely of a Hungarian and an Austro-Hungarian sense of nationhood; and the latter was at home in Austria, whereby the Austrian sense of nationhood actually became homeless. The Austrian himself was only to be found in Hungary, and there as an object of dislike: at home he called himself a citizen of the kingdoms and realms of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as represented in the Imperial Council, which means the same as an Austrian plus a Hungarian minus this Hungarian, and he did this not, as one might imagine, with enthusiasm, but for the sake of an idea that he detested, for he could not endure the Hungarians any more than they could endure him, which made the whole connection more involved than ever. As a result, many people simply called themselves Czechs, Poles, Slovenes or Germans..."

19. Actually he wished to create the impression that the German text was a translation. See the forewords to volumes one and two of the German edition, Der Einfluss der herrschenden Ideen des 19. Jahrhunderts auf den Staat, Vienna, 1851, and Leipzig, 1854. That the German text is in fact the original one can however be conclusively shown, even by merely philological means. The Hungarian text is poorer, less articulated than the German one. There is, for example, the sentence according to which "eine Gesellschaft, wo man, um sie in einer gedachten Form neu aufzurichten, allen Kitt, welcher die einzelnen Theile zusammenhielt, aufgelöst, wo man Alles, was zu gross schien, verkleinert, und was sich zu fest gezeigt und nicht in jede Lage fügen wollte, zerschlagen hat, kann durch eine Form allein eben so wenig Festigkeit gewinnen, als eine Masse Schutt, ob man sie nun als Kegel oder Pyramide aufgehäuft, dem Sturme und Regen nicht zu widerstehen vermag" (vol.1, p.244). From the Hungarian version of this sentence the crucial word "gedachte" (in einer gedachten Form) is missing.


21. Ibid., p.274.


23. "Az aesthetica és a társadalom viszonyos befolyása" (The interconnections between aesthetics and society) is the title of a talk he gave in 1862.

24. The suggestion that Hungarian nationalism somehow provided a psychological defense against cosmic-philosophical doubt, is well illustrated by what W.O. McCagg writes about the assimilated Hungarian Jew Mór Ballagi: "Ballagi's Magyar nationalism is interesting to us because it bore such an obvious relation to his participation in the secularized, nationalistic culture of modern Western Europe. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment struck down the medieval religious and social barriers which could have kept Ballagi from exploring on the frontiers of modern knowledge, emancipating his intellect. And his Magyar nationalism in a sense served the function of imposing new limits upon his intellectual wanderings. It would be venturesome to define too narrowly how in particular nationalism served this function. We might speculate that he felt the intellectual horizons of the West were too broad, and from some sort of loneliness in the great world of Europe sought to find a new 'home' in a Magyar national community." McCagg, Jewish Nobles and Geniuses in Modern Hungary, East European Monographs III, East European Quarterly, 1972, p.81.

25. Cf. the following passage from Macartney: "The salient difference between the political workings of Austria and Hungary for a generation after 1867 was that while in the former the Dualist system achieved in
1867 was, after some initial hesitation, generally accepted as an unpalatable but unalterable fact of life, this was not the case in Hungary. ...it never occurred to the Hungarians, whose entire political history had consisted of a series of periodical re-statements of their relationship to their Monarch, that this one was to be regarded as sacrosanct and immutable. If satisfactory to them, it should be maintained; if it proved unsatisfactory, they were as a nation neither legally nor morally bound to refrain from trying to get it amended. And the effect of the inveterate traditional national assumption (which had some historical justification) that all Hungary's problems were governed, in greater or less degree, by her relationship with her king, was that this question of the maintenance or revision of the Compromise - the 'issue of public law', as it was called, was from the first the central theme of her entire political life. ... It was entirely natural that [in the Parliament of 1867] the Deputies' minds should still have been filled with the great Issue, and as natural that, almost without exception, they should have taken up the traditional attitude which invested it not only with the primacy over all other problems, but with governance of them... If this development was natural, it was none the less profoundly unfortunate for Hungary, particularly as it proved self-perpetuating. It meant that precious energies were wasted in barren wrangling over the Issue which ought to have been devoted to constructive work..."

The Habsburg Empire, pp.687f.


27. As, for example, Franz Alexander, the Hungarian-born American psychoanalyst would describe it in his The Western Mind in Transition, New York: Random House, 1960, p.42. Alexander's father was a prominent philosophy professor in fin-de-siècle Hungary, and his son writes that his father's generation, "and the next one, grew up in an atmosphere in which creativity and intellectual and artistic accomplishments were publicly and officially held in the highest esteem." Ibid., pp.43f. This however presents a misleading picture. Although it is true that, as McCagg writes, "membership of the Academy of Sciences was one of the highest honours to which a Hungarian of the Ausgleich Era could aspire, and particularly in Jewish families, where this Magyar respect for education mingled with Jewish traditions, at least one son in every family was usually encouraged to pursue an intellectual career" (op. cit., p.212), still scientific or literary achievements were invariably judged by the standards of a shallow, narrow-minded nationalism. Franz Alexander's father himself joined, in 1894, the chorus of those who condemned certain novel experiments in Hungarian literary life merely on the grounds that those experiments were found to be not sufficiently Hungarian.


30. Namely the essays which then made up the Hungarian edition, A lélek és a formák, Budapest: Franklin, 1910. The German edition, Die
Seele und die Formen, Berlin, 1911, contains two further essays, both written in 1910.


33. Frankfurter Zeitung, September 5th, 1912.

34. See p.53 of the German edition.

35. For the synonymity of the four terms see e.g. pp.4,13 of the German edition. The 'Platonist' and the 'critic' are, again, taken as identical on p.46 of the same edition.

36. Ibid., p.16.

37. Ibid., p.50.

38. Ibid., pp.233ff.

39. See e.g. William J.McGrath, Dionysian Art and Populist Politics in Austria, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974, p.9f. See also Macartney, op.cit., pp.301ff. - Two works which, in the early 1850's, did something to express in philosophical form a dissatisfaction with historical-empirical reality were Eduard Hanslick's Vom Musikalisch-Schönen (1854), and R. Zimmermann's Philosophische Propädeutik (1852), of which the second edition (1860), incidentally, had much less philosophical depth than the first.


42. See W.J. McGrath, Wagnerianism in Austria, Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1967. See also McGrath's book Dionysian Art and Populist Politics in Austria, referred to above.


44. Schorske, “Politics in a New Key”, p.344. To quote another relevant passage by Schorske, this time from his “The Transformation of the Garden”: “In the 1890's the anti-Liberal movements paralyzed the state and extruded the Liberals from the positions of power they had acquired only three decades before. The position of the Liberal haute bourgeoisie thus became paradoxical indeed. Even as its wealth increased, its political power fell away. Its pre-eminence in the professional and cultural life of the Empire remained basically unchallenged while it became politically impotent. Thus the Viennese upper middle class became one which, even more than the Emperor it so loyally served, reigned though it could not rule. A sense of superiority and a sense of impotence became oddly commingled. The products of the new aesthetic movement reflect the ambiguous compound formed of these elements. . . . the Austrian aesthetes were alienated not from their class, but with it from a society that defeated its expectations and rejected its values.” (pp.1304f.)

45. I have tried to put forward some experiments to this effect in my paper “Beim Sternenlicht der Nichtexistierenden”, Inquiry, 17, 1974.


47. See e.g. Gesammelte Werke XII, London: Imago, 1947, pp.8,11.


52. The Austrian social-historical background of and relevant ethical motifs in Wittgenstein's Tractatus are dealt with extensively in the book of Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin. I have put forward some tentative ideas concerning the same subject in my paper "Das unglückliche Leben des Ludwig Wittgenstein", in Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 26, 1972.

53. That there are, indeed, such parallels was pointed out by Erich Heller as early as 1959 in his paper "Ludwig Wittgenstein. Unphilosophische Betrachtungen", Merkur, 1959, repr. in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Schriften. Beiheft, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1960. In a short essay published in 1967 in K.T.Fann, ed., Wittgenstein. The Man and his Philosophy, New York: Dell, Heller again refers to them: "Wittgenstein belonged to that astonishing generation of minds who, with all their differences, bear yet a common stamp: the indefinable but unmistakable mark of the end of the Austrian monarchy. It happened once before that the dissolution of a great Empire brought forth men possessed of extraordinary spiritual energies; and at that time too, when the days of Rome were numbered, these men were largely Jews." The Austrian Monarchy was "a place where the confusion of decline and fall filled the elect with the desire to lift the world into a sphere of eternal clarity. 'Only this could given me happiness' - it is an entry in Franz Kafka's diary." (pp.65f.)
1. My thesis is that William Johnston's notion of therapeutic nihilism is a cloud of confusion condensed into a drop of rhetoric, that it obfuscates precisely those things that an intellectual history of Austria ought to illuminate, the most inaccessible and uniquely Austrian figures he treats in The Austrian Mind. I shall argue (1) that this confusion is rooted in Johnston's incoherent development of the term, (2) that it refers to a set of dubious presuppositions concerning rationality, and I shall attempt to show (3) how these dubious presuppositions lead him to distort his subject, by examining the specific case of Otto Weininger. I have chosen Weininger as my test case because he, according to Johnston, 'epitomized' therapeutic nihilism (162), but also because he is so central to the intellectual life of fin de siècle Austria - indeed, Weininger is such a focal point in the cultural life of Alt Wien that I am surprised that no one has yet written a book called Weininger's Vienna.
1.1 The first problem with Johnston's notion of therapeutic nihilism is that, while it is absolutely central to his exposition and analysis, he nowhere provides us with a sustained account of precisely what he takes the term to signify. We can obtain a preliminary idea of what it signifies by examining what is meant when it is said of Karl Kraus that if Weininger embodied the *null plus ultra* of therapeutic nihilism, Kraus fell not far behind. While censuring feuilletonists for constructing aesthetic paradises, he himself took refuge in a fortress of solipsism. What pained him was not to see other people suffer but to witness how the press exploited it... He delighted in discomfiting victims by mimicking the bestial in them. Among medical men, therapeutic nihilism originally meant faith in the healing powers of nature; illness should be left to run its course lest an ignorant physician wreak more harm than good. The renegade Jews Kraus and Weininger disdained such faith in the recuperative force of nature; no lapse of time could redress the abuses for which they berated their contemporaries (206).

It is worth noting that this passage occurs on p.206 of *The Austrian Mind*. Johnston does not manage to get around to discussing the term's original medical connotation until p.203 - but this does not prevent him from introducing the term as early as p.71. It should be evident from the passage cited that identifying Kraus as a therapeutic nihilist also entails evaluating both his personality and his work by means of an expression which is explicitly metaphorical. Further, Johnston implies that the root expression has a positive sense at least some of the time. However, when we turn to his exposition of the development of therapeutic nihilism at the Medical School of the University of Vienna, we discover that Johnston does indeed assert that there are both legitimate and illicit medical applications of the term; however, there is not a little vagueness about his criteria for making such a distinction. His conceptual difficulties begin there. Hence it is necessary to begin
by examining his account of the medical meaning of the term in some detail.

1.2 Originally, the term designated 'systematic refusal to prescribe remedies for fear of perpetuating quack cures' (71). Concretely, it signified a decided preference among the faculty of the medical school for pathological anatomy in place of therapy. The medical scientist most closely associated with the practice, Carl von Rokitansky, is praised by Johnston for developing pathological anatomy into 'the first reliable tool of diagnosis to supplant Hippocrates' "doctrine of signs"' (224). Johnston thus recognises that therapeutic nihilism played a crucial role in the development of nineteenth century medicine and helped to make Vienna in the phrase of Rudolf Virchow (which Johnston endorses) 'the Mecca of Medicine' (227). The pejorative sense of the term originated with the abuses which arose from the excessive and exclusive proccupation with pathology to the exclusion of therapy. In these circumstances, Johnston asserts, there emerged from the practice a twofold problem. First, there was a growing tendency on the part of Rokitansky's students, especially a certain Josef Dietl, to distort 'skepticism towards nostrums into the doctrine that to do nothing must be the best treatment' (225) at a point in time when genuine cures were becoming available. This led, Johnston argues, to the second, more important, consequence of the therapeutic nihilist approach to healing: callous disregard for suffering patients to the point of criminal neglect (228). It is important for Johnston that well-documented faith in the exclusive healing powers of nature co-existed with equally well-documented abuses of patients, so important that he neglects to document the causal link he claims to have existed between them (I am not claiming that he cannot
do so, but merely asserting that he has not).

1.3 Hence, the first point at which we ought to call Johnston's analysis of therapeutic nihilism into question is when he claims that there was a necessary connection between:

(1) refusal to prescribe remedies on the basis of faith in nature's healing powers,

(2) its illicit extension,

and

(3) its implication for the treatment of patients in the form of, say, abysmal training procedures for nurses.

Once more, I am not claiming that Johnston cannot document these connections but asserting that he has not, and that the price for not doing so renders the metaphorical extension of the concept of therapeutic nihilism all but unintelligible. The unintelligibility follows from the fact that the criteria he has given us for distinguishing its legitimate from its illicit employment are hopelessly vague. In short, he has failed to tell us how much therapeutic nihilism is, in medical practice, too much. He has failed to draw the line between criminal neglect and sound medical practice unambiguously, a line, it must be emphasised, which he clearly recognises must be drawn. Without such precise criteria the term can only obfuscate the cultural phenomena to which he chooses to transfer it.

1.4 A second set of doubts about the aptness of employing the term therapeutic nihilism to characterise thinkers like Wittgenstein, Kelsen and Weininger or writers such as Kraus or Zweig, follows from the fact that it is not a term that they used to describe themselves. Indeed, there is no evidence that any of them knew that such a medical practice
existed, let alone associated themselves with it. Why, then, is it appropriate for describing them? Is there some actual connection between the practice of therapeutic nihilism in the medical school and a peculiar kind of social criticism or is this an expression which Johnston has projected onto the figures I have mentioned? He does not tell us. In the crucial passage he says only this:

Outside the Medical Faculty a conviction that no remedy could relieve suffering or forestall decline infected such thinkers as Karl Kraus, Otto Weininger, and Albert Ehrenstein. They preserved therapeutic nihilism as a major trend in Viennese thought long after it waned at the Medical Faculty (71, my italics).

