THE HOEFER PRIZES FOR EXCELLENCE
IN UNDERGRADUATE WRITING

in recognition of writing achievement in the
undergraduate field of study

May 21, 1997
Abstract

Salvaging Civilian Security:
The Role of Civilian Police in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions

Regine Spector
IR199R  Peacekeeping and Conflict Management
Professor Stephen Stedman
January 1997

United Nations Peacekeeping Missions have increased since the end of the cold war as intrastate and ethnic conflicts have become important concerns for international security. In order to address issues of civilian security in countries where law and order has deteriorated, the United Nations Civilian Police (CIVPOL) have become prominent actors in peacekeeping missions. Although numerous individual case studies examine CIVPOL in the context of one particular UN mission, there are no comparative studies assessing the role CIVPOL has played across different UN Peacekeeping Missions. This paper fills this gap by analyzing the CIVPOL's role and performance in Cambodia and El Salvador. The paper derives general lessons from the cases and identifies themes present in both CIVPOL experiences. The analysis suggests two kinds of lessons: those which pertain to the operation of the CIVPOL unit itself and those which involve how CIVPOL fit into the overarching organization and goals of the specific UN mandate. The paper argues that while the UN has begun to address operational issues, it has paid insufficient attention to the larger questions concerning the fundamental role and purpose of CIVPOL in peacekeeping. In order for the CIVPOL to create a secure environment for ordinary citizens in war torn countries, their role as monitors, trainers, and law enforcers must be more clearly defined.
Since the end of the cold war, interstate and ethnic conflicts have increased in number and have become important concerns for international security. The United Nations has responded by increasing its peacekeeping missions; since 1988, 18 new missions have been established--five more than had been deployed in the previous 43 years of UN peacekeeping history.\(^1\)

Corresponding to this increase in peacekeeping missions has been an enlargement in the number of United Nations Civilian Police (CIVPOL) deployed.\(^2\) As of December 1994 there were over 4,500 CIVPOL on the field compared to 35 at the end of 1987.\(^3\) The number of CIVPOL has increased as a means of addressing issues of civilian security in countries where law and order has broken down.

Prior to 1989, most peacekeeping missions deployed military observers to monitor cease-fires between states. The mandates of those first generation peacekeeping missions sought to verify cease-fires in order to provide provisional peace. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the mandates of peacekeeping missions require implementation of complex peace agreements. These newer second generation peacekeeping missions have predominantly nonmilitary tasks such as humanitarian assistance, human rights protection, electoral and administrative supervision, economic restructuring and public security monitoring. These new tasks require the UN to oversee and execute political solutions to rebuild war torn societies. Second generation missions are intricately involved in the internal affairs of the host country, and attempt to instill a broader notion of reconciliation and peace building within the nation.\(^4\)

The notion of peacekeeping has evolved from managing the conflict to creating conditions where a 'positive peace' can exist. Fetherston describes 'positive peace' as "a much broader idea which takes as its starting point the need to deal with fundamental structural problems and

---


\(^2\) From this point on, the United Nations Civilian Police will be called by their UN jargon name, CIVPOL.\(^\)


inequalities which are often the sources of tensions that escalate into destructive conflict."\(^5\) One of the common structural problems many countries experience is the breakdown of civilian security. The CIVPOL Component of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions addresses the issues of law, order and public security in order to aid in the creation of a stable environment where peace building can occur.

Although general literature on CIVPOL is scarce, highly researched case studies critique the role of CIVPOL in particular missions. This paper draws on those cases and attempts to compare CIVPOL’s contribution across two missions: El Salvador and Cambodia. In each of these cases, I ask the following questions:

- What was the initial mandate for the CIVPOL?
- Did they fulfill their mandate? How? Did the mandate change over time?
- What were the successes and failures of each mission?
- What was learned from their experience?

After investigating these two cases, I distinguish common trends and experiences in the missions and additionally, note any changes or any learning that has occurred from the former CIVPOL experiences.

CIVPOL: Promising or Pointless?

The first mission to utilize a CIVPOL Component was the 1989 mission in Namibia.\(^6\) Cedric Thornberry explains that the CIVPOL "...were designed to keep a sharp eye on the local police and to monitor the human rights' situation very closely, and I think that most people feel they turned out to be immensely important to the ultimate success of the mission."\(^7\) Thornberry describes why CIVPOL are in general, a positive contribution to peacekeeping efforts. He notes

---


\(^6\) Civilian Police Components have been part of peacekeeping missions in the past, for example in the Congo and in Cyprus. However, Namibia was the first mission where the CIVPOL played a more extensive role.

that unlike administrators and government officials, CIVPOL live and work amongst the people. This allows them to gain valuable insight into the concerns, fears and needs of the general population. They can use this knowledge to relay information to the other levels of government, acting as ombudsmen to gain the support of the people. Thornberry calls the CIVPOL the "glue" to a mission.8

