§54. Categorial distinctions.

Throughout the present work we have encountered the need for criteria by means of which it could be decided whether a given entity, existent or non-existent, is an individual object-proper, or whether a purported entity which seems to be presented in a given act, context, proposition or theory is admissible as an entity at all, and in particular as an admissible object. Is, for example, the planet Vulcan, so many measurements of which were taken by 19th century astronomers, admissible as an object, given the fact that it has been shown that no such planet exists? Is Meinong's golden mountain an object? Or Banquo's ghost? In the present chapter we shall attempt to provide such criteria, on the basis of which we shall be able to show that it is not merely for reasons of intellectual or institutional prejudice that mathematical objects form a particularly favoured group amongst non-existent objects in general, closely followed by aesthetic objects, especially objects of fiction.

Our first task will be to sharpen the criterion on which the distinction between objects-in-general and noematic entities is based, postponing until later sections the more finely-drawn distinctions which will enable us to isolate, amongst objects-in-general, those entities which are individual objects proper.

Categorial divisions of this broad type are drawn by analytic philosophers on the basis of different forms of identity criteria. The manner in which we re-identify, for example, a material body as 'the same again', is clearly distinct from the manner in which we re-identify mathematical objects such as numbers. Hence, claim the analytic philosophers, these two sets of entities belong to different ontological categories. Noematic entities however do not
sustain identity criteria as these are conceived by analytic philosophers, that is to say, on the model of direct comparison of objects in the 'target' position of a single act. (See, e.g. Frege, SuB, p.30, lines 1-5). And there are large and important classes of entities which are admissible as objects, yet which are such that identity criteria cannot be provided for them: The writings of Conan Doyle have engendered all manner of pirate works ostensibly 'about' one and the same violin-playing detective/fictional character. Many of these works depart, to a greater or lesser extent from Doyle's original specifications, but the question does not seem answerable whether Holmes of work W₂ is or is not identical with Holmes of, say, work W₁₀. Indeed the answer to this question may change over time: one particularly outrageous purported Holmes is initially rejected as a Doppelgänger only, until, with the movement of taste, and with the establishment of a series of works which present Sherlockian detectives intermediate between the two extremes, he is admitted as Holmes himself, though presented in aspects distinct from those laid down for Holmes by his original creator. This is reflected in the fact that concretisations of the pirate work are thereafter effected in such a way as to involve acts of 'transparent' reference to Doyle's original Holmes where before such acts had been 'neutralised', i.e. diverted to a quite distinct literary character. ¹⁴³

Hence an ontological framework which recognises a place for non-existent objects and for noematic entities must rest upon criteria having a wider catchment area than 'target' identification. Frege has shown us how one such framework can be developed, on the basis of distinctions in the logico-grammatical form of (what are for him) corresponding referring expressions: distinctions in the mode of linguistic access to the entities in question. Here however we wish to develop a framework which rests upon a far more general distinction amongst both linguistic and non-linguistic modes of access. This may be expressed as follows: members of the category of objects are entities access to which is by means of an 'intentional directedness of thought'; where the proper mode of access to noematic entities is the mode of immediate actualisation: noemata are lived through.
§ 55. Act-Schemata: Noematic and referential access.

To see this distinction in what may be a clearer light, let us recall how, in our discussion of the 'objects' of propositional attitudes (on pp. 165-68), we saw that propositions are excluded from the category of objects, on the grounds that they are not entities toward which our acts of thought are directed, but rather that they are entities which exist as part of the medium of articulation of those acts, through which determinate directedness to (or thought about) objects is achieved.

This suggests a view of the familiar schema:

```
act -- noema -- referent
```

as a schema of 'access', the subject accedes in the given act to the referent of the act, which is given in a particular aspect as determined by the noema involved. Because this schema has been exploited by phenomenologists in association with analyses of acts of perception, which are taken as the standard by which other acts are to be judged, it has been insufficiently realised that there need be no geographical contiguity between the subject and the object of reference involved: as we shall see, the notion of access is merely the reverse side of the coin to the notion of directedness.

We may now distinguish members of the category of objects-in-general as entities which must always lie at the end of an act (i.e. in the referent or 'target' position) where, to risk another metaphor, noematic entities may lie parallel to and thus be actualised in an act. In particular, where we have an act of linguistically mediated reference, the linguistic meaning or sense involved will itself be actualised in the noema of the act of reference, somewhat as follows:

```
act -- full noema -- referent
    \sign \meaning of the sign
    \{(the referent of a subsidiary act)\}
```
Here we must recall that a noematic entity actualised in a given act is never the object (referent) of that act; rather it is transparent to the act, allowing access through and onto the referent (if there is one). The noema is transparent to the act in the sense that it is not anything of which we are conscious in the act, and this is true even in those cases where there is no referent for the act but only a noema, that is, only an intended referent qua intended. This intended referent is no more thereby also a referent than an intended insult ('Hegelian!') is thereby also an insult. A non-veridical act is not an act in which the noema, or any constituent of the noema, itself plays the role of referent; non-veridical acts are distinguished precisely by the absence of any referent. Thus, objects must always lie at the end of an act, in contrast to noematic entities the proper position of which is in parallel with an act. Nonetheless, as will by now be clear, given particular kinds of reflection and of abstract thought noematic entities too may come to hold a referent position for an act. But such an act must involve a new second-order noema of its own, as follows:

\[
\text{act of abstract thought} \rightarrow \text{2nd-order noema} \rightarrow \text{referent (original noematic entity)}.\]

What, now, has become of our distinction between object-entities which can only occupy the referent-position of an act, and noematic entities which, as we see, can occupy both the noema and the referent position? This question can be answered only after we have explored in more detail the role of language in our 'abstract' cognitive experience.
§ 56. Proper vs. merely symbolic access:

Referential accessibility as a criterion for object-status

The most important species of 'reference' to noematic entities is linguistically mediated reference, effected by means of such expressions as:

(a) 'Pythagoras' theorem',
(b) 'Christ's vision on the cross',
(c) 'Ptolemy's knowledge of astronomy',
(d) 'The General Theory of Relativity',

as well as more familiar cases such as 'the concept horse' and so on. Such acts conform to a schema such as the following:

act of linguistically mediated reference to a noematic entity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>referent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>full 2nd-order noema</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sign (say: 'the concept horse') sense of this sign

Linguistic access to noemata is, of course, merely an empty or, as we shall now say, 'improper' (unrichtig, cf. § 14 above) access-at-a-distance. Here the situation is not radically different from that which prevails in the case of linguistically mediated reference to objects. Entities of all kinds may, indeed, serve as the mediate targets for improper acts, as when, for example, we gain access-at-a-distance to the tallest man in Smolensk, or to the central point of the Sun. But in the case of mundane objects we accept (and are justified in accepting) such linguistic access as an adequate surrogate for intuitive or fulfilled access. This is because of the general possibility of turning linguistic into proper, fulfilling access by taking appropriate steps (e.g. by travelling to Smolensk and picking out the tallest male), either actually or in thought. In some cases fully adequate access will of course be 'medically' (contingently) unobtainable, but we can clearly extend, in thought, our actual resources for access.
by means of idealising assumptions based on imaginative variation. Such an exercise is of interest, however, only to the extent that our idealisations preserve some analogy between assumed faculties and those with which we are familiar.

This kind of 'analogous' access is possible, for example, in the case of fictional objects, the successful work of literature being one which makes it possible for its readers to live in the created fictional world as though it were an extension of the world of their experience. It thereby allows them to gain fulfilled access to created objects in a way which parallels their access (which in many cases is restricted, e.g. to newspaper reports or to historical documents) to real objects. And a rich store of examples of analogous access is supplied also by mathematics: assume, to take just one example, that we have fulfilled 'target' access to (some) natural numbers (qua abstract objects) based on the process of counting. This process can be extended, by analogy, into the transfinite, thereby yielding analogous access to (some) transfinite numbers.

Fulfilled target access, therefore, comes to have an extremely wide scope when such extensions of our actual resources for access are taken into consideration. Nevertheless I wish to claim that there is at least one important field where fulfilled target access is absolutely impossible: the field of noematic entities: There are no steps which can be taken to turn abstract or generic referential access to noematic entities into fulfilled referential access.