Thus, Johnston explicates a metaphor by yet another metaphor, that of 'infection'. This seems to imply that therapeutic nihilism was an attitude which could in some sense be transmitted, but there is not even a hint in The Austrian Mind of precisely how the alleged infection spread. In fact, Johnston says nothing more about the issue. Consequently, it is difficult to see how he has done anything but explain the obscure by the yet more obscure. In order to discover the cognitive content of the term we have to hunt through all 402 pages of his text, piecing together as we go to obtain something like a comprehensive picture of just what it means for someone to be a therapeutic nihilist. I shall try to form such a composite from his disparate allegations.

1.5 Weininger is the therapeutic nihilist par excellence because he scorns the study of society and politics but equally because he declines to commit himself to life (162). Apropos of Weininger and Karl Polanyi, Johnston claims that therapeutic nihilism is a 'cause of a proclivity to suicide' (180) - Weininger, it will be remembered, took his own life in October 1903. This proclivity to suicide is taken to be directly related to the view that there are no solutions to
the problems which beset us. Oskar Kokoschka is doubly a therapeutic nihilist, for he acquiesces in the 'dry rot of Western civilization' (147) without prescribing cures for the malaise, either as a painter or as a playwright. Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, with its injunction that judges must refrain from interpreting the law, incorporates therapeutic nihilism because Kelsen insists that law cannot recognise norms beyond itself (98). Richard Wahle's more traditional version of nihilism incorporating cynical diatribes against reason itself is another therapeutic nihilism (201-203). Even Johnston's hero, Sigmund Freud, succumbs to a 'limited' therapeutic nihilism in the end, by positing a 'death wish' in terms of which 'nature inscrutably condemns some beings to destruction' (248). Kraus, Loos, Kokoschka, Wittgenstein and Schoenberg are therapeutic nihilists because they endorse a conservative 'counter-revolutionary' movement in the arts (213). In terms of the psychoanalytic theory Johnston so esteems, thinkers prone to therapeutic nihilism appear to have an underdeveloped ego, for they tend to oscillate between idealistic fantasies and despair. Therapeutic nihilists tend to be relentless exponents of dualistic accounts of the way things are, as well as having a nostalgia for Biedermeier values. In short therapeutic nihilism can refer to any of the following:

- the substantial claims entailed by a theory (which is often dualistic),
- personal psychological dispositions,
- a type of ethically motivated social criticism, which generally is rooted in an unfavourable contrast between the current state of society and some earlier period,
- an intellectual's failure to place the study of society and politics at the head of his list of priorities.
Throughout this analysis Johnston never questions whether there is a discrepancy between what a writer or thinker claims to be doing and what he is actually doing: Johnston is content to take therapeutic nihilists at their word. The concept comes into focus a bit more sharply if we contrast those who have been 'infected' with therapeutic nihilism with their psychically healthy counterparts. Chief among the sane and sound intellectuals in Johnston's version of Austrian cultural history are:

- the pacifist Berta von Suttner,
- the feminist Rosa Mayreder,
- the anti-clerical social reformer Josef Popper-Lynkeus,
- the founder of modern Zionism Theodor von Herzl,
- the positivist ideologue Otto Neurath.

Generalising superficially from this list it would seem that the opposite of therapeutic nihilism is advocacy of liberal social reforms, a sort of 'realistic' idealism against which theories, personalities and attitudes can all be judged. Healthy intellectuals have a psychological disposition to produce scientific theories which are sound by current standards (or are at least recognisable forerunners of currently held views), with a view to the constructive criticism of society and politics. In short we obtain a picture of intellectual life and of the role of the intellectual in society not radically different from that of classical nineteenth century liberalism inasmuch as it emphasises individual freedom and progress through the growth of scientific knowledge - but tempered by a dose of Freudian psychoanalysis. These are certainly laudable values in themselves and doubtless provide sound criteria for judging the rationality of Anglo-Saxon intellectuals, but I doubt whether they do anything but obscure our assessment of intellectuals in a society in which the institutional
prerequisites for a genuine political liberalism have existed only since the end of World War Two. I take the fallacies in Johnston's work to be rooted in his doctrinaire Liberalism. Unless I am mistaken, Johnston is merely following Otto Neurath's suggestions about how to explain away metaphysical beliefs in the Vienna Circle's manifesto, "The Scientific Conception of the World". It is at least certain that both Neurath and Johnston fall into the same error about rationality. It is to this important topic that we must now turn.

2. At this point I must make it very clear that I have no argument with political liberalism. I endorse it as the least evil alternative among the alternatives with which we are confronted. My argument is with a naive application of political liberalism to the data of intellectual history in a doctrinaire fashion. My claim is that some historians - including William Johnston - have been systematically blinded by their belief in liberalism's ultimate truth, that they have failed to distance themselves sufficiently from their own beliefs to be in a position to appreciate how differing beliefs in the figures they study could come into existence in the first place. I must emphasise that I do not consider this phenomenon interesting as a personal failing of Johnston's but rather as it is implicit in a widely held concept of rationality which has been part and parcel of liberalism since Locke. I am referring to the identification of rational belief with true belief. This dubious identification can become grounds for making the covert assumption that the present state of knowledge has normative value in assessing rationality, that those beliefs which are currently taken to be normal are the very substance of rationality. On the account that I am criti-
cising here, to reject the contemporary view of something or other or its legitimate precursor is to be 'anti-modern' and consequently irrational. Because contemporary scientific knowledge is taken to have a normative value, its open-textured character is on the one hand obscured, with the consequence that on the other hand radical conceptual change becomes difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of as having taken place in the past. At this point, therefore, I must spell out the philosophical issue at stake here, so that I can turn to a concrete instance which will illustrate how Johnston has been misled by his misconceived notion of rationality.

2.1 It must be clear from the outset that whole constellations of assumptions, webs of beliefs, are involved when we turn to the discussion of rationality. Two issues in particular emerge as central to the confusions surrounding the doctrinaire liberal approach to intellectual historiography, the aforementioned problem of rationality and the question as to the relativity of truth. Classical liberalism maintains that experience is the sole criterion for determining whether beliefs are true or false. Classical liberalism also claims to endorse Hume's position that experience is always fallible. We can always be mistaken about matters of fact. It follows from this that we must respect opinions contrary to our own because we can never be absolutely certain that our own views are correct. However, it is not clear from the rejection of the notion of absolute truth which of two possible counter-claims should be made. Should we assert that all claims are equally valid (providing they are founded on evidence), or that some claims are stronger than others because they appeal to the right kind of evidence (assuming for the moment that each of the proponents of these views agrees on what constitutes a valid argument). The strong claim
embodied in the former view is that the rejection of absolutism entails the rejection of all criteria except the general injunction that substantive meaning must be tied to sensible experience as the Vienna circle insisted. The second, weaker claim is that we do not have to reject all appeals to criteria because the criteria to which we appeal are not 'absolute'. If we accept the former view, a belief will be rational if it is verifiable according to sensible experience. Claims which are not subject to such verification will be rejected as metaphysical or superstitious. This account of rationality, however, will become strained when there is more than one account of the phenomenon in question which is subject to verification. At that point the weaker claim, the one I would endorse, becomes more plausible, for it is clear that we require rules for discriminating between different kinds of verifiable statement in addition to the principle of verification alone.

2.2 The weaker response to absolutism holds that claims are not relative to an hypostatised notion of 'experience' but to the criteria (i.e. the institutions) which make us regard certain procedures for making claims as more authoritative than others. Rationality, on this weaker view, is less a matter of what we believe than it is of how we believe, of how we conduct ourselves intellectually. To put the matter in another way: on the second account we will not be inclined to evaluate the rationality of an individual merely upon the substance of his claims, but we shall be more concerned with the specific sorts of evidence he produces for his claims and the rules and procedures which establish that evidence as being of the appropriate type and thus above all we shall be concerned with his reactions when confronted with counter-examples. We will determine that a person is rational when he is prepared to consider seriously
public knowledge that runs counter to his beliefs and to modify his beliefs accordingly. He will be irrational when he ignores or redescribes evidence that runs counter to his claims or consciously entertains a formal contradiction in his thinking. Thus we shall be suspicious, say, of the Marxist who tells us that it is our bourgeois mentality which leads us to question the inevitability of political revolution in advanced industrial society. In sum, to distinguish rational from irrational beliefs on this account will entail being able to give an account of how the individual (or group) in question responded when confronted with evidence that appears to falsify his view. Our account of intellectual history will differ depending upon which view of rationality we endorse.

2.3 If we assume that to be rational is to hold true beliefs about the universe and society, there will be one dramatic event (radical conceptual change) in the history of ideas corresponding to the moment of enlightenment in a particular area of study: the appearance of a Copernicus in astronomy, of a Locke in political theory or of a Hume in epistemology, who dispels the conceptual monstrosities of millenia of metaphysical speculation and thereby opens the door to progress after centuries of stagnation. This intellectual history is very much a history with heros and villains. The heros pave the way to the big breakthrough and form the links between the great discovery and today's science. These histories are entirely concerned with internal criticism and have the flavour of Biblical genealogies about them. We are all familiar with, say, histories of philosophy which tell us that Descartes begat Spinoza who begat Leibniz, and Locke begat Berkely who begat Hume - Kant being the result of miscegenation between Leibniz and Hume with Christian Wolff as midwife - until finally
Quine begat Kripke and all was light. I do not think that any one will have much trouble recognising this phenomenon. I do not wish to denigrate the innumerable scholars who have done much serious and profound work in the history of ideas by producing such histories. I only wish to point out that this is only one aspect of the historiography that proceeds from the equation of true belief with rational belief. The view that rational belief is to be identified with currently held scientific theories engenders another historical project which entails writing the history or, better, the sub-history, of the opposition to scientific enlightenment.

Let us examine how this comes about.

2.4 The linear progressive account of the history of ideas has two important implications neither of which is usually recognised explicitly by its proponents. The first is the paradox that a contemporary student of, say, physics, is somehow 'more rational' than an Aristotle. This is true despite the fact that Aristotle was the greatest physicist of his day, because Aristotle held views that physical theory has long discarded. To be sure, only a very few people would be satisfied with the point just made as it is here stated. Nevertheless, it is implicit in the view that rationality is primarily an adjectival quality which modifies theories as opposed to an adverbial modifier describing human actions or procedures. Franz Steiner has shown how it was that just such an equation of rational belief with what was once taken to be true belief undermined the foundations of classical social anthropology in the work of Sir James Frazer and Robertson-Smith. The second consequence of holding such a view is the necessity to posit a kind of reflex sub-intellectual history, which is the history of the opposition to enlightenment. George Mosse's work on the crisis of German ideology is an example
of the sort of sub-intellectual history I have in mind.4 Mosse, whose assumptions by and large are identical to Johnston's, has raised interesting and important questions as well as drawn our attention to figures and problems that have been otherwise ignored; however, this should not blind us to the fact that Mosse's work, like Johnston's, raises more issues than it resolves. In both Johnston and Mosse there is an assumption that strict demarcation between science and pseudo-science is always possible - as assumption that has been seriously challenged in the wake of Kuhn's work in the philosophy and history of science - as well as an assumption that any ethically motivated criticism of modern society can be dismissed simply on the grounds that it is 'anti-modern'. I find this approach to intellectual history disturbing because it seems to entail first locating a thinker's proper sphere, i.e. deciding whether he is to be discussed seriously or explained away on the basis of the substance of his views rather than on the basis of his reasoning. There are several dangers lurking in the underbrush of this approach. First is the precipitous bifurcation of intellectual life: it seems all too easy by their methods to classify and therefore to evaluate on the basis of a superficial interpretation. Granted that we may want to endorse a dual methodology for dealing with rational and irrational thinkers, we must avoid making that discrimination a mere result of classification. The second problem with this approach to rationality is that it would seem to make rationality the prerogative of an elite of liberal, (academic?) scientists. The third difficulty with this position is that it would appear to forget that all claims to knowledge - even our own - are fallible. However, the most disastrous effect of this approach to the history of ideas is that the resulting history is almost guaranteed to leave a certain segment of the intellectual development
of a culture less than intelligible, as such it would seem
to be incompatible with the goal at which the intellectual
historian aims, intelligibility. When we judge a thinker
solely by reference to his political views or by reference
to his role or that of his type of thought in political
developments without examining the reasoning that went into
his views, then there is so little chance of obtaining any
genuine understanding of those views that come to be iden-
tified as 'anti-modernist' that we are constrained to adopt
the hypothesis that the segment of intellectual life to
which he belonged was, in some sense or other, sick. In
short, I suggest that this danger is present from the out-
set because it is covertly entailed by the historian's abso-
lute presuppositions. It is for this reason that their
histories appear to have such a strong moralistic tone, one
which is curiously akin to that which they condemn in the
'anti-modernist'.

2.5 At this point it is fair to expect from myself an
alternative to Johnston's methodology. Recent developments
in the historiography of the natural sciences in the wake
of the philosophical analyses of thinkers such as Kuhn,
Toulmin, and Lakatos,\textsuperscript{5} to name but a few of the most promi-

\textsuperscript{5} These thinkers share the view that the mere

\textsuperscript{5} fact that a mode of thinking has become discredited by no

\textsuperscript{5} means indicates that it is uninteresting to examine the

\textsuperscript{5} reasoning that went into developing it. This is because the

\textsuperscript{5} question of rationality is more a question of whether a

\textsuperscript{5} theory could possibly be rationally advanced, given the

\textsuperscript{5} state of knowledge, scientific procedures, etc., at that
time, than it is of the theory's truth. If we are to under-

\textsuperscript{5} stand science, we must understand how scientists actually

\textsuperscript{5} operate with concepts. The obverse of this will be a con-
textual analysis of how the theories of scientists in previous eras, working with paradigms that differ from those currently accepted, were either in a position to recognise and meet legitimate objections to their views or not. In short, on this view 'rational' will be an analogous expression which will apply to the evaluation of both conduct and theories with the primary reference being to the former, while it will apply to theories in a secondary sense. To speak of a theory as 'rational', then, will signify that the theory has been formulated with the anticipation of eventual criticism.