The United States Institute of Peace likewise extols the virtues of CIVPOL. The cover story of a recent edition of their newsletter, Peace Watch, reads, "Police Are Critical to the Peace Process: Peace operations often face the challenge of creating stability in societies where law and order have broken down completely."9 This headline captures the theme of a USIP conference entitled "Police Functions in Peace Operations," where several officials, panelists and experts discussed their experiences or research in the field. The President of USIP stated that by providing "...the guarantee of personal safety and the safety of property, and the restoration of public trust, order and stability," CIVPOL help to create a secure environment. While the article points out the difficulties in organization, mandate and training of the CIVPOL in certain situations, it ends on an encouraging note, asserting that "the need to reform, establish, or recreate a local constabulary has become an essential part of international peace agreements."10

Recently, discussion has focused on how exactly CIVPOL fit into peacekeeping mandates. Within many of the missions, the responsibilities of the military and civilian police components often overlap. Upset with the recent ambiguity of civilian and military duties, IFOR's Force Commander, Admiral Leighton W. Smith Jr., stated recently in the NY Times that "we are not trained to do police work. Training to be a policeman is entirely different than training as a soldier. We have got to be very careful not to mix the two up."11 Denis McLean from USIP argues:

Police officers, for example, with their specialized training in crowd control, community interaction, and surveillance of criminal activity have much to contribute, especially at the early stages of a deteriorating situation. Police training is, indeed, what is needed to defuse tensions early on...The military are not trained to arbitrate civil or political issues. The police and the military should be sufficiently diverse to meet all eventualities while preserving its discipline and coherence.\textsuperscript{12}

Confusion between police and military responsibility confirms the need to define the mandate for each unit and train each group appropriately.

Scholars also disagree on how CIVPOL should function within broader peacekeeping missions as a whole. For example, Peace Watch argues that CIVPOL should play a role in rebuilding war torn societies, thus implying that CIVPOL should be used in a post conflict peacebuilding stage. McLean, on the other hand, states that CIVPOL should play a role in the early stages of a deteriorating situation, implying that CIVPOL should play a pre-conflict preventative role. These two views represent opposite poles on the spectrum of United Nations responsibilities delineated by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace.\textsuperscript{13} The limited theoretical and policy work done on CIVPOL suggests that these are the two major CIVPOL roles in current UN missions.

Most of the literature written on CIVPOL examines CIVPOL in the context of one particular mission. There have been no published papers or books addressing CIVPOL from a thematic approach. This paper attempts to fill this gap in knowledge by looking at the role of CIVPOL in two UN Peacekeeping Missions. The following two sections of the paper examine the CIVPOL, first in the Cambodian mission and then in the El Salvadoran mission.

\textbf{Cambodia}

\textsuperscript{12} McLean, Denis, "Peace Operations and Common Sense," United States Institute of Peace, Peaceworks no. 9, June 1996. 11.

\textsuperscript{13} "An Agenda for Peace," Boutros Boutros - Ghali, 1992.
The general objective of the UN CIVPOL unit under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was to ensure the maintenance of law and order and protection of human rights among the civilian population. The UN mandated the use of 3600 CIVPOL in the mission, who were recruited from 32 countries and made up 16% of the total UNTAC force.\textsuperscript{14} UNTAC intended to deploy one CIVPOL for every 15 Cambodian civil police and for every 3000 Cambodian citizens. The CIVPOL would be divided among 21 provinces and 200 districts with the primary duties of the provincial units to guide the district level police and respond to emergency situations. The district level police toured throughout villages and established contacts with local police and citizens.\textsuperscript{15}

In order to understand the role the CIVPOL played, one must step back and evaluate the initial police situation in Cambodia. The Implementation Report issued on 2/19/92 stated that the vast majority (40,000 out of 50,000) of the Cambodian Police were from the Cambodian People's Party, also known as the State of Cambodia (SOC). These police were divided into two categories: 1) those who performed public security duties and 2) those who were patrolmen in charge of the maintenance of law and order. UNTAC mandated that the CIVPOL be responsible for only the latter job. The former would be taken over by the Civil Administration (CIVADMIN) unit. In order to maintain law and order, the CIVPOL were instructed to monitor local police, establish contacts with village leaders, ensure public confidence, follow codes of conduct and operation guidelines, teach police about human rights, and assume other responsibilities as assigned. Additionally, the CIVPOL were in charge of recruitment, reorganization and training of the police force, although the costs were to be borne by the Cambodian parties themselves.\textsuperscript{16}

There were three major setbacks for the CIVPOL even before the mission began: the late appointment of the Police Commissioner, the inaccuracy of the Secretary General's Survey Report

\textsuperscript{14} CIVPOL for the Cambodian mission were from the following countries: Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Columbia, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sweden, and Tunisia. Doyle, Michael W., \textit{UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate} (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado, 1995), pg. 28.


and the unfeasibility of the CIVPOL mandate given the circumstances. Although UNTAC officially commenced on March 15, 1992 the Police Commissioner, Klass C. Roos, was not appointed until March 6, about a week before the mission began. One of the direct effects of this logistical problem was the tardy deployment of the actual CIVPOL force into the field. Almost two months after the mission began, only 193 CIVPOL were deployed and only 1903 of the 3600 were pledged. It wasn't until September of 1992 that 2500 were working in Cambodia. It took almost a whole year, two-thirds of the 18 month mission, to establish the full CIVPOL force. CIVPOL's late deployment only served as a hindrance to its effectiveness on the ground.

