Pilgrimage in Turbulent Contexts: One Hundred Years of Pilgrimage to the Holy Land

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In this paper, I review select developments in the last one hundred years of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic pilgrimage to sites found today in Israel and the Occupied Territories. I argue that only by viewing the pilgrimages under analysis as dissipative systems, is one able to explain historical change in this most turbulent of contexts. When combined with an understanding of pilgrimage as social action, this approach enables historians of religions to account for not only the restructuring of pilgrimages over time but also to understand dynamics surrounding ritual birth and death. Furthermore, the political strategies of traditionalists and revivalists who attempt to authenticate contemporary ritual behavior by linking it up to purportedly longstanding, unchanged practices are undermined. After initially focusing upon changes in pilgrimage catalyzed by socio-political events, I discuss the birth of distinctively new pilgrimages associated with the rise of the State of Israel as well as the demise of several other pilgrimages in the years since 1948.

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INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I examine developments in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic pilgrimage to sites in Israel and the Occupied Territories over the last one hundred years. I argue that only through adopting a dissipative model of ritual system change is it possible to explain the various transformations of pilgrimages in this most turbulent of contexts. By viewing the pilgrimages under review as dissipative structures—“open, complex systems” that often adapt and unwind in unexpected nonlinear and asymmetrical ways—scholars of religion are optimally able to account for and even predict both their weakening and sometimes radical restructuring over time but also ritual failure, death, as well as birth (though never, strictly speaking, rebirth). Rather than viewing travel from diverse locales by people with very different cultural backgrounds to specific sites as singular pilgrimages, or the similar rites performed at them as “the same,” change in ritual performances—following the methods of microhistorians and anthropologists/ethnographers engaged in extended case studies—will be highlighted. Critically, my approach undermines the strategies of those who attempt to validate contemporary ritual behavior by linking it up to purportedly longstanding, unchanged practices. Shifting the emphasis of Victor Turner and more specifically Max Gluckman, the founder of the Manchester School and head of the Bernstein Research Project who is often considered the founding father of Israeli anthropology, I contend that pilgrimages do not necessarily uphold the social order or foster social cohesion. Modifications in ritualized pilgrimage activity, in addition to bringing about social stability, can also undermine the “status quo.” In the hands of competing interests, change in pilgrimage to sites in Israel and the Occupied Territories during the last century has commonly supported ethnic, religious, and nationalist goals—often serving as a weapon advancing cultural domination. After initially focusing upon changes in pilgrimage catalyzed by socio-political events, I discuss the birth of distinctively new pilgrimages associated with the rise of the State of Israel as well as the demise of several Islamic and some local Christian pilgrimages in the years since 1948.

While pilgrims often maintain that they are performing the “same” or “original” pilgrimages as those who came before them and insist that their actions are exclusively religious and unrelated to political or economic interests, these claims are clearly not born out upon close anthropological analysis. In spite of the authenticating and sometimes obscurantist rhetoric of traditionalists, revivalists, and nationalists (Turner 1969: 132,
“ideological communitas”) who use the “past” as well as the work of historians to support their claims to sacred sites in the present, many pilgrimages carried out to sites now in Israel and the Occupied Territories have undergone striking changes over the just the last one hundred years. Travel for religious purposes is commonly “tweaked” to meet contemporary exigencies. Like other rituals, pilgrimages can even change by “accident,” in the most unintended of ways (cf. Hüskens 2007). Most notably, in turbulent contexts pilgrimages increasingly undergo profound transformations. Pilgrimages fade away and are forced into disorder, though are sometimes retooled for new contexts. They likewise die with greater frequency. Oftentimes entirely new pilgrimages, with modified ritual practices, emerge. Of particular interest to historians who study religious traditions over the course of long periods of time, there are often fundamental “discontinuities” between different historical performances of the so-called “same” pilgrimage. Following Michel Foucault’s archaeological method, pilgrimages are—a priori—historical events that occur in very specific epistemic settings. In order to appraise them accurately and the changes that they undergo, one must attend to specific conditions that are often extraordinarily different from those in other historical periods. Dissipative models presume that ritual change is commonly nonlinear. In many cases, it is best to characterize transformed pilgrimages as newborns in almost every respect.

I treat pilgrimage as inherently social activity played out on dynamic fields of conflict where competing forces attempt to control not only geographical locations and their spheres of influence, but the “meaning” and “history” of these sacred sites and the journeys made to them as well. Historical changes, as manifest in the emergence of new contextual factors, often serve as a catalyst for alterations in pilgrimage. In recent years, anthropologists have supplied historians of pilgrimage with much more precise data concerning ritual change. Upon close “in vivo” analysis such as performed by Gluckman and his students using the extended case method, rituals themselves are revealed to be dynamic structures which often undergo change—especially in unsettled contexts. I contend, however, that Gluckman’s description of ritual change as unifying and stabilizing is one sided. While rituals like pilgrimages do oftentimes foster much unity across specific traditions by working to resolve tensions in society and upholding the social order, this is not necessarily always the case. For Gluckman (1954), even “rituals of rebellion”—dramatized, ordered protest—end with resolution, a renewal of the unity of the social order. They are “conservative phenomena” (Schröter 2004) that ultimately
have a cathartic, steadying effect on individuals and societies undergoing dramatic change. Such an approach to ritual change does not take into account the potentially destabilizing effects and aggressive nature of pilgrimage.

Pilgrimages, as seen in the examples I will shortly present, are clearly used and have even been born in support of specific political, economic, and individual interests. In the Holy Land over the last one hundred years they have regularly been disarmed—temporarily canceled and even banned due to the threat they pose to competitors and social stability. By highlighting the historical struggles between various interests over the control of pilgrimage to sacred centers, I do not deny—as some have who completely reduce the “ideal” to the “material” or internal to the external—that rituals promote various symbolic associations, religious values, or messages. They always exhibit self-generating “autopoietic” forces that affect those involved with them. These influences and messages though, are frequently understood and promoted in very different ways across time. Oftentimes, ritual performers in the same historical locus endorse or take away from their seemingly identical practices very different meanings (Bell 1992: 183, 186; Hutt 2009: 77). Even though at first glance words spoken and actions taken might appear to be the same, these require historicization. While natural features like geography and weather patterns might produce comparable, measurable stimuli that color pilgrimage to specific locations over the long term, there is no evidence to suggest that sacred sites themselves exert unchanging, asocial “religious” or “spiritual” influence over the visitors to them. One must always, like Timothy Lubin (2001: 377–408), attend to the “civic spectacle” surrounding and informing pilgrimages—so-called revivalist ritual performances definitely included! Pilgrimages unmistakably play a critical role in establishing unity across specific cultures and advancing their hegemony. This, however, is not because pilgrimages do not change and evolve—often dramatically.