2.6 Increasingly, contemporary philosophers of science have come to admit that science cannot be understood apart from its history. Close scrutiny of that history however, reveals that the history of the physical sciences is as much the story of shifts in the standards by which theories and discoveries are assessed as it is the story of discoveries and theories themselves. The notion that there are timeless criteria shared by thinkers as different as Descartes and Carnap is incompatible with the actual development of the natural sciences. Criteria do not exist in nature, as it were, but are the property of a community. The history of science is thus very much the history of scientific communities and their projects. It is the account of the assumptions these communities share regarding, say, what counts as a good explanation and of how these assumptions change. Unlike the Cartesian model of scientific knowledge, the most striking feature of this concept of knowing is the centrality of the concept of radical conceptual change. The implication of this notion of science that is vitally important for intellectual history generally is the idea that the contemporary state of knowledge is the result of radical conceptual changes which are such that they make
contingent whether or not we are able to understand past scientific activity or the science of another culture. An important part of the history of science is thus preoccupied with establishing painstakingly just how scientific criteria develop. I am suggesting, then, that it will always be a contingent matter whether historians are able to grasp precisely what a thinker in another society at another time claims, that this makes the distinction between intellectual history and sub-intellectual history questionable and that this has in fact been the cause of serious distortions in William Johnston's work in Austrian intellectual history.

3. I propose to illustrate precisely how Johnston's assumptions have led him to distort the thinkers he brands as therapeutic nihilists by examining his treatment of Weininger's Geschlecht und Charakter. My claim is that Johnston's doctrinaire liberalism and the faulty view of rationality it incorporates leads him to overlook explicit statements in Weininger which run counter to Johnston's interpretation and that it systematically prevents him from asking precisely those questions which would enable him to obtain a more accurate assessment of the project to which Weininger's work is devoted. This is because his assumptions preclude examining Weininger's reasoning, his claims, the grounds upon which they are alleged to rest and the conceptual framework in which those grounds are taken to be the appropriate type of evidence for establishing the soundness of the sort of claims that Weininger wants to make (the complexity of Weininger's work makes it impossible, in an article of this length, for me to do anything beyond sketching how Johnston ought to have approached
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Weininger). Unless I am mistaken, analysis will reveal that Johnston has made assumptions which lead him to an unhistorical reading of Geschlecht und Charakter, a reading which obscures its chief hypothesis and thereby renders critical judgment impossible.

3.1 Nothing I have said up to this point should be taken to imply that Weininger's book is easy to fathom: on the contrary, it is on the face of it one of the most bizarre and outrageous philosophical books ever written - so much so that the editor of Kantstudien published a disclaimer, along with the advertisement Weininger submitted to them for the book, stating that the publication of the advertisement in no way constituted an endorsement of the book.7 A superficial reading of the book quickly reveals why it was an instant succès de scandale. Consider the following claims made therein:

- women are exclusively and entirely sexual, men alone are rational (106)
- woman's physiology makes her constitutionally incapable of abstract thought and thus of intellectual insight, moral action and artistic creativity (122),
- all women are either prostitutes or overly possessive mothers. The former are completely selfless, the latter completely selfish. Both are essentially faithless but the prostitute is the more estimable (232),
- women are too low on the moral scale to be classified as criminals (303),
- it is only women who are happy (376),
- women - like children, imbeciles and criminals - should have no voice in human affairs (450),
- love and understanding are mutually incompatible (451),
- what is true of women is also true of Jews (408),
- politics is essentially feminine because the tribune of the people must prostitute himself before them (294-95),

and the final paradox:

- in the end the argument of Geschlecht und Charakter turns against men.

Confronted with these bare claims I think we would all be inclined to conclude that the author of the book in question was some kind of a nut. Nor would we be likely to be surprised to discover that its Jewish author committed suicide six months after it appeared (dramatically, by renting a room in the house where Beethoven died and there shooting himself). To reason thus is certainly understandable, unfortunately it is also fallacious. But to say something like that is to put myself into a position where people will take me to be a nut too, so I must hastily spell out just what I want to argue regarding this bizarre book.

- Firstly, I want to insist that it must be evaluated by reference to the state of biological science, psychology and humanistic social reform circa 1903.
- Secondly, I want to assert that a close reading of the text reveals a strong dialectical element in Weininger's thinking which actually renders his conclusion that the argument turns against men less paradoxical than it appears at first glance.
- Thirdly, I want to detach Weininger's book from the fact of his suicide as virtually none of his numerous enemies (and his friends as well) have done.

Let me begin with the third point.

3.2 Johnston assumes that Weininger's bizarre theory and his bizarre behaviour (suicide) are indissolubly linked.
Apart from having an *ad hominem* character, this approach to Weininger tends to become vacuously circular in that Weininger's bizarre behaviour then becomes evidence for explaining away the bizarre theory (remember that therapeutic nihilism is among other things a 'disposition to suicide'). Johnston appears to be oblivious both to the general philosophical difficulties surrounding ascriptions of intention and also to the specific problems we encounter when we try to ascribe motives to suicides. For Johnston it is sufficient to explain Weininger's 'diatribe against women and Jews' (159) in terms of 'disappointed Oedipal feelings' (159) and Jewish self hatred (Weininger, it will be remembered, was one of Theodor Lessing's models in developing that concept). I have two reasons for rejecting these psychohistorical explanations. First, they can be only as reliable as the theory upon which they rest. The claims to scientific legitimacy of that theory are meagre, to say the least. Secondly, even if I were disposed to accept Freudian explanations, I would remain sceptical about our capacity to produce a sound psychoanalytical account of Weininger because the validity of such accounts, as Freud himself always insisted, rests upon minutely detailed biographical, preferably autobiographical, information of a sort that is in scant supply in Weininger's case. Apart from a few letters, the biographical data we have concerning Weininger is principally highly speculative, equally biased accounts of friends and detractors. Because Johnston does find psychoanalytic considerations convincing in Weininger's case, he is more concerned with discussing Freud's claim that Weininger stole the idea of human bisexuality from him than he is with establishing the context in which Weininger developed his ideas. Apart from ignoring Freud's own neurotic tendencies in the face of challenges to his originality and status, Johnston fails to recog-
nise that to take such a claim seriously he is obliged to explain why Weininger's views differ from Freud's in precisely the way that they do. So much for Johnston's account of Weininger's personality, now let us turn to his account of Weininger's theories.

3.3 The following passage is virtually his entire exposition of the main thesis of Geschlecht und Charakter:

In Geschlecht und Charakter, Weininger distorted a useful thesis into monomania. He postulated that all human behaviour can be explained in terms of male and female protoplasm constituting each person. Contending that every cell of every organism possesses sexuality, he coined several terms to designate various types of protoplasm. Idioplasm is sexually undifferentiated, arrhenoplasm is male protoplasm, while thelyplasm is female cellular tissue. Using algebraic formulas, he demonstrated how varying proportions of arrhenoplasm and thelyplasm could elucidate such topics as the psychology of genius, physiognomy, theory of memory, prostitution, anti-Semitism and theory of race (159-60).

The anti-feminism that Johnston perceives in this theory leads him to assert:

Weininger ranks as one of the most petulant of misogynists. He simply equated sexuality with woman, who contaminates man in the paroxysm of orgasm. He diagnosed hysteria as a malady peculiar to woman, caused by conflict between her exclusively sexual nature and the ideal of chastity which men foist upon her (160).

In producing such a theory, Johnston concludes, Weininger so withdrew into contemplation of the human predicament that he forsook all desire to remedy it (162).

Now I must make it absolutely clear that there is no question in my mind that Weininger's views are wholly untenable today, but that in no way implies that they were untenable then. As I have mentioned, the confines of a brief paper are such that I could not hope to provide the nuanced account of Weininger's work which would bring out the mani-
fold deficiencies in Johnston's presentation of it; rather, I shall try to indicate how an awareness of the context in which Weininger was writing and the reasoning that went into the theory of plasms would lead one to quite a different assessment of Weininger.

3.4 The task of reconstructing the context in which Weininger was operating is not as difficult as it might seem at first glance. This is because Weininger appended 135 pages of notes and references to Geschlecht und Charakter. However, like Lukács 60 years earlier, Johnston merely considers the 'impressive area of authorities' (160) cited in the book as showing off on Weininger's part. In ignoring Weininger's sources Johnston differs widely from the Professor to whom Weininger submitted his dissertation, from which Geschlecht und Charakter was developed, Friedrich Jodl. In Jodl's otherwise critical evaluation of the dissertation Jodl wrote,

It merits recognition that the author endeavoured to assemble abundant data from biology, psychology and pathology, as well as manifold observations from the most different areas of life and wide reading in aid of establishing his hypothesis aptly and acutely. The examiner is convinced that this hypothesis, whether verifiable or not, will allow us to see much that is now known in a new light and to notice many things hitherto unobserved. 

Incidentally, this statement does not altogether square with Johnston's description of Jodl as finding Weininger's dissertation to 'abound in extravagances and crudities' (159). Had Johnston looked into these sources what might he have found? Two things, I think: first, that Weininger's undertaking, however disreputable by today's standards, was conceived in conjunction with one of the leading programmes for social reform of the era and thus in no sense a 'forsaking' of society; and secondly, that the theory of plasms could
clearly be construed as a scientific 'bold conjecture'.

3.5 Even a cursory glance at Weininger's notes and references indicates that he was heavily indebted for his data about women to a work called *La Donna Delinquente e La Prostituta* by Cesare Lombrose, Professor of Forensic Medicine at Turin and father of modern criminology. Lombroso's programme involved reforming penal codes and improvement of conditions in prisons with a view to the prevention of recidivism. He based his position on arguments drawn from contemporary biology, namely that one could identify degeneration in terms of physical characteristics. He argued that the psycho-physicalist principle much appealed to in contemporary psychology implied that deviant minds and abnormal bodies were two sides of the same coin. By producing accurate measurements of bodies, especially of the skull, he hoped to produce a statistical profile of normalcy and deviance represented on a bell-shaped curve with geniuses on one side of normalcy and criminals on the other. More precisely, he hoped to be able to distinguish congenital deviance, for which individuals were not responsible and from which they could not be rehabilitated, from environmentally induced deviance, which could be rehabilitated. His aim was to set up two distinct prison systems so that non-congenital deviants would not acquire permanent dispositions to crime from the congenitally criminal. Not a little of the 'empirical data' upon which Weininger based his reasoning is to be found in Lombroso's study of the female offender. For example two ideas which were to recur as central themes in *Geschlecht und Charakter*, namely that women are generally less sensitive to perceptual stimuli and the notion that women are more prone to lying than men (for which he advances eight causes) are already central themes in Lombroso's work. In fact most of the things that
we find obnoxious and repugnant in Geschlecht und Charakter today, can be found in La Donna Delinquente. Though Lombroso's status among scientists was on the wane at the time Weininger was writing, his reputation as a 'bleeding heart' liberal was intact. The legal profession was not about to countenance a major reduction in the total number of crimes. Weininger's concern for establishing hereditary foundations for prostitution have to be read as part and parcel of the same efforts to change society's moralistic attitudes. Incidentally, just as establishing that some criminals were congenitally so was central to Lombroso's programme - and to the programme for educating society at large about sexuality conceived by Havelock Ellis as an extension of Lombroso's work - the notion that homosexuality was in some sense congenital was equally central to the programme for the decriminalisation of homosexuality of the "Wissenschaftlich-Humanitären Komitee" of Magnus Hirschfeld in Berlin (despite its basic disagreements with Lombroso).
Weininger's references indicate that he was very familiar with the work of Ellis and Hirschfeld. In the light of the well-known police and press harassment of homosexuals and prostitutes in Weininger's Vienna, it is difficult to see how Weininger was 'forsaking' society in undertaking a Kantian critique of Lombroso's positivist theory of crime. His theory of plasms, which Weininger admitted was speculative but nonetheless scientific for being so, must be seen as a contribution to explaining the biological basis of crime.

3.6 An examination of the references relating to Weininger's postulating the theory of the male and female plasms with an eye to the state of science circa 1902 is revealing indeed. In order to justify his procedure Weininger cites a parallel situation in the recent history of botany where
a significant breakthrough towards understanding the heredity of plants was made by Carl Wilhelm von Naegli und Hugo DeVries on the basis of a theory of idioplasm. The latter is thus not, as Johnston claims, a coinage of Weininger's. Actually, the notion of idioplasm played a role in the discovery of chromatin. To appreciate the significance of Weininger's reasoning we have to bear in mind that he was writing in what Loren Eisley termed a 'confused intellectual climate' in which the younger generation of biologists 'were opposed by the confused and incoherent situation which they had inherited from their dead master [Darwin]. This was the time when the biogenetic law, the notion of transmission of acquired characteristics and all sorts of curious notions about the nature of the gene were still current. Actually, Weininger was attempting to formulate a theory which would account for the mechanism, the bio-chemistry, of heredity in a pre-Mendelian context. For the purposes of assessing the rationality of Weininger's claims it is noteworthy that in the same passage where Weininger explains his reasoning in postulating the plasmas he also identifies August Weissmann as the source of the strongest arguments against his position as well as the works he takes to be a rebuttal of Weissmann's position. There can be little doubt that he clearly recognised that there was another approach to genetics than the one he endorsed. I take this to imply that the theory of plasms was indeed a 'bold conjecture' in the best Popperian fashion, one that was refuted not long after his death. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the generally hostile review Geschlecht und Charakter received in Hirschfeld's Jahrbuch für sexuelle Zwischenstufen mentions that this side of Weininger's thought represents a variation on a more or less standard theme in Hirschfeld and Möbius, the hereditary foundation of homosexuality. Certainly, Hirschfeld's
reviewer, who found plenty to object to in the book, saw nothing objectionable in the theory of plasms.\textsuperscript{19} What is most astonishing is not that Weininger's view should have been refuted, but rather that nearly every aspect of the scientific side of his work should have become thoroughly suspect within a very short time after his death, from Sir Charles Goring's refutation of Lombroso's programme for criminology to Wilhelm Johannsen's determination of the true relation between genotype and phenotype.\textsuperscript{20} It was not merely that single propositions were called into question but Weininger's data, his principles of reasoning and the research programmes in which Weininger was working fell into disrepute almost immediately after his death. Thus, one could accuse Weininger of being precipitously speculative but not of being unscientific in his own time. Indeed even his penchant for speculation had a precedent in contemporary medicine. Professor Kassowitz of the Vienna medical faculty, whom he erroneously cites as having provided conclusive refutation of Weissmann's theory of the inviolability of the germ plasm, made theoretical speculation into a cornerstone of his approach to medical science. It is very significant that Erna Lesky in her monumental history of the Vienna Medical School should describe Kassowitz as a subtle and brilliant speculator and critic of contemporary medicine whose works, distinguished by the quality of his reasoning, have been almost totally neglected because the substance of his opinions was nearly always wrong.\textsuperscript{21} I shall conclude briefly by showing how this bold conjecture fits into Weininger's metaphysical scheme.