Another initial problem with the CIVPOL was the inaccuracy of the initial Secretary General Survey Report on the situation in Cambodia. The Report states that in addition to the majority of SOC police, there also existed 9,000 PDK (Khmer Rouge) police, 400 KPNLF police and 150 FUNCINPEC police. However, Commissioner Roos states in his evaluation report that no police from any of these latter three parties existed: "As far as police information in the [survey] report was concerned, it was obvious that this part of the report was written by officials without a police background. Needless to say that it hampered my efforts to set up this largest and most complicated police operation within peacekeeping." Misinformation of the initial situation in Cambodia caused errors and miscommunication once in the field.

Finally, the most detrimental and outstanding hindrance for the CIVPOL in Cambodia was the UNTAC mandate itself. While the mandate required the CIVPOL to supervise and control the local police and to pay specific attention to the protection of human rights, the CIVPOL initially lacked any means to execute their powers. There was no authority for the CIVPOL to make

arrrests, nor did they possess any enforcement mechanisms. Since the factions within the state of Cambodia itself did not have any formal system of law, there was no way for the CIVPOL to carry out their mandate. Mayall calls this inability to prosecute the "most serious weakness of the CIVPOL [mandate]." While this inability existed for the first year of the mission, UNTAC Directive 93/1 in January of 1993 established "a Special Prosecutor's Office to arrest, detain, and prosecute persons accused of politically motivated criminal acts and human rights violations." This gave the CIVPOL a method of arrest and enforcement. However, the CIVPOL still lacked the authority and means to prosecute since there was no independent court system to hear the Prosecutor's case, no witness protection program, no proper defense council and no accepted criminal laws. The effect of a lack of independent court "frustrat[ed] the attempts to upgrade law and order procedures in Cambodia."  

Although the CIVPOL were not able to full carry out their mandate, they did make some contributions that fell under their initial directive. The CIVPOL were present in all villages and districts as ordered in the initial mandate and succeeded in the training of local police. In November of 1992, CIVPOL established a training course where 84 police from the PDK and KKPLF were awarded graduation certificates. By April of 1993, a training school was established in Thmar Puk where students of all factions were officially trained, including police from the Khmer Rouge. By May of 1993, over 2,000 SOC police were trained as well as 450 from other factions. In addition to the formal police training, the CIVPOL "did provide useful briefings on human rights and basic principles of policing to about 9,000 Cambodian police officers."

27 Doyle, Michael W., UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado, 1995) 47.
Partly because of the inability of the CIVPOL to carry out their initial mandate fully, and also because they were needed in other branches of the UNTAC mission, the mandate of the CIVPOL evolved over time. The CIVPOL branched out in three different areas to help with the overall mission: 1. aiding with refugee replacement; 2. helping to demobilize soldiers, and 3. assisting with the election. The first group of 193 CIVPOL to arrive in Sisophon and Battambang aided in the resettlement of displaced persons and refugees as their initial responsibility. Throughout the mission, the CIVPOL were called upon to work with the Repatriation Component in protecting over 365,000 returning refugees.

The CIVPOL also worked with the Military and Electoral Components. Some of the CIVPOL were stationed at border check areas along with the military; others were involved in the confiscation of weapons. An initiative was created in Phnom Penh that called for 14 random checkpoints to be searched each day, attempting to decrease the number of weapons and thus crime in Phnom Penh. This initiative was considered a success, as crime decreased after this policy was instated. As the election drew nearer, the CIVPOL became involved in monitoring rallies and demonstrations, supervising political meetings and providing protection for party officials. Finally, the CIVPOL were present at the election itself, ensuring that they were fair and free.

While the CIVPOL did have success in the aforementioned aspects of their mission, there were several fundamental deficiencies in the recruitment, training and understanding of the mission. The CIVPOL were recruited from 32 countries around the world and thus had 32 contending interpretations of policing and police function in society. Recognizing this obstacle, the UN laid down some specific requirements for CIVPOL recruitment; for example 6 years of police experience and knowledge of the official mission language. While these rules provided general guidelines, they did not specify the other necessary skills or background for CIVPOL candidates. Commissioner Roos stated that CIVPOL should be "community police" with "special police skills" including technical and forensic experience, communication, traffic and crime specialists and

investigative training. UNTAC also required CIVPOL to possess a valid driver's license and speak one of the two official languages, French or English. It became apparent that because of the lax screening methods, many of the CIVPOL did not meet these requirements. Additionally, for political reasons, the Secretary General attempted to dissuade certain countries from donating police, instead of relying on stricter methods of screening. It was only after most of the CIVPOL had been recruited that Boutros-Ghali required a placement test before the recruits left their home countries.

Most scholars and practitioners agree that the CIVPOL were insufficiently trained and prepared for the mission. Based on a phone interview with an UNTAC CIVPOL official, scholar Stephan Ratner concluded that "Other than the briefest of human rights awareness classes once members arrived in Cambodia, the officers received no training." This inhibited the CIVPOL from effectively communicating with the local people and with the other officials. Given that this was one of the primary objectives of the CIVPOL component, the inability to communicate reduced CIVPOL's ability to foster trust amongst the people.