JEWISH PILGRIMAGE

I am going to begin by examining historical changes in Jewish pilgrimage to Jerusalem and other sites in the Holy Land. In spite of the common emphasis placed by pilgrims as well as their leaders, organizers, and sponsors on the need to keep “authentic” ritual traditions assiduously, change occurs as a result of a need to adapt to new contextual factors. While some pilgrimages have seemingly existed across several hundreds or even thousands of years, if Foucault was correct we should treat even the most longstanding as
a collection of ritual transfers or transplacements across time. In the same way that rituals can change when performed in new locations removed from their contexts of origin, there too can be substantial change across historical periods in pilgrimage to specific locations like Jerusalem. To date, almost all research on ritual transfer or transplacement has focused on the performance of rituals outside of sacred centers. Rites that originate at sacred sites are replicated in new locations. Historical changes, as manifest in the emergence of new contextual factors (e.g., material or political), often serve as a catalyst for alterations in rituals and their performance. Most famously, this is seen in ritual celebrations of Passover in diverse Jewish diaspora communities marking the sacred trek out of slavery in Egypt. This journey, as evidenced in the existence of over 3000 different types of Passover *aggadot* (instruction manuals for ritual performances), is commemorated in many ways—adapted to match needs in specific communities in wide-ranging socio-cultural/historical contexts. Similar ritual change from the center to the periphery in many cases can be easily explained to result from Jewish exile or life in diaspora communities far removed from the sacred center.

Historians and anthropologists of Jewish pilgrimage to Jerusalem today, however, cannot ignore the simultaneous existence of almost the opposite dynamic—where cultures and their rituals developed in wide-ranging diaspora communities impose themselves upon ritual practices in Jerusalem in the present. Focus on the “eisogetical,” on what pilgrims bring with them to their specific pilgrimages and religious migrations, is required. The diversity of pilgrims from what appears to be the same religious tradition to a single location is great. Take, for example, travel to the reputed site of Solomon’s Temple and second Jewish Temple destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE—for the last 1350 years, known alternatively as the *Haram al-Sharif* (the Noble Sanctuary) by Muslims. Jewish pilgrimages have been made to this site—when possible—for over 2500 years. Today, Jewish pilgrimage is largely focused on the Western Wall of former Temple (or, to Muslims, the *al-Buraq Wall*) in a plaza adjacent to the *Haram* specially designed after the destruction of the Mughrabi quarter in 1967 to hold large numbers of people and facilitate public access. Prior to 70 CE, Jewish pilgrims came to the Temple in Jerusalem to make sacrifices—most importantly, on Yom Kippur—and to celebrate the festivals of *Sukkot* (the *Shlosha Regalim*; cf., Exodus 23:14), *Pesach*, and *Shavuot*. In addition to religious Jews gathering at the Western Wall post-70 CE on the formerly required sacrifice and festival days, new fasts of mourning were instituted in remembrance of the
destruction of the first and second Temples—culminating on ninth of Av (note minor fasts of mourning on the tenth of Tevet, seventeenth of Tammuz, and third of Tishrei). Many Jews on Yom Kippur count it a religious obligation (Avodah) to recount sacrificial practices at the Western Wall. Since the destruction of the second Temple when sacrifice was discontinued until the capture of East Jerusalem in 1967, Jews have had spotty access to the Western Wall—at times being permitted at the site (though all desired ritual practices have not always been permitted) and at others times forbidden such as in the years between 1948 and 1967. Especially in the years since 1967, entirely new pilgrimages to the Western Wall have been carried out. Most notably, non-religious, secular Jewish Israelis have likely participated in pilgrimage—broadly defined—to the Western Wall plaza as the location has become a site for National Memorial Events such as Holocaust Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, and Jerusalem Day. The Western Wall is also commonly visited by groups of Israeli schoolchildren along with teenagers from outside the country participating in the Taglit (Birthright) program. Israeli Defense Forces hold initiations and services for fallen soldiers at the Wall—from Bar Kochba to soldiers who fought heroically for the state of Israel—not unlike what occurs at Masada and other non-religious memorial sites (cf. Ben Yehuda 1995; Zerubavel 1995; Noy 2009).

Simple statistical analysis of Jewish pilgrimage to sacred sites throughout Israel and the Occupied Territories in the last century confirms the connection between political change and developments in ritualized pilgrimage. When comparing changes in pilgrimage recorded after the Israeli War of Independence with what occurred in the years of the British Mandate and Ottoman rule before it—post-1948 changes are more dramatic and far greater in number. As argued by Doron Bar in his article “Reconstructing the Past: The Creation of Jewish Sacred Space in the State of Israel, 1948–1967” (2008), the Israeli War of Independence was “the main catalyst for the creation of a new map of Jewish pilgrimage sites.” Bar—who examines the actions during this time of Director-General Kahana of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in addition to various “semi-official” religious, nationalist and local organizations—divides pilgrimage sites on this new map into several different categories including:

1. Sites visited by Jewish pilgrims before 1948 that were intensively developed into cultic centers—e.g., the Cave of the Sanhedrin in Jerusalem; tomb of Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai in Meiron (purchased in
the 19th century); and, Tiberias rabbis’ tombs. One major way of supporting pilgrimage to these sites was through the Ministry of Religious Affairs sponsoring hiloolot or celebrations on days that a Tsaddik (“righteous person”) died.

2. Muslim owned and frequented sites taken over after 1948 as sites of Jewish worship like King David’s Tomb in Jerusalem (note that the importance of this site changes after 1967 as before this Kahana and the Mt. Zion Committee cultivated this as the main Jewish heritage site in Israeli controlled West Jerusalem); the Cave of Elijah in Haifa; as well as tombs like that of Ali Abu Hurayra and Sheikh Gherib which became associated with Rabban Gamliel Ha Nasi in Yavneh and Samson near Beit Shemesh, respectively.

3. Bar divides new pilgrimage sites established during the period between 1948 and 1967 into two categories. First, several sites—allegedly linked to Jewish religious heritage—have been established by Director-General Kahana that historians have no of evidence of ever having existed before the founding of the modern state of Israel. These include the “Tamarisk of Abraham” in Beersheva (a focus of pilgrimage celebrated on Tu B’Shvat); the “Rock of Destruction” near the settlement Eshta’ol; and, the “Cave of the Lion” in Jerusalem. Second, new “sacred” Zionist space has been created primarily linked to sites of Jewish heroism—both in the distant past (Masada) and last century such as war memorials and military cemeteries.

It is obvious to Bar that these relatively large-scale changes were triggered by increased Jewish immigration to Palestine and Israel’s War of Independence. It is not only a matter of correlation but causation. With the arrival of Israeli control came dramatic changes at pilgrimage sites. New Jewish owners, custodians, and pilgrims made for what were often effectively new pilgrimages—in spite of claims made that pilgrimages were simply being expanded or renewed after long absences.