Alternative statements of this claim would be: that the second-order noema of an act of reference to a (first-order) noematic entity can never be a fulfilled noema; that what we have called 'transparent' senses for expressions such as (α) to (Σ) above, are unachievable. Or, again, to exploit Russell's terminology, that knowledge by (target-)acquaintance of noematic entities is impossible - we can have only knowledge by description.
Target access to noematic entities is, then, always an inadequate surrogate for fulfilled access, being little more than a verbal re-expression of the results obtained through direct ‘noematic’ access to such entities, which is achieved in every act of thought. Such re-expression is demanded, since it allows the given results to be formulated in a ‘referential’ language which satisfies the conventions of scientific theory (conventions devised for sciences of object-entities). The effect of this re-expression is, in general, that the theory which results is not a theory of noematic entities as such, but one or other more or less adequate model of such a theory, and the ‘noemata’ which form the subject-matter of this model-of-a-theory are themselves more or less adequate noema correlates.

**Mally and the Noema-Object Opposition**

The arguments above come very close to certain views expressed by Ernst Mally, a disciple of Meinong who introduced formal logical techniques to Austrian philosophers. Mally’s version of the noema-object distinction was developed as part of the criticism of the proliferation of object-entities to which Meinong’s Gegenstandselehre seemed to be committed. Following Wolf (1972), we may illustrate Mally’s position by means of a simple perceptual judgment. In such a judgment, e.g., “this is a table”, three moments can be distinguished, 1. the act, which rests on the conviction of the truth of the perception, 2. the “logical” content of the thought-formation “table” which is, according to Meinong’s theory a “pure” existence-free object dasselnsfreier Gegenstand, and 3. the intended object of the act, the actual table, expressed by means of “this”. (Wolf, 1972, p. 64, my trans.)

Mally now points out that in a precise account we must recognize that whilst every judgment intends an object and acquires through its content directedness toward an object, only in the case of a true judgment does it actually strike an object. A false judgment has, to be sure, a determinate sense-content ... but it has no object. (Loc.cit.)

‘Sense-content’, also designated as ‘sense form’ or simply as ‘sense’ is Mally’s equivalent of the notion of noema outlined in the present work. Mally also
recognizes a close equivalent to our distinction between 1st and 2nd-order noemata:

In primary judgments something actual and individual - a thing, a process - is intended and, in the case of a true judgment, actually met with and grasped, in this way a sense-content is "effective" ("durchgriffen"). Only in a secondary turn can thought make the sense-form itself into a 'target'-object (Ziel-Gegenstand), as in the judgment "table is a concept",

and here the entity which is the referent of 'table'

is intended and grasped in the effecting (Durchgreifen) of a new sense form of a logically higher level, namely the sense-form concept. (Wolf, Loc. cit.)

Mally also defends an equivalent of our distinction between 'entities' and 'objects' as that between 'Gegenstände (Überhaupt)' and 'Gegenstände im primären Sinn'. The latter are distinguished by Mally as entities

which can themselves no longer function as sense-contents, but which are rather to be intended in the effecting of a sense-content of the first level. (Wolf, op. cit. p.64f).

The realms of sense-forms is, then, the medium through which we gain access to entities in general and objects in particular, and the latter are distinguished by the fact that they do not belong to this 'medium of access' but to a transcendent non-transparent realm.

Concepts were distinguished by Frege as a network of characteristics (Merkmale) which were the properties possessed by all those objects which fall under the concept in question (see his 1892a, pp.201f). Similarly our noemata may be conceived as complex manifolds of ascriptions. The term 'ascription' is used both because it is more general than 'property' and because it conveys the fact that we can, in the course of our experience, ascribe features to an (intended) object, even though there is in fact no object to which they are ascribed. (Compare the discussion of 'demarcating' null totalities on p.343f). Mally, too, puts forward a view of his sense-forms as constituted out of individual 'determinations', a notion which he had already introduced in his early work (of 1912) on the Gegenstände-
theoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik. Again we shall follow
the account which is given by Wolf of Mally's later exploitation of this
notion:

The "round square" is, for the old Gegenstandstheorie at the same
time round and also square, i.e. non-round, which contains a contra-
diction. In opposition to the orthodox Meinongian approach Mally
begins with the sense-form, which is seen as being determined,
conceptually constituted from its individual determinations or con-
ceptual characteristics [Begriffswerkmale], but these do not
fulfil it. Sense-contents may not be objectivated [vergegenständ-
licht], for one makes a mistake in interpreting them as carriers
of or as fulfilments of themselves. The concept blue is not itself
something which is blue. (Wolf, op.cit.p.65).

For the notion of 'fulfilment' which is involved here the reader is invited
to recall Mally's 'non-extensional' quantification theory, introduced in n.71,
which can now be seen even more clearly as a close analogue of Frege's own
universal quantification, since both rest on the relationships between 'concept-
ual characteristics' independently of any adventance to objects. (See pp.316-18).

With regard to the ontological status of sense-forms Mally's initial
tendency is towards a 'platonism of meanings' of the type discussed in Ch.3
and §18 above. Thus

Sense-contents exist - in the appropriate sense of 'exists' - independ-
ently of thought and of their fulfilment. This philosophical sense
of "exists" [of "es gibt"] should not be understood according to
the manner of conceptual realism, nor should it be misinterpreted
in a nominalistic way. Mally questions just as much the "ideal
objects" of Hartmann as the "incomplete symbols" of Principia Math-
ematica and the "synsemantic expressions" of the later Brentano.
The mistake lies in a failure to distinguish between 'bezeichen' (to
mean) and 'bezeichnen' (to designate, to denote). 'The perpetuum
mobile' or 'Pegasus' designate nothing, because there are no objects
of this kind, but they are sense-forms with a determinate meaning.

As conceived in the Grundlagen of 1912 sense forms are still
atemporally existing positions [zeitlos wesende Stellen] in the
manifold of all that is possible (Wolf, loc.cit.),

His later works however seem to acknowledge the tongue-in-cheek nature of such
'platonism' (intimated on p.122 above). Thus that a particular sense-form exists, or that such and such determinations are assembled together, means: 'the question concerning fulfillability here is decidable' (Wolf, loc. cit., quoting from manuscript material in Mally's Nachlass). But by 'decidability' here Mally does not have in mind empirical verifiability. He is referring rather to the logical notion of decidability (of whether, e.g., a given well-formed formula is a theorem of a particular system). In fact

Mally pleads the case for the sharpest possible separation of questions of sense from questions of being, and demands a purification of logic from all 'existential' admixtures — logic can decide only questions about theoretical sense, and not questions of existence. (Wolf, loc. cit.)

Perhaps the most immediate consequence of the noema-object distinction, of the view of noematic entities, (including our own thoughts considered as meaningful contents), as entities to which 'transparent' access (in a 'Kripkean' sense) is impossible, is the account which this implies of our own awareness of our thoughts considered, again, as meaningful contents not as real psychic events. This we shall discuss in the section which follows.
§57. A Note on phenomenological reductions and the method of philosophy.

It is necessary, first of all, to dispel one important misconception of the process of reflection, according to which this process involves a special access to 'inner entities' (inner processes or states). Reflection is, rather, a complex process of thought directed to referential entities such as past events and actions, and to the referential products, such as linguistically expressed thoughts, of earlier cognitive experiences. Thus we cannot, to use Hume's phrase, 'turn our eyeballs in our sockets' and somehow 'see' the noemata of our acts. (Cf. Treatise, Bk.I, Pt.IV, §vi). It is likewise impossible, as Hume recognised, to turn 'noematic' access to our 'selves' into full referential access. For

when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other... I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. (Hume, loc. cit., my emphasis; in place of Hume's 'perception' we should use 'referent').

It is no accident that exactly parallel considerations apply equally well to noemata as to selves - i.e., in Husserl's terms, to transcendental egos - for noemata and selves are two sides of the same coin: the self is that which actualises noematic entities, and which is exhausted, ontologically, in its actualisation of such entities. (This may suggest, indeed, that we draw the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that selves themselves are noematic entities).

