The Glocal HIV/AIDS Epidemic and the Need for an Extended Theory of Power in International Relations

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This paper argues for an extended theory of power in International Relations (IR), using the example of the glocal HIV/AIDS epidemic. It will argue that world power relations depend not only on military, economic, social and cultural power, but also on the power of the human body itself. This argument builds on the author’s own theory of glocalised world power, which combines a Foucaultian with a structurationist approach to argue for the existence of four-faced power relationships across the following twelve interdependent sites of power: 1) time; 2) space; 3) knowledge and aesthetics; 4) morality and emotion; 5) identities; 6) the body; 7) welfare; 8) culture/cultural life; 9) civic associations; 10) the economy; 11) the organisation of violence and coercive relations; and 12) regulatory and legal institutions. Due to the interdependency of all of these sites, it is argued that HIV/AIDS not only has a detrimental effect on the power of the human body, but also on the power of human agency in all of the other sites, thereby constituting an important but often ignored power relationship both within world politics as well as within the academic discipline of IR itself.

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INTRODUCTION: THE GLARING ABSENCE OF HIV/AIDS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

More than 35 million people worldwide have so far died of HIV-related causes (WHO 2017), a figure that dwarfs the highest estimates of the Rwandan genocide (800,000), Khmer Rouge regime (up to 2 million), Holocaust (11 million), and Iraq war (up to 38,000) combined (Penketh 2006). Despite the devastating magnitude of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the vast as well as long-term global and regional variations in its political and socioeconomic causes and consequences, it is a subject that only recently emerged in International Relations (IR) literature and is still primarily limited to security studies. Browsing IR journals, one can find a few special issues on the subject (e.g., *International Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies* 8: 1 [2012]; *International Affairs* [March 2006]; *International Relations* 15: 6 [2001] and 19: 4 [2005]; and *Third World Quarterly* [2002]), but the IR theorists contained therein (Elbe, McInnes et al.) write mainly on the security aspects of the epidemic.

Although securitizing HIV/AIDS, both in theory and in practice, could have the effect of raising awareness and thus also resources to combat the disease, the dangers of doing so include increasing state control (McInnes and Rushton 2011: 129), overriding the civil liberties of persons living with the disease and brings into play a “threat-defense” logic “that could undermine international efforts to address the pandemic because it makes such efforts a function of narrow national interest rather than of altruism, because it allows states to prioritize AIDS funding for their elites and armed forces who play a crucial role in maintaining security, and because portraying the illness as an overwhelming ‘threat’ works against ongoing efforts to normalize social perceptions regarding HIV/AIDS” (Elbe 2006:119).

Nor is it obvious that HIV/AIDS should be securitized at all. According to McInnes and Rushton, HIV/AIDS has now returned from being an issue that was securitized by IR theorists and actors, such as the United Nations Security Council, in the mid-2000s to being an issue of “normalcy” (although they maintain that it remains securitized domestically within the U.S.) (McInnes and Rushton 2011: 129):

Between 2000 and 2005 there was a widespread assumption, reflected both in the International Relations literature and in statements by key policy-makers, that HIV/AIDS had become well established as an international security issue. We suggest that in fact the strength of the
international consensus over HIV/AIDS as a security issue tended to be overstated; that within a few years that consensus seems to have dissipated (not least in the Security Council), and significant doubts had emerged over the evidence for the supposed links between HIV and security. (McInnes and Rushton 2010: 225)

The omission of HIV/AIDS from mainstream IR theory and its isolation to security studies has not gone unnoticed—Stefan Elbe, himself a security specialist, writes:

> Despite the international scope of the AIDS pandemic, and the growing involvement of a number of prominent international organizations in its management, the discipline of international relations still lags notably behind many [other] related fields in studying these effects. Only very recently has the AIDS pandemic begun to make inroads into the core of the field through the efforts of a small group of scholars exploring the implications of the pandemic for international security. (Elbe 2006: 120)

Those who write on the global political and socioeconomic causes and effects of the disease mainly originate from other disciplines, such as political science, economics and sociology. A more general perusal of mainstream IR literature provides little evidence of the subject having penetrated the deeper debates on the content and contours of IR theory itself—indeed studies of HIV/AIDS have remained mainly empirical in content and have not made a significant theoretical contribution to IR (Harman and Brown 2013: 85). Again, what little theoretical debate there is on the issue centres on the relevance of the epidemic for the contours of security studies specifically, which is only one of the many sub-disciplines that constitute IR theory. The recent emergence of Global Health studies does something to rectify this but so far this also seems to be a sub-discipline that focuses mainly on the security aspects of global health (ISA website, 2016).

One possible explanation for the hitherto exclusion of HIV/AIDS from the conceptual frameworks of mainstream IR theories could be the continued dominance of the discipline by Western, so-called developed countries when it comes to deciding what should be considered to be matters of global political importance. Even though the majority of HIV/AIDS cases are found in non-Western, so-called developing countries, it is these countries that are still generally underrepresented in mainstream IR theory (Thomas and Wilkin 2004: 241). Another possible reason for mainstream IR’s silence on HIV/AIDS could be that as a primarily sexually transmitted disease, it simply does not figure in the
discipline’s conception of what constitutes a relevant topic for theoretical discussion. As shall be expanded upon below, however, it is the argument here (as well as that of many other theorists in other disciplines) that HIV/AIDS is not just a biological condition, but both affects and is strongly affected by global social inequalities (Barnett and Whiteside 2006). As such, it is a subject that should be highly relevant for mainstream IR theory, but most likely remains excluded due to a continued bias within the discipline towards issues considered to be of importance to Western policy makers, as decades of critique by feminists and post-colonialists have made clear.