By capitalizing upon plausible and sometimes implausible links to significant Jewish pasts in Palestine, pilgrimage to sacred heritage sites has also had a clear effect on political developments—regularly serving as justification for and supporting Israeli claims to sovereignty. Glenn Bowman, in an article on the politics of tour-guiding in
Israel and the Occupied Territories (1992), described the tactic of “legitimation through religion” in the 1980s. In their itineraries and discourses, Christian tourists—especially from western countries—are exposed to religious “history” that supports Israeli claims to this land promised to them in Jewish/Christian scripture. This continues today with the focus often shifted by Jewish settlers and at least the present Israeli government to heritage sites and trails in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Groups like the Elad Association and Beit Orot, not only run “tours” to sites of religious significance, but occupy property in these locations—establishing footholds in Palestinian neighborhoods of Jerusalem. The Kol HaTor project, which was founded in 2005 in the face of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's alleged attempts to “secularize the nation” and comply with anti-settlement demands of the international community, promotes and organizes tours primarily for Israelis (though also Christian Zionists) to religious sites in the Occupied Territories of Judea and especially Samaria. What ostensibly appear to be religious pilgrimages to the “Biblical Heartland of ancient Israel”—to roads traveled by the patriarchs, Shiloh, Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal, as well as the Jordan Valley—also include visits to settlements in danger of being dismantled, businesses, and educational institutions boycotted by some Israelis and non-Israelis alike. Consultations with settlers and their rabbis, who often serve as political spokespersons, are a regular part of the travel programs. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, like other Israeli leaders before him, clearly follows Director-General Kahana’s lead. On 3 February 2010 in a speech at the Annual Herzliya Conference, he outlined his government's “Heritage Plan”—available online on the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. On 21 February 2010, PM Netanyahu put his words into action announcing that the Tomb of the Patriarchs (the Ibrahimi mosque) in Hebron and Rachel’s Tomb, formerly in Bethlehem but now in greater Jerusalem, had been placed on the list of Israeli heritage sites—sparking riots on the West Bank and international protest. Recently, the Netanyahu government's Education Minister Gideon Sa'ar announced the expansion of Israeli high school heritage tours to Hebron (2/1/12). On account of the likelihood of producing violent confrontations, the present Israeli government has halted some pilgrimages/processions by extremist settler groups to sites on the West Bank such as led by Moshe Levenger to the ancient synagogue in Na’aran (8/10/10 and 2/21/10). In the “flag dance” procession on Jerusalem Day during May 2012, while the religious nationalist participants were kept away from the East Jerusalem neighborhoods of Sheikh
Jarrah and Silwan—the site of violent confrontations in 2011—they were once again allowed to parade through the Muslim Quarter of the Old City through Damascus Gate for a “prayer rally” at the Western Wall plaza.

While historical research into “revived” Jewish pilgrimages calls into question their connection to and similarity with past practices, close analysis reveals ongoing dynamic nonlinear change in pilgrimage activity. For example, as evidenced at King David’s Tomb on Mt. Zion, after being cultivated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Mt. Zion Committee (also headed by Director-General Kahana) as the most important Jewish heritage site from 1948 to 1967 much changed. As detailed by Bar (2007), with the capture of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and its Jewish sacred sites, many ceremonies and rituals that had been celebrated throughout the course of the year on Mt. Zion were discontinued and transplaced to the Western Wall, Rachel’s Tomb, and other locations. Prompted by new developments, pilgrimage to King David’s Tomb was diminished and de-emphasized. Similar dramatic change has occurred in sites throughout the country, where political developments on the ground such as the loss of access to holy sites has prompted residents and pilgrims to discontinue, alter, and/or create new religious customs. As emphasized by Bar, Jewish pilgrimage to sites in Jerusalem was profoundly influenced by the division of city between 1948 and 1967. One need only read Susan Sered’s description of women’s pilgrimage to Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem (1986) and compare it with that which occurs to a radically transformed holy site today—one forcibly cut out of and removed from Bethlehem by the recently erected security barrier—in order to appreciate the effect of forced separation on pilgrimage in the Holy Land.

In periods of marked competition over the control of sacred sites, small changes in ritual practices—easily overlooked or deemed inconsequential by outsiders who do not understand their symbolic and sometimes practical importance—not only proliferate but can also be extremely destabilizing to the status quo. For example, during Ottoman control in the early part of the 20th century and throughout the British Mandate disputes over the introduction of chairs, benches, tables and screens for use during Jewish worship led to intermittent violence at the Western Wall (e.g., 1928, 1930). The symbolic raising of a Zionist flag and singing of anthems at the Wall on Tisha B’Av in 1929 sparked hostilities throughout Palestine culminating in the infamous Hebron Massacre. The British, responding to the 1929 violence, appointed an international commission which
recommended protecting Jewish access though restricting the use of chairs and other objects at the Wall. The blowing of the Shofar on Yom Kippur was forbidden though several Jewish worshippers regularly made the attempt. Israeli police today, guard against other destabilizing changes—as evident in the arrests of Women at the Wall members Nofrat Frenkel for wearing a tallit and Anat Hoffman for carrying a Torah scroll to prayer at a site away from the main plaza set aside for “egalitarian” worship. Access to the “Temple Mount,” especially to groups like the Temple Mount Faithful that advocate the destruction of the mosques on the Haram and building of a third Jewish Temple, is forbidden.

**ISLAMIC PILGRIMAGE**

The expansion of Jewish pilgrimage to sites in Palestine directly corresponds with a marked decline in Islamic pilgrimage to and within the Holy Land during the last century. Changes in pilgrimage activity are not only caused by major political and demographic shifts, but—as described above—also play a role in bringing these about. Jewish pilgrimage at least since 1948 has served to support Israeli claims of sovereignty. It is apparent from a review of developments in Islamic pilgrimages—which oftentimes have come as a result of coercion—that they have been treated by British, Jordanian, and Israeli governments as potential sources of instability and even as weapons to be disarmed. Islamic pilgrimages, where they have survived today, are generally subject to Israeli monitoring and control. They are de-emphasized by the Israeli government—for example, the Ministry of Tourism and Municipality of Jerusalem—in addition to being relatively unknown to the majority of the population of Israel.

The State of Israel is certainly not the only power in the last one hundred years in Palestine to marshal religious pilgrimage in support of a political agenda. As detailed by Roger Friedland and Richard Hecht, during the period of the British mandate the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husayni clearly used Islamic religious events and sacred sites for similar nationalist purposes—especially the Nebi Musa pilgrimage/festival (môsam). At this time, the Haram al-Sharif became a symbol of local Palestinian national aspirations. During the week of the Nebi Musa pilgrimage (which always occurs at the same time as Eastern Orthodox Holy Week) Muslims from surrounding cities like Nablus and Hebron would converge on the “noble sanctuary” in Jerusalem. As a group, pilgrims would then journey to the cenotaph of Moses alongside
the road to Jericho. The fostering of national identity is also evident in al-Husayni’s appropriation of the Isra and Mi’raj (Lailat al-Mi’raj)—celebrated at the Haram commemorating the prophet Mohammed’s night journey to Jerusalem and ascension to heaven—for the first “Palestine Day.”