The claim that noematic entities are never 'properly' accessible as referents, conflicts with some of Husserl's own accounts of the status of noemata, in which he claims that the latter are accessible via a specific method, the 'phenomenological reduction'. This method Husserl characterises as allowing the 'breakthrough' into a whole new realms of scientific exploration: the realm of noemata. It is possible to argue, however, that despite some grandiose programmatic accounts of his philosophical method, Husserl obtains his sharpest and most important results through a complex, but quite familiar heuristic of reflection, conjecture, deduction, correction,
and so on, – that these results never depend upon a fulfilled face-to-face access to noematic entities achieved by means of some special method. As Ryle points out,

\[ \text{every genuine enquirer conducts his enquiries, not much according to any paraded methodology, but in the ways in which, so to speak, his fingers and thumbs have learned out of their daily labours how to get results. (Ryle, 1971, p.11, criticising both phenomenology and linguistic analysis).} \]

Phenomenology, we may conclude, does not consist of reports of observations of 'internal objects', but rather of philosophical arguments erected on the basis of our 'first person' experience of 'outer' objects, arguments whose evaluation rests exclusively – and this is the crucial difference between phenomenology and other approaches to philosophy – on the conformity of their results to all that is given in such experience. No special access to noematic entities is required since every act of reference to objects thereby includes its own 'noematic' access to the noemata involved.

As already stated, amongst the most important 'referential products' of our cognitive experience with which the phenomenologist will have to deal are our linguistic expressions – and in this respect linguistic analysis may be conceived as a variant species of phenomenology. We owe it to König for the demonstration of how close Ingarden had come to the insights which can be seen, from this phenomenological point of view, as underlying linguistic analysis already in 1920, when 'ordinary language philosophy - as we know it today - did not yet exist' (König, 1969, 331). Ingarden recognised, in contrast to some more orthodox Husserlian phenomenologists, that there is no direct access to the elements which make up 'original experience', such access can be achieved only by back-reference from our everyday experience, and it thereby comes clothed in the concepts which pertain to that experience and in particular to the language which is associated with it:

"It is not possible in practice to stop one day to use all concepts and to limit oneself exclusively to an 'immediate intuition' of the objects." At the very moment when we start a phenomenological inves-
tigation, he says, "we already possess everyday language, of which we make use to settle (and usually with success) the diverse affairs of daily life. This ordinary language contains - both in its vocab-

ulary and in its different syntactical functions - many ordinarily established concepts which concern, among other things, the objects 

\[\text{we should prefer 'entities'}\] which we want to analyze in immediate experience". (King, 1969, 330f, quoting from pp.302 and 305-6 of

Ingarden, "Dążenia fenomenologów", (The aims of the phenomenologists),

Przegląd Filozoficzny, 22 (1919-20), repr. in Zbadan nad filozofią

wpótszcema (Investigations on contemporary philosophy), Warsaw, 1963,

pp. 267-379).²⁴⁷

This language, and the concepts which it carries, are needed, first of all to isolate those particular areas of experience in which we are interested.

This is most particularly the case where we are dealing with, say, higher-level mathematical experience, or with any field of theoretical entities, access to which is possible only after the theory involved, or more particularly: its linguistic expression, has been interiorised by the phenomenologist. And language is also necessary as a focus of stability: a stable symbol serves as a supporting point of our intention, because it facilitates the task of keeping the direction of our intention fixed (within certain limits). (Ingarden, loc.cit., as trans. by King).

We have already seen, however, that ordinary language, and even 'theoretical'

languages embody certain partialities - in particular the tendency toward 'referentialisation' - which implies that the concepts which are carried by such languages can never serve as anything more than a starting point for our investigations:

Once we have come into direct contact with the objects \[\text{or 'entities'}\] the role of the concepts taken from ordinary language comes to an end; we must go on and strive to make ourselves independent from all the suggestions which flow from this language. For there is no doubt that the habit to use just such words, resp. concepts, and not other ones, produces (or at least may produce) a certain bias in the way in which we see the objects... (Ingarden, loc.cit.)
§ 58. Admissible and inadmissible abstract nouns:

Accessibility within a field of predicates as a criterion for object-status.

Having indicated the criteria by means of which object-entities are 'separated out' from entities in general, we must now develop more refined criteria which will tell us how individual objects proper are isolated within the broad category of objects-in-general. The most important recent attempts to develop such criteria have been made by Dummett as part of his attempt to clarify certain Fregean theses to the effect that there are philosophical abstracta, such as numbers and truth values, which belong to the category of objects. The value of Dummett's work is marred, to some extent, by the purely linguistic approach which he adopts, the crucial problem as Dummett sees it being not the determination of the categorial status of particular entities but of the grammatical status of corresponding expressions. This approach he justifies by an appeal to an interpretation of Frege's ontological theory which has a certain cautionary interest in its own right.

Dummett's interpretation of Fregean ontology may perhaps be summarised as follows: Given Frege's division between objects and functions, and also the further divisions, of equal importance, between functions of the first and of higher levels, it may seem that we can reasonably raise the question as to how, in general, we are to determine the category to which a given entity is to belong. How, in particular, are we to ensure that we refer to entities in what is for them the logically appropriate way, that is, using singular terms to refer to objects, predicate expressions to refer to concepts, and so on? It may be however that there are certain kinds of entity with respect to which anyone who posed such a question would have things precisely the wrong way round. For it is a question which presupposes that the realm of entities is everywhere given to us in advance of our language-aided exploration of its individual regions. As we have seen, this is not the case where we have to deal with certain kinds of abstract entity, for the only access we have to the entities in question is linguistic access.
(Russell would say that they are entities of which we have only knowledge by description, Husserl that we have only symbolische Vorstellungen).

Dummett however, who is unsympathetic to the realist strand of Frege's philosophy, takes the above line of reasoning to its extreme conclusion. He argues that it is the case for all entities that the ontological categories to which they belong can be determined only by reflection on the logical categories of expressions which we use to talk about them.

This is in opposition to the view, forcefully defended by Geach and (more recently) by Moss, that for Frege it is the ontological rather than the linguistic realm which provides the primary criteria of classification. According to this alternative view it is because Frege believed that numbers are objects that he classified numerical terms as proper names, in accordance with the principle that whatever stands for an object is a proper name. (FPL, p. 56, summarising Geach; cf. Anscombe and Geach, 1961, p. 136).

Now, argues Dummett, if this account were correct we should be left wholly in the dark how it is to be decided whether numbers, or entities of any other sort, are objects or not: or what, indeed, making a decision on this issue amounted to. (FPL, loc. cit.).

We should be bound to conceive the matter as being one of recognizing that a certain form of expression was more appropriate to the character of what was being spoken of than an alternative form: but what it was in the characters of the entities concerned... that we were thus responding to, and which we signalized by saying of them that they were, or were not, objects, would remain quite opaque. (Loc. cit.)

Dummett's remarks here express in a particularly marked form the attitude of intellectual impotence in the field of ontology which is characteristic of analytic philosophers. In fact this attitude has been extended by Dummett in such a way that it applies not only to meaning-entities (intensional entities, noematic entities), but to entities as a whole.

Frege's use of the ontological term 'object' is seen as being strictly subservient to his use of the linguistic term 'proper name': the referent
of a proper name is always an object, and to characterise an entity is an object is to say that there is, or at least could be, a proper name which
has that entity as its referent. The decision to award the status of
objecthood to a given entity depends, for Dumett, upon a prior, purely
grammatical decision concerning its associated referring expressions. This
implies that the distinction between proper names and expressions of other
types must itself be capable of being
drawn in wholly linguistic terms, without the necessity for any
scrutiny of the things for which the respective expressions stand.
(IPL, p.57).

And one can indeed go very far, as Dumett shows, in providing criteria for
proper namehood which depend only upon the most general features of the
use of expressions in sentences, criteria which enable him to exclude, on
purely linguistic grounds, expressions such as 'nobody', 'something', (p.59),
'a poet', 'everything', (p.60), 'wise', 'foolish', (p.64), 'undetected
murders', (p.67), and all the variant forms of these and similar expressions
from the category of proper names. But there is a limit to the effectiveness
of such highly general grammatical criteria, constructed without any appeal
to the extra-linguistic examination of the entities in question. Dumett's
most valuable contribution is made only as a consequence of his recognition
of this limit, that is of the fact that such criteria cannot but admit as
'proper names' all sorts of expressions
which it would be, not merely philosophically tendentious, but down-
right absurd to speak of as standing for objects. We use a wide
variety of substantial expressions of all kinds - gerundives, infinitives, abstract nouns - derived from other parts of speech,
and these often constitute, or can be used to form phrases constit-
uting singular terms: that is, words or phrases which function like
singular terms in respect of their immediate grammatical role.
(IPL, p.70)

Examples here would be: 'the platoon commander's lack of a map', 'the
identity of the murderer', 'the whereabouts of the garden hose', 'the
reputation of Hegel', 'aliminess', 'shininess', 'reciprocity', 'incompar-
ability', and so on.
The immediate reaction which such examples prompt,...namely that the use of such abstract nouns and noun-phrases is only an easily dispensable turn of speech (FPL, p.70)
is, as Dummett rightly points out, in part correct. But the notion of 'easy dispensability' does not present itself as a very stable notion - at best it would be a matter of some kind of sliding scale - and there are examples of absurdly artificial substantival phrases which are eliminable only with comparative difficulty. Ontological distinctions cannot rest on anything so arbitrary as the dispensability of particular turns of speech in particular languages. Dummett points out, again correctly, that such an appeal would in any case be contrary to the general approach adopted by Frege:

When, in Grundlagen, [Frege] is arguing that numbers are objects, it suffices for him to observe that, besides the adjectival use of number-words, there occurs, in arithmetical statements, also a substantival one, as in, e.g. 'The number 5 is prime', and that, in this substantival use, number words satisfy his criteria for being proper names. It does not appear to occur to him to enquire whether this substantival use of number-words is dispensable, whether, that is, we could express e.g. 'The number 5 is prime' by means of a sentence in which the word 'five' occurred only adjectively. (FPL, p.71).