Whatever the reasons for its continued absence, the fact that very little is currently written about HIV/AIDS in mainstream IR is not just a theoretical miss, but also constitutes a very real, serious and, above all, pressing problem. Those who do write about it, within the sub-discipline of security studies, are in some disagreement as to whether the disease constitutes a matter of national, international or human security, but they have all been united for quite some time in pinpointing the epidemic as a matter of utmost urgency both for international policy makers and IR theorists themselves. The HIV/AIDS epidemic has been considered to be perhaps the greatest security threat from disease since the bubonic plague ravaged Europe between 1346 and 1351 and the short- and long-run impacts vary considerably (Ostergard 2002: 346–7). It has already ravaged the political and socioeconomic landscape of many parts of the world, leaving scars that will remain for many decades, if not centuries to come—and yet it is hardly mentioned at all in mainstream IR literature. When it is mentioned, it is under the rubric of security, which is itself a matter of enormous normative contention.

It is the aim of this paper to suggest ways to rectify this, by changing the very parameters of IR to include issues such as HIV/AIDS, rather than excluding them to the sidelines by default. To do this, IR needs to rethink which power relations are relevant to the study of international relations and which structures and agents are to be studied. This paper is structured around this question, starting with an account of how theorists from other disciplines outside IR have treated HIV/AIDS. The contested global territories and histories of HIV/AIDS will be discussed and the argument will be made for the claim that HIV/AIDS is currently glocalised to sub-Saharan Africa. Then ensues a discussion of whose bodies matter in IR theory, followed by the argument for a definition of world power as structurated relations between world polities across twelve sites of power, to better encapsulate phenomena such as HIV/AIDS in mainstream IR theory.
GLOBALISATION THEORISTS ON HIV/AIDS

Outside the discipline of IR, the volume of academic writing on the social causes and effects of HIV/AIDS is not only vast, but is also extremely rich and diverse in content. Many theorists focus on the global impact of the disease, as well as the especially devastating effect it has had and threatens to continue to have, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. What distinguishes these globalisation theories of HIV/AIDS from those of IR is that here there is little focus on the concepts of human or inter-/national security (although some authors do include security as one of the many problems related to the disease)—rather, the primary concern is with the global cultural, social, economic and political causes and effects of the virus. Many are united in the view that the modern-day phenomenon of globalisation has not only facilitated the rapid spread of the disease, but could also, if managed appropriately, provide the means with which to contain it.

AIDS “is both a product and a cause of globalization” (Altman 2008: 145) and “fits the common understanding of globalisation in a number of ways, including its epidemiology, the mobilization against its spread, and the dominance of certain discourses in the understandings of the epidemic” (Altman 2001: 69). Although many theorists agree on the basic premise that the spread of HIV/AIDS has been greatly fueled by globalisation and its effects on cultural and socio-economic structures, there is less agreement about the spatial and temporal boundaries of this so-called globalisation (as is the case with broader globalisation debates in general), as well as on the nature of the structural inequalities that it produces. As will be examined in the following section, some argue that it is a relatively recent phenomenon, with its roots in twentieth century global politics and culture and the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) etc., while others contend that its roots go as far back as the slave trade and colonialism, if not further. Furthermore, some theorists contest the idea of temporally or spatially determining the spread of HIV/AIDS altogether, arguing that this only reifies racist institutional attitudes that HIV/AIDS is the developing world’s problem. This paper will begin, however, by accounting for the two underlying premises that unite most of these theorists.

The first point on which most globalisation theorists are agreed is that the movement of people caused by this globalisation—most notably through urbanization and migration trends—has greatly contributed to the spread of the disease, both across continents as well as within nation-states themselves (Altman 2008:147 and 2001:70). This basic claim, that patterns of migration have contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS, could
be used to support the arguments made by those IR theorists and policy makers who wish to securitise the disease, so that it can be contained within nation-state boundaries. However, for many globalisation theorists, the causes and effects of HIV/AIDS cannot simply be attributed to the movement of people alone—gendered, cultural and socio-economic inequalities all play their part in contributing to the spread of the disease. Indeed, as Nana Poku and Alan Whiteside so succinctly put it, being mobile in and of itself is not a risk factor for HIV/AIDS: “it is the situations they encounter and the behaviours in which they may engage while they are travelling and living away from home that lead to an increased vulnerability to HIV/AIDS” (Poku and Whiteside 2017: xx). Moreover,

- one common feature in both the rich and poor world is that HIV spreads among people at the margins of society, the poor and dispossessed. In Africa many are poor. (Whiteside 2002: 314)

The second point on which many globalisation authors are agreed is the link between HIV/AIDS and poverty, stemming from the fact that the disease is still highly concentrated in certain parts of the world, notably those already suffering from other diseases and epidemics. According to Whiteside, “the causal chain runs from macro-factors, which result in poverty through the community, household and individual, into the capacity of the individual’s immune system” (Whiteside 2002: 316). Poverty is not only a contributing cause of infection, it is also deepened by HIV/AIDS. The epidemic has “undermine[d] efforts at poverty reduction, income and asset distribution, productivity and economic growth” and “reversed progress towards international development goals” (Whiteside 2002: 325). Poku, citing United Nations (UN) and World Health Organisation (WHO) data, states that the glaring fact is that 95% of the global distribution of HIV infections and AIDS cases are located in the developing world (Poku 2005: 7). The link between HIV and poverty is not a straightforward one, however. At the macro level, for example, the relationship between poverty and the HIV virus is weak, since a majority of the global poor, for the time being anyway, remain unaffected by the virus (Poku 2000: 46)—but Poku maintains that poverty is one of the major contributing factors to the African continent’s particular vulnerability to the disease (Poku 2002: 535). And indeed, medical experts like Paul Farmer, also attribute differences in global health to global inequalities, particularly economic ones, both within and across national-state boundaries (Farmer 2005: 20).
Globalisation theorists seem thus to be united in the view that the spread of HIV/AIDS has been greatly facilitated by globalisation and that structural inequalities, especially economic ones, are the underlying causes for vulnerability to the virus. However, there is some disagreement as to how to define this globalisation, as well as on the weight given to the various structural inequalities in question.