3.7 For Weininger individual humans are neither wholly masculine nor wholly feminine but are distributed across a continuous spectrum (rather than Lombroso's bell curve). Empirical data alone will not generate this spectrum, it
must be constructed. The dialectical element in Weininger follows from the fact that Man and Woman are *ideal types*:

Knowledge of male and female by means of a right construction of the ideal man and the ideal woman, using the word ideal in the sense of typical, excluding judgment as to value. When these types have been recognised and built up we shall be in a position to consider individual cases and their analysis as mixtures in different proportions will be neither difficult nor fruitless (12).

The implies that all of the shocking things I mentioned earlier about the characteristics of men and women must be drastically qualified for there are elements of each in *all of us*. This is because Weininger's Neo-Kantian methodology proceeds from the assumption that there is a dialectical relationship between explanans and explanandum, individuals and types. He insists that these types are not to be construed as reifications or as existent beings (i.e. Platonic ideas):

Acceptance of these schemata in no way involves positing metaphysical entities beside or above the world of experience. On the contrary, their construction is necessary heuristically for a description of the world which will be as complete as possible (12).

In fact, Weininger is proceeding from the Kantian principle that experience cannot reveal anything about nature to us until we are in a position to sit in judgment upon it, i.e. until we have developed rigorous methods for questioning. The construction of ideal types as limiting cases will thus be employed to resolve anatomical, psychological and ethical differences between individuals. The theory of plasms is the physiological basis which explains the differences between individuals, the theory of types allows us to perceive the significance of those differences. Thus, a summary of Weininger's views on these points would look something like this:
(1) the individual is never to be identified with the type, it is never Man or Woman - thus Weininger is hardly a relentless dualist;
(2) the individual is always a man or a woman, clearly male or female;
however,
(3) the individual is always intermediate between the types, participating in the characteristics of each, something both language and anatomy conceals;
(4) thus, even the individual does not know its own sexuality directly - we have no privileged access to our own sexuality;
(5) we all contain residual elements of our opposite numbers within us;
which explains,
(6) how we can become enigmatic to ourselves, i.e. how our own behaviour can become incomprehensible to us.
Thus Weininger wants to be in a position not only to explain the hereditary foundation of 'deviant behaviour', but also to explain why deviant behaviour should be obscure to the 'deviant' himself. Once more, it is difficult to perceive how this is 'forsaking society'.

4. Georges Canguilhem has written in his classic study *The Normal and the Pathological* that historians of science ignore the general intellectual atmosphere of the culture they write about at their peril. Unless I am mistaken *The Austrian Mind* indicates that the converse of that statement is no less profound a truth: historians of ideas ignore the history of science at their peril also. Because Johnston has made no effort to set Weininger into the context of science as it was at the turn of the century, he has failed
to scratch the surface of Weininger's thought. This failure is principally a failure of his conceptual apparatus. It is not merely that Johnston has erred in his presentation of Weininger but, given the muddle that is 'therapeutic nihilism', he could not but distort Weininger and the whole of one of the main currents of Austrian thought.

Notes


12. Friedrich Jodl, Bericht on Weininger's doctoral dissertation Eros und Psyche, Archives of the University of Vienna, my translation. The dissertation itself was destroyed during the Second World War.


16. Weininger, Geschlecht, pp.279-81 is the crucial passage.


The twenty-five years before and after 1900 display a marked turn of attention in the philosophy, literature and art of Austria and Germany towards the mechanics of representation. Clearest examples of this are provided, perhaps, by the Logical Investigations of Husserl on the one hand, and by Hofmannsthal's Chandosbrief on the other. But the same is true even of a work such as Weininger's Geschlecht und Charakter in which very traditional philosophical oppositions appear in explicitly sexual (and characterological) terms, and of Freud's Traumdeutung, an account of the limits and role of language-like mechanisms in the life of the mind. Even Musil's dissertation under Husserl's teacher Stumpf on Mach's theory of sensation belongs here, and further examples could be multiplied without limit.

In the present paper, in order to minimise the risk of uninformative generalities, I shall focus on texts of Husserl, Wittgenstein and Kafka, and on two topics only: animality and justice, in order to bring out a little noticed shared feature of these texts and to demonstrate the radical break effected through them.
Although the turn towards representation in literature and other arts in this period is familiar and has been well-documented, the academic philosophy of central Europe at this time still remains relatively little known and understood. It is not realised, for example, the extent to which Husserl's *Logical Investigations* represent an important shift in the sort of problems philosophers had hitherto been interested in. Husserl here sets out for the first time and in great detail the idea that the world, thinking and language are all articulated and have a (logical and ontological) *structure*. This idea finds its most forceful expression in the importance accorded to the distinction between sense and nonsense and in Husserl's discussion of what is, perhaps, that rare thing, a philosophical discovery, the concept of *Sachverhalt*, of the state of affairs (the hanging-together of objects or things). What Husserl argued was that the access we have to structure in the world is typically access through sentences to states of affairs. Thus what we desire, or hope for, or strive to bring about, what makes our beliefs true or false, are states of affairs — never simply objects. Twenty years later Wittgenstein was to give powerful expression to the way this discovery breaks with the traditional view of the world as made up of subjects and objects in the magnificent opening lines of the *Tractatus*:

1. The world is all that is the case.

1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

Identifying the new turn in academic philosophy of which the discovery of *Sachverhalte* is a symptom involves reducing the complexity of a large body of writings to a common denominator. But it is not difficult to see how the unity of a new field of problems breaks with the importance traditionally accorded to subjects, objects, concepts and
ideas or presentations. If knowledge is propositional, is knowledge of Sachverhalte, then objects are objects of knowledge only insofar as Sachverhalte in which they figure are known. And if this is the case then the traditional conception of cognition as a relation between an object and a subject (in which the former is present to the latter) has to be rejected. In Husserl's early philosophy, subjects, objects, and concepts, disappear altogether, and the appearance of the ('metaphysical') subject at 5.63 in the Tractatus is a very untraditional one indeed.5

Both in the writings of the early phenomenologists and in Wittgenstein's works the idea emerges that the opposition between subject and object, or between concept and intuition in their systematic traditional deployment are sustained by a whole series of other, more or less hidden philosophemes of a lower order. Once these are brought to light, then they are seen to lack all philosophical basis. We can distinguish very easily three such lower order philosophemes, which have by no means lost their attractiveness to philosophers even today:

(1) The distinction, drawn from social and political discourse, between theory and practice. Subjects, it is alleged, have ideas or theories, and then put these into practice by producing or transforming objects. Or, in a slightly more sophisticated version: practice and the production of theory go on simultaneously, they can modify each other. The relations between the two terms can be complicated in very many ways but it remains the case, on the traditional view, that we can meaningfully apply the exclusive disjunction theory/practice to any segment of the social world. What we identify as theory will be
subjective or the property of subjects; what we identify as practice will be production of, or transformation of, objects.

(2) The complex of ideas associated in particular with the production of texts but capable of more general application across the whole sphere of social action: the notion that an author has ideas which are expressed in texts, and that reading is some kind of access to the author's ideas. Closely related is the view that literary texts or other artistic products express a message or content. Psychologism can be regarded as a particularly crude form of this notion applied to logic (cf. the Prolegomena to Husserl's Logical Investigations).

(3) The conception of power as something which either involves subjects bringing other subjects to have certain beliefs (and this can be spelled out in terms of rational persuasion, ideology and false consciousness or even mythically as involving some sort of social contract), or involves subjects constraining other subjects - who thereby become objects - by means of force, violence, or physical restriction or control. This opposition in its turn comes in very many different shapes and sizes: history itself can be considered as the subject guiding both poles; or humanity can be considered as subject, history as object, and so on.

These three oppositions, some of which are taken up again below, suffice perhaps to bring out the resources of representationalism in traditional philosophy. And so I suggest as working hypothesis that a measure of any break with this tradition will be the extent to which these oppositions, or the associated philosophemes, are avoided.
The commitment to the subject-object dichotomy is often aligned with two other major obsessions: the distinctions between *inner* and *outer*, and between what is *deep* or *profound* and what is *superficial* or *on the surface*. Wittgenstein's lengthy underminings of these oppositions in his later writings are well-known: those of Husserl, less so.\(^6\) A formula which brings out the approach shared by Wittgenstein and the early Husserl might be: concentrate on what is external and on the surface; and do not let the difficulty of seeing this clearly lead you to invoke a spurious depth or interiority.

The above oppositions functioned to provide example-domains for the successive systems of German idealism and, though to a lesser extent, for the subsequently predominant varieties of positivism, psychologism and naturalism.

This historical picture of a break with traditional philosophy made by Husserl and Wittgenstein runs the risk of making a traditional mistake: that of assuming that a group of texts can embody or express, more or less imperfectly, a 'current of thought'. But what might look like a unified picture is in fact much more complex. For example Husserl's penetrating descriptive analyses in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, in the *Logical Investigations* and in his work on the structure of our consciousness of time soon gave way, after the first decade of the century, to a curious reaffirmation on his part of various traditional philosophical positions. This retreat from what was novel in his work was certain of success within German academic philosophy, not least because it was able to make use of the earlier results but in such a way as to reinforce the power of traditional philosophical discourse. This route was not taken by all of Husserl's
early readers. There is an important body of work by German and Austrian philosophers (particularly Reinach and the Munich school) which takes seriously Husserl's injunction to describe ontological structure and the workings of representation and to avoid the sterile dichotomies of idealism/realism, subject/object, etc.

It is difficult, too, but no less important, to avoid describing what was new in Austro-German philosophy after the turn of the century in purely philosophical terms. Important because it is part and parcel of much traditional philosophy to believe that its philosophical 'expression' in some way represents or captures also the truth of literary or musical movements. That there is no such all-embracing view is one of the insights of the critique of traditional philosophy and the new emphasis on ground-level description and clarification.

What follows, then, is an attempt to show by reference to two examples how concerns distinguishable in one area, academic philosophy, are shared by literary texts, to locate these concerns in and between the two series of texts, to show how they overlap. The series of texts in which animality is discussed is: Weininger's Tierpsychologie from his posthumous Über die letzten Dinge, Kafka's animal stories, and some remarks of Wittgenstein in his Notebooks 1914-16. The series of texts on justice is: Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Kafka's Trial, and - a favourite of Wittgenstein's - Kleist's Michael Kohlhaas. In each series one text represents an intermediate position between traditional concerns and those texts of Wittgenstein and Kafka which mark a definitive break with the tradition. Half-way house in the series of animal texts is Weininger's Tierpsychologie, in
the series of texts on justice, Michael Kohlhaas.

Weininger's Tierpsychologie forms a section of the chapter entitled "Metaphysics" of the extremely influential posthumous collection Über die letzten Dinge. The full title of the relevant section is: "Containing the idea of a universal symbolism, animal psychology (with a fairly complete psychology of the criminal, etc.)". Explaining his notion of a universal symbolism Weininger writes:

...what I am concerned with is not the whole but the meaning of every individual thing in the whole. What the sea, iron, the ant, the Chinese mean, the idea they represent, that is what I want to set out.

This enterprise is to span the whole world, to disclose the deeper sense of things... The fundamental thought and presupposition of the book, the basis on which everything that follows rests, is the theory of man as a microcosm. [Cf. Tractatus 5.63, Notebooks, p.84] Since man has a relation to all things in the world so must all things in the world already be somehow present in man...

The system of the world is identical with the system of man.

Nature is to be interpreted by means of psychological categories, everything in it is to be a symbol of the latter:

To every form of existence in nature there corresponds a human characteristic.

These programmatic remarks justify in only one respect Weininger's claim to originality, his claim to do for psychic phenomena what Kant did for physical phenomena. To draw parallels with contemporaneous texts of Dilthey would be misleading because of the peculiarly pure form of the representationalism which Weininger defends. In the remarks I have quoted there is the classical distinction between man and the world. Everything, every object, in the world expresses something, has a meaning, a meaning which is
human (a meaning for man).

What Weininger then goes on to say about the meanings of dogs, horses, plants merely confirms this. "The dog acts as though he felt his own lack of value". The loyalty of a dog is a symbol of the slave. Weininger brings the good news, for some of us, that dogs only bark at those with dog-like natures. People who can't be 'shaken off' have the eyes and faces of dogs. Fear of dogs is far more common than, say, fear of horses, because dogs symbolise criminality.

Plants symbolise only types of women: roses, tulips, lilies. But amongst men, suggests Weininger, plants correspond to neurasthenia. He continues in this vein for several pages, isolating correspondences in a world which literally drips with meaning:

The mountain is the symbol of the giant. The river is the self as time. The sea is the self as space.../but/ the deep sea is crime...

In a letter to Moore, Wittgenstein, perhaps trying to justify his high opinion of and interest in Weininger's Geschlecht und Charakter, suggests putting the negation sign before Weininger's text. It is tempting to read too much into this suggestion. For Wittgenstein, like Husserl and Frege before him, had been impressed by the important fact that whether a proposition is affirmed or negated, something remains unaffected, the sense of the proposition. And where negation does not function like this we have something which is countersensical but may for all that be important.
It is however more profitable to turn to what Wittgenstein says about animal behaviour in the *Notebooks*. Both in the *Tractatus* and later, Wittgenstein thoroughly undermines the view that the world consists of objects and subjects which are the sources of thoughts, desires, acts of will and so on. Rather: the world, thought and language are all structured, and perhaps the most that can be said is that there are certain parallelisms of structure between the three. Access to the world is only to the world as structured, and the very fact of access is itself structured. Because the world is structured objects occur only in states of affairs. And because the access is structured it is not the property of any subject, whether individual or collective. Talk about subjects is really talk about features of the structures of the world or of the structures of language. So there are subjects and objects: but they have to be understood in terms of what is neither subject nor object: ontological, logical and grammatical structure.