Dummett argues that it would be impossible to say with certainty what Frege's approach to the difficulty of providing precise criteria for proper namehood would have been, since whilst Frege admits a large range of types of abstract object, such as geometrical shapes, directions, sets, he displays no awareness of the problem of supplying linguistic criteria of demarcation between admissible and inadmissible 'abstract nouns' which are required to avoid 'the danger of being engulfed by a proliferation of abstract objects' (Lacks, Takes, and whereabouts), (FPL, p.71).

But is it really true, as Dummett claims, that Frege's philosophy stands in need of completion by such criteria? Or is it not rather the case that Frege could legitimately afford
to allow the whole distinction between proper names and expressions
of other kinds to depend upon intuitive recognition, guided only by the most rough and ready tests, (FPL, p.54)?

Dummett fails to recognise the power of Frege's 'rough and ready' ontological intuition since he has assumed a priori that language has universal primacy over ontology in the determination of categorical status. For Frege however these two dimensions are allowed to interact with each other, the rough edges of one being counteracted by the possibility of greater precision in the other. But despite this failure to appreciate the crucial role played by ontological intuition in Frege's philosophy, Dummett has nevertheless been of great service in uncovering the basis of this intuition, for those who know where to look.

As we have seen, the abstract objects which Frege considers include points, lines, moments, weights, shapes, directions, Werteformen and numbers; (colours also deserve a place here 249). What is crucial in distinguishing this group of admissible abstractions from the broad mass of adjectival nouns and noun-phrases ('punctuality', 'untidiness', ...) is the existence in regard to the former of what Dummett calls a 'special vocabulary of predicates'. For example, in the case of colour-words such as 'red' used as nouns, we have a whole field of predicate expressions: 'primary', 'chromatic', 'warm', 'complementary', 'deeper than', 'darker than', 'tones with', 'lies between', etc. Now it may be that anything that can be said by means of this vocabulary, with colour-words used as nouns, could be re-expressed by sentences in which the corresponding colour-words appeared only as adjectives; in some cases, the transformation would be easy, in others it would depend upon a thorough understanding of the principles of application of these predicates; but it would in no case consist merely in the conversion of one general idiom into another. We might say that, by equipping our language with this special vocabulary for talking about colours - comparable to the vocabulary we have for talking about numbers - we are taking colours seriously as objects, in a way in which we do not take consistency, discouragement, partisanship, and the rest of the motley host of abstractions seriously as objects. (FPL, p.72, my emphasis).
Dummett's thesis may be expressed, in purely linguistic terms, as follows: that the introduction of a 'special vocabulary of predicates' into a language may render certain purported abstract noun expressions admissible as proper names. Thus the ontological status of particular entities may depend upon the linguistic machinery which is operative at any given stage, and it is even conceivable that we may (for example as a result of the development, along a wide front, of a particular scientific practice) extend our conceptual framework in such a way as to increase the supply of objects hitherto available.

This captures two important insights into the nature of (some) non-concrete objects. But in being purely linguistically expressed Dummett's thesis involves a running together of a number of disparate sets of cases. Even if we take into account the fact that the 'predicate field' theory is associated, in Dummett's eyes, with what he sees as a more crucial approach via identity criteria of the type which we have already had occasion to reject (see p. 366f.), it is still the case that there is an underlying ontological diversity amongst the effects of 'predicate field introduction' which Dummett fails to acknowledge. This in turn is a consequence of the fact that the ontological distinctions involved are not reflected in any clear-cut grammatical distinctions, either within natural languages or within the artificial languages (variants of the first or second order predicate calculus) which are generally considered.

The consequences are, as we shall see, that Dummet - in a truly Fregean spirit - papers over crucial ontological distinctions in order to save the appearances of an insufficiently refined linguistic framework.
§ 59. Effects of the introduction of fields of predicates

The introduction of a 'special vocabulary of predicates' into a language has ontological effects only in so far as the concepts expressed by the predicates involved are taken up and used by the linguistic community involved. By the arguments on 'linguistic division of labour' (§ 3) it is not necessary that every language-using subject should have an effective grasp of the concepts involved, and even among members of the relevant 'Fachwelt' in whom responsibility for ensuring the well-groundedness of those concepts has been stored, there may be different grades of effectivity of grasp, a generally inferior grasp perhaps giving way, through increases in knowledge, to a closer awareness of the distinctions which must be made. What is indispensable however is that there should be some conceptual underpinning of a predicate field, only then can we properly allow the linguistic expressions to 'do the thinking for us'. Hence in what follows we shall restrict the terms 'introduction', 'embedding', and so on, in their application to predicate-vocabularies, to those cases where such an underpinning is present. We can now distinguish, on this level of generality, three distinct sets of cases as follows:

(1) **Incremental ontogenetic effects**: The 'ontogenesis' of an object or (more usually) of a range of objects, which takes place gradually over time, as the conceptual framework which is carried by the predicate field is incrementally absorbed by the appropriate Fachwelt and its object-giving consequences are slowly appreciated. (And note the use of 'ontogenesis', shorn of all its biological implications, as meaning simply 'bringing into being').

(2) **Attenuated ontogenetic effects of first and second order**: Strictly speaking all ontogenesis is 'incremental' in the sense that it requires the prior establishment of frameworks of conventions (e.g. for reading works of literature), the prior understanding of the background language involved and the ability to follow rules (not only of a linguistic nature). Nevertheless it is possible to isolate a wide range of cases where objects are brought into being 'at one stroke', e.g. with the publication of a work, the proving of a
theorem, the signing of a contract or of a constitution. As we shall see, it is sometimes necessary in such cases to distinguish 'first order' events of this nature from the 'second order' truly ontogenetic level, where the former are, like Mrs O'Gullible's incipient theory of leprechauns, 'non-veridical'.

(3) Ontological disclosure: the introduction of an object-giving predicate vocabulary is not always such as to result in the bringing into being of a new range of objects. Extensions of scientific theories which purport to reveal objects which have been hitherto unrecognized sometimes rest on propositions which are true.

We shall discuss each of these cases in turn.

(1) Incremental ontogenetic effects.

The general 'ontogenetic' interpretation, according to which the laying down of a predicate field may be such as to result in a transition from an idiom involving nothing more than linguistic variants of (synonymic) predicates into one which is properly and 'transparently' referential, seems to fall into line with some of Dummett's earlier and less stridently anti-ontological views. Thus for example in his paper on 'Truth' Dummett defends a conception of mathematical reality as 'coming into being as we probe' (1958/59, p. 68), that is - in the light of his more recent work - as coming into being as a result of our heuristic linguistic innovations. (Cf. Smith, 1975, § 8).