THE CONTESTED GLOBAL TERRITORIES AND HISTORIES OF HIV/AIDS

As already mentioned, some theorists contend that the globalisation that is relevant to the spread of HIV/AIDS and its predominance in developing countries is a modern-day phenomenon. Freedman and Poku, for example, focus on the political economy of HIV/AIDS, arguing that the WB’s Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) are largely to blame for the African continent’s particular vulnerability to the HIV/AIDS virus (Freedman and Poku 2005: 676). Poku in particular is mainly concerned with the contemporary effects of globalisation, believing that it has made the African state irrelevant (Poku 2000: 40–1). He also, however, maintains a broad view on the many cultural and socio-economic causes of HIV/AIDS, such as “poverty, famine and food shortage, inadequate sanitation and health care, the subordination of women and fiscal policies that allocate insufficient resources to the social sectors” (Poku and Whiteside 2017: xxi–xxii).

Linge and Porter agree with Poku’s primary focus on modern-day economic structures, claiming that

the 1980s saw a paradigm shift in the economic management of many developed countries. Globalisation was used as the imperative for pursuing competitiveness which, in turn, provided a raison d’être for deregulating the economy, dismantling publicly funded welfare institutions and encouraging individual initiative….In this climate there was little sympathy for groups, like those living with HIV/AIDS, who by their non-conforming behaviours had apparently brought problems on themselves. (Linge and Porter 1997: 13)

For Barnett and Whiteside, AIDS is also a symptom of modern-day global inequalities—although they do briefly trace the history of these inequalities, claiming that, for the last five centuries, Africa has experienced an abnormal normality (Barnett and Whiteside 2006: 143–45). Altman writes that the spread of the virus has made a mockery of national sovereignty claiming that it is the growing internationalization of trade in both
sex and drugs that has played a major role in the diffusion of HIV, and its rapid spread into almost every corner of the world (Altman 2001: 71). Other theorists, however, point the finger of blame for the rapid spread of the disease solely at past forms of globalisation. Susan Hunter, for example, investigates how the slave trade, colonialism, labour exploitation and the Cold War affected the health of Africans for many generations to come (Hunter 2003: 54).

Others question whether HIV/AIDS is a global disease at all. Altman and Buse write “[i]t is no longer possible to suggest that HIV is a global pandemic that will see the horrific figures from southern and eastern Africa reached in other parts of the world.” They emphasise that it is a disease that unequally affects “the most vulnerable and marginalised, in terms of geography, gender and behaviour” (Altman and Buse 2012: 131).

Some theorists contest the idea of temporally and spatially defining the epidemic altogether, however. Cindy Patton writes that many attempts to geographically map the epidemic have been rooted in institutional racism, stating that “although the simple scheme of world patterns may originally have had broad scientific and heuristic value in preparing for a pandemic, it quickly took on a narrative life of its own, offering supranational policy makers and news reporters a veneer of scientific objectivity for what were essentially racist and class-disadvantaging representations of local epidemics” (Patton 2002: xi–xii). Irwin et al. agree with Patton, arguing that the myth that AIDS is primarily an African problem needs to be displaced altogether (Irwin et al. 2003: 1–2).

Indeed, the very history of the geographical origin of the HIV virus is itself a highly politically contested issue. In a famous speech, the South African president, Thabo Mbeki, attributed Africa’s particular vulnerability to the virus to poverty and Western exploitation (Boseley 2008). The idea that the virus was brought to the continent by the West is strongly adhered to by many people on the African continent, with some politicians and religious leaders advocating against the use of condoms, since these too are believed to be infected (e.g., McGreal 2007). One Western historian, Edward Hooper, supports the suggestion that the virus was brought to the continent, tracing its origins back to trials for a polio vaccine in the 1950s (Hooper 1999). Other historians, however, such as John Iliffe, maintain that current biological evidence on the genetic evolution of the disease has “effectively ruled out [Hooper’s] theory […] a theory also contradicted by negative tests on surviving vaccine samples.” Instead, Iliffe traces the origins of the virus back to the transmission to human beings of the ancient and related simian immunodeficiency virus
(SIV), an infection of monkeys in western equatorial Africa that also spread to chimpanzees (Iliffe 2006: 3–9).

The main reason for the heated debate over the historical, geographical origins of the disease lies not only with the stigma that is attached to the virus, but also with the racist connotations underlying the apportion of blame. In his book entitled *AIDS & Accusation—Haiti and the Geography of Blame*, Paul Farmer highlights the devastating impact that such racist connotations and stigma can have on a population—in this case, when Haitians were blamed for having brought the virus to the U.S. (Farmer 2006). Indeed, even if it is proven beyond a doubt that the virus originated in western Africa, the question remains why it has so severely and yet so diversely affected the African continent. For although sub-Saharan Africa currently accounts for ca. 60% of global HIV infection, there are also several strains of the virus, not all of which have yet taken hold and spread (UNAIDS 2005), and there are also several cultural and social contexts within African nation-states that determine the extent of infection within that area (Barnett and Whiteside 2006). Attempts to find one single African reality that ignores the regional variation of infection on the continent are thus not only analytically flawed, but are also in danger of explicit racism.

**THE CURRENT GLOCALISATION OF HIV/AIDS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

It is, therefore, perhaps analytically more useful to speak of a current glocalisation of the HIV/AIDS virus to sub-Saharan Africa. Although the concept of glocalisation was initially introduced to signify the interplay between global and local culture and identities (Robertson 1992), it can also be used to signify the interplay between other global and local social phenomena, such as political or economic processes. Rather than there being one single globalised reality or lots of different localised ones, glocalisation reflects the many local variants that exist of global phenomena, such as the many local variants of the globalised social causes and effects of HIV/AIDS. Indeed, this is how the concept will be used in this paper. It will thus be argued that Africa’s particular vulnerability to the disease has not only to do with global factors, both past and present, but also to do with varying local cultural, social, economic and political contexts that heighten the vulnerability of some parts of the continent and lessen that of others. This is not to say that there are not unifying factors that link one part of Africa with another and that make the continent as a whole currently more susceptible to the HIV/AIDS virus. However, the fact that there has
also been an increase in infection in other parts of the world, such as India, reveals that sub-Saharan Africa is not alone in facing the challenges of HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS 2016).