Because most CIVPOL did not have a comprehensive understanding of the mandate and international humanitarian standards, many CIVPOL actually committed human rights violations. For example, the Bulgarian contingent committed corrupt and even criminal acts such as rape. The Bulgarian Parliament was unable to explain these acts, but did blame the failure of the Bulgarian CIVPOL on the "Khmer Rouge's 'negative attitude towards East Europeans', language difficulties and a lack of 'serious training.'" Other comments cite deviance from UN general personnel standards: "Most complaints by local Cambodians against UNTAC stemmed from inappropriate

behavior by CIVPOL members, including sexual harassment and rudeness. This badly tarnished UNTAC's image with the populace. Such violations diminished the goal of providing security to the general population. Additionally, some UN officials and electoral personnel voiced a lack of confidence in working with their own CIVPOL. Because of these negative results, Berdal and Leifer deem CIVPOL as the least successful of UNTAC's components.

While many of the CIVPOL were under qualified or mistrained, a few units were exemplary. For example, the UN electoral workers praised the Singaporean police unit in Battambang for their assistance in the registration process. The Secretary General attributed their success to the careful screening and training of the CIVPOL prior to deployment. All 75 Singaporean CIVPOL spoke English, drove and had at least 10 years of police experience. Additionally, they took a special 8 week training class in communication, mental awareness, intercultural communication, and history. Michael Doyle also deemed the Australian unit equally successful in the area of police training, however for a different reason. The Australian unit stationed in Banteay Meanchey provided their own supplies for the first 90 days, and were thus able to successfully investigate 205 cases and train 42.9% of the police in the Thmar Pouk district.

The UNTAC mission was one of the first UN Peacekeeping missions to utilize CIVPOL for more than monitoring purposes. They were also the first CIVPOL unit to come under direct control of a mission head rather than a military commander. These factors suggest several lessons for deployment of future CIVPOL components. They can be broken down into two categories: 1) lessons that apply to the actual formation and organization of the CIVPOL units themselves and 2) lessons about the plausibility of the CIVPOL mandate. The first category includes issues such as

38 Doyle, Michael W., UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado, 1995) footnote 76, page 94.
the timely recruitment and deployment of CIVPOL, a proper and thorough training program, and sufficient resources to aid them. In the case of Cambodian CIVPOL, it proved unrealistic to recruit 3600 qualified CIVPOL in such a short amount of time. It proved equally impossible to obtain the necessary funds to equip and train them properly. Finally, it was unreasonable and unfair to expect Commissioner Roos to coordinate the 3600 police unit when he himself was appointed only one week before the actual mission began. The UN decision not to have a pre-deployment conference and training program as suggested by Commissioner Roos also worked to the unit’s disadvantage.\textsuperscript{39}

With regard to the plausibility of the mandate, CIVPOL effectively aided the monitoring of elections and also successfully trained a small number of Cambodian Police. However, since CIVPOL were only present in the last third of the mission, they were unable to train a large number of officers thoroughly. One analyst suggests that it would have been cheaper to train a new Cambodian force than to deploy such a large CIVPOL unit.\textsuperscript{40} CIVPOL were also less than successful with regard to human rights and law enforcement. UNTAC experience suggests that if CIVPOL enforce law as part of their mandate, then they need to be given the means to do so. In essence, CIVPOL operated in a country where the foundations of courts, defense attorneys, criminal laws and judges did not exist. Finally, the responsibility of the CIVPOL to aid in the investigation of human rights proved ineffective because the lack of a judicial system prevented them from following through on cases and also because much of their work overlapped with the Human Rights Component. The CIVPOL and the Human Rights Component often investigated cases independently; without communication they would often end up researching the same case twice.

\textbf{EL SALVADOR}

\textsuperscript{39} Roos, Klaas C., "UNTAC'S Civilian Police Operation," Azimi, Nassrine, The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: Debriefing and Lessons," (UNITAR, 1995) 143. The military unit did have one of these pre deployment training sessions.

ONUSAL in El Salvador is an example of a multi-disciplinary peacekeeping mission which has been hailed the "first in the 'second generation' of peacekeeping operations to emphasize post - conflict peace - building."⁴¹ Part of the peace building entailed a complete restructuring and retraining of the national police force - in essence, constructing a new public security system. The Civilian Police Component was established on January 1, 1992 to monitor the progress of this new force. The mandate of the CIVPOL included monitoring the creation and advising of the national police, providing confidence for the citizens, deterring intimidation, and promoting impartial and fair law enforcement.⁴² As of May 26, 1992, there were 304 CIVPOL in El Salvador from Austria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Guyana, Italy, Mexico, Spain, and Sweden under the direction of General Homero Vaz Bresque from Uruguay.