Consider, for example, the introduction into mathematics of transfinite objects (ordinals, cardinals and sets) by Cantor. In the period before Cantor's work the term 'infinity' could have been employed, in general, only as a stylistic variant of the predicate 'infinite', that is as a non-denoting term. This usage still survives in informal mathematical analysis where 'tends to infinity' is employed as a convenient shorthand for less tendentious modes of speech. But as a result of the establishment by Cantor of a field of predicates within which we can talk, and say true things about infinite objects, contexts have arisen within which the term 'infinity' (more precisely: a systematically ordered set of related terms) is admissible as a proper name.
Cantor's work was presaged by a great deal of related, conceptual advance, and it was ultimately accepted in its full significance only when the concepts involved had been interiorized by the mathematical community - or by those members of the mathematical community who were prepared to accept Cantor's achievement as 'mathematics' and not as mere 'Begriffsdichtung'. Thus the ontogeneses involved were what we have designated as 'incremental' ontogeneses. What this involves may be indicated, perhaps, by means of a somewhat simplified example. We imagine a tribe whose members have a habit of tossing small white cubic pieces of wood, on the sides of which are from one to six indentations, and of reacting to the fall of these objects with exclamations which satisfy various uniform rules. We imagine also that the vocabulary of the tribe contains only predicate expressions concerning the activity involved. Mastery of this vocabulary, of the given rules, and of the activity itself, reflects the establishment of a 'conceptual framework' of the type here under discussion. (Cf. n. 234). If, now, a missionary arrives, bringing with him a mastery of predicate-fields of a higher order, clustering around, for example, the concepts game, win, even gambling-compulsion, he imports also the possibility of 'referentialising' this activity, of giving it a name ('dice-playing') and a semi-official object-status. What we are arguing is that such a naming-process is meaningful only against the background of the given 'conceptual framework', e.g. of an understanding on the part of the natives of what it is to follow a rule. Without this background the 'baptism' would be a meaningless ceremony.

This implies that incremental ontogeneses determine for themselves a determinate ordering, relative to every given community into which they are to be introduced or by whom they are to be effected; something which is particularly clear, again, in mathematics.
(2) **Attenuated ontogenetic effects of first and second order.**

In the tribal example just given, the name-giving process is merely one stage in the gradual introduction of the object under consideration, and which object shall be introduced is something with respect to which the subjects involved have very few degrees of freedom (the freedom of demarcating the game in question: is one to include, for example, the ceremonies which precede the commencement of the dice-throwing itself?). This is the case also where a group of, say, musicians, who have long played together, acquire a name ('Boston Symphony Orchestra', 'Blaugton Street Football Team', ...), or where a disease, or some other social or cultural trait, is possessed by individuals or by a whole society before being recognised as such. At the other end of an incremental/attenuated spectrum however we have cases of ontogeneses where the naming-process (or some equivalent analogue) is the single crucial factor in the bringing into being of objects of a given type. Take, for example, the established concept of a limited company: the background of rules, laws and conventions which support this concept are such as to enable groups of individuals in our society, with a relatively high degree of freedom, to create new objects which are legal and commercial entities in their own right. (Note that the initial introduction of the given concept - which had been presaged, in turn, by appropriate political (and philosophical) innovations, and which resulted in the reorganisation of a large number of more or less loosely organised bodies which became renamed as 'limited companies', - was thus reflected in a series of relatively non-attenuated ontogeneses).

Other examples of attenuated ontogeneses would be the bringing into being of nation states (the re-drawing of the map of Africa) and of fictional characters. All of these examples are what we shall call 'first order ontogeneses', in the sense that they result in the bringing into being of objects by particular groups of subjects who have collaborated, so to speak, in the creation of those objects. Now whilst by 'ontogenesis' we imply the successful creation of objects (creation which is valid from the external point of view) and thereby exclude all purported creations which, for one or other reason, do not
qualify as 'creations' at all, no matter how great may be the agreement among
the members of the relevant community as to their validity, it is sometimes
possible, by means of an ascent to a second-order, theoretical level, to effect
surrogate ontogeneses even in those cases where no successful first-order
creation has been effected. The clearest cases of such second-order ontogen-
esses are provided by the anthropological theories of Professor MacAnthropol-
ologist already considered. The suggestion is that there are many areas, not
only in field mythology but also in, say, the history of science and the
philosophy of mathematics, where it is found necessary to make retrospective
theoretical investigations not of, say, the tribes or scientists who suffered
under beliefs of a certain kind, but rather - insofar as this is possible - of
the 'objects' presented in those beliefs. This is done, effectively, by construc-
ting truly objectual models of those systems of 'objects', models which are
obtained - to put the matter in a not wholly metaphorical way - by treating the
cultural artefacts (scriptures, formal systems, ...) which had maintained the
currency of those 'objects', as constituting borderline cases of fictional
works: It then becomes possible to treat not of first-order illusions of ex-
istent objects, but of second-order purely intentional objects proper, which
implies, of course, that there can be no question of drawing lines of identity
between the two totalities.

Perhaps the matter may be expressed as follows: If Mrs O'Sullible reads
a work of fiction in the belief that it is a true historical record, then she
is simply making an ontological error; her purported ontological projections
have a purely epistemological significance. (This is because, from the point
of view of ontology, we are interested only in the artefactual and conventional
background to her beliefs, in virtue of the properly ontological import of the
great bulk of projections which are yielded by the latter). In Fregé's case,
or in the case of a tribe who believes that there is a fire-breathing giant
who lives half-way up the side of a local mountain, just the same kind of ont-
ological mistake has been made - but here the mistake-free conventional and
theoretical background is brought forward only after the mistake has occurred,
and in response to it.
(3). Ontological disclosure

There are cases where any ontogenetic interpretation, either of type (1) or of type (2), of the effects of predicate field establishment, seems wholly inappropriate. It seems difficult to conceive of numbers (qua abstract objects), to take just one example, as objects which would be dependent for their ontological status upon the contingent introduction of suitable linguistic machinery. And social and cultural object-entities: diseases, civilisations, empires, and so on, seem, at least in some cases, to be examples where the effects of predicate field establishment has been to reveal what had existed before, (effectively by extending the catchment area of the conceptual framework within which the diagnostician, the social historian, et al., can operate).

This suggests the question: what are the conditions for predicate fields to have truly ontogenetic effects, i.e. effects which are not merely such as to reveal what had existed before? Predicate field establishment is ontogenetic only when the objects involved depend for their existence (status as objects) upon that spectrum of acts whose canonical nomes are the concepts expressed by the predicates involved. Clearly this condition is satisfied only if these predicates concern intentional objects (objects which are not autonomous, i.e. not independent of all acts). And even then it is satisfied only when the intentional objects involved have been established by a network of pre-conceptual (pre-predicative) acts, which merely become articulated with the laying down of an appropriate vocabulary. A monarchy, for example, may exist prior to the codification of any appropriate legal or political framework.

The names involved may be over-briefly intimated as follows. Restricting our attention to higher-order objects (objects founded by certain, relatively lower-order entities, which are themselves objects in their own right), we can distinguish within this category certain autonomous higher-order objects. Such objects seem to exhibit a determinate series of distinct degrees of freedom with regard to the 'looseness of connection' of the lower-order objects by which they are
found. Thus consider the following series of examples (adapted from Ingarden, "On the Nature of Literary Works", p. 135):

1. a wall (of bricks),
2. a heap (of stones),
3. a body of liquid (made up of its molecules),
4. a gas of high density, a train of ants, a planetary system,
5. a gas of low density, a swarm of bees, a galactic system, ...

Despite the looseness of connection between the founding objects in the later examples here, the higher-order objects which result are nevertheless autonomous: Galaxies were discovered by the astronomers responsible for the galactic theory, not created as a response to their sedimentation of an appropriate predicate vocabulary. Many higher-order objects however are dependent for their existence upon conscious acts (acts of 'demarcation' and its analogues). But here again we can distinguish varying degrees of freedom of interconnection between the founding objects involved. Thus consider the following examples:

6. the 10th century kingdom of Mercia,
7. the 20th century British Crown Lands,
8. the British Meat Marketing Board,
9. the summative whole of all cattle in England at some specific instant \( t \),
10. the summative whole of all northward-facing cattle in England at time \( t \), ..., where we are assuming, for our present purposes, that all the examples given satisfy the conditions for objecthood.

The suggestion is, now, that a precisely parallel ordering, of 'degrees of interconnection', can be distinguished amongst predicate fields (conceptual frameworks), and that it is possible, moreover, to compare the degree of interconnection of a given predicate field with the degree of interconnection of higher-order objects (and, eventually, objects in general) put forward as entities which owe their existence to the sedimentation of that field. Then two distinct cases result: one in which the degree of interconnection amongst predicates is at least as great as that amongst objects, and one in which this is not the case. In the former case we can say that the predicates (their associated concepts) are by themselves sufficient to support the ontological load of the objects involved - when the predicate field is a candidate ontogenetic field. In the latter case however the predicate field must appeal to some independent support for the given objects, and is thus not a candidate ontogenetic field.
§ 60. Veridical contexts and veridical acts:

Accessibility within a veridical context as a criterion for object-status.