In the *Notebooks* Wittgenstein still experiences the need to discuss certain positions and questions which, from the *Tractatus* on, he no longer needs to pose. He discusses the problem of solipsism and the possibility of a universal mind, as well as one of the most sophisticated traditional answers to the question as to the relation of subject (mind) to object (body): psychophysical parallelism.

Now is it true (following the psycho-physical conception) that my character is expressed only in the build of my body or brain and not equally in the build of the whole of the rest of the world?

This contains a salient point.

This parallelism, then, really exists between my spirit, i.e. spirit, and the world.
Only remember that the spirit of the snake, of the lion, is your spirit. For it is only from yourself that you are acquainted with spirit at all.

Now of course the question is why I have given a snake just this spirit.

And the answer to this can only lie in the psycho-physical parallelism: If I were to look like the snake and to do what it does then I should be such-and-such.

The same with the elephant, with the fly, with the wasp.

But the question arises whether even here, my body is not on the same level with that of the wasp and of the snake (and surely it is so), so that I have neither inferred from that of the wasp to mine nor from mine to that of the wasp.

Is this the solution of the puzzle of why men have always believed that there was one spirit common to the whole world?

And in that case it would, of course, also be common to lifeless things too.¹⁰

In the *Tractatus* and later the notion of psychophysical parallelism cannot even get off the ground because the basic categories are - as also in Husserl's case - neither what is physical nor what is psychical but objective states of affairs. Nevertheless what is striking about this quotation is that, in germ at least, the idea is present that what is fundamental is action, behaviour, signs and the description of these. It is on the basis of these that discriminations between humans and animals are made. (cf. Philosophical Investigations § 357). Animals and humans are not given straight off, as they had been for Weininger who, given his basic terms - subjects (men) and objects (nature, animals, women...) - can then easily proceed to discover asymmetrical correspondences between them (a means, symbolises, or expresses b).

Kafka's animal stories - in particular *The Metamorphosis*, *Report for an Academy*, *Jackals and Arabs* and the *Researches of a Dog* - take this even further, in two respects.
First, in all these stories, what we have is a continuum of actions and behaviour within which we can pick out human behaviour, animal behaviour and combinations of these; for example: what humans impose on animals and the possibilities animality opens to humans. The very term "metamorphosis" (Verwandlung) indicates that we are dealing with a continuum. In some stories, such as the Researches of a Dog, we are presented with animals which have human characteristics and others which are more purely animal.

The second and more concrete respect in which we find Kafka's animal stories breaking with assumptions of the sort still capable of being made by Weininger is a thematic characteristic of these stories which has been much discussed. We find in The Metamorphosis, for example, that the process of becoming an animal functions as a way of relativising, putting into perspective, even fleeing from pervasive systems of representations of humans by which Kafka had been obsessed: particularly family and bureaucracy. Gregory qua son, his relation to his father, to the threatening director, - these are all things Gregory qua animal flees. But the link with the system of human representations in the form of an attachment to the portrait of the woman in furs remains and spells the failure of his flight.

Kleist's Michael Kohlhaas provides all the basic vocabulary of justice. Michael Kohlhaas is a well-to-do christian, father, family man and merchant who is completely at home in the society in which he lives. Slowly but surely he becomes enraged by injustices committed against him by those above him in the legal and social order. All his
attempts to gain a legal redress are thwarted and so, with the help of a large band he has gathered together, he embarks on a war against the state which after much destruction is eventually almost successful. In the end he gains justice, but at the price of his own execution - something he willingly accepts. Legal and social order is restored. This is the story, but it is at the same time a gross distortion of what happens in the story. For what is most striking about Kleist's work is the way in which a series of different conceptions of justice interpenetrate the text: justice in the form of an absolutist state; justice as divinely guaranteed; justice as a pact or contract freely entered into by the Bürger; natural justice as something to be won by the people or a part of the people; superstitious and enlightenment views of justice; justice as what must be done whatever the price; political justice. Kohlhaas circulates amongst these different conceptions, establishing connections and oppositions between them. What repeats itself throughout the story is Kohlhaas' hypochondriacal obsession with justice and with experiencing punishment and reward in and on his own person in reflection of his belief that das Gesetz ist das Höchste. There is also a persistent refusal within the story to let any one conception of justice emerge triumphant. Kleist even manages to relativise Kohlhaas' final acceptance of the justice of his execution: this execution comes about only because the Elector of Saxony infringes the amnesty that he had himself declared.

In view of the complexity of the theme of justice (e.g. of just reward and punishment) in Kafka and in Wittgenstein it is as well to introduce some key shared distinctions. There is first of all the notion of law or norm which can be considered narrowly in its legal form or, more widely,
as a moral and cultural function (things are forbidden and commanded in society on many different levels and in many different ways). Secondly, the objects of these laws will have their own positive and negative characteristics: the objects are for example conceived of as morally good or bad, socially desirable or undesirable, divinely ordained or condemned, and so on. Finally, there are associated with laws the oppositions between applying and complying with or breaking and disobeying them; between judging correctly and incorrectly (the correct or incorrect verdict of, for example, a criminal trial); and the notions of punishment and reward, guilt and innocence.

Now given these distinctions we can see that it is possible to pose a very traditional question to which many answers can be given: does a law command or prohibit something on the basis of some characteristic of the object of the law? Is a certain course of action prohibited by law because of some respect in which the action is negative, bad, undesirable, or whatever? The question can be turned round: is an object good, bad, desirable, etc. not because of anything intrinsic to the object or to its penumbra of consequences, but simply because it falls (happens to fall) within the orbit of the law?

The first and most striking feature shared by Wittgenstein and Kafka is the refusal in their texts to let this traditional question arise, in any of its forms, and hence also the undermining of the possibility of embracing any one of the traditional answers to it, of embracing any dichotomy between law and its objects on the basis of which e.g. a measure of justice could be derived.
Readers of the Trial are often tempted to assume that these questions are indeed posed and answered; that in the Trial and elsewhere the object of the law (of justice) - what is commanded or forbidden - is explicitly posed as missing, and hence that the message of the book is that the law is fundamentally irrational, that the idea of justice is an elaborate sham, etc. And on this basis there have been erected the various readings of Kafka's world as tragic, pathetic, allegorical, absurd, etc.

But this involves a very simple confusion. The fact that something is not present in a text - in this case the object of the law - is of course not at all equivalent to an assertion in the text that this something is missing or absent. If John tells Mary the time he is not thereby telling her that he loves her but nor is he telling her that he does not love her.

It is interesting to note that what leads to such readings is often the pressure of precisely the traditional conceptual resources identified above: the conviction that authors express a meaning in a text about the objects represented in the text and that the text communicates the author's message to other subjects.

One of the main implications of the Tractatus is that representations of justice, propositions about laws and their objects belong to that which cannot or should not be said. Justice, right and wrong, are what show themselves, particularly when we explore how justice works or functions, or simply live justly. Wittgenstein in his later works was to explore variants on the idea that it is descriptions of function and use which show what cannot be represented. And so thoroughly did he come to hold this view that, in order
to dispel the idea that the propositions of the *Tractatus* were about something, had an object, he declared them to be countersensical - which is not to say that they have no use.

*The Trial, The Castle, The Prison Colony* and *The Wall of China* all explore the working of justice. But not one of these texts contains any explicit statement about justice, and it is possible to read such statements into them only by ignoring the fundamental distinction between what the texts say and what their structure shows and explores. Hence allegorical readings of *The Castle*, for example, in which K. is depicted as a soul anxious to do God's will but who cannot find out what this is. Descriptions of Kafka’s worlds in terms of alienation invoke the same resources. What is supposed to be alienated is always a subject, part of which has been made into an object by, say, the evils of bureaucracy. The subject has become a stranger to himself - or is only potentially not a stranger to himself, and so on.

In order to see how Wittgenstein and Kafka concur in showing how the distinction between laws and their objects need never get off the ground it is necessary to go into a second, shared novel convergence between them which has already been mentioned: the thoroughly worked-out avoidance of what might be called second-order discourse. This in its turn will lead on to the treatment by Kafka and Wittgenstein of the third traditional component of the machinery of justice: the distinction between guilt and innocence, punishment and reward.

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein puts forward the view that the structures of what is said and thought must be so
different from that which falls within the domain about which we think and speak that they could not be brought within this domain: they belong irreducibly to the category of what shows itself; second-order discourse is excluded. This category of what shows itself comprises also what is ethical and, presumably, what is normative in general. Now the absence of any position, critique or standpoint which would unify the different series of descriptions in, say, the Trial, is just this same absence of second-order discourse. Allegorical interpretations of Kafka consist, in effect, in attempts to open up a dimension of second-order discourse within his works. And substantive claims about justice, or about ethics, representations and adjudications of the relation between ethical activity and social or legal goings-on and events in the world constitute equally illegitimate attempts to open up such a dimension in the social world itself. All such attempts are examples of what Wittgenstein called transzendentes Geschwätz, i.e. of what is both counter-sensical and trivial. But not everything which is counter-sensical is trivial, is such as to make no difference. There are also things in this category which are profound: Weininger's work might be a candidate. The difference is presumably also something which shows itself and cannot be said.

For the author of the Tractatus canonnic (meaningful) discourse is guaranteed by the existence of formal (structural) correspondences between the well-formed formulae of a language on the one hand, and connections between simple objects on the other. The simple objects must exist, says Wittgenstein, though they are not the objects we normally think we are dealing with. Where, then, does this leave ethical, normative or law-invoking activity? How is the discourse which this involves capable of being made canonnic?
Wittgenstein says:

There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and punishment but they must reside in the action itself.
(And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant.)

Michael Kohlhaas, and the officer at the end of In the Prison Colony illustrate very vividly how punishment can be seen as necessarily involved in the action with which normative discourse is bound up. If this were the extent of Kafka's treatment of justice and punishment it would mean that Kafka had broken with the traditional closely-meshed connection between law, its objects and guilt and punishment only to the extent of emphasising the non-expressibility of the connection between a law and its objects. Whether Kafka (or Wittgenstein) goes beyond this to put in question the traditional roles of guilt and innocence, punishment and reward is a matter which would require detailed investigation. Here I want only to point to one possible line of argument. There is a controversial textual suggestion that the Trial should not end with K.'s execution. Might not the execution be a dream sequence which should be placed in the body of the text? If this were the case, if punishment is not the message of the Trial, then Brod's remark that, according to Kafka, the novel is really interminable, would appear in a new light. Culpability would truly have been eliminated as an object of the propositions of the text; its elimination would not merely be one of K.'s intentions.

Wittgenstein's Tractarian commitment to the necessity of punishment and reward as part of the internal make up of ethical and normative action may also - we can speculate - have given way to a different view. The later Wittgenstein came to realize that the demand for simple objects in the
Tractatus had been just that, a demand, one which was incompa­
tible with the need for description. Might not a simi­
lar criticism apply to the Tractarian variety of punish­
ment and reward?

What Kafka, Wittgenstein and Husserl share is a desire

to get as clear a view as possible of the workings of the
world, of the ways things hang together. One obstacle to
this is the easy confusion of methods of representation and
the workings of the world - a confusion which is only made
worse when the former make themselves felt through deeply-
rooted conceptual presuppositions. The confusion can be
avoided only when we recognise that methods of represent­
ation have their own ways of working which in turn require
description, and thereby recognise also the extent to which
they cloud our picture of the way things work.

Notes

1. All the points made below about Kafka have been made already by
G. Deleuze and F. Guattari in Kafka: pour une litterature mineure,

2. M. Cacciari, Krisis. Saggio sulla crisi del pensiero negativo da
Nietzsche e Wittgenstein, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1978, is a partial
exception, though Cacciari's approach is very different from that
adopted here.

3. Das sich zu einander Verhalten von Gegenständen.

4. Cf. Husserl's fifth and sixth Logical Investigations and Kafka's
frequent use of phrases such as 'da es sich so verhältn'.

5. Wittgenstein's conception of a philosophical subject in the
Tractatus and Husserl's similar but not identical notion in his
writings after the first edition of the Logical Investigations would
require extended comparison. For present purposes it is enough to
note that because of the importance attached to structure - to net­
works of states of affairs as parts of the world - the traditional
subject disappears in both authors.

Kleist and Wittgenstein employ similar turns of speech to express
a view identical to that of the early Husserl to the effect that there
are no philosophical subjects or egos. 'It is not we who know, it is
first and foremost a certain state of ourselves which knows.' - Über
die allmähliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim Reden. (Here, as elsewhere, Kleist's ideas resist formulation in, say, Kantian language.)

And cf. the passage in Wittgenstein's "Lectures of 1930-33" (p.309 of the Philosophical Papers of G. E. Moore, London: Allen and Unwin, 1959) where Wittgenstein quotes with approval the remark of Lichtenberg to the effect that instead of saying 'I think' we should say 'it thinks' as we say 'es blitzt'. For early phenomenological treatments of impersonalia see A. Reinach, Gesammelte Schriften, Halle: Niemeyer, 1921, p.117ff; H. Ammann, "Zum deutschen Impersonale", Husserl Festchrift, Halle: Niemeyer, 1929; and Pfänder's Logik, Halle: Niemeyer, 1921, p. 200ff.

6. Cf., again, the fifth and sixth Logical Investigations.

7. Here and elsewhere I avoid going into the question of possible influences; not so much because this is irrelevant to the attempt to isolate a shared field of problems, but because this question is one of many which requires extensive discussion.


11. See the discussion in Deleuze and Guattari (fn. 1 above) of what is, in the terms of the present paper, Kafka's exploration of such lower-order notions as flight and evasion (Ausweg) as constituting an alternative to the metaphysical dichotomy of freedom/determinism.


13. 'falls within the orbit of the law' is synonymous with: exists as an element of a legally relevant state of affairs (Rechtsverhältnis).