As shall be argued in the concluding part of this paper, the current global differences in vulnerability to the HIV virus depend on both global, structural inequalities, as well as behavioural actions on the part of both individuals and policy makers alike. Mainstream IR theory, therefore, needs to account for all of these aspects of the epidemic—something which it thus far seems to have been unable to do. This means incorporating the concept of the body into the mainstream IR theoretical toolbox, so that the discipline’s more basic concepts, such as the concept of power, can be broadened to include phenomena such as the global inequalities of HIV/AIDS. Indeed, if the discipline continues to use very narrow concepts of power in its analyses of global politics, it may even risk helping to maintain institutionally racist or stigmatized concepts of the body and HIV/AIDS that apportion the blame and responsibility for the virus solely on individuals in the African continent, without acknowledging the other multifaceted and glocalised sites of the disease.

**WHOSE POWER & BODIES MATTER?—DEFINING THE HUMAN BODY IN IR THEORY**

The body is not just skin and bones, an assemblage of parts, a medical marvel…The body is also, and primarily, the self. We are all embodied. Obvious though this may be, what it means in practice is not always so obvious. Controversies rage about the ownership of the body, the boundaries, its meaning, its value, the criteria of life and death, and how it should be lived, and loved….The body is not a “given,” but a social category with different meanings imposed and developed by every age, and by different sectors of the population. As such it is therefore sponge-like in its ability to absorb meanings, but also highly political. (Synnot 1993: 1)

How then can mainstream IR theory hope to include HIV/AIDS, when there is an inherent bias within the discipline (bar a few exceptions, such as Johan Galtung) to only focus on security and those forms of violence that are caused by military conflict, thus leaving out other forms of structural violence such as poverty and other social inequalities, all of which are proven to have an effect on the prevalence of HIV/AIDS? Well, to begin with, it needs to contend with its narrow concept of power, in order to include all forms of social power
that are relevant to all human beings across the world, rather than just those that are typically highlighted in mainstream IR analysis, such as the military, economic and cultural power of (primarily state) political actors. And to do this, it needs to include a concept of the human body as more than just a biological construct.

The human body, in its constitution, is the very essence of politics, for without it there can be no human agency and thus no relationships of power. However, the body is not merely the vessel through which politics happens, but is in itself a very important part of the reciprocal relationship between agency and structure. It is, as the above Synnott quotation so eloquently puts it, a “highly political” “social category” that is “sponge-like in its ability to absorb meanings” Indeed, it is argued in this paper that the body constitutes one of twelve sites of power (see next section)—as fundamental a resource of power as any other.

This paper argues that the origin of social inequalities between human beings lies in the very theoretical construction of the concept of the human being itself. For, as the post-modernist debates of the late-twentieth century have revealed, any attempts to locate social inequalities can no longer be attempted without first deconstructing the core concepts at the very root of the discourse.

This is not a petty meta-theoretical point—on the contrary, it is a highly political one. As feminists and post-colonialists worldwide have shown, it is the phrasing of such discourses that have helped to maintain the conceptual and thus, more importantly, the practical divides between human beings, resulting in social divides that have included some individuals within the concept of humanity and excluded others.

More often than not, the answers to the questions—Who counts? Who is to be considered hu-man?—have been politically exclusive, focusing on the concerns of some and not of the majority of others. This crisis of human classification is as relevant today as it ever has been, as the world remains divided by the most fundamental human characteristics and thus continues to witness the most inhumane atrocities known to humankind, from genocide to torture, as well as the less visible but at times equally life-threatening suffering of the socially excluded masses.

It is probably no coincidence, therefore, that one of the main theorists of power, Michel Foucault, dedicated a great deal of his life’s work to the subject of tracing the social and thus political roots of the definition of the human body and subject. In his *History of Sexuality*, he wrote that “power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the
race, and the large-scale phenomena of population….The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed” (Foucault 1978: 137–39).

Indeed power, defined here as the capacity to act as a social agent in society (see next section), can also be defined as the social “organisation of power over life,” as Foucault would have it. The life of the human body, in its many social and cultural variations, is what is under focus in any study of power—simply focusing on the crucial moments or events when brutal force is used against it, or on one economic, cultural or social structure of power that shapes it, ignores the many other ways in which the social organisation of the body shapes and delimits an individual’s capacities to act as a social agent in society.

This paper argues that the many varied ways in which the human body is organised enable the capacities of some agents and disable those of others, forming the social hierarchies and orders that divide and rule world society. Most importantly, it seeks to highlight the fact that today, over 36.7 million people in the world are severely limited in their social capacities (UNAIDS 2017)—indeed, many of them face premature death—due to a disease that it is certainly not beyond the capacities of humanity as a whole to eliminate, namely HIV/AIDS. Furthermore, this paper seeks to highlight the importance of these social inequalities in determining who contracts the disease in the first place. For it is not just the simple case that one individual action—e.g., one individual conducting unprotected sex or drug-use—leads to infection, even though this is certainly the primary causal factor, but rather this individual action needs to be analyzed in the context of a multitude of actions or inactions on the part of global polities that lead to the social inequalities that make some individuals more vulnerable to infection than others.

**WORLD POWER AS STRUCTURATED RELATIONS BETWEEN WORLD POLITIES ACROSS TWELVE SITES OF POWER**

Power is defined here as the capacity of human agents (as socially constituted rather than sovereign individuals) to re-/act in all (or most) social relations, by drawing upon a number of issues and resources (both social and material). This is based on a combined Foucaultian /structurated approach that I expanded upon in my Ph.D. thesis at The London School of Economics and Political Science (Hughes 2009). The rest of this paper outlines the main points of that argument, the basic premise being that a theory of world power should be
able to account for relations of power that exist both independently of and interdependently with state relations in world society. For if non-state actors are to be truly incorporated into IR theory (and not just added on as an afterthought), then the discipline has at least to be theoretically prepared to include both individuals and collective actors from all levels of world society, even if the prevalence of these actors can vary over time and space. Thus, in this theory of power, I take world society to be that which is formed by the interaction of polities on a global level—that is, a world of polities.