Neither was Israel the first to suppress Islamic pilgrimage as de-stabilizing to the status quo. The Nebi Musa pilgrimage was carefully watched and even banned by the British due to frequently occurring violence between competing Muslim clans as well as between Muslims and Christians/Jews. In an attempt to limit the influence of al-Husayni and power of Palestinian nationalists, suppression of the pilgrimage was continued by the Jordanian government who assumed control of East Jerusalem and the West Bank after Israel’s War of Independence. In 1967, the Israeli government continued the same practice. Since then the Nebi Musa pilgrimage has been conducted only a few times. In 1987, the pilgrimage was revived for one year before being stopped with the onset of the first intifada. In 1995, Nebi Musa itself was ceded to the control of the Palestinian Authority. Pilgrimages, however, were only carried out from 1997–2000—under the patronage of President Arafat. Since this time, even though the site has been under control of the Palestinian Ministry of the Islamic Waqf, the pilgrimage procession from Jerusalem has been halted for security reasons by the Israeli government.

The effects of the Israeli War of Independence and increased Jewish immigration upon Islamic pilgrimage in Israel were deadening. Against the backdrop of the depopulation of hundreds of Palestinian villages, several pilgrimages (s. môsam, pl. mawāsim) catalogued by Tewfik Canaan in the 1920s have ceased to exist. Amongst these include pilgrimages to sites like the Cave of Elijah in Haifa and Nebi Rubin south of Jaffa. After the establishment of Israeli control in Haifa and Nebi Rubin both of these were eventually transformed into Jewish sites. For example, the Nebi Rubin môsam that lasted for a full lunar month was the largest and perhaps most popular pilgrimage in pre-1948 Palestine. Tens of thousands of Muslims (and Christians) visited the small village on the coast, until the Giv’ati Brigade expelled its Arab inhabitants on 6/1/48 and 8/24/48. After years of neglect, the tomb of Rubin was reconstituted as a Jewish holy site. In several cases, Islamic pilgrimages were simply discontinued. The Nebi Saleh môsam held in Ramleh, for example, died with the forced flight/expulsion of Arab inhabitants from the city (7/14/1948). The Nebi Ayyub (Job) feast suffered the same fate with the

Since 1967, the Palestinian population of Jerusalem, along with its Islamic and Christian holy sites, has been progressively cut off from its neighboring feeder communities on the West Bank. In many ways, the culmination of this process is the building of the well-known separation wall—for security reasons—by the Israeli government. At the same time, Jewish Jerusalem has grown rapidly with unhindered access to the city from Israel and newly constructed large-scale satellite communities (aka: “settlements”) in Occupied Territory. The consequences of this for Islamic pilgrimage to the Haram during Ramadan, for the Lailat al-Mi’raj, as well as at other times during the year is severe. Most critically, access to Muslims from the West Bank is limited, which has resulted in a demographic change amongst the pilgrims themselves. The percentage of participants from Muslim communities inside the wall has increased as well as their perceived obligation to protect the Haram. For example, in the days surrounding the dedication of the newly rebuilt Hurva synagogue in the Old City (an accomplishment, according to some, that heralds the building of the third Temple and inevitable destruction of the mosques on the Haram), Muslims from throughout Israel were left to “defend” the holy site with a curfew placed on Palestinian travel from the West Bank. Islamic pilgrimage to Jerusalem is definitely a “complex system,” where moves taken to bring about a specific outcome like reducing security risks can easily produce unanticipated, conflicting results.

International Islamic pilgrimage to the Haram has been mostly stifled since 1967. This is the result of a boycott by Muslim dominated states and Israeli government policies. In an attempt to call attention to the Israeli occupation, even countries like Jordan that have a peace treaty with Israel object to international tourism to east Jerusalem (Haaretz 8/9/10). This strategy has been occasionally challenged, for example, by former Egyptian Minister of Religious Endowments Mahmoud Hamdi Zaqzouq who called upon Muslims to flood Jerusalem (JPost 8/9/10). The commitment of the Israeli government to support Islamic pilgrimage to Jerusalem is highly questionable. Upon review of the Israeli Ministry of Tourism’s website over the last several years, one might think that there is no market for Islamic “tourism” to Jerusalem at all. While generally speaking Christian travel to Jerusalem is promoted (though this is not always the case, as with the most ancient Christian pilgrimage procession in the world celebrated primarily
by Palestinians today on Palm Sunday), it is almost as if Islamic pilgrimage to the Haram and elsewhere in the city does not exist. Whereas travel to sites associated with famous figures in the history of Jewish and Christian religious traditions are advertised and promoted by the Israeli Ministry of Tourism, no reference at all is made to sites like the graves of the “companions of the prophet”—hugely important individuals in the earliest Islamic communities. Israeli silence regarding Islamic pilgrimage was particularly evident in June 2012, when the centuries old Lailat al Miraj was held in Jerusalem. This longstanding worldwide celebration of the ascension of the Prophet Mohammad at the site of the Haram in Jerusalem, renowned for its accompanying exhibition of lights not only in the present but well before the invention of electricity, was almost entirely overshadowed by the new, competing Jerusalem Festival of Lights sponsored by the Municipality with its dramatic displays erected throughout the contested Old City. The Lailat al Miraj, perhaps the most important of all historical Islamic pilgrimages to Jerusalem, was neither advertised by nor a recipient of funding from the Israeli Ministry of Tourism or the Jerusalem Municipality. This Islamic celebration is unknown to the vast majority of Jewish residents of Israel and international pilgrims/tourists to the Holy Land.

The utility of anthropological research on the effects of relatively small changes to pilgrimages in turbulent contexts is especially clear upon review of the managing of Islamic pilgrimage to the Haram and elsewhere by governments controlling East Jerusalem since the British Mandate until today. While politicians and others make speeches about protecting religious freedom for all faiths in Jerusalem, in practice control over the demographic makeup of pilgrims—that is, where they come from (whether city or clan, as seen in British restrictions on the Nebi Musa)—serves in principle to limit outbreaks of violence. This is echoed in the use of age restrictions today on who can enter the Haram—in particular, for Friday prayers.\textsuperscript{16} As just noted, controlling “when” Islamic pilgrimage to or even worship at the Haram is allowed to occur, has tangible effects. Whereas the introduction of changes in pilgrimage rituals or even new competing pilgrimages can lead to volatility, keeping the festival dates and locations of competing religious/political groups separate at least in the short term reduces opportunities for violence.
CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN PILGRIMAGE

In the following section, I am going to take a brief look at some of the work graduate students and I are doing on contemporary Christian pilgrimage to sites in Israel and the Occupied Territories. In addition to viewing developments in Christian pilgrimage against the historical backdrop of prior performances of the “same” pilgrimages, following Foucault, not only are radical differences across historical strata acknowledged but similarities between pilgrimage activity occurring across traditions in the same locus are highlighted. Christian pilgrimage to sites in the Holy Land today is influenced by the same political developments as Jewish and Islamic pilgrimages above. Frankly, it is imprudent and irresponsible for those studying Christian pilgrimage to the Holy Land to do so in a vacuum—not paying attention to what occurs in parallel religious traditions. What makes Christian pilgrimages distinctive is not only the diversity of the pilgrims themselves and what they bring with them on their special journeys, but the treatment they receive by those exerting influence over sacred sites. Developments in diverse Christian pilgrimages are mixed. They mirror those in Jewish and Islamic travel to and within the Holy Land. On the one hand, local Christian pilgrimage to and from the Occupied Territories has declined. At the same time, some international Christian pilgrimages have flourished in the last several decades with the explicit support of the Israeli government. I have divided this final section into two distinct parts, the first on local Palestinian Christian pilgrimage and the second on international Christian pilgrimage to the Holy Land.