We can complete the task of supplying necessary and sufficient conditions for the object-status of particular entities (or of particular purported entities) if we can answer the question: what are the conditions for the 'external validity' of a purported ontogenesis?

19th century astronomers investigating their newly-discovered intramercurial 'planet Vulcan' certainly satisfied, from their own point of view, all the conditions for proper referential access to the object involved, and they were able to appeal to the rich background of predicates which they had acquired from their investigation of other planets. Yet Vulcan is not an object; indeed 'Vulcan' is not admissible as a denoting expression at all. The immediate suggestion is that the additional condition—which is clearly demanded—would restrict ontogenetic contexts (belief-systems, works, theories, scientific practices) to those whose constituent propositions are true: Vulcan-astronomy is non-ontogenetic, because it rests on false premises on the part of the astronomers involved. Such a condition would be insufficiently discriminating however: its bluntness would lead us, in fact, back to the reductivist ontology within which existence and objecthood are regarded as equi-extensional, an ontology which we have already had occasion to reject. This is because the propositions expressed by the sentences which make up, say, Hamlet, are, we may presume, all false: and yet Hamlet is a prime example of an ontogenetic context. Further, it seems that there are cases where the fact that a given context is ontogenetic seems easier to determine than whether or not its constituent premises are true: sometimes, indeed, there may be insuperable difficulties in the way of deciding the truth of propositions which we know to be associated with ontogenetic contexts, e.g. the propositions of large cardinal set theory, and (perhaps) of certain types of theology.

Nevertheless the above condition does capture an important element of truth (and hence its hegemony amongst philosophers for so long). However, it is not
the truth of propositions to which we must appeal, but to a more general notion, one which applies not merely to propositions (the noemata of linguistically carried acts of judgment) but to noemata in general: We have already seen that there are some acts which are 'purely noematic' in the sense that they lack a referent: for example, acts of involuntary hallucination, acts of seeking out the golden mountain, or the largest prime number. Yet each such act possesses an 'object', given 'internally' as it were. To see why this 'object' (more precisely: illusion of an object) cannot serve as a referent for the acts in question, let us consider in some detail an example (which we borrow from Kung, 1972a, p.21) of a certain Mr X who believes that he has seen live centaurs grazing on the lawn of Notre Dame University. Then Mr X's acts of imagining or hallucinating have certain noemata, which in turn have certain noematic senses with determinate poles (the 'objects', or intended centaurs qua intended just mentioned). But clearly there are no actual centaurs towards which Mr X's acts are directed. As Kung points out, a Meinongian philosopher might wish to conclude that Mr X's belief was concerned therefore with nonexistent centaurs, but

Mr X does not want to make any claim concerning non-existing centaurs: he claims that existing centaurs are grazing on the lawns of the University of Notre Dame, i.e. the centaurs are intended as having real physical existence. Thus in this case there is no referent, only an intended referent qua intended, an apparent referent: but an apparent referent is not a referent at all...

Further

Mr X does not claim that there are noemata on the lawns of the University of Notre Dame. Rather his belief is "through" a noema about physical reality. The noema is so to speak the tip of the arrow of sense which points to a certain "point" in physical reality, but in the case of Mr X's belief nothing can be found at this "coordinate point". In a case of true knowledge, on the other hand, the noema, i.e. the tip of the arrow of sense, and that which exists at the "point" pinpointed by the arrow do "coincide"; that is, the noema "fits" the actual referent. (Kung, 1972a, p. 21).250

Such coordinate points can be distinguished, however, not only on the face of physical reality, but also throughout all strata of intellectual objects.
Indeed we have already indicated (in notes 70 and 211) that the standard paradigm of an object, as an extensional whole, cannot be applied unquestioningly to intentional objects in general and to abstract objects in particular, since the latter may be comparable rather to nodes of attention, articulated in certain purely non-extensional ways. (Consider, again, the examples of the empty set, and of individual finite and infinite numbers). The question is, what is the condition which must be satisfied before it can be established that a given coordinate point is 'filled', as it were, by an appropriately constituted object? This condition is, we suggest, that the noemata of reference which are directed to the given coordinate point must be veridical noemata.

What this means may perhaps be conveyed as follows: the noema projected by a given act may be fulfilled or frustrated by the noemata of subsequent acts; thus the noema of an act of perception of a distant tower is progressively fulfilled as we move closer to the tower and an ever larger number of features become visible; but it then becomes frustrated if, e.g. when we reach the foot of the tower we find that it is not a tower at all, but merely a cardboard tower-facade. In response to such frustration we immediately cancel the original noema (of directedness to a tower), and erect instead a noema of reference to the cardboard structure, restructuring in an appropriate way all the individual features which had been acquired in our original perceptions of the 'tower'.

But there are certain cases where a noema is not merely qualitatively frustrated, but 'exploded' completely, in such a way that all features are cancelled. This occurs when the original 'object' proves, on closer inspection, not to have been an object at all, as e.g. when an oasis in the desert proves merely to have been the product of hallucination. A veridical noema, now, is a noema which is not liable to explode in this way, e.g. as a result of increases in knowledge about, or as a result of closer inspection of, the 'objects' concerned.

The hallucinatory 'oasis' is not an object, because the noemata of reference to it (in the given context) are all non-veridical; and the planet Vulcan is not an object, since again the astronomers' noemata of reference to it were all noemata which lacked veridicality.
Noemata of reference to Hamlet and to Holmes are, in contrast, veridical noemata, and this is notwithstanding the fact that there are isolated examples of acts directed to these objects the noemata of which rest on ontological error, e.g. the acts of someone who believes that Doyle's novels are true of some existent detective. For it is not individual acts the veridicality of which determines conditions for objecthood of the referents involved, but rather the contexts maintained by a spectrum of such acts, effected, in general, by a large number of different subjects. Vulcan-astronomy, we can say, constitutes a non-veridical context, as does, e.g. the arithmetic of the largest prime number; Hamlet, on the other hand, both in performance and in criticism, constitutes a veridical context, such that anyone who is epistemologically qualified to enter into that context thereby has the objects maintained in being by it as the referents of his acts.

But what is the status of this notion of 'veridicality'? We have already suggested that it should be regarded as a generalised truth-value, or, more precisely, that the opposition: veridicality/unveridicality, should be conceived after the model of the more familiar opposition between truth and falsehood. Veridicality/unveridicality differ from the variant truth-values which are normally presented in the literature, in that veridicality is not weaker in its scope than truth, in such a way as to give rise to 'truth-value gaps' as a result of the existence of propositions \( p \) which are such that neither \( p \) nor \( \neg p \) are assigned the designated positive value. Veridicality has in fact a wider scope than truth — corresponding, as we shall see in §61 to the greater size of the domain of objects as compared to the domain of existents — something which results in truth-value overlaps, i.e. in the existence of propositions \( p \) such that both \( p \) and \( \neg p \) are designated as veridical. The relation between truth and veridicality may be indicated by means of the following diagram:

\[
\begin{array}{c|ccc}
 p & T & F \\
 \hline
 V & \text{V} & \text{F} \\
 \hline
 \mu & \text{V} & \text{F} \\
\end{array}
\]

Now since, as we saw in §42, all propositions satisfy the (logical) law of excluded middle, it follows that if we turn this diagram 'on its head' and
consider the values assigned not to \( p \) but to its negation, then the line \( \ell \) between truth and falsehood remains fixed:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\neg p & \underline{F} & \ell \\
& U & \ell \\
& T & \ell \\
\end{array}
\]

but the line \( \mathcal{M} \) between veridicality and unveridicality is shifted to a position \( \mathcal{N} \) which is such that all propositions caught in the interval between \( \mathcal{M} \) and \( \mathcal{N} \) have the property indicated above, that both they and their negations are veridical. This is merely an immediate consequence of the fact that all true propositions are veridical, which clearly implies that any propositions, such as e.g.