The Peace Accords called for the creation of a newly trained police force. The former police force in El Salvador consisted of the National Police, the National Guard and the Treasury Police, all of whom received training from military personnel under the Ministry of Defense. During the civil war, these police were "the principle perpetrators of systematic and extensive human rights violations."⁴³ The Peace Accords mandated that all three bodies be disbanded, the National Guard and the Treasury Police immediately and the National Police over the next two years. In place of these police institutions, a new one would be created entitled *Policia Nacional Civil* or PNC. This force would be completely independent from the military and the political parties. During the transition period, the police would be comprised of 20% former National Police, 20% FMLN members and 60% general civilians. ⁴⁴ Eventually the police force was to be drawn exclusively from the civilian sector, and each person was to be trained at a newly established police academy.

---

The UN CIVPOL primarily played a verification role in the ONUSAL mission. The 304 CIVPOL were deployed to six regional offices and 4 sub-regional offices to "...monitor National Police activities through visits and day and night patrols..."\textsuperscript{45} Initially, the CIVPOL mandate sought to ensure that the National Police abided by the new laws of the PNC. The UN CIVPOL also aided the Auxiliary Transitory Police in 30 posts designated as former conflict zones. Each of these posts consisted of a group of Auxiliary Transitory Police accompanied by a small group of CIVPOL who provided "constant supervision and guidance."\textsuperscript{46} The goal was for the CIVPOL to ensure order and security in these most troubled regions while the PNC were being trained. Ultimately, the Auxiliary Transitory Police was to be disbanded.

In addition, the CIVPOL were given other duties on an \textit{ad hoc} basis, including:

\begin{itemize}
\item to participate in the functioning of the special regime of public security in the former zones of conflict; to coordinate the technical cooperation for the ANSP and the PNC; to secure international financial support as a complement to the internal resources needed to bring about the reforms; and to verify respect for human rights, especially by the police forces, both old and new.\textsuperscript{47}
\end{itemize}

Some of their specific duties involved observing marches, demonstrations, and other events. With regard to their mandate, the CIVPOL succeeded in ensuring security for the parties, as well as providing a means to resolve political deadlocks. The CIVPOL also monitored and verified the progress of the National Police transition on a daily basis.

As of May 1993, the 315 CIVPOL assumed additional roles with regard to the transition of the Police Force, including the responsibility of evaluating the new police force, and "providing it with technical and logistical support."\textsuperscript{48} They also worked with the Military Division locating and confiscating illegal arms caches, as well as with the Human Rights Division responding to human

rights violation claims. Finally in this time period, some CIVPOL monitored admission into the National Public Security Training Academy.

In evaluating the CIVPOL Component in El Salvador, two major flaws arise: problems with the CIVPOL mandate itself and poor coordination between various UN Components and other institutions. The main problem with the mandate was that part of it changed half way through the mission. At the beginning of 1993, the police were evaluating, assisting and supporting the creation of the new police force, the PNC. However, at the end of 1993, the government decided not to renew this part of the CIVPOL mandate, thus hampering the role of the 277 CIVPOL on the ground in El Salvador. They could no longer aid in the logistical and technical support of the PNC, nor could they provide leverage in solving political problems that arose during the development of the PNC.

Another problem that arose from the mandate involved the relationship between ONUSAL and the International Technical Team. The ONUSAL mandate required the Police Training Academy's International Technical Team to fall under the supervision of ONUSAL. However, at the same time, the mandate deemed that ONUSAL could not be involved in the advising and training of police at the academy. Thus, conflict arose between the CIVPOL monitors and the Police Academy instructors. The CIVPOL wanted to share their knowledge, resources and political weight with the Team, however were discouraged to do so because of the lack of trust that the instructors felt towards the monitors. The monitors, in turn, felt their "...mission diminished for having to observe the performance of a force condemned to extinction." Although the CIVPOL unit acquired information regarding the problems of the PNC, they were unable to use it to make necessary changes.

William Stanley considers the lack of coordination between the Police unit and other units of the ONUSAL mission the greatest flaw of the CIVPOL.\textsuperscript{52} The relationship between the Police Component and the Human Rights Component was especially troubling since the personnel not only failed to share information, but actually displayed outward hostility towards one another. This hostility arose because both units were mandated to do similar tasks, namely to investigate human rights violations. Often times, one unit would investigate certain cases which the other had already inspected. Tensions arose because each unit would claim that their data held more validity. This problem was recognized in April 1994, three quarters of the way into the mission, and was essentially too late for structural changes to make a significant impact.

A lack of communication caused poor communication within UNOSAL for two reasons. First, the leaders at the top, for example the unit heads and the mission chief, did not communicate effectively. The normal structure of the mission did require the Police and Human Rights Divisions to meet with the Chief of Missions. However, these meetings had "...had too broad an agenda to be effective to deal with specific areas, such as public security."\textsuperscript{53} The structure of the meetings did change in mid-1994, again too late in the mission to be effective.

Second, the police themselves were not trained or experienced in working with others from different divisions. The CIVPOL and Human Rights workers all had diverse training backgrounds, but more importantly were not trained to work with one another. Because of this lack of training, the two groups began their respective tasks of the mission with great distrust and suspicion of each other. In a mandate where the CIVPOL and Human Rights workers did similar work, it was necessary for them to not only get along, but to share information freely.