A polity in this theory denotes an entity with a significant measure of institutionalisation, identity and capacity to mobilise persons for value satisfaction (or relief from value deprivation) in world relations. This definition differs from Ferguson and Mansbach’s original definition (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996: 34) in that it does not include the concept of hierarchy, thus enabling the analysis of more diffuse forms of human interaction, as well as more traditional, hierarchical forms of polity, such as the state.

The paper argues that there is always at least a potential for individuals and collective actors from any part of world society to be a part of the larger picture and change its structures. Accordingly, the paper suggests the use of “world society” and “polities” (instead of “international relations” and “states”), which eliminates the unhelpful distinction that is traditionally made in IR theory between state and non-state actors. This also means that it is possible to include all political processes of power that are relevant on a global scale. These polities can comprise of individuals and/or collective actors from all levels of world society.

Unlike most structuration theory, however, which only includes time and space as the third dimensions through which structures/relationships operate, I also take time and space themselves to constitute issues or resources over which humans can compete. I will expand on this below, but the persistence of colonial or patriarchal structures/relationships, as well as the competition over their histories, are some examples of time and space as structurated resources and issues of social power.

However, the notion that there are an infinite number of resources or issues that unite or divide humanity is illusional, since there are only so many issues or resources over which humanity competes. These relate to fundamental human needs and desires—which, although multiple, are certainly not infinite. This argument, however, brings us dangerously close to the dividing fault-line between Foucaultianism and structurationism. For while Ferguson and Mansbach (in true Foucaultian spirit) rather unhelpfully claim that
there are as many issues or resources as there are actors and structures (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996: 30), Giddens, Mann and Bourdieu all restrict their respective lists to only include four such issues, or as they call them “sources” or “resources” of power. They divide re-/sources into: 1) political; 2) economic; 3) cultural/ideological/symbolic/discourse and; 4) social/legal/military power (Giddens 1984: 33; Mann 1986: 17; Parker 2000 (on Bourdieu): 48). The vast difference in the actual content of each of these four definitions naturally goes without saying, as it is near to impossible to conceive of social and military re-/sources, for example, as denoting similar relationships of power. For although these re-/sources may and frequently do overlap, they cannot be said to mean the same thing. Indeed, the very fact that theorists so fundamentally disagree on what constitutes these re-/sources or issues of power reveals that there must be much more to the story than each of the four-faceted approaches can possibly recognise on their own.

In an attempt to bridge the Foucaultian/structurationist divide in this matter, therefore, it is the argument here that a compromise must be sought. For at the same time as the structurationist definitions fail to sufficiently cover the vast scope of re-/sources over which humanity competes, Ferguson and Mansbach’s definition (where the possible number of issues totals the number of structures and agents) is useful only to a historian or an anthropologist, and not a social theorist wishing to more generally map the relationships of power that are possible in the human world. I have, therefore, chosen to use and augment an already much more extensive definition of re-/sources/issues offered by David Held in his account of nautonomic structures.

Nautonomy, according to Held, “refers to the asymmetrical production and distribution of life-chances which limit and erode the possibilities of political participation”—in other words, a reversed concept of autonomy or freedom. Nautonomic structures, states Held, are shaped by the availability of a diverse range of socially patterned resources, from the material, through the coercive to the cultural—all of which can undermine or corrode the principle of autonomy. Thus, a theory of power which can disclose nautonomic structures and processes is “potentially a theory which can highlight obstacles to the empowerment of persons as equally free agents in a community” (Held 1995: 170–72). In order to disclose these nautonomic structures, Held claims that we must analyse seven sites of power:

1) The Body: how physical and emotional wellbeing are organised;
2) Welfare: organisation of the domain of goods and services that aids the transition of the citizen from private person to full membership of the community;

3) Site of Culture/Cultural Life: those realms of social activity where matters of public interest and identity can be discussed, where differences of opinion can be explored and where local custom and dogma can be examined;

4) The Sphere of Civic Associations: the array of institutions and organisations in and through which individuals or groups can pursue their own projects independently of the direct organisation of the state or of economic collectivities such as corporations or trade unions;

5) The Economy: the collective organisation of the production, distribution, exchange and consumption of goods and services;

6) The Organisation of Violence and Coercive Relations: concentrated physical force for/against the community; and

7) The Sphere of Regulatory and Legal Institutions: the state as an independent corporation, made up of an ensemble of organisations (Held 1995: 176–85).

These sites of power constitute an interaction context or institutional milieu in and through which power operates to shape the capacities of people—“that is, to mould and circumscribe their life-chances, effective participation and share in public decision-making.” Each site may operate independently, or shape and delimit other sites (Held 1995: 173). Autonomy (and thus the extent of political agency) in a site of power can be detected by three indicators: 1) whether and to what extent people have access to that site; 2) whether opportunities within the site are open or closed; and 3) whether outcomes (e.g., education levels, jobs, range of cultural activities) are biased in favour of certain groups or interests (Held 1995: 176).

At this point, it should be clear that all of the aforementioned theorists, from Giddens, Bourdieu and Foucault through to Held, are essentially talking about the same thing, namely human freedoms. For regardless of whether one chooses to call these freedoms re-/sources, issues or sites of power, they all fundamentally denote the same concept—namely the organisation (through relationships) of resources on which humans can draw upon in order to be able to act freely. And it is interesting to note that Held, although initially entitling them as “sites” of power, then interchanges between the words ‘sphere’ (sites 4 and 7) and ‘site’ (site 3) (Held 1995: 176–85). There is no apparent reason for this interchange of terminology and so—in my modification of his theory—I have opted
for the word ‘site’ throughout, as it in my view better denotes the idea of a node of human interaction than the words ‘sphere’, ‘freedom’, ‘re-/source’ or ‘issue’, all of which sound much more diffuse and thus void of human action. And although Held’s seven sites of power certainly offer a more detailed view of the number of resources over which humanity competes than the previous four-faceted attempts, there are still in my view a few sites missing.