*Sherlock Holmes is a detective,*

or: *Hamlet is a Danish prince,* which are both veridical and false, will be such that their negations are thereby veridical and true. Note, however, that this does not imply that any inconsistent proposition of the form \( 'p \land \neg p' \) is veridical. For whilst \( T \) satisfies the following rules:

(i) \( T(p) \land T(q) \iff T(p \land q), \)

(ii) \( T(p) \lor T(q) \iff T(p \lor q), \)

veridicality satisfies only the much weaker rules:

(iii) \( V(p) \land V(q) \iff V(p \land q), \)

(iv) \( V(p) \lor V(q) \iff V(p \lor q). \)

Thus even though both 'Sherlock Holmes is not a detective' and 'Sherlock Holmes is a detective' express veridical propositions, the conjunction of these two sentences does not express a veridical proposition, in virtue of the fact that there is no single context within which both sentences could be veridically uttered. Even more interesting, perhaps, are the consequences of the failure of

(v) \( V(p \lor q) \iff V(p) \lor V(q); \)

thus, whilst it is certainly veridical to assert that Hamlet was either right-handed or non-right-handed, i.e. that \( V(Eh \lor \neg Eh) \); neither \( Eh \) nor \( \neg Eh \) are veridically assertable, a consequence of the fact that Hamlet's right or non-right-handedness are among the infinite number of loci of indeterminacy in the stock of internal characteristics with which Hamlet has been endowed by.
his creator.

The ascription of truth-values to propositions is, as we have already
stressed in §17, atemporal. Thus if we suppose that there are 3 people in a
room at time t, and that a 4th person enters the room at t+1, then the proposi-
tion expressed by the sentence 'There are 4 people in this room' did not be-
come true at time t+1, since it already contains a time-reference within it
which is contextually understood: the given sentence expresses distinct
propositions as uttered at distinct times (or, e.g. in distinct rooms). Thus
in the case considered we are dealing with the proposition more fully expres-
sed by 'There are 4 people in this room at time t+1' the canonical meaning of
which is identical with the canonical meaning of 'There are 4 people in this
room' as uttered in the given context. Now this may be thought to give rise
to a crucial objection against the conception of veridicality as a variant
truth-value. For whilst it may reasonably be argued that the proposition ex-
pressed by, say, 'There are four people in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of
Versailles at 6 a.m. on the morning of the 1st of November 1788, Paris time', is
atemporal true, no such reasonableness can be attached to any claimed atemp-
oral veridicality of, say, 'There are 4 people in the Queen's Bed-chamber in
the Palace of Elsinore at cook-crow on the morning of Prince Hamlet's 24th
birthday'. This objection does not turn on the fact that it is here impossible
to 'close up the gaps' in such a way as to remove all 'variables' from the can-
onical meaning (proposition) expressed by the given sentence, something which is
always possible, at least in principle, in the case of propositions which would
put forward a claim to being true. Indeed it is not relevant that we have no
independent means of determining e.g. the year of Hamlet's 24th birthday, since
it is a quite distinct dimension of temporality with which we have to deal when
we are dealing with the veridicality-value of given propositions. The objection
rests, rather, on an appeal to the fact that, where the first of our two sen-
tences expresses the proposition which it does express independently of any
associated propositional context (linguistic structure), the second sentence
expresses a proposition (has a canonical meaning) only against the background
of Shakespeare's play, and thus - or so it is supposed - veridicality can be
assigned to it only in the time subsequent to the writing of that play. This objection to the parallelism between truth and veridicality cannot be upheld however. This is because, if the second sentence is veridical, then this can only be as a result of certain truths concerning, e.g. Shakespeare's actions and the existence of certain determinate texts. But if it is true that Shakespeare will behave in such a way as to present 4 people together in that room at that time, then it is atemporally true that he will behave in this manner; and clearly this is all that we need to support our claim that the given fictional sentence is atemporally veridical. Indeed it is clear that since veridicality is correlated in every case with certain truths about autonomous objects (literary texts, scientific text-books, language-using subjects, etc.) then it follows that there is a perfect reciprocity between the two notions with regard to their temporal properties. The basis of the objection lies in the fact that where propositions may be true individually, propositions are veridical only en bloc, and it is held to be a more questionable claim that the hugely complex structure of propositions which would correspond to all the determinations built into, say, War and Peace should be somehow atemporally assembled together in such a way that veridicality can be assigned to them, than that each individual true or false proposition may exist (in isolation from its neighbours) in such a way that its truth-value may be atemporally assigned to it. If, as we argued in § 17, even the second claim cannot be supported however, then there can be no possibility of erecting a criticism of veridicality along the lines suggested.

This completes our task of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for objecthood. Perhaps the best light in which they may be considered is as an attempt to introduce an analogue of the 'external' viewpoint which, as we have seen, is alone of authority in the field of ontology, within the locus of our internal, epistemological domain. The notion of veridicality, for example, is an expression of the various different ways by which external validity or invalidity may make itself felt on the internal level. This has one important consequence, namely that whilst objecthood/non-objecthood is a black and
white distinction, where a purported object does not satisfy the conditions for objecthood we do not have some inferior 'inadmissible object', but merely certain purely noematic configurations - nevertheless each of the conditions which we have isolated may present itself as a matter of degree. This situation may be rectified, at least to some extent, by more closely worked analyses e.g. of the notion of 'fulfilment' which is involved in our claims regarding fulfilled referential access, or of the notion of a predicate field, analyses which would lead to more perspicuous expressions of the conditions involved. But it seems that at least some degree of mis-alignment between the ontological dimension and the epistemological dimension is unavoidable, given that there is an unavoidable shortfall in our knowledge of the distinctions which pertain to any given object-region. Perhaps the issues involved may be illustrated as follows: Let us consider the totality of (formal) mathematical theories. Here veridicality is, though not identical with, at least closely related to the notion of consistency. Now certainly each and every mathematical theory is either consistent or non-consistent, and yet for many theories - even theories which are central to mathematics as presently conceived - we have no consistency proof nor any idea as to how such a proof may be obtained. Thus we have an example of a distinction which is non-gradational when considered in its application to the entities themselves, yet which is reflected in a series of over-lapping, gradational notions (e.g. of relative consistency) in the knowledge of mathematics which we actually possess.

However deep-seated this mis-alignment may be it cannot be exploited to support an objection to the notion of objecthood as such however. For we can discern an exactly parallel mis-alignment with regard to the notion of existence, and, indeed, with regard to all the ontological notions which have been accepted even by those philosophers suffering under our 'prejudice in favour of the actual'. These and other parallels between the notion of objecthood and the notion of existence lie at the very centre of the discipline of formal ontology with which the present work has been principally concerned; thus we shall find it useful to conclude our investigations with a discussion of the issues which they raise.
§61. Truth and veridicality, existence and objecthood: the parallelism of logic and ontology.

We saw in §36 that 'exists' is a predicate narrower in scope than 'is an object', and that in consequence we can regard the quantifier '∃' as a restricted quantifier relative to the objectual quantifier 's', namely by appealing to an existence predicate 'EI' of individual variables as primitive. Whilst the line between existent and non-existent objects is by no means unproblematic - conditions for existence of objects are as difficult to state as the conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by sentences containing terms which refer to such objects - nevertheless the difficulties involved are not reflected in any reluctance to make decisions in individual cases: it is by reference e.g. to encyclopaedias, not to philosophical arguments, that we decide the categories in which to assign, say, the Moutonlier brothers and the Karamazov brothers respectively. But this degree of conceptual familiarity does not surround the decision as to what is to count as an object, and in particular, as to which singular referring expressions are to be counted as successful in their reference to objects, a state of affairs which has arisen by virtue of the introduction by philosophers of an alien (reductivist) metaphysics which has no basis in the extra-philosophical contexts in which non-existent objects are brought under investigation. We wish to advance the claim that the decision as to objecthood should be aligned much more closely with the decision as to existence (in its application to objects and to purported objects), to claim, indeed, that the former is philosophically less problematic than the latter - a reflection of the fact that, since there are more objects than existent objects, the criteria involved in the case of objecthood are, at least marginally, simpler to state.

Perhaps the most important parallel between objecthood and existence (in its application to objects) turns on the fact that both notions are univocal through all contexts of use. What this means is that 'exists (as an object)' is identical in sense through all sentential contexts, and so is 'is an object', which differs only in that it has a wider scope. This univocality is
the underlying philosophical justification for Quine's 'critic of ontological commitment'; i.e. that when a given theory has been rendered into Quine's canonical notation, all of its ontological commitments may properly be seen as having been channelled into the range of variables of the individual variables of quantification, or: that a theory is committed to a given category of entities if and only if at least one member of that category must be counted among the values of the variables of quantification of the theory in order that the statements of the theory be true. (Cf. his 1960, p.242, 1961, p.103).

But note that the force of the claim is not that all existent objects exist in the same way, merely that to say of them that they do exist is, in each case, to appeal to one and the same concept of existence, (there are good philosophical reasons for our use of a single word in such a way as to comprehend not only spatio-temporal existence but also, e.g. the existence of (some) theoretical constructs of mathematics and physics).