14. Another Wittgensteinian term which can perhaps be used to translate this is 'transcendental gassing'.

15. Tractatus, 6.422.
The final paper in the volume forms part of the Nachlass of the philosopher Aurel Kolnai (1900-1973). It was not intended by Kolnai for publication and I am grateful to Mrs E. Kolnai for her patient assistance in the preparation of the manuscript for this volume and for her permission to allow its publication. I have deleted a number of incidental passages in which arguments are initiated by Kolnai without being brought to a conclusion, and I have made occasional minor stylistic alterations in what remains. I believe, however, that the result coincides to a large extent with what would have been Kolnai's intentions.

Born in Budapest, Kolnai studied in Vienna under Heinrich Gomperz, Karl Bühler, Moritz Schlick and Felix Kaufmann. He also enjoyed a period of study in Freiburg under Husserl and Martin Honecker. His writings are characterised by a unique fusion of phenomenological method with a passionate concern for political and moral issues. This
gave rise, at one extreme, to a book on the philosophy of Nazism, *The War Against the West*,¹ published in 1938, and, at the other extreme, to a series of articles written in the last period of his life for an Anglo-Saxon philosophical public (after Kolnai had himself settled in England) on problems in analytical moral philosophy. These articles have now been collected together in a volume entitled *Ethics, Value and Reality*,² which also contains a bibliography of Kolnai's writings and a biographical note.

The present paper, although written towards the end of Kolnai's life, bears witness to the influence upon him of the ideas of the Ganzheits-theorists in Vienna in the '20s and '30s against which he had reacted so strongly. The essence of the Ganzheit doctrine of integrative holism as this was applied to the theory of political order is captured in the following passage by the Catholic Nazi Schmaus, quoted by Kolnai in his *The War Against the West*:

> In Liberal society, men did not stand by one another in an existential community: they were so many individuals, equal, of equal rights, and self-subsistent, who - rather like stones in a heap, not like members of a living body - formed unions by free decision and contract.³

The extent of Kolnai's reaction against this prejudice of collectivism, but the extent also to which he possessed a deep understanding of its roots, are clearly revealed in the essay which follows.
Notes

IDENTITY AND DIVISION
AS A FUNDAMENTAL THEME OF POLITICS

Aurel Kolnai

§1. The articulation of society
§2. Political life interpreted on the supposition of identities established by interests
§3. The interpretation of politics in terms of shared ways of life
§4. Identity and Division as a theme in its own right
§5. Conclusion: a note on conservative libertarianism

§1. The articulation of society

Society is composed of constituent parts; first of individuals, and secondly of sub-societies (sometimes called 'groups', 'collectives', 'communities', etc.). This constitutes our most elementary knowledge of society, but two further, still quite elementary considerations immediately spring to mind. Society is far from being a wholly determinate or univocal concept. When we speak of society we do not normally mean the totality of mankind at a given time. But still less do we mean just any small and local plurality of people united by some particular bond of kinship, community or purpose: say a family in the narrowest or even in a broader sense (of 'gens'), or the population of a town or a
county, or an association, or a social microcosm such as a university class or a grammar-school form. Very possibly we mean what, at least in the conceptual language of Western Europe (including America), would be described as a 'national society', that is to say a society defined in terms of or by reference to a sovereign nation state, coinciding more or less exactly with an area of common language and (though even less exactly) with an area where there exists a certain community of interests. Our intention normally relates to such a society in contradistinction to the governmental and administrative apparatus which predominates in the area involved (the state proper), and perhaps also it ignores the 'natural' substratum of the country in question, that is, its particular geographical features and the range of its extra-human material contents and fittings at any given time. But by society we may also mean a social medium stretching beyond the limits of a single nation, e.g. 'European society' or 'Islamic society' or North American' or 'Spanish American society'. On the other hand it makes sense too to speak of, say, South Italian or Catalan or, in the American context, of Mid-Western or New England or Southern society.

Thus we see how indeterminate a society is: it not only consists of parts but has itself something virtually part-like about it, as if it might coalesce into a larger whole with other societies, whereas in relation to the individual (and to its other more definite constituent groups or institutions) it somehow represents 'mankind' tout court, though without ever actually denoting it.

The division of society into constituent parts, however well-grounded in contours of objective reality which are independent of the classifier's whims, fancies, choices,
etc., it may be, is yet inevitably subject to a measure of arbitrariness. A society consists of functional, e.g. of professional, vocational or corporate groups, or again of 'classes' (which doesn't mean quite the same thing); but it also consists of denominational groups, and of groups characterised by a similarity of outlook (again not quite the same thing); it consists of two sexes, and of age groups (however these may be divided); and in some cases at least it embraces also different racial strains, whatever that may mean exactly. The possible points of view according to which a pattern of division could be sketched are certainly not enumerable in any exhaustive way. More importantly, we cannot establish in any precise and definitive fashion a hierarchy of these points of view. All such attempts, e.g. Marxist, religious, or racialist, involve a forced and arbitrary interpretation on the part of the alleged student of society reflecting his own pragmatic bias or system of biases.

Thus in fact society is not only composed of various parts - it is composed of various parts in a multiplicity of ways; and consequently its component parts cannot but overlap. In other words, it consists ultimately of individuals, but only in the sense that it divides into a multitude of individuals across several social subdivisions, such that it comprehends the same individual over and over again in line with his various social affiliations, - some of them factual, natural and 'statistical', some of them largely or wholly a result of voluntary choice.

But if society and every social group is a collection of individuals, every individual is, on the other hand, a collection of societies, or at any rate of sub-societies, in that he embodies a multiplicity of social aspects or
categories. Consider, as an example, some typical inhabitant of a Rhenish industrious city around 1910: he is a subject of the German Reich and more particularly of the Kingdom of Prussia; he is a factory hand; he is a Roman Catholic; he is a member of one of the Catholic trade unions; he is a regular voter for the Centre Party; he is a father of a family; he is a wine-drinker; he is probably a firm believer in marital fidelity and a fairly consistent offender against it in Carnival time but not otherwise (whatever else he may be besides).

To apply a crude mathematical consideration, out of a tiny society of, say, ten persons, no fewer than $10^{12}$ groups can be formed (not counting, of course, either the single persons themselves, or the ten-person society as a whole, or the empty set). Most of the abstract classes that in pure formal logic can be formed out of the members of a society are of course irrelevant, lacking all cohesion, operative reality or significance. For sociological and political purposes there are many more individuals than significant collectives. Yet no individual is linked to society through one hierarchy of bonds alone, nor at all times (not even throughout his adult life) through the same constant hierarchy of categories and allegiances.

This means that the articulation of society is subject to change, and that in a stricter and more salient sense than merely as conditioned by the constant change in the identity of the individuals that compose it which is occasioned by the fact that we are all slaves to the obnoxious habits of being born and (often after a period of matura­tion and decay) of dying off. Even within the limits of a roughly identical stock of individuals processes of social re-articulation take place, and the continuous
renewal of the stock of individuals which actually occurs, though a potent factor, is by no means the only source or the unequivocal and automatic determinant of those processes of re-articulation. The identity of social 'parts' or 'groups', of significant social 'forces' and thus, I wish to say, of the themes predominant in a social medium, reveals an inconstancy and fluctuation over and above the variation in the identity of the component persons; and this is a fact of the highest importance for our understanding of the existence and nature of politics which has almost certainly not so far been appreciated to the extent which it deserves. For our original, naive consciousness of social and political phenomena tends to overestimate the persistence of social forces - of cohesions and antagonisms within society - and the permanence, not of their respective positions and of their comparative strengths and weaknesses, but of their basic schemata of articulation. It is easier to conceive, or easier at any rate to interpret the world in terms of the waxing and waning of the selfsame, classic antagonistic forces, than in terms of changing alignments, no matter how manifest these may be.

This is rooted, I think, in the conditioning of our socio-political thought by pragmatic preoccupations: the more solid and immutable we allow the issues and the interests with which we have to deal to appear, the stronger will be our feeling of certitude of being somehow able to further our purposes and avert dangers. But even on the purely intellectual level we derive a reassuring sense of orientation from a conception of society, and of its correlated issues and interests, in conformity with a fixed model of individual identities. And thus we are tempted to personify countries and nationalities, currents of thought, religions and ideologies, collectives proper and collective
states of mind - a simplification akin to the pathetic fallacy. By the same token, we tend crudely to solidify in our imagination the adherence of individuals to unequivocal and definitive 'camps' or 'causes', and thus our very taste for personification tends to dim our awareness of individual personality, personal choice and autonomy.

A remark seems necessary on the absolute identity of the individual which is here presupposed, as contrasted to the hazier, more elusive and more problematic network of collective solidarities, natural and selective affinities, loyalties and antagonisms in which it is enmeshed. This 'absolute' identity is in some sense still a relative one; the individual himself embodies a manifold of appetites, strivings, purposes, concerns, tastes and beliefs, largely interlaced and convergent, but to an equally great extent also related to one another only loosely and contingently or indeed mutually competing and clashing as a consequence of his inconsistent beliefs and principles. And this is so, in part, precisely in virtue of the social origins and constitutive dependence of the individual mind, and also of the social effects and social references inextricably involved in its working.

In one clearly definable sense the individual does nevertheless mark a point of absolute identity: mortal as he is, develop and decay (and reproduce) as he may, he can neither fuse with others into one new individual, nor split into several new individuals; his limits and distinctness are clear-cut. Howsoever I may look upon myself from outside, criticise myself, break a habit or abandon a policy and adopt another, etc., I cannot relinquish the intimate government of my own self and assume instead that of some other self or selves. And whilst my interests too may undergo a
great deal of change, I cannot turn away from and cease to administer my interests as such. It would be absurd to deny that highly important and fascinating problems cluster around the theme of individual identity; yet it is not capable of being called in question as are all collective identities, nor are we capable of suspending our attitude of belief in it. Thus there have existed widespread beliefs (whether true or not) about the survival or immortality of the human self, but no similar beliefs about an analogous survival, in heaven or hell, or in whatever transmundane place, of extinct states of nations, of vanished religions or institutions, or of the original constituents of communities that once emerged from the union of these and today display a unitary identity and might one day split again along quite different lines.

Gladstone unquestionably died in 1898 and Bismarck in the same year - they are 'quite dead' as British legal language once had it - though much of their work survives. But did the Austrian Empire die in 1918 in a similarly unequivocal sense? The 'successor states' left by the Empire were its surviving parts rather than its products or progeny. Some of them fused with this or that neighbouring country, some of them retaining the name 'Austria', dying in its turn (i.e. being absorbed, in this case) in 1938 and being recalled to life seven years later. We may speak, with all necessary reservations, of an ontological priority of individuals, and discern in collectives of all kinds an aspect of mere things made by men, deprived of ultimate autonomy of being in spite of their larger scale and generally longer life. There attaches to them something of the blurred outline and also something of the blunted 'immortality' characteristic of lifeless matter, even though at the same time they embody crucial aspects of the life of mankind.
§2. Political life interpreted on the supposition of identities established by interests

Politics means, putting it in crude outline, social and institutional self-regulation, in particular with reference to relationships of authority and obedience or of super-ordination and subordination existing within the framework of a state or a medium of states, and centred on or expressed through or culminating in controversial issues; the struggles about such issues; and the agreements reached or striven for with a view to their solution. Political acts and processes - wars, civil commotions, elections, party campaigns, choices of one course of action as against another, decisions about problems of distribution, rights, privileges, prohibitions, etc., - are, it seems, necessarily agonistic. They are at the same time however equally necessarily set in a reconciliatory perspective, in a common teleology of peace.

The non-controversial pursuit of common aims as such, something requiring the solution of technical problems only, falls short of politics, pertaining rather to the level of administration. Enmity, hostility or antagonism pure and simple fall short of politics, whether issuing in mutual avoidance of contact or in the practice of mutual extermination (something like the war of each against all, or at any rate a striving, say between two alien tribes, for complete mutual displacement or annihilation), and even mere enslavement and exploitation is still a marginally non-political relation. Politics, in other words, belongs to a mode of contact between distinct wills that is characterisable as a tension kept in or directed to the establishment of a more or less acceptable balance. Its key concept is controversy, ranging from discussion and intrinsic persuasion through
negotiation and the show of force, to brutal conflict still somehow aimed at compromise and the finding of a modus vivendi.

This oversimplified, annoyingly incomplete and misleadingly linear description ought to suffice for our present purposes. I will now proceed to what seems to me the most elementary form of a more profound, more tangible interpretation, namely the conception of politics as a game-like interplay of distinct and mutually competing interests.

In the concept of interest, which is not quite so simple and evident a concept as we might take it to be, the emphasis is on the purely self-regarding intention underlying a given pursuit. To buy cheap and to sell dear (supposing other things, i.e. the goods in question, to be equal) is the classic paradigm of interest-inspired behaviour, as is the aim of ensuring, whether by physical superiority, successful litigation or other means, that I and not he, or we and not they, should possess a disputed good or complex of goods or ground or territory or access to a market. Our objection to the other fellow, to our rival antagonist, relates not to his character or qualities or to his objective significance, but rather precisely to his 'otherness', his alienness, his distinctness from and non-identity with ourselves.

Clearly distinctness among given opposing parties is of itself not enough to engender actual opposition, even of the mildest kind. Some quite special circumstances, e.g. the desire on both sides for control over the same object, or for a title to it, is required in order to conjure up the flame of strife out of the cinder of mere separateness. But opposition may develop round the core of any distinctness,
and we are inclined to find this wholly natural. The most familiar examples are erotic jealousy, competition between independent producers or sellers of the same kinds of goods, rivalry between centres of power whose ranges of activity border on or overlap each other with no essential regard to their respective aims, qualities or characteristics. In this last example, however, and also to some extent already in the case of economic competition, we are faced with the conflict of interests between collective 'individuals', i.e. between personified collectives. This need not puzzle us unduly in view of the fact that clear lines of social cleavage and quasi-natural overriding loyalties on the part of their component persons (who are individuals in the proper sense) do actually exist. Men do obviously identify themselves, particularly in situations of acute conflict or division of interests, with their families, their countries, their sects or with other more or less massive and identifiable communities to which they belong. This identification is primarily directed to those collective wholes to which an individual belongs by virtue of his birth and upbringing, language and customs, etc., but very often also, and sometimes as the single crucial factor, it will involve an element of choice.