As already mentioned, the concepts of time and space are fundamental to any analysis of society. And these are usually included as the necessary but relegated third dimensions in most structurationist theories—through which power and other relationships operate. However, it is one of the main arguments of this paper that they also constitute sites of power. To begin with the concept of space, although Held, like Foucault, accounts for the human body as a site of power, both seem to forget about the planet Earth as a body—i.e., the natural environment. In general, the spatial (geographical and environmental) organisation of social life—as a competition over, for example, natural resources, demography and urbanisation—is fundamental to relationships of power across the world. And the site of space, as all the other sites, interplays with the site of time—namely, the historical organisation of social life. Relevant with regard to the site of time are, for example, the ongoing effects of colonialism and the continued prevalence of patriarchal structures around the world. For although the site of time may have its origins in the past, it is relevant today to the extent that certain relationships of power are still maintained in the present. I call this the ghost of agency and will return to it later.

There are also, in my view, three cognitive sites of power that are missing from Held's account. These are the sites of power that are internalised within each individual human being but which interact on an aggregate level through socialisation processes. They are thus just as dependent on processes of human interaction as other sites of power—and, just like the other sites of power, may operate independently, or shape and delimit other sites. The first is the site of knowledge and aesthetics (linguistic, visual and sonic discourses)—again, a central concept to Foucault and other post-modernists, as well as Gramscian concepts of hegemony. This site can be exemplified in world power relations by the dominance of modern Western academic and political discourses on development, democracy and Orientalism/Occidentalism, as well as by the ongoing battles between Hollywood/Bollywood and various other forms of popular art and music around the world.
The second of the cognitive sites to be included is the site of morality and emotion—argued here to be distinct from the former cognitive site in that this one denotes core psychological ethical and emotional codes, as opposed to the more rationalised or intellectualised ones of knowledge and aesthetics. For although these two sites, like all of the others, affect each other, the distinction I am trying to make here is between the rationalising of core beliefs and emotions (the site of knowledge and aesthetics), and the actual core beliefs or feelings themselves (the site of morality and emotion). Examples of the latter include the deep-rooted ethical struggles between religion and secularism (as emotional struggles, not intellectualised debates), or equally contested and core emotional dichotomies such as the belief in monogamy or polygamy, respectively.

The third and final cognitive site of power to be included here is the site of identities. This is held to be separate and distinct from Held’s site of culture/cultural life, which denotes the public and local—thus collective—organisation of identity. The cognitive site of identities that I have added here denotes instead the organisation of social life around the individual Self/Other, and as such is distinct from more organised Self/Other processes on a collective level. Examples of this include gender, race, ethnicity and class on the individual level—all of which can lead to a struggle within the same individual and thus lead to diverse struggles of power within supposedly homogenous human collectives (as found in Held’s site) such as gender, race, ethnicity, and class. Indeed, this site problematizes the very concept of homogeneity, for, as Foucault so succinctly put it:

[the individual or subject ] is not a substance. It is a form, and this form is not primarily or always identical to itself. You do not have the same type of relationship to yourself when you constitute yourself as a political subject who goes to vote or speak at a meeting and when you are seeking to fulfill your desires in a sexual relationship. Undoubtedly there are relationships and interferences between these different forms of the subject; but we are not dealing with the same type of subject. In each case, one plays, one establishes a different type of relationship to oneself.

(Foucault 1996: 440)

My own account of the—now twelve—sites of power is therefore as follows:

1) The Site of Time: the historical organisation of social life, including the ghosts of agency, e.g., Westphalian polity, colonialism, patriarchal structures etc.
2) The Site of Space: the geographical and environmental organisation of social life, e.g., natural resources, demography, urbanisation etc.

3) The Site of Knowledge and Aesthetics: the organisation of social life around knowledge and discourse, e.g., discourses such as development, democracy, Orientalism/ Occidentalism etc.

4) The Site of Morality and Emotion: the organisation of social life around morality and emotion, e.g., religion versus secularism, monogamy versus polygamy etc.

5) The Site of Identities: the organisation of social life around the Self and the Other, e.g., gender, race, ethnicity, class etc.

6) The Site of the Body: as Held’s definition above

7) The Site of Welfare: as Held’s definition above

8) The Site of Culture/Cultural Life: as Held’s definition above

9) The Site of Civic Associations: as Held’s definition above

10) The Site of the Economy: as Held’s definition above

11) The Site of the Organisation of Violence and Coercive Relations: as Held’s definition above

12) The Site of Regulatory and Legal Institutions: as Held’s definition above

Unlike most other theories of power, I do not give any of these sites of power precedence over the others. That is to say, economic or military power (in sites 10 and 11, respectively) are not considered to be more or less powerful than any of the other sites. For while it is certainly possible that the site of the organisation of violence and coercive relations (military power) is more effective than all the other sites of power, this does not necessarily have to be the case. Therefore, such potential empirical facts must be kept distinct from any such conceptual distinctions in the theory. Indeed, due to the interdependency of all of the sites, military power usually does not have precedence over other forms of power (except in the final, total act of war), as it requires all of the other sites to survive. This brings us to the concept of existential power which can come in many different forms. For military power is not the only form of power that can take the life of human agency through total domination — this is also possible through economic, legal or other social means. And again, although social death is at least potentially reversible, until this is actually done, the effects of total domination on human agency remain the same — leaving no possibilities for action and resistance. As Foucault made clear, such instances are rare, but the fact that they can and do occur means that a theory of power must take them into account.
Accounting for the sites of power alone will not suffice for a study of the relations of power that operate within and across them—indeed, to do so would amount to little more than a singularly structural account of power. For, as I have tried to make clear, these sites, or structures, cannot exist—or, in the case of the physical ones such as the body, have no social meaning—without human relationships. And these relationships cannot exist at all without human agency. How then does the agency of power operate? Here, I turn to more traditional notions of political power—namely those describing the political decision-making process—most famously summarised in the by now classical faces of power debate (see Dahl, Robert-Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S.-Lukes, Steven et al.). This may seem to be a most odd turn for a supposedly relational theory of power, in that the faces of power debate typically saw power as “transparent, expressed in an unambiguous and empirically demonstrable way in the decision-making process” (Hay 2002: 171). The point is, however, that including the concepts of decisions, non-decisions and manipulation does not necessarily need to result in a definition of power as transparent and observable. Indeed, it is certainly not my intention to define power as such, or as a zero-sum game for that matter—another criticism made of more traditional faces of power definitions (Hay 2002: 173). I maintain instead that power exists within and across all of the aforementioned sites of power, not as an observable entity in itself, but rather as a potentially endless number of both observable and unobservable reciprocal relationships. However, these relationships, by their very definition, need human agency, and thus the exercise or practice of power, to survive. This human agency can be sub-conscious and without motive, but it still needs to include the vital ingredient, namely, action itself. And action, fundamentally, is about making decisions—however sub-conscious or concealed these may be. Indeed, action cannot exist at all without the decision-making process and vice versa. Not all—indeed, probably very few—of these decisions will ever be observable or even entirely conscious, but they nonetheless exist.