Local Palestinian Christian pilgrims, alongside their Muslim neighbors, have been hugely affected by political events and demographical changes in the last century. This is particularly evident upon examination of pilgrimages between various local Christian population centers. Volatile change in travel from month to month, year to year, and decade to decade has been common—from the time of the British Mandate until today. Just as Jewish pilgrimage to the Western Wall between 1948 and 1967 was stifled, so too was it extraordinarily difficult for Palestinian Christians living in Israel to reach sites on the Jordanian controlled West Bank. During times of war and recurrent violence, travel has often been curbed both by authorities controlling specific locations and voluntarily in order to preserve personal safety. Under pressures associated with war, occupation, and internecine rivalries, Christians have been made refugees or simply emigrated to pursue a better life. Since 1967, Christians have left the Holy Land in large
numbers—from East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Christians living in Israel and the
Galilee in particular, while their numbers have not precipitously declined as in East
Jerusalem and on the West Bank, have also been regularly cut off from traditional
pilgrimage destinations on the West Bank such as Bethlehem and Aboud. Obviously, it
has been impossible for many Palestinian Christians made refugees in 1948 who
presently live outside of the Holy Land and their descendants, especially those living in
Muslim countries, to travel on pilgrimage to sites in Israel.

On account of limited space, I will not address local Christian pilgrimage to
famous sites in Nazareth or Bethlehem—even though journeys to these locations, in
Israel and the Occupied Territories respectively, are subject to many of the same
influences that affect the less well-known pilgrimages that I will discuss. To my
knowledge, while the increasing “Islamicization” of Nazareth has been provocatively
addressed by Raphael Israeli (2002), no study of the impact of the separation of
Palestinian Christians living in Israel and the West Bank on local pilgrimage or Christian
communities has been undertaken. Neither will I discuss the effects of declining Christian
population and reduced pilgrimage to Bethlehem, as this has been documented in detail
by the anthropologist Toine van Teeffelen (e.g., 2006) and Palestinians like Mitri Raheb
(2004), as well as the international press. These are not, needless to say, isolated trends
as is seen upon examination of less well-known Christian pilgrimages involving travel
between Israel and the West Bank.

Pilgrimage for the Feast of St. Barbara to Aboud has been dramatically affected
by political turmoil, violence, and hardened borders. The Palestinian town of Aboud on
the West Bank is located on an ancient road between Nazareth and Jerusalem. It is no
stranger to violence. Over the centuries, many of its churches and shrines have been
destroyed. In recent years, the annual feast day procession (12/17) to the cave of St.
Barbara's habitation was interrupted by the “mistaken” dynamiting of the site by Israeli
soldiers on 5/31/2002. Today, change in pilgrimage practices is mostly the result of the
building of the famous separation/security wall. Aboud, with this construction, has
become increasingly secluded. In addition to local Christians being separated from their
fields by the concrete barrier that now runs through their land, Christian pilgrims who
formerly visited Aboud and often attended the Feast of St. Barbara—the majority of
which came from the Galilee—have been discouraged and generally prohibited from
making the trip. Decreases in Christian pilgrimage to Aboud have had a negative impact
on the upkeep of her churches and the local economy. They have exacerbated the feeling of isolation amongst Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and even Protestant Christians (Church of God)—all of whom have friends and family members who have chosen to emigrate. The feeling of being “alone” is not only caused by the building of the wall but increased demographic pressures as well. All residents of Aboud interviewed cited worry about nearby large-scale Israeli settlement activity. Some also noted the increasing Islamicization of Aboud and the West Bank in general, with Christian women in the last several years feeling pressured to dress more “modestly.” Other Christians emphasized that, in Aboud, Christians and Muslims have always lived in peace side by side and that the two religious groups view themselves as one people. As evidence of this, it was pointed out that Muslims regularly participated in the celebration of the Feast of St. Barbara.

The dwindling population of Christians in Aboud is also, for most of the year, cut off from sacred sites of pilgrimage in Bethlehem, East Jerusalem, and Israel. In order to attend the longstanding Saturday of Lazarus/Palm Sunday celebrations on the Mount of Olives, security passes into Israel—normally difficult to obtain—must be carefully arranged in advance. Applying for these permits is a new part of the pilgrimage process, which receives the attention of not only individuals but Christian leaders who often provide organizational support to those wishing to make the journey. As recorded by a University of the Holy Land (UHL) graduate student, several people making the journey for the Palm Sunday procession remarked that going on the pilgrimage was like “getting out of jail.” This, as Victor Turner would have guessed, intensified the experience of pilgrims turning the short journey into an “adventure.” The trip was also an occasion for meeting family and friends, going shopping in Jerusalem, and even touring outside the city. When arriving at Bethpage for the start of the procession, Christians from Aboud—now amongst other Christians from Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and international locations—were reminded that they were “not alone.” The participation of Muslims from Jerusalem in the Palm Sunday procession mostly produced the same reaction, though in an ethno-nationalist sense. Unmistakably, as Turner and Gluckman certainly would have pointed out, these pilgrimages strengthen group identity and foster a feeling of “communitas.” It is perhaps for this reason that this most ancient of Christian pilgrimages is not widely advertised amongst many international Christian Zionist communities or by the Israel Ministry of Tourism. Anthropological investigation of pilgrimage both to and
from Aboud offers a unique opportunity to track ritual system change in a clearly turbulent context, amongst a Christian community under extreme pressure from the forces of both political and demographical change.