Different persons do not as a rule insist on killing one another just because they have noticed that they are not one and the same person, or even that they belong to different clans and the like. But in regard to an event such as, say, the Franco-Prussian war, it is not incorrect or unnatural, nor gravely misleading - however fraught with problems it might be - to say that 'the French' and 'the Germans' are at war with each other, almost as if they were two men fighting each other over a fine horse, perhaps, or over a woman or a house of which each considers the proper owner
or legitimate occupant to be himself. Of course two such groups, as well as any two distinct individuals, might in fact also specifically dislike each other; but we would then have arrived at a point where the constructions placed upon the concept of interests have become so broad as to involve an outright transcending of the category. Interests as such do not intrinsically involve mutual hostility, though their emphatic directedness (e.g. to one finite unsharable object) giving rise to a particular clash of interests may also, through psychic fixation in the state of enmity, usher in a relation of hatred which extends to a mutual denigration of distinctive qualities.

A coalition or an alliance still appears at this level to analyse into common or parallel interests on the part of its members which stand opposed to some other set of interests. Thus the French Crown had an enduring tradition of alliance with the Sublime or Ottoman Porte, aimed at weakening and circumscribing Habsburg Imperial power, and the Third Republic pursued a similar policy of cooperation with Russians, Poles and other Slavs in order to contain or possibly crush the power of modern Germany. And whilst between the extreme right and extreme left the unifying force of a shared conflict of interests is naturally less likely to operate in domestic politics, where the intrinsic ideological antithesis between the two is precisely at its sharpest, temporary alliances between right and left directed against a powerful centre have been known to occur in several if not in most European countries. One thinks, for example, of the transitory brotherhood between the Catholic and the rationalist anticlerical elements in Belgium which rose up against Dutch Calvinist rule in 1830. And there have been cases of cooperation between Carlists and Republicans (or Anarchists) in Spain. But the classic example,
perhaps, is presented by the Democratic Party in the U.S.A., a permanent coalition, from Reconstruction days almost to the present, between the Southern aristocrats and the poorer, less capitalistic and less considered strata of the Northern population.

The primary mechanics of divided and conflicting and of conjoined interests, then, is indeed a part of social reality. But its effects are easy to overrate. This is because, on the one hand, it seems to offer such transparent evidence of its functioning, and on the other hand because of the illusion of an absolutely rational schema which it is apt to evoke. A closer analysis of what really constitutes the 'interests' of an individual however, and, a fortiori, of how far the concept is really transferable to communities or organised collectives, would show the insufficiency of the interest approach taken alone, and reveal problems radically alien to the apparently cast-iron logic of interests with their ostensibly ready-made divisions, antagonisms and identifications of the ideals, tastes predilections, conceptions, etc., either of individuals or of collectives and groups with which individuals identify. It is this sharing of views and principles and what lies behind it which will concern us in the section that follows.

§3. The interpretation of politics in terms of shared ways of life

It may happen, and is perhaps the case as a rule, that in a country where there are formally existent political parties and competitive elections a citizen votes for Party \( X \) because he thinks that an \( X \)-dominated government is likely
to be conducive to his self-regarding (largely, though not always exclusively, pecuniary) interests, whereas a rival Y-dominated government is likely to harm them more or less gravely. But it also happens, however uncommonly, that 'on principle', 'from conviction', or following his 'opinions' or 'sympathies', he votes for the party whose victory he expects to be positively bad for his interests. (Less rarely he will vote on the basis of his convictions in the belief that his interests are hardly, if at all, affected by the issue; still more often he will let his intrinsic preference for some part decide his vote with the feeling that he cannot estimate at all what impact, if any, the outcome of the election might have on his interests.)

There are also situations in which it is possible to express openly one's sympathy for the national enemy - as did the pro-Boer faction in England at the time of the South African war. And it is always possible, to express the matter somewhat crudely, to cultivate such sympathies more or less covertly (but then perhaps all the more passionately) as did I myself living in Austria-Hungary from the first to the last moment of the 1914-18 war. More often are individuals inclined and in a position to voice their preference for the prospective enemy's cause in times of (uneasy) peace. Various kinds of strange states of consciousness are observable in situations such as this. Thus in the Great War the vast majority of the German socialists, eager to conduct themselves patriotically but at the same time to exercise and flaunt their loyalty to their political cause, interpreted the conflict in terms of a 'war of liberation against Tsarist tyranny', while the mass of the French leftists (including the majority of Socialists) likewise conceived of it, though naturally with different overtones and alongside other, more obvious democratic war aims, as
involving a struggle for the transformation of Russia into a progressive democracy.

To come to grips with some of these issues we shall use the term 'ways of life' (cf. expressions such as 'the American way of life', etc.), as a portmanteau term for ideals, faiths, predilections, tastes, outlooks, ideologies, and so on. Ways of life differ structurally from interests, however interwoven they may be with these, in that they bear essentially on qualities of value and disvalue as possible characteristics of man's private or communal existence, and not, like interests, primarily on the mere distinctness and dividedness of individuals and of discrete collectives (i.e. collectives modelled on self-contained, delimited and unitary individuals). Ways of life are, it is true, as divisive as are interests. Indeed they may provide more potent sources of antagonisms, for contradictory beliefs and divergent intrinsic preferences are not amenable to barter and compromise as interests naturally are.

It is not that they are divisive ex vi terminorum, according to their expressible content. Catholics, Moslems and Communists would not necessarily repudiate - openly and formally - the possibility of the whole of mankind becoming, respectively, Catholic, Moslem, or Communist. I prefer El Greco to Murillo, Beethoven to Wagner, etc., and I should rather be glad than sorry if everyone came to share these and many more preferences of mine. And we do not wish that a section of mankind should reject, say, Euclid's prime number theorem, or Fermat's or Wilson's divisibility theorems, simply in order that we may have somebody to despise.
Ways of life in this broad sense might indeed by credited with a primary tendency to unite men and to engender community of feeling and attitude rather than with any similarly implicit tendency to separate them and to foster opposition, isolation and enmity. One category of cases reveals indeed an inherently 'apostolic' trait, a messianistic urge towards unity, though even these cases are apt to evoke as a consequence violent reaction, scission, antagonism and hatred. Private preferences, in contrast, preferences centred upon individual tastes, not linked to formally held beliefs and putative evidence and thus not linked either to claims to universal acceptance, are likely to be peaceful and innocuous, though capable of exerting only the mildest possible unifying force: there is no contradiction between my being supremely fond of apricots and another person's peculiar predilection for grapefruit. And the code of ordinary deontic morality also, whilst embodying a comparatively high degree and permanence of unifying power (claiming to reproduce a 'universal consensus'), does not provide a contentual basis for sharply profiled identifications, in contrast to the highly specific and ambitious religious, ethical and political 'ideals' which inspire a closely-knit unity and may, but need not always, involve a correspondingly highly strung attitude and encourage the growth of situations of total antagonism. In Chesterton's words:

Likelier the barricades shall blare,
Slaughter below and smoke above;
And death and hate and hell declare
That men have found a thing to love.

The realm of undefeasible evidence, of pure reason and certain knowledge, the archetype of which is mathematics (though not the philosophy of mathematics), or again the realm of patently incontrovertible factual cognition, is
most permanently and universally unitive, while on the other hand not divisive at all (discounting irrelevant marginal cases), being accordingly powerless to articulate men into characteristic identities and forces of collective action.

A further distinction should be noted here, dependent upon, though certainly not identical with, that between qualitative preferences on the one hand and comprehensive ideals with the pretension of universality on the other. Interests necessarily attach to individuated entities, to individuals and groups (I, you, he, them, us, etc.), in other words to concrete subjects situated in place and time. And they bear on 'goods' in the widest sense, i.e. on those things which can be conceived as objects of analogous desires. Preferences and ways of life, on the other hand, or anything generally related thereto, are centred either - and this I think has logical priority - on abstract qualities, modes of being, dimensions and varieties of value and disvalue, or on persons and other concrete entities (countries, historically identified causes, organised political parties, and so on). Not primarily because these are to be identified with or opposed for their own sakes, but much more because they are admired or abominated or somehow graded in accordance with a particular scale of preferences. There are no doubt transitions between these two types. At the one extreme we may situate, say, our qualitative preferences for various kinds of dishes or drinks, somewhere in the middle we may situate our attitude of feeling ourselves centrally attached to something like 'the Christian way of life', conceived as interpolated between the appropriate horizon of abstract values and conceptions (charity, endurance, a certain style of humility, etc.) and, at the opposite pole, the concrescence of
'Christianity' in a hierarchically constituted, dogmatically orientated Church. Or, again, a central attachment to progress, interpreted in, say, socialist terms, as an intermediary area between the abstract postulates of 'equal justice' or 'universal prosperity' or 'the ensured human dignity of each individual' on the one hand, and the Communist Party or the Marxian Socialist movement on the other.

The reason for attributing logical priority to the experience of quality, to what one might call the adjectival mode of valuation, is that it would clearly make more sense, say, to love and serve life outside of and inferior to ourselves without ever having heard of Francis of Assisi, than it would to venerate Francis of Assisi without any *prius* conceived in abstract terms, i.e. without any reason for our veneration. However I do not deny the psychologically potent enlightening effect, the attractive or repulsive force, of *exemplars*. We may indeed love a person (sometimes a collective) more ardently or hate his (or its) guts more intensely than is proportionate to the clarity or intelligibility of the terms in which we may try to account for our attitude. Orthodox Jews and Moslems repudiate pork *because* of their religious orthodoxy, and may even feel a violent repugnance to its flavour if they happen to taste it. Our tender love for little birds and at the same time for the cat poised to pounce upon them may actually spring from the Franciscan strain in our, perhaps especially in the English, nature. And for all I know, a convinced and militant Communist may actually come to find the *Internationale* an intrinsically fine song and the hammer-and-sickle cum pentagram a beautiful symbol. Nazism is said to have driven some German émigrés actually to detest the German language.
In these and countless similar phenomena the identity-and-division motif reveals its power to outgrow and indeed to remodel or rearrange the complexion of original and intrinsic valuations on the part of individuals, in spite of the normal priority of the latter in relation to their experiences of identification and antagonism. Similarly, once I have identified myself with a social body, tradition or cause, and engaged in an antagonism, these positions will react upon and contribute to the shaping of my interests, partly in the objective sense that it will affect them by reason of determining some of the circumstances of my life, but partly also in a subjective sense.

§4. Identity and division as a theme in its own right

If the key question of the interest theme is 'Who?' - meaning 'Who gets what (or how much and when) ?' - and that of the way of life theme may be formulated either as 'What?' - meaning 'What kind of thing (or order) should prevail ?' - or again as 'Who?' i.e. as representative of 'What quality ?', then it is, as we shall see, incomparably more difficult to formulate a corresponding question for the third theme, identity itself (always inseparable from the sister-concept of division). It relates to a many-faced problem of selection, e.g. of selection by the individual of a corporate body to which he may belong or with which he may identify himself. But not everyone, of course, shall be allowed willy-nilly into every list. I owe allegiance and feel loyal to..., I belong to and form part of..., which social bodies? As E. Gellner has expressed it in reference to the new African countries: nationalism is the programme, but the nations, with their frontiers, have
somehow to be recognised or created.

All this is admittedly so far an over-sharp and mis-drawn picture. For if the questions were not already answered, at least in part, then they could not be asked at all, just as, in general, there must already have been given and become known to us a great deal that has come to be grasped and taken for granted as it were natively, in the mode of primary certitude, before we can become aware of any underlying problems and start being critical of the concepts involved. We need not invent for we already have the experience of kinship, neighbourhood, country and sovereignty, of nationality vs. state and empire, of right standing against wrong, of selective affinities governed by intrinsic agreement and disagreement, and of traditional bonds as well as of new unions in the making (the latter arising to a large extent out of long-standing, traditional dissatisfactions). But there exists nonetheless a dimension of highly intractible problems, and we can sometimes be confronted by a sense of arbitrary contingency in, for example, our national boundaries, comparable to a feeling of desolate vertigo when faced with a bottomless abyss. We might venture the following three-tiered analysis of that disquieting experience and of its associated dimension of problems.

(a) At the first and, to ordinary consciousness, the most familiar level, we are concerned with the age-old, eminently practical problem of the straightforward conflict of loyalties. This sometimes acutely and painfully besetting phenomenon constantly confronts us all in a more or less dormant state. It is then constitutive of the social ego of a person who exhibits given loyalties, giving rise to a characteristic tension in his life and sometimes, when
it makes itself felt in an actualised manner, requiring an either/or decision on his part. Apart from trivial cases in which a comprehensive (e.g. national) allegiance stands in opposition to some linkage which is, in comparison, either narrow in scope or poor in content (e.g. some shallow kind of shared interest or hobby, whether or not it is embodied in a formal association, cutting across national divisions), there are no generally valid and self-evident criteria of decision or standards of priority.

Thus the principle 'My country right or wrong' - which (except for the kind of jingoistic nationalist in whom conscience shades into moral perversion and moral perversion into ideological insanity) is not tantamount to 'The interest of my country is the standard of right or wrong' - may serve as a rule of thumb in acute situations of international crisis. But its validity is circumscribed by the unspoken and unevadable question of proportion which is implicit within it. How luminously evident and how overwhelmingly weighty is the right involved and how monstrous the associated wrong? How vitally does a particular matter affect my country? If a substantially developed ethnic nationality, whose importance is perhaps increased by lingering traditions of independent statehood, is locked in conflict with the state proper or with a highly integrated empire as, say, in the case of the Austrian Empire in 1848 or, at the same time, the Croatians, Slavs, Rumanians, Swabians and Saxons in Hungary vs. Hungary proper, where, in such cases does the obvious duty of loyalty lie? Are Austrians Germans, or is there an Austrian 'nation'?

One can feel this kind of loyalty to a state in a narrower sense even when this is a state which coincides with no ethnic nationality of its own. Thus General Lee, to my
knowledge heartily opposed to Secession, nevertheless at the call of Virginia, his patria chica, assumed supreme command of the Confederation armies and exercised it brilliantly until the tragic end. This was a decision which may well astound us, but which we should hardly dare to condemn outright.