This can again be exemplified with the more traditional and favoured example of military power. As already mentioned, holding a gun to someone’s head is only one of the many forms of existential power available to humanity. And it also needs to be viewed as something more than the simple question of whether one take someone else’s life. For behind that decision lie a multitude of other—individual and collective—decisions that have already been made. These are the more cognitive ones, denoted in my additional sites of power. To take someone’s life, for example—except in the rare cases of psychotic
illnesses or accidents—is never a random act, but involves cognitive evaluations and, thus, decisions over different types of action that are deemed to be required at different times—i.e., social and ethical conditioning. A culture that endorses violence, for example, is more likely to pull the trigger than a culture that endorses pacifist actions. Thus, the decision of whether or not to pull the trigger has already, to some extent, been made before the actual decision itself. This is not to say that it cannot be reversed—i.e., that another decision cannot be made—but it does mean that it is not the case of one simple, observable decision-making process. Patriarchy is another example of this. The decision of whether or not to employ a woman in a work place may also in some cases be pre-made, depending on the gendered conditioning of the employer. If the employer has a more gender-neutral predisposition, the decision will depend more on the employee’s merits and the interview than in the case of an employer who has a gender-biased predisposition either for or against female employees.

This argument is not an attempt to null and void the notion of responsibility from human action, but it is an undertaking to problematise the notion of the decision-making process as a simple case of singular decisions that are without precedence. Indeed, to make alternative decisions to the socialised pre-made one may sometimes require decisions made on a larger, more collective scale than that of the individual—i.e., by a culture that decides to change and adopt a more pacifist or gender-neutral approach to social life.

This said, a multitude of decisions remains a multitude of decisions. They do not have to be conscious, or an organised chain of events—indeed, it is rarely the case that decision Z has been preceded by decisions X and Y in a linear sequence. On the contrary, there can be many decisions occurring separately or simultaneously, both within and between individuals. It is rather like the question of structure and agency, in that it resembles the chicken and egg scenario—and, just as in the case of structuration, it is not really that important which did come first. The important thing is that decisions are being made—consciously or sub-consciously—that favour one type of action, or outcome, over another.

The inclusion of outcomes to this concept of power may seem to signal that it is, after all, a question of a zero-sum game. For as Colin Hay points out, the problem with such approaches is the notion that “[i]f Anna has power [and] Ben does not, the extent of Anna’s power is the extent of Ben’s lack of power” (Hay 2002: 173). Thus, if Anna affects the outcome, Ben does not and power as such is a zero-sum game of win or lose. This is
not, however, the approach I am advocating. Like Foucault, I argue that Ben can have as much power as Anna to affect the outcome—and this requires action on both parts, and therefore necessarily decisions and outcomes. Thus, if Anna makes a decision that will somehow affect Ben, Ben can—unless there is a state of total domination—counter that decision with another that either changes their relationship of power or maintains it as it is. Either way, both agents have the power to make a decision and thus take an action—why it is necessary to include this most fundamental aspect of human relationships in a concept of power. These decisions and outcomes need not be conscious, intended or co-ordinated by the relevant actors, or observable to the social scientist. The important thing is that they—as forms of human interaction—take place.

I have two more concepts relevant to the agency of power that should be introduced before I conclude, and they are the ghosts and the myths of agency, respectively. These are not to be confused with one another, however. I use the former—the ghosts of agency—to denote actions that occurred a long time ago but that are still having an effect on current power relations. As already noted, these actions are here listed under the site of time, but obviously the ghosts of agency—and thus also the site of time—can affect all of the other sites of power—e.g., the birth of capitalism or the creation of the Westphalian polity. The second concept—the myths of agency—refers instead to actions that have never taken place at all. Stories of these mythical actions can be kept alive by human agents that wish to preserve current power relations. Thus, a powerful polity may find that he/she/it benefits from these myths of agency being kept alive, even if they are untrue. This mythical discourse is included here under the site of the knowledge and aesthetics of power, but also, and naturally affects all of the other sites. Examples include conflicting stories of who first discovered the Americas, or who came first, Adam or Eve.

Finally, this paper claims that it is fundamentally wrong to deface the concept of power altogether—as Clarissa Rile Hayward has suggested (Hayward 2000)—even if one chooses a Foucaultian approach. Indeed, this is one of the central arguments of this paper—namely, that if power, as Foucault would have it, comprises of reciprocal relationships, then these relationships need both the concepts of structure and agency in order to exist. One thus has no choice but to include the concept of agency—for power cannot exist independently of the faces of human society. Hayward and other critics (e.g., M.S. Archer) are right to point out that this agency cannot be defined as a simple equation or universe comprising of only two actors—A and B—but this does not mean that these actors can be
excluded from the analysis altogether. For each actor affects the relationships in which they are a part. Here, again, it is useful to return to Foucault and the reciprocal nature of power. In this conception, it is not only A who makes a decision over B, but also B who makes a decision whether to comply or to resist. Thus, the three faces of power definitions can equally be written that B makes A do something he or she would not otherwise have done, or neglects to make a decision etc. As already mentioned, most of these are not single, observable decisions—although such processes certainly do exist. The point of structuration theory is that action cannot exist freely from social conditioning, and so decisions can also be sub-conscious and/or collective ones, such as cultural practices. However, the exercise or practice of power in these relationships remains the same—culture/group A (and conversely B) can make culture/group B (and conversely A) do something that they would not otherwise have done, or neglect to make a decision etc. In line with David West and others, I do not think it is wise for the social analyst to try to work out what A or B would otherwise have done—i.e., to ascribe interests, real, objective or otherwise—but in the case of manipulation of interests (the third face of power), it is not impossible to find the actual processes that would cause such a change of interests to occur—advertising, as West argues, being a case in point (West 1987: 141–42).