Travel to the old city of Lod (Lydd) in Israel for the Orthodox Feast of St. George/Al-Khader (11/16) by displaced evacuees, refugees and their descendents, while impossible for many, has regularly occurred over the last several decades. Pilgrims from Nazareth, Haifa, Ramleh, Abu Ghosh, Shefa Amr, Kufr Yaseef, Raineh, Mghar and locations on the West Bank like East Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Beit Sahour, Beit Jala, Nablus, Ramallah, Jifna, Aboud, Taybeh, and Bir Zeit arrive by private car and bus. In Lod at the Greek Orthodox Church of St. George, they join the Christians and some Muslims that still remain in the city which is now three quarters majority Jewish or live close by in Ramleh. The Church of St. George occupies only a corner of what was a much larger earlier Basilica. Today, it shares the space with an Islamic mosque. Muslims also revere Al-Khader (“the Green,” who is also identified with St. George and the prophet Elijah) and they commonly join with Christians for feasts associated with St. George both in Lod and Beit Jala. The feast in Lod, like that in Aboud, provides researchers with one of the last examples of “inter-religiosity” between Christians and Muslims which was much more common one hundred years ago in the years before 1948. Participants interviewed who were over age fifty, asserted that divisive differences between Muslims and Christians were seldom emphasized in their youth. At the feast on November 16, Muslims alongside Christians—in an act peculiar to Middle Eastern forms of Christian piety—sacrifice sheep for thanksgiving and even participate in sacerdotal ceremonies associated with the event.¹⁹

For Palestinian Christians returning to Lod, the pilgrimage is more than a journey for “religious” purposes but a “return home.” To use the vocabulary of Turner augmented by Delaney (1990), the “liminal experience” shared by pilgrims characterized by a strong feeling of “communitas” is intensified not only by the out of the ordinary nature of the celebration and difficulties surmounted by those making the trip but by the secular return to homes occupied in a lost past. Pilgrims from Ramle walk to Lod, as the pilgrimage should involve effort and suffering. This procession is joined by many, including Orthodox Christian Scouts and bands. Many of the pilgrims, especially from the West Bank, use the occasion—taking full advantage of their security permit to visit
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Israel—to visit family members and friends but also to visit their former properties that are often now occupied by other people.

While local Palestinian Christian pilgrimages to and from locations in the Occupied Territories have become more difficult and in some cases faded away altogether, those investigating contemporary international Christian pilgrimage to the Holy Land encounter a more complex, mixed situation. In several telling cases, where political support for Israel by pilgrims is explicit and some degree of government patronage is clear, Christian pilgrimages have grown in size and importance. The most important examples of this alternative trend, is pilgrimage by diverse groups of Christian Zionists and millenarianists. While shunning traditional Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and mixed processions attended by local Palestinian Christians like that which occurs on Palm Sunday, these Christians predominantly from the West—though also, notably, in recent years from South America, Africa, and South Korea—have with the patronage of the Israeli government made several new pilgrimages popular. One of the most famous and researched examples of these is the “Feast of Tabernacles,” a Christian celebration of the Jewish holiday of Sukkot that lasts for one week and has been held for more than thirty years. Other Christian pilgrimages that have benefitted from Israeli sponsorship, twentieth and twenty-first century geo-political events, and changing demographics include those attended by Russian Orthodox and Ethiopian Coptic Christians.

The Israeli government, while publicly championing religious freedom for all Christians, has clearly played favorites when it comes to facilitating religious travel to holy sites under its control. Such strategies are longstanding, as can be seen in Uri Bialer's description of relations between Israel and diverse Christian communities from 1948 to 1967 in his recent book Cross on the Star of David. In search of allies, the Israeli government turned first to pre-millenial dispensationalist Christians for support. These groups, some of which have been active in Palestine since the early nineteenth century and advocate the return (and, frequently, conversion) of Jews to Jerusalem in light of the role they are supposed to play in the coming Messianic age, oftentimes both supported Jewish immigration to Palestine. In several cases, they have also advocated the so-called revival of ancient “Judaized” Christian practices—the viability of which my microhistorical, anthropological approach to pilgrimage seriously calls into question. The origins of contemporary Christian Zionism can be traced to such millenarian and
“Judaizing” groups, though this extraordinarily influential and diverse modern day religious/political movement has also been greatly strengthened by the support of Christians horrified by the consequences of Christian anti-Semitism that culminated in the perpetration of the Holocaust/Shoah against Jews in Europe in the mid-twentieth century. With the arrival of these new Christian pilgrims, the epicenters of Christian pilgrimage in the last one hundred years have shifted. For Christian Zionists, travel to traditional holy sites like the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem or the Church of Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem is not a priority, but instead—especially by those expecting the imminent return of the Messiah—the assumed site of the future Jewish Temple (the present day Haram al-Sharif) has become the primary focus. Replacing the inter-religiosity between Christians, Muslims, and indeed Jews encountered at holy sites in Palestine prior to mass Jewish immigration in the early twentieth century—like at Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem, the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, the tomb of Joseph in Nablus, Elijah’s Cave, and sundry other sites—new Christian pilgrims such as those journeying to Israel for the Feast of Tabernacles are frequently pro-Israel and virulently anti-Muslim. They make visits to the frontlines of the political conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors like the pre-1967 Green Line, “flashpoints” in Jerusalem, and the Sderot/Gaza border area in addition to the homes of Holocaust survivors and Yad Vashem. It is apparent that the Holy Land for these pilgrims is not “holy” in the same way that is for Oriental Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholics, or those Protestants not committed to Christian Zionist and, especially, pre-millenial dispensationalist beliefs.

It cannot be denied that Israeli governmental support for new Christian pilgrimages like the Feast of Tabernacles has helped them to flourish. Israeli Presidents and Prime Ministers, for example, have helped to put a spotlight on Feast of Tabernacles welcoming pilgrims in person almost every year without exception since its inception. Similarly, close cooperation between the Knesset Christian Allies Caucus and Christine Darg’s “Covenant Alliance” has resulted in the organization of three “Christian Jerusalem Assemblies” where international Christian leaders and Israeli government officials meet together for the purpose of securing backing for unilateral Israeli control of Jerusalem. One of the unexpected and unintended consequences of this emergent Jewish-Christian inter-religiosity has been rapid growth amongst Israel’s population of “Jewish-Christians” or “Messianic Jews.” These Christians, whether they end up living in Israel for extended
periods of time or not, commonly make trips to the country. Several of the numerically largest Christian congregations in the country contain many “Jewish-Christians” or are exclusively “Jewish-Christian.” The legal status of these Christians has been the topic of debates in the Israeli Knesset and a number of specific cases have been deliberated upon by the Israeli Supreme Court. Jewish Christians/Messianic Jews oftentimes suffer persecution in Israel by groups like *Yad L’Achim*.  