Naturally some people totally engaged on one side of such a dispute will appeal to unconvinced and hesitant bystanders with specious claims as to the self-evidence of their case: Haven't you discovered yet that your real solidarity is with your fellow-proletarians all over the world, not with your home exploiters and their agents? Has it not dawned upon you yet that you are 'organically' linked to your fellow countrymen of whatever class, that you and they are complementary organs in the organism to which you belong, and that this far outweighs any abstract analogy of social situation between you and some similarly placed category of aliens? These are, of course, nothing but rhetorical tricks. I am however far from wishing to imply that decision of this kind is of its very nature blind and arbitrary, beyond the possibility of justification and of subjection to the manifold of argument, nor that they are immune either to moral criticism or to the claims of wisdom as opposed to folly. If that were the case deliberation would lose its point, exactly as it would if the agent were simply to obey the dictate of 'reason' or to swallow the bait of spurious self-evidence. I mean only that, especially in the face of conflicting appeals to one's self-identification, there is a residuum of arbitrary choice from which we cannot escape, and that this should be regarded on its own terms as entirely legitimate.
A person cannot 'choose' his adhesion and alignment by sheer fantasy, without reference to objective data not of his making and to the moral demands which are _prima facie_ binding upon him and of which he is in no conceivable sense the author. But within this objective yet incomplete set of facts and obligations, his own subjective preference or emergent feeling will itself assume the status of one valid and significant datum of the situation, for practical decisions are reducible neither to exercises in moral judgment nor, much less, to intellectual conformity-to-the-facts, as if they were somehow a matter of perceiving what is already present to the senses. Thus if my own moral conceptions and sensibilities have some place in determining what it is objectively right for me to _do_, and if my own elucidation of what I 'really' and enduringly desire has an even more important place in determining what is likely to benefit me, then what I _am_ in social or, more exactly, in political terms, i.e. which collective will, interest and teleology I shall assume as my own, is still more essentially dependent on what I myself as an individual feel, choose, will or commit myself to be.

(b) The perspective of the second, higher, tier concerns the collective's own awareness of, and the cult which it may weave in strenuous assertion of, its own identity; it concerns the techniques and policies of expansion and of self-delimitation and self-insulation, as well as the attitudes, both sympathetic and antithetic, towards other collective wholes which are implied thereby. The behaviour of collective entities displays an extreme variability in this respect, both according to the peculiar nature of a given collective: whether it is interest-centred or emphatically oriented about a particular outlook, whether it is "perfection"-centred or power-centred, predominantly local and
esoteric or 'messianistic', 'universalist', and so on, and according to the content of the creeds or aims by which it may be constituted. It may however safely be said that any such entity is concerned on the one hand to assert its identity by making itself felt in the world, by extending its range of influence, by assimilation, absorption and attraction, and on the other hand to maintain its identity by protecting itself against disruption, dilution and denaturation, by the exclusion of 'heretical' elements and by inhibiting the influx of all that it deems to be alien, un congenial, unassimilable or destructive. Expansion, conquest, incorporation, propaganda and a system of appeals to supposedly kindred or potentially subservient elements or to elements amenable to persuasion, and also identification of and cooperation with common interests in the outside world will thus alternate and often go hand in hand with policies of exclusion and defiance and with an overstrained emphasis on distinctness, contrast and antagonism. The maxims 'Whoever is not with us is against us' and 'Whoever is not against us is for us' will seldom fail to be applied in combination.

Officially and with more or less explicit contrivance, as well as unofficially and spontaneously, a principle of hierarchy will come into operation. Not only in the service of efficiency, but also, in a twofold and seemingly antithetic fashion, in the service of identity. The inner circle of rulers, leaders, models and exemplars, officials, close adherents and retainers, etc., - I am of course simplifying matters - will on the one hand enjoy privileges of various kinds, including both the privilege of exerting an active influence on the establishment and of interpreting standards, and also - being less exposed to the suspicion of a basic breach of identity - the privilege of exercising
an occasional bout of deviant thought or other eccentricity. These are privileges denied both to the rank and file and, in a somewhat modified fashion, to the penumbra of secondary adherents.

On the other hand however, both in the politically more highly strained and in more relaxed situations, the reverse attitude can be expected to prevail. There are, first of all, certain particularly onerous obligations which are customarily imposed on the privileged classes: thus much that would be considered unpardonable in its members may be quite readily condoned in the broader mass of those belonging to the group and especially in extraneous sympathisers, allies and mere candidate members. Where to aspirants to membership of the inner sanctum there applies the paradox of 'The more you give the more will be asked of you', and the more severely are such individuals exposed to ultimate failure even as a result of the barest and least noticeable lapse, to outsiders there is accorded a generous longanimity and unstinted encouragement. Hitler in Mein Kampf, with characteristically hyperbolic crudeness, wrote that whilst for the good of the National Socialist movement the number of secondary adherents could never be too large, the number of hard-core militants could not be small enough. Similarly he later disclaimed the policy of 'Germanisation', i.e. of assimilation of subjugated or dependent races, which had been cherished as an element of the earlier and still partly liberal policies and programmes of German imperialism.

Along with tendencies to personal rule, the choice of peculiar symbols and growth of peculiar linguistic habits, etc., we characteristically find in sectarian and totalitarian movements and also in other types of political and
institutional life an insistence upon the purity of the inner circle. When in 1952 I visited the city of Burgos in Old Castile I was told by some eminent local personages that the place had now a population approaching the 60,000 mark, that this was far too many (some 30,000 might be the optimum) and that they were not a little apprehensive of further growth. Again in the epoch preceding the Great War the Austrian leaders of the Monarchy were much more anxious than their Hungarian counterparts to expand into the Balkan Peninsula by annexing new (Serbian) territories, and indeed the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza, initially attempted to prevent the sending of the fatal ultimatum. For the Austrian concept of the state was that of a dynastic patrimony merging into a pluralistic federation of nationalities with only a mild aspect of German hegemony, whereas the Hungarian concept was that of a homogeneous national state within which the non-Magyar half of the population (consisting of Rumanians and various groupings of Slavs) would be kept under subjugation with a view to achieving their almost complete Magyarisation, and this latter purpose was likely to be hampered or altogether frustrated by swamping Hungary (or Austria, or the Dual Monarchy as a whole) with still more Slavs. Thus concepts of identity and the policies consequent upon them may differ and, in conjoint or inter-penetrating collectives, come into conflict. Both Austrian and Hungarian policy, each in its own way, proved to be suicidal - a potentiality hidden in all schemes of policy, individual perhaps no less than collective.

There is also the idea of an inner core whose elements are somehow peculiarly representative of the collective (say, national) identity, - as somehow forming a crystallisation or purification of the latter - an idea not necessarily restricted to the spiritual underworld of totalitar-
ian perversion, even though it may reveal its full importance only under the magnifying glass of the latter. This shows the inadequacy of the narrow distinction elaborated by modern political philosophers between 'descriptive' (as it were *photographia*) and 'prescriptive' (or *mandatory*) political representation. Besides these way may also discern what we might call 'substantive' or perhaps 'consensual' (or *voluntaristic*) representation, involving reference to the identity of the community, to what it is and what it has been (its distinctive traditions), but also to what it strives to be (its dominant currents of self-renewal and self-redefinition, its tasks and prospects). 'Who are we?' is then not simply a descriptive question. This has been grasped most clearly perhaps by Ortega in his albeit somewhat exaggerated theory of the 'project' as the constitutive factor of nationhood.

(c) Finally with the topmost level, the level of what I venture to call the impartial taking of sides, we return to the starting point of this essay, that is, to the articulation of society itself, now viewed as itself a possible theme or controvertive issue of politics (always geared, needless to say, into other, 'lower' themes, involving more or less emphasis on collective identities and individual or sub-societal self-identification). Here we are faced with preferences and arguments relating to such questions as 'What are the most essential, the most meaningful, the most enduring, the most unchallengeable, perhaps the morally or culturally most justifiable criteria of identity in and lineaments of division of society?' 'Is any general primacy to be awarded to the local, or to the national, imperial, or more or less federal type of polity?' 'How far is national identity based upon or definable in terms of linguistic community?' Or again: 'What is the relation
between the state, of whatever type, as a formalised and well-delimited legal and sovereign unit (or collective agency) and other kinds of significant collective entity such as an historic pattern of civilisation, a religion or a church, autonomous municipality or region, the family and the gens (Sippe, zadruga), and perhaps some kinds of international élite endowed with a measure of formal organisation and of consciousness of identity?'

Is there, or can there be, any intrinsic reality underlying, say, the League of Nations or such concepts as 'Europeanism', 'Panamericanism', 'Panslavism', 'Panarabianism', slogans such as 'Asis for the Asians', and so on? Could any meaningful con or pro attitudes be formed - independently of the conflicting interests and contrary tastes and preferences of the individuals concerned - in regard to, say, the dissolution of Belgium along ethnico-national lines, or to the creation of a new Switzerland in the Danube basin, or to the setting-up of an independent French State of Quebec? How far is India or Israel a true national state, how far something else? Or again, in the areas of domestic politics, which, if any, of the American, or British type of prevalently two-party parliamentary system, the classic European multi-party system of opposing coalitions of government and opposition, or the Swiss system of a quasi-automatic all-party coalition, is most conducive to the maintenance of a secure, established constitutional mode of life? What truth, if any, may there be in the declarations of certain African dictators that the one party régimes that they have established are distinct from totalitarianism proper?

Proceeding in the opposite direction of philosophical abstraction we encounter such fundamental themes as the
desirability of any tidy pattern of clear-cut and sharply delimited large-scale identities, as against a predominance of smaller-scale overlapping identities, of a plurality of communal forms and of the maximum practicable level of autonomy. Should we be happier with a limited number of co-existing types (say the nation state, the federal state, and perhaps the city state) or ought we to accept and cultivate an indefinite number of non-uniform types of identity (which reminds us of the view according to which certain diseases, in particular influenza or falling-in-love, are structurally different in each single case).

§5. Conclusion: a note on conservative libertarianism

A host of questions such as have just been presented would constitute a tedious and insipid conclusion which would be perhaps even worse than a mere unargued profession of faith. I would therefore beg permission to state explicitly that my own personal preference, as no doubt that of conservative libertarians in general, is fully on the side of plurality, manifoldness, mobile equilibrium and the unceasing play of tensions, of qualified and multiple allegiances, of the rejection of all unreserved identification of the individual with any community or organised collective (even at the expense of the perspicuity of social outlines, of predictability and of efficiency). Although one's scale of preferences is primarily an expression of one's temper, and thus far above and also below the level of rational justification, still I believe that my attitude as here stated has this much to say for it, that it is grounded in, or is at any rate a response to the ontological fact that the individual alone is the ultimate
social reality: that however short-lived and changeable he may be, however tenuous his hold on reality, he is still the only bearer of invariant self-identity. Yet we must not lose sight of his essential and insurmountable incompleteness. He is conditioned by society, chooses and acts under the influence of and on behalf of others, and is subordinated to the will and interests of collective wholes with which he cannot but identify himself or with which he has come to identify himself by voluntary choice. He 'fulfils himself' not, as some have imagined, transitorily, as a mere phase of history, but ineluctably, constituting himself through the medium of a network of hundreds of alienations from interests and collectives, each one involving the pain, or a glimpse of the pain, of isolation and impoverishment, sometimes of total insecurity and ineffectiveness. And the secret of his freedom resides not in his overcoming alienation by some kind of all-comprehensive union, nor again by minimising his social ties, but in the balanced and pluralistic (as opposed to absolute and monistic) character of the collective identities to which he is a party,

I draw a great deal of comfort from the following lines by Kipling, and wholly share the wonderment they express:

All Power, each Tyrant, every Mob
Whose head has grown too large,
Ends by destroying its own job
And earns its own discharge.

And Man, whose mere necessities
Move all things from his path,
Trembles meanwhile at their decrees
And deprecates their wrath.

What Kipling here calls 'Man' is however not every or any individual taken in his atomic nakedness. Even though he is capable of rising above and sweeping away that Power,
that Tyrant, that Mob, so long as the latter exist 'Man' is somehow represented by them, underlies them, acts through them (they are not extra-human entities). And when Man gets rid of them, which he may do and certainly ought to do, he does so by virtue of older and more legitimate identifications and by forming new, revised and modified identities. For it is through these alone that he can give effect to his act of disaffection and disidentification; it is through these alone that his divisive intention can be hammered into shape.
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS


MARGARET IVERSEN is the author of an article on Riegl which appeared in the issue of *Art History* for March 1979. She is lecturer in the Department of Art at the University of Essex.

ALLAN JANIK is the co-author, with Stephen Toulmin, of *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973 and is currently at work on a study of *Der Brenner* and twentieth century philosophy. He is a Research Associate of the Boston University Center for the Philosophy and History of Science.

R.J. KAVANAGH is the author of articles on Karl Gutzkow, *Junges Deutschland* and Kafka and of translations of poetry by Gottfried Benn and Georg Weerth. He is lecturer in the Department of Germanic Studies at the University of Sheffield.

PETER MCCORMICK is the co-editor of *Husserl: Shorter Works* and of *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals*. He is the author of *Heidegger and the Language of the World* and of a forthcoming book entitled *Literary Truths*. He teaches philosophy at the University of Ottawa, Canada.
KEVIN MULLIGAN is the author of articles and reviews in the area of philosophy and translation theory. He is currently at work on a major study of Husserl, Wittgenstein and the background of their work in Austro-German thought. He teaches at the Zentralfremdspracheninstitut of the University of Hamburg.

J.C. NYÍRI is the author of a large number of articles on Austrian and Hungarian intellectual history, especially on the work of Wittgenstein and on the relationship of Wittgenstein's thought to twentieth-century neo-conservatism. He teaches in the Department of the History of Philosophy at the University of Budapest.

BARRY SMITH is the author of papers on Husserl, Ingarden and Wittgenstein, and the editor of *Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology*, Munich: Philosophia, 1980. He is lecturer in the Department of Philosophy of the University of Manchester.