Finally, there are two external reasons why the CIVPOL were not as effective in achieving their mandate. First, the National Public Security Academy was delayed in its opening. This led to a slow deployment of the National Civilian Police (PNC) and created what is know as a "public security gap". The primary reason for the delay was the lack of funding; as of September 1, 1992

\textsuperscript{52} Phone Interview: William Stanley, Professor of Political Science at the University of New Mexico 11/14/96.
when the Academy opened, there was only enough money pledged to finance the institution until the end of 1992. This was problematic especially because the mandate expected 330 new recruits to be trained at the Academy each month in order to replace the National Police by the new National Civilian Police by mid 1994. The CIVPOL were not prepared (both financially and structurally) to deal with this delay.

Another external problem that affected the CIVPOL centered around the National Police's refusal to be phased out. As of May 1993, the Secretary General actually noted an increase in the National Police due to the transfers from the other two former police institutions. This was contrary to the mandate which stated that the new police should replace the National Police as they were trained. By the end of 1993, the situation was not corrected and the Secretary General sent observers to El Salvador to investigate the situation. These delays were problematic primarily because the National Police were the ones committing human rights violations, including torture, execution, and physical abuse of citizens.54

CIVPOL in the El Salvador faced fewer problems with recruitment, training and deployment than did the CIVPOL in the Cambodia. Hampson attributes this to the missions size:

[T]he relatively small size of the UN force in El Salvador actually worked to the advantage of the peace process. Unlike the UN operation in Cambodia...with its far larger and more cumbersome bureaucracy, ONUSAL did not experience major delays in deploying its workers, setting up its offices, acquiring the necessary equipment, or generally going about its business.55

The 1993 Report on the El Salvadoran Police by William Stanley states that the ONUSAL police division "has played a vital role in assisting the PNC during initial deployment, providing both extensive logistical support and ongoing tutoring in the practical challenges of policing."56 Stanley

also cites the main source of problems for the CIVPOL in the ONUSAL mission were those involving coordination with the rest of the units, specifically the Human Rights Component.\textsuperscript{57}

Summary: Conclusions and Lessons

In this paper, I have distinguished between the lessons learned which apply to the CIVPOL unit itself, and the lessons learned about the role CIVPOL play as a part of the broader mission mandate. Melanie Greenberg has drawn a similar distinction from her work in general policing, albeit using different terms. She labels issues involving the internal workings of the police unit \textit{operational} elements. In the case of UN CIVPOL, these would include issues such as recruitment and training. \textit{Organizational} elements, on the other hand, focus on the broader role of the police. In this paper, organizational issues include how the CIVPOL function with the other mission components and how they contribute to mandate.\textsuperscript{58}

Operational Elements

Because no one country has an abundance of qualified police officers, CIVPOL units are comprised of police from numerous countries around the world. Because each country has its own set of laws and perceptions about policing, so does each police officer. The challenge for the Police Commissioner lies in forming a single cohesive unit of police officers when each has an entirely different policing experience. The primary means of ensuring at least a semblance of uniformity amongst the officers rests in the utilization of the Minimum Standards Requirement for CIVPOL, which was tightened after the Cambodian experience. In order to be a qualified CIVPOL, each person should:

- be a citizen of a UN member state
- be a police officer for the member state
- have proper mental and physical health
- have a minimum of policing experience
- pass the language proficiency, usually English or French

\textsuperscript{57} Phone Interview: William Stanley, Professor of Political Science at the University of New Mexico 11/14/96.

\textsuperscript{58} The categorical distinction between \textit{operational} and \textit{organizational} is by no means a black and white one. It should be looked upon as a tool to facilitate and break down the elements of a CIVPOL component and not as an infallible method of categorization.
- pass driving test
- possess personal and professional integrity
- have knowledge of the use of firearms

Other requirements that are strongly suggested, but not required include:

- knowledge of their member state’s laws and codes of conduct
- conflict resolution skills
- first aid skills
- previous mission experience
- eight years of policing experience for the more complex mandates
- knowledge of mission countries’ culture, history and religion
- knowledge of mandate

While these are the bare minimum requirements for effective CIVPOL, they do provide a solid basis for CIVPOL selection. The main problem in CIVPOL recruitment, however, has not been in the nature of the requirements themselves, but rather in the state’s ability to screen their candidates effectively.

Each government is responsible for selecting its own CIVPOL based on the UN requirements listed above. The CIVPOL are then sent to the mission country after training. In Cambodia there was no checkpoint between these two stages – no dialogue or consultation between the DPKO staff and the CIVPOL-contributing country to ensure the requirements were satisfied. For political reasons, because of lack of personnel and finances or because of apathy, governments sometimes do not take the CIVPOL recruitment seriously. This wastes the UN’s time and the money since they not only have to repatriate those who are unqualified, but also must spend time finding additional qualified CIVPOL.