Other important recent examples of the impact of Israeli government policy on Christian pilgrimage to the Holy Land relate to developments in travel from Russia and the Ukraine. The effects of the recent elimination of visa requirements on Russian (9/20/2008) and Ukrainian (6/20/2010) pilgrimage have been dramatic. These actions have led to a huge upsurge in Russian and Ukrainian Christians to holy sites, who now are second in number only to Christian pilgrims to Israel from the United States. As shown by Leon Menzies Racionzer, the number of Orthodox Christians has also swelled as a result of large scale Jewish immigration to Israel from these countries. While many of the Jews who have immigrated to Israel since the fall of the Soviet Union are not “Jewish,” at least according to Jewish religious law (*halacha*), several families are of mixed religion—with one spouse retaining at least privately their Christian faith. This is also the case with Jewish immigration from Ethiopia. Whereas Russian and Ukrainian Christian pilgrims in the last couple of years have flooded the streets of the Old City of Jerusalem, Coptic pilgrimage from Ethiopia has not increased dramatically. There is, therefore, a more clear connection between recent spikes in attendance at Ethiopian Coptic feasts and liturgies in Jerusalem with Jewish immigration from Ethiopia during the last few decades since Operations Moses, Joshua, and Solomon.

**EPILOGUE: PILGRIMAGE IN TURBULENT CONTEXTS AND THE ETHICS OF HISTORICAL BELIEF**

As a participant on numerous trips to sites sacred to Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Israel and the Occupied Territories, I have been struck by the extreme preponderance of time given by tour guides and those maintaining these sites to historical facts about events that occurred at these locations centuries if not millennia ago. At the same time, almost nothing is added to these descriptions about what has taken place in the Holy Land during the last hundred years—events that have certainly influenced the presentation of sites made to pilgrims and the general public. One hears little about
relatively recent pasts. But are such close-to-hand influences uninteresting or irrelevant to one's pilgrimage? I suggest that they are not. I admit, that as an historian I am personally guilty of oftentimes ignoring such relevant details, until forced out of academic slumber by events shaking the ground in the turbulent present.

Commonly, pilgrims are asked while on their journeys to put themselves in the sandals of those living in the past—to imagine what it was like when sacrifices were made at the Jewish Temple or when the first Christian pilgrimages took place. As if nothing of any real consequence has happened in the time since! This project, focused on the commonplace wide-reaching changes in the last one hundred years of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, is an attempt to begin to fill this deficit. One thing that cannot be denied, given the increased data generated by historians and anthropological fieldwork in the present, is that not only the “meanings” of ritual activity in Jewish, Islamic, and Christian pilgrimage have been regularly transformed but that this has often been the case with the performance of the rituals themselves! This is why I advocate the adoption of dissipative models for the study of pilgrimage. In spite of the purported enduring influence of sacred centers and so-called longstanding ritual traditions, pilgrimage practices in the Holy Land have regularly undergone substantive alterations. Pilgrimages, unequivocally, never maintain themselves as designed by their initial planners. Unforeseen developments continually modify these events. Dramatic political, demographic, and cultural change has swept over pilgrimage destinations like Jerusalem repeatedly in the last one hundred years. Obviously, what pilgrims have brought with them to their sacred journeys from diverse historical and geographical settings has also been highly variable. Sometimes, as witnessed above, even small-scale variations can bring about considerable change and even social upheaval. Please note, in this paper I am not making the argument that ritual change needs to be limited as it increases social volatility. When rituals fail to work for people, volatility can also be a consequence. As has been noted by social scientists like Max Weber and Kenelm Burridge, it is precisely at such points in time that new beliefs, practices, and leaders are likely to emerge. Sometimes carefully planned change, designed to reinvigorate and make relevant worn traditions can forestall major breakdowns, re-orderings, and disorder. Out of respect for ancient pilgrimage traditions, their performance deserves careful consideration and management.

When examining the last several decades of pilgrimage activity to and within the Holy Land, it is critical that investigators attend not just to broad social transformations
or what pilgrims bring with them from their various historical-cultural locations, but also to the activities of specialists who design, manage, and guide their journeys. We must ask specific questions like: Who is responsible for the production of the messages impressed upon pilgrims? With whom are these key players affiliated and what are the interests of the groups they represent? It is, moreover, simply not enough to inquire into the discrete “religious” purposes of pilgrims and pilgrimage organizers. While religious reasons should not be ignored, astute examination of what Pierre Bourdieu calls “symbolic economies” oftentimes reveals hidden interests as well as much competition and violence. Where “dis-interest” is feigned, one regularly encounters pilgrimages lending support to political, economic, and other community/individual interests (Bourdieu 1998). It is only when we follow Lubin in explicitly investigating the “civic spectacle” accompanying ritual performances that these connections come to light. Pilgrims may never ask questions like who is responsible for the presentations made at sacred sites or how does one become an official tour guide? This does not mean, however, that this information should be hidden from them. As understood by Turner, voluntary commitments to religious (and political) communities as well as the teachings that they advance are more robust than those garnered as a result of concealment and coercion. By resorting to such latter tactics, the weakness of traditions and authorities are revealed. The same can be argued vis-à-vis governmental supervision and oversight of pilgrimage. Actions taken ostensibly for the sake of protecting or promoting “religious” interests, often have profound political consequences. The processes for arriving at policies implemented by the Israeli government and Palestinian Authority (as well as other relevant political bodies) should not only be transparent but subject to revision. When government policy statements are revealed to be at odds with actions on the ground, the credibility of the ruling body—to local and international pilgrims alike—is called into question.

I think that historians, anthropologists, and others whose work is utilized by those engaged in the organization and management of contemporary pilgrimages have a professional, moral requirement to ask a couple more questions. First, what effect does the fruit of their labor have on pilgrimage and the societies in which this occurs in the present? Whether scholars are aware of it or not, their “academic” endeavors impact not only the experience of specific pilgrims but minimally both the communities that these participants come from and travel to. The work of historians and social scientists is (like
specific religious pilgrimages!) not performed in a vacuum—even those whose inquiries are directed at life in the ancient world.\(^1\) Second, I would encourage my colleagues to seriously ask themselves a much more general query: “For whom do we work?” While many of us both acknowledge and willingly take upon perceived debts to specific political, ethnic, and religious communities—in Jerusalem, the larger multi-cultural and historical picture dictates that we pay attention to more wide-ranging and far-reaching considerations. Listening to some religious Jews, Muslims, and Christians—as well as the occasional non-religious fanatic—one might think that only they have legitimate claim to revered and cherished sites that have drawn pilgrims from a variety of backgrounds for sometimes almost three thousand years. This clearly cannot be the case, unless history is reduced to propaganda and truth to the preference of the most powerful. Whether the topic is cultural preservation or the management of pilgrimage in the present, the rights of minority groups to the recovery of the past and religious freedom in the present should not simply be swept aside or covered over for the sake of the interests of dominant powers. As academics, we owe more than just this though. We are responsible for our representations of the past and the present to those who come after us, fully aware that the results of our inquiries are revisable and inviting the revisions.

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NOTES

1. Ilya Prigogine, the 1977 Nobel Prize winning Belgian chemist and physicist, postulated the existence of dissipative structures in the natural world that inevitably deteriorate and pass away. Initially trained as an historian and archaeologist, Prigogine—unlike his fellow “chaos scientists”—argued that his work was applicable to social phenomena as well. For a primer on anthropologists’ subsequent use of Prigogine’s complexity theory concerning non-equilibrium social structures, see Mosko 2005: 1–46. Good examples of the use of dissipative models in the social
sciences can be found in Albert 1995, Bentley and Maschner 2003, as well as Beekman and Baden 2005.