There are, in the end, only so many ways that agents can exercise power over each other. So far, the faces of power debate, and this paper suggests four such ways—namely, decisions to overtly/covertly change, overtly/covertly neglect, covertly manipulate or overtly/covertly self-regulate relations of power. In the spirit of a structurated/Foucaultian analysis, the argument here is that all of these four ways can be exercised by individuals or groups, (A, B, C … x), as either initial instances of power or as reactions or resistance to such initiatives. At this point, it may seem that the faces of power debate thus has little to offer an analysis of power, being so disarmed of its original conceptions and language. This paper, however, claims that it is vital to maintain the notion of human agency in relationships of power. These relationships—as processes—cannot exist freely of decision-making to change, neglect or maintain them as they are. And while it may not always be the simple case of one actor exercising power over another, sometimes it is that simple. Indeed, for all the social conditioning of an action—and thus multitude of individual and collective decisions that came before it—power can sometimes be the simple case of one action changing the nature of a certain power relationship for good. At the end of the day, the reasons behind that action will never truly be known to anyone other than the relevant
actor. The effects of the action, however, can usually be traced—either through individual actions or through more diffuse social processes. For actions do indeed speak louder than words.

CONCLUSIONS—THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXTENDED THEORY OF POWER FOR AN ANALYSIS OF HIV/AIDS

So where then does this theory of world power leave an analysis of HIV/AIDS? Well, to begin with, it recognises the fact that the high concentration of the disease in the so-called developing parts of the world is partly a result of global, social inequalities across twelve sites of power. It also recognises the fact that the spread of the disease is not just a result of these structural inequalities—or of individual action or inaction—but rather the result of highly complex, structurated relationships that determine each individual’s capacity as a social agent. It thus also recognises the fact that HIV/AIDS is not just the developing world’s problem or responsibility, but rather the result of an intrinsically complex web of relationships between humanity across time and space.

A structurated analysis of HIV/AIDS also does away with the traditional institutional focus on behavioural remedies—recognising that this epidemic cannot be fought by the individual alone. For together with the more frequently acknowledged socio-economic aspects of the epidemic that are revealed in Held’s seven sites of power, my additional five sites of power intertwine to form complex structural constraints on individual agency. It is the argument here that both IR theory and most globalisation theories fail to address these important aspects of global power and thus HIV/AIDS. For although globalisation theories of HIV/AIDS frequently take into account many, if not all, of Held’s seven sites of power, and may even take into account some of my additional sites, the overall analysis usually weighs heavily on only one or two of these aspects, instead of acknowledging the enormous complexity of the issue.

Including the site of time in an analysis of HIV/AIDS, for example, highlights the importance of prevailing colonial and patriarchal structures in determining who in the world is currently most vulnerable to the HIV virus—which, at this time, is predominantly women in Africa and India. Including the site of space highlights the importance of the geographical and demographic aspects of the disease, as it is primarily spread through the mechanisms of urbanisation and globalisation. The site of knowledge and aesthetics adds the Foucaultian twist to the tale. In general, not having access to knowledge handicaps your
capacities as a social actor which, in the case of HIV/AIDS, can be a matter of life or death. The aesthetic dimension to this site also highlights the stigma that is often attached to coming out as an HIV sufferer—which can itself be highly constraining to social agency and can, in extreme cases, even lead to death (by stoning by the community etc.). The site of morality and emotion, in its turn, highlights the extreme sensitivity at the core of the issue—namely, that of the action of having sex. Sex is one of the most private of human actions and yet is also one of the most heavily regulated, across both time and space. Frequently, these regulations cut to the very core of the human condition, namely that of morality and emotion, governing what individuals both think and feel about HIV and sex. The site of identities is also at the very heart of the HIV issue, highlighting the variance in attitudes towards the disease between individuals within otherwise seemingly homogenous-looking groups.

However, despite the primary focus in this paper on the site of the body, it is important to remember that all of the sites are interdependent and that HIV/AIDS not only has a detrimental effect on the power of the human body and thus of course on human agency itself, but also on the power of all the other sites as well. It is very difficult, for example, to imagine that poorer states that are already heavily burdened with debt managing to survive the enormous economic costs of the epidemic without external financial aid. Put very simply, no polity, be it a state or a financial organisation, can survive without its members—i.e., its citizens or employees. For what is power without life to sustain it? In this sense, perhaps, the site of the body is the most fundamental of all the sites of power in that, in numbers, human bodies constitute the very building blocks of society itself.

HIV/AIDS continues to be considered to be a disease of the nobody, however. As Barnett and Whiteside so eloquently put it:

[HIV/AIDS] is a global epidemic that defines the excluded of the world—the wretched of the earth. Above all, HIV/AIDS defines those who can purchase well-being and those who cannot. (Barnett and Whiteside 2006: 6)

This paper is thus an attempt to voice the cries of a highly underrepresented population within mainstream IR theory—namely the many diverse cries of the more than 36.7 million sufferers of the virus. For these people’s cries will remain unheard as long as IR limits its theoretical analysis of HIV/AIDS to in-house debates as to whether or not it is
necessary for state polities to securitise the disease instead of analysing the multitude of ways in which the disease both affects and is affected by a multitude of polities and social inequalities that vary in importance, as well as in prevalence, across the world.

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