Within the past year, the UN has established a unit called the Selection Assistance Team to address this problem. The team helps governments select CIVPOL by flying to the member country and screening the candidates. The team also ensures that the proper government officials receive the information supplied by the UN, since often times it gets lost within the government bureaucracy. Since the team was established less than one year ago, the UN calculates that it has saved over 1.5 million dollars by preventing the deployment of unqualified police for branches of the missions in the former Yugoslavia.59

59 Phone Interview: Michael Emery, UN Training Consultant and former Commissioner of UNPROFOR CIVPOL, 11/13/96.
Once the CIVPOL have been selected, the national government providing the police has the responsibility of training them. The problem with training has been twofold. First, as in the case of Cambodia, governments often do not take the training seriously and leave the CIVPOL unaware of their basic duties and required codes of conduct. And second, in both Cambodia and El Salvador, training was limited to the specific requirements of CIVPOL and omitted how the CIVPOL should work with and interact with the other branches of the mission. The UN has attempted to improve the training of CIVPOL by creating a comprehensive training guide for the government's use. This new guide attempts to ensure uniformity in training from country to country. It will be forwarded directly to the mission commander and the appropriate branch of the government once it is completed.

In the missions discussed above, there was confusion about the relationship between CIVPOL and other branches of the UN mission. In Cambodia and El Salvador there was a lack of communication and a duplication of duties between the CIVPOL and Human Rights Component, a problem exacerbated by the lack of training to cooperate with one another. This has been improved through the establishment of training courses which emphasize the importance of working together. One of the most prominent and renowned of these training services is called the Lester Pearson Training Center which is funded by the Canadian government. The course approaches the training CIVPOL from a multi-dimensional perspective, focusing not only on the general training of CIVPOL but also on how the CIVPOL unit should work and interact with other branches including human rights, electoral and military.

The United Nations Centre for Human Rights has also taken initiative to emphasize human rights training for law enforcement officials. They compiled a training package for peacekeepers including a training manual on human rights and a pocketbook of human rights standards for police work. The Centre also instituted training programs specifically for CIVPOL in Mozambique and Zagrab. The courses, taught in the mission country, "have been adjusted to the specific needs of the concerned CIVPOL component, formulated taking into account the mandate...", the specific CIVPOL functions within the overall mandate of the operation, and the relation between CIVPOL...
and the other components of the peacekeeping operation."60 This program that provides knowledge of human rights standards, procedures and techniques has been so well received, that participants recommend such training be provided to all CIVPOL when they are first assigned to a Peacekeeping Operation.

Austria sponsors another notable training center established for the purpose of training civilian personnel for peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. Organized by the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution in conjunction with the European University Center for Peace Studies, this 3 week course entitled the International Civilian Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Training Program (IPT) trains all civilians, including CIVPOL, in the basic skills, requirements and strategies for peacekeepers. The methodology of the course centers around the importance of 'contact skills,' including communication, management and intercultural concepts required for interaction with people. Located in Stadtschlaining, Austria, this course is one of the few opportunities for any peacekeeper to gain valuable skills and practice in the peacekeeping field.61

While the changes in CIVPOL recruitment and training have proven to be necessary ones, they are by no means exhaustive. Effort still needs to be made to ensure that pre deployment training covers the cultural specifics of the mission country in addition to the general CIVPOL requirements. "While universal guidelines for police reform might be helpful, any training organization must take into consideration the individual context in which training is occurring. Factors include the local political environment, local community organizations, the local economy, the needs of the police themselves, possibilities for political reform independent of police reform, level of ethnic or other internal tension, and the risk factors for deadly conflict."62 Additionally,

60 From the presentation by the United Nations Centre for Human Rights, "Information Paper on training activities for Civilian Police Components of peace-keeping operations," at the Singapore Conference on the Role and Function of CIVPOL in Peacekeeping Missions, 11-13 December, 1995, pg 5. This report has additional details regarding the training for ONUMOZ and UNPF missions in addition to the Centre's approach to CIVPOL training.
61 From the presentation on IPT at the Singapore Conference on the Role and Function of CIVPOL in Peacekeeping Missions, 11-13 December, 1995 and also from the IPT Information Brochure.
the new Selection Assistance Teams and the new approaches to training discussed above must be expanded and honed, so that all CIVPOL undergo a uniform recruitment and basic training process.

Institutional Elements

Institutional questions involving CIVPOL are equally important as operational ones. One of the conclusions from the recent conference on Police Reform held at Stanford University states that reform happens "...when principles can be transferred (as opposed to skills, technologies and techniques) that contribute to the development of policing." When the UN takes on the responsibility of creating a new police force as it did in El Salvador, general questions of police reform must also be taken into consideration. "For police reform to work.....the culture and organization of the police must be examined, not simply the behavior of particular officers." 63

The first and most important step for the CIVPOL to be better incorporated into the mission as a whole is to allow the CIVPOL commander or another CIVPOL official to accompany the pre-mission evaluation. This did not happen in Cambodia. A change in policy would allow the commander to have more information about the type of force, training and equipment necessary for the mission. Since each country's prior police situation, terrain and policing needs are different, it is essential that the commander have knowledge of the situation prior to sending the unit in. Part of the reason for the lack of inclusion lies in the lack in funding and personnel assigned to the CIVPOL unit. Currently, only one UN paid employee works for the CIVPOL office at DPKO in New York on a full time basis. Four other full time workers at the New York office are paid by their respective governments to work in the CIVPOL office. 64 In comparison, there are over 200 full time employees in the military division.

64 Phone Interview: Michael Emery, UN Training Consultant and former Commissioner of UNPROFOR CIVPOL, 11/13/96.
In understanding the role the UN CIVPOL play within each mission, it is first important to define the three UN interpretations of policing. First, CIVPOL can play a purely monitoring role which includes supervising elections and participating in human rights activities (as CIVPOL did in Cambodia and El Salvador). Secondly, CIVPOL can supervise and train local law enforcement officials (as the CIVPOL also did in El Salvador and Cambodia). Finally, CIVPOL can be responsible for actual law enforcement functions, like arrests and detention (as the CIVPOL did in Cambodia). It is generally agreed upon that the CIVPOL should play a strong monitoring and training role in the mission. "The ultimate goal of [police] reform efforts is to change deeply embedded ideological, political and cultural norms regarding policing..."65 Giving CIVPOL the mandate to train and aid the existing police force allows them to be a part of the institution building for civilian security.

The term 'training' however must be used with caution. There is a distinction between training and advising. The primary mission of the CIVPOL in El Salvador was to advise the police and trainers - the teachers at the Training Academy were solely responsible for the actual training of police. In Cambodia, CIVPOL trained local officers both on the field and in the created Training Academy. The distinction between field training and academy training is an important one because Academy training teaches standardized curricula to all officers while field training often depends on the field officers in charge. Field training of local police officers can vary from region to region and is often deemed less successful than Academy teaching.

Whether or not to assign the CIVPOL power to enforce law has proven to be the most debated question regarding the CIVPOL mandate. Two issues have arisen regarding the power for CIVPOL to enforce law. First, is CIVPOL able to enforce the law when a legal system does not exist, or is severely disorganized? In the Cambodian mission, the CIVPOL were entrusted, for the first time, with the power to arrest and detain prisoners. However the attempts by the CIVPOL to utilize their powers were hampered and basically ineffective because the judicial structure did not.

---

exist to support them. One thought on this dilemma is to only allow CIVPOL to have enforcement power if there exists a corresponding commitment in the mandate to redo the judicial system. This implies a long term commitment for the international community to be involved in the true peace building of a society. If there exists a long term commitment of the international community to build the civil security institution, then the CIVPOL will be better equipped to effectively enforce the law.

A second issue concerns whether or not CIVPOL should carry arms. In Cambodia, the CIVPOL did not officially have weapons, but they often acquired them from other sources. In an enforcement role, CIVPOL need arms to be taken seriously and to be effective since local communities often expect CIVPOL to enforce regulations. If they are not allowed to carry weapons, they are perceived as weak and thus lack credibility. Succinctly stated, "The UN separates the military and civilian components and opts for unarmed police in a monitoring rather than a proactive role. This often makes for a less effective police operation."\textsuperscript{66} Neil Poulit, Police Commissioner in Haiti says that his force would not have agreed to go into Haiti unless they had the security of carrying a weapon, and that CIVPOL must have weapons to be effective in a mission.\textsuperscript{67}

Analysts suggest three reasons why CIVPOL should not carry arms. First, by carrying arms and enforcing the law, CIVPOL violate the country's national sovereignty. Second, carrying weapons may place CIVPOL in greater danger. The third, CIVPOL should not bear arms because that is the responsibility of the military unit. The National Defense University describes the interaction between the CIVPOL and military unit as a fluid one - the military often initially does law enforcement at the beginning of the mission to fill in the "public security gap." Then, during the "transitional phase," duties such as electoral and human rights investigations are turned over to the CIVPOL while the military still deals with armed factions and demilitarization. Finally, the "final phase" for the CIVPOL entails a long term commitment to recruit and train the new police

\textsuperscript{66} "Policing the New World Disorder," \textit{Strategic Forum}, National Defense University and the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Number 84, October, 1996, pg. 2.
\textsuperscript{67} Phone Interview: Niel Poulit, CIVPOL Commander in Haiti, 11/16/96.
force and judicial system. In this way, the division between CIVPOL and military units exists such that weapons are only needed by the military.68

The experience of the CIVPOL has shown that the Cambodian mandate was inappropriate given the situation. The CIVPOL had difficulty fulfilling their mandate because the UN did not have consent from all parties, there were very weak security institutions, and there was no long term commitment to rebuild the country. In contrast, CIVPOL in El Salvador given power to monitor and advise in the training of a new national police force during the ONUSAL mission. The commitment to solidify this new institution extended beyond ONUSAL to MINUSAL, the new Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador, which was created on May 1, 1995. This small scale operation includes 8 police observers who primarily verify and provide good offices to ensure the Peace Accords are fully implemented. This post-ONUSAL observer mission reflects UN commitment to rebuild the civilian security institution among others, allowing necessary time for such a task to be completed fully. The success of CIVPOL in El Salvador shows that UN commitment in ONUSAL and MINUSAL was appropriate for an effective CIVPOL unit.

Police units are an essential link which allow communication and interaction between civilians and government. CIVPOL play an important role in promoting this link because they are temporary police who reform (as in the case of Cambodia) or create (as in the case of El Salvador) the national civilian security institution. This paper has shown that the effectiveness of an individual CIVPOL unit can be