2. Victor Turner famously viewed rites of passage as social dramas that resolved tension and conflict in a society in addition to fostering “communitas.” In recent years, this view has been increasingly challenged—for example, see the collection of papers published in Eade and Sallnow 1991. Max Gluckman and his students working on the Bernstein Research Project like Moshe Shokeid and Don Handelman focused primarily on nation building and identity formation in peripheral Jewish communities. See the description of this undertaking in Shokeid 2004: 387–424.

3. In his *L’Archéologie du Savoir* (1969), Foucault argued that in a specific context or locus, cultural artifacts are best evaluated relative to others found horizontally in the same historical stratum rather than vertically across diverse historical strata. Discontinuity between the different layers of a so-called “single” tradition, even those occupying the same geographical locus, is common across what Foucault calls “*epistemes*” and Thomas Kuhn “paradigms”—historical “conditions for the possibility of.” A very compelling argument, for example, can be made that the earliest “Christians” resembled various Jews and pagans living in the same historical setting than they do their fellow “Christians” who live in very different historical and cultural contexts.

4. Langer, et. al. 2006: 2. The only change that I would make to the writers’ list of external “Contextual Aspects” would be to remove “history” from this list and make it a meta-category which could be applied to the list of “‘Internal’ Dimensions” as well.

5. My usage of the term “eisogetical” is similar to that found in Tuck 1990. For an excellent account of such influences on present day religious practices in Israel, see Bilu 2010 who documents the influence of Moroccan Jewish immigrants on contemporary Jewish pilgrimage practices.

6. Following Turner and Turner 1973, pilgrimage involves—like other rites of passage—passage through a transformative, liminal stage. Like Delaney (1990), who describes the return of the children of Turkish migrants working in Europe to their parents' villages of origin, I think that “non-religious” journeys can evoke similar experiences in secular travelers.
7. Other “non-religious” sites of pilgrimage in Israel include Mt. Herzl and Yad Vashem. See, especially, Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman 1997 as well as Bar 2010.

8. There exists a fairly large collection of “ethnographic” work about Jewish pilgrimages to Palestine—the result of the work of travelers, both Christian and Jewish—in the early twentieth and nineteenth centuries. Older descriptions of Jewish pilgrimage to Jerusalem are also available in the work of earlier sources such as Benjamin of Tudela (12th century), Rabbi Jacob (13th century), and Rabbi Isaac Chelo (14th century).

9. Such “legitimation” is of course established in many different ways, for example, through recourse to revelatory events (dreams, healings, etc.) connected with sites in the present. See Bilu 2010.

10. Research on this topic was performed in part by UHL graduate student Jong Hyun Yoo.


13. The scheduling of the Nebi Musa pilgrimage leads one to believe that it was intended by its designers to compete with Christian Holy Week, and perhaps to a lesser extent the Jewish Passover. The earliest reference we have to the site is from the time of Saladin in the 12th century. The Mamluke Sultan Baibar constructed a mosque here in the 13th century complete with a cenotaph for Moses.

14. Canaan 1927. As documented by Noga Kadman (2010: 58), 182 out of 418 depopulated Palestinian villages were located in what are now tourist, recreation, and Jewish heritage sites in Israel. See also Shai 2002.

15. While the Israeli government and many Jewish religious groups have separated themselves from such extreme messianism, the dedication occurred at the same time as “Temple Awareness Day” was observed by many in Israel. This event was sponsored by several groups including the Temple Institute and Israel National Radio—Arutz Sheva.
16. See, for example, the 8/12/10 Jerusalem Post article titled “Jerusalem police ‘ensures freedom of worship’ on Ramadan.” The text reads as follows:

   Thousands of police officers will be posted throughout east Jerusalem and the Old City on Friday, for the first Friday of Ramadan. A police statement said: “The officers will ensure freedom of worship for tens of thousands of Muslims that are expected to pray. Men aged 45–50 from the West Bank will be allowed into Jerusalem with special permission and all men over 50 will be let in. Women aged 30–45 will be allowed in with special permission, and women over 45 may enter Jerusalem freely.

17. See, for example, Raheb 2004. News correspondents from around the world report annually on pilgrimage to Bethlehem during the Christmas season.

18. UHL graduate students, most notably Laura Hull, performed fieldwork on the Palm Sunday pilgrimage from Aboud in 2009 and 2010.

19. UHL graduate student Samuel Martin, who has attended the celebration annually for almost a decade, performed interviews with several participants from Israel and the West Bank including several over the age of seventy-five on 11/16/2010.

20. There are a large number of Christian Zionist groups with diverse agendas. The oldest is CMJ Israel (The Church’s Ministry Amongst the Jewish People), while the most powerful is probably the International Christian Embassy. Today many Christian Zionist pilgrims associated with individual evangelists—like John Hagee and Benny Hinn—make a twenty-first century American pilgrimage to the Holy Land. It is not unusual today to see a bus carrying American pilgrims associated with groups like John Hagee’s Christians United for Israel to arrive in Silwan or Sheikh Jarrah in support of highly controversial Jewish settlement activity. As seen in the recent Pew Study (6/22/10), Christian Zionism and millenarianism often merges. 58% of white evangelicals think that Jesus will return in the near future.


22. Twain (1869: ch. 52) describes religious activity at Joseph's Tomb in Nablus/Shechem in 1867 in the following way: “Few tombs on earth command the veneration of so many races and men of divers creeds as this of Joseph. Samaritan and Jew, Moslem and Christian revere it and honor it with their visits.”
23. See the trips organized by the International Christian Embassy in Jerusalem for pilgrims to the Feast of Tabernacles on their website—http://int.icej.org


25. Arguably the two most attended Christian churches in Jerusalem fall into this category—namely, the King of Kings community located in the Clal Building or “Prayer Tower” at Davidka Square and Revive Israel's Ahavat Yeshua. The U.S. State Department’s 2010 International Religious Freedom Report estimated the number of Jewish/Messianic Christian believers in Israel at between 8,000 and 15,000. In the just released 2011 report this number increased to “approximately 20,000.”

26. See the Time Magazine article on this topic (6/6/2008).

27. In 2011, visa requirements for Ukrainian pilgrims were canceled as well.


29. Max Weber on numerous occasions outlined the typical rise to power of “charismatic” authorities amongst communities disenchanted with the world and in states of distress. See, for example, the “Sociology of Religion” and “Charisma and Its Transformation” in Weber 1978.

30. See Burridge 1969: 105–16. For Burridge, like Weber, the rise of charismatic leaders in millenarian communities is associated with movement in cultures from “old rules” to “no rules” to “new rules.”


REFERENCES