Thus there are no special senses of 'exists', e.g. of the kind to which Meinong appeals in side-stepping the contradiction which seems to be implied by pure objects such as the existant golden mountain (see p.323 above). Such objects, Meinong claimed, on the one hand exist whilst on the other hand they 'lack being'.

Moss has expressed Quine's thesis on the univocality of existence more precisely as follows:

In the true theory [or hierarchy of theories] for which philosophers are searching, there is just one primitive sense of existence, and whatever is a value of a variable in this theory [or hierarchy] exists in the same sense. (A, §2.2).

But the force of this claim has been clarified by Moss by means of a comparison between existence and truth, both of which are univocal expressions. As he points out, it will, perhaps, be more readily agreed

for truth than for existence that there is just one notion, even though there are different species of truths, e.g. truths about particulars, law-like truths, logical truths,... For example, no reputable philosophical theology would assert that a theological proposition and the proposition that Sheffield is a city could be
true in different senses of 'true'. To any such claim, the
cutting and unanswerable reply would instantly be: 'true-in-a-dif-
ferent-sense' is just a devious way of saying 'false-or-meaningless'.
(Moses, loc.cit.)

It is in deference to such arguments that we have taken care, throughout the
present work, to make no claim to the effect that the non-existent objects to
which we are committed should exist or 'have being' in some different, deviant
sense, nor to claim that factually false propositions such as 'Sherlock Holmes
is a detective' or 'St George slew the fire-breathing dragon' are somehow
true-in-a-different-sense—though note that such propositions are false, not
because there are no existing referents for the singular terms involved, but
because detectivehood and is a dragon slayer are both existence-entailing attri-
butes. What Quine (and Moses) fail to recognize, however, is that the univocal-
ity of both existence and truth is something which is preserved only so long
as either notion is considered in its application to object-denoting singular
terms or to propositions expressed by sentences 'about' such terms. Thus

(a) \(2 + 2 = 4\),
(b) The number of cyprus trees on the side of Mount Etna is 4,
(c) Mount Everest is taller than Mount Etna,

are all, we shall assume, true (at this moment), and insofar as (a) and (b)
are interpreted as expressing propositions about the objects 2, 4, Mount Etna,
the given cyprus trees, they are all true in the same sense. If, however, (a),
say, is interpreted not as expressing a proposition about objects, but rather
about the second-level concepts (quantifiers) 2 and 4, then it seems that the
sense of 'true' which is involved is a metaphorical extension only of the
sense with which we are familiar in regard to propositions concerning objects.\(^{251}\)

And there is a second problem for the Quinean approach which arises against
the background of our dual \(\exists/V, \&/\), quantificational machinery, namely that
Quine's criterion — originally expressed in the form of a now familiar slogan:
'to be is to be the value of a variable' (1939a, p.66) — is ambiguous as between

(1) to exist (as an object) is to be the value of an individual variable
admitting of \(\exists\)-existential generalization, and:

(2) to be an object is to be the value of an individual variable admitting
of $S$-existential generalization.

What we now wish to suggest is that truth is related to existence not only in the fact that both are — within the limits expressed — univocal notions, but more precisely in the fact that the two notions are 'twinned', that the dimensions of logic and ontology become mutually correlative through these notions in the sense that a 'substantial' proposition concerning purported individual objects is true only if the 'objects' in question exist. The force of 'substantial' here is such as to imply positivity (in the sense of note 194), since one can of course construct true negative assertions (Sherlock Holmes was not a detective) which concern non-existent objects, and it is also such as to exclude the purely formal and purely intentional predicates which, as we have seen, can be applied to objects in general, existent or non-existent.

(See e.g.p.308; 'substantial' attributes will therefore correspond closely to Cocchiarella's existence-entailing attributes, and to Grosmann's simple properties.) But it should by now be clear that veridicality and objecthood, too, are mutually correlative in precisely this sense, since a substantial proposition concerning purported individual objects is veridical only if the 'objects' in question are admissible as objects; and this is yet another confirmation of the well-foundedness of the extension of ontology beyond the sphere of existents to the sphere of objects in general.

Further confirmation is provided by the fact that the two domains $E$, of existent objects, and $O$ of individual objects in general,

![Diagram](image)

each sustain two quite distinct interpretations with respect to the dimension of time, in such a way that the considerations which apply to $E$ can be unproblematically applied also to $O$. On the one hand we have a conception of $E$ as a domain which is exhausted, ontologically, in the present moment: Henry Kissinger would thus belong to $E$ as now constituted, but will cease to belong to $E$ at some point in the future, as Julius Caesar before him entered and
departed from the domain by very similar means. And on the other hand we have a conception of $E$ not as the ontological analogue of a temporal section through the spatio-temporal continuum, but as a temporal 'tube', which would either become elongated with the passage of time or - though this seems less coherent - as a domain which would be fixed in its extent, independently of time, such that it would contain not only past and presently existing objects but also all objects which will exist in the future. On the first of these two conceptions (which we shall alone consider) both Julius Caesar and Henry Kissinger, once they have entered the domain, remain there forever (and are thereby assigned the predicate 'El' forever): objects are never disincluded from $E$, though clearly purported objects which were once regarded as secure members of the population of $E$ may be shown never to have existed at all. But now $O$ too sustains just these two distinct sets of interpretations, according to the first of which Sherlock would cease to be an object should all copies of and memories of the relevant documents cease to exist - a view which was defended by Ingarden, - where, according to the second interpretation, Sherlock, once created, is 'indestructible' in just the same way that Caesar is indestructible: his status as an object is assured forever. (This latter view seems to have been defended by Conrad-Martius: cf. her 1923, p.182 and the discussion by Ingarden, LWA, text to note 98)\textsuperscript{252}

Perhaps the most interesting application of the notion of veridicality is within the philosophy of mathematics: Not all set theories are true. In particular not more than one of the theories which result when we add to the axioms of, say, $ZF$, each of the following continuum hypotheses in turn, is a true theory:

\begin{align*}
(1) \quad & \mathcal{N}_0 = \mathcal{N}_1, \\
(2) \quad & \mathcal{N}_0 = \mathcal{N}_2, \\
(17) \quad & \mathcal{N}_0 = \mathcal{N}_{17}, \text{ and so on.}
\end{align*}

Let us assume that $ZF_{17}$ ($ZF$ together with (17) as axiom) is false; and let us assume also that $ZF$ itself is consistent, then we know also (pace G"odel, 1940) that $ZF_{17}$ is consistent. Note that the falsity of $ZF_{17}$ would, by itself, cast no aspersions on this theory as a piece of mathematics; indeed we may argue
that truth as an evaluation criterion ceases to be relevant to mathematics once we leave the 'central core' of mathematics which is applicable. (Cf. p. 100 of my 1975, and n.66 above). This follows from the fact that we have no firm grasp of the considerations by means of which the truth of peripheral mathematical propositions could be determined, since mathematicians engaged in research in these areas are concerned, primarily, with the creation of new strata of objects, not with the discovery of any pre-existent strata, of which their propositions could be true. Indeed it seems to be a characteristic of all creative disciplines that veridicality alone has a role to play in the evaluation of the 'results' which are achieved.

Thus there is, after all, a close relation between logical considerations (of truth and veridicality) and ontological considerations (of existence and objecthood), and it seems that the parallels which we have discovered in the field of individual objects proper can be extended in such a way as to be applicable to all members of the category of objects in general, including, e.g., properties, relations, states of affairs, events, and processes. But there can be no general (logical) rule for obtaining such extensions, of the type which would allow us to dispense with direct ontological investigations of the entities themselves, in favour of purely logical or linguistic analyses. As we have discovered so often throughout the present work, an exclusive reliance on analyses of this type, in any area, leads to a shortfall in the ontological theory which results, the ill-consequences of which then have to be avoided by means of compensating adjustments which can only have a purely pragmatic justification. Thus it is further ontological investigations which are called for, and - in the light of difficulties of the type which we encountered in §42 - it seems that these investigations will have an even greater complexity than those which we have developed here for the case of individual objects proper. In this way philosophy begins to reassume its status as a cumulative science, characterized by gradual advances made on an ever-widening front, with minor setbacks caused as a result of intersubjective critical response. And perhaps the single most important message of the present work, is that formal logical methods should be used to nurture this advance, and not to stifle it, through the imposition of logical frameworks which are over-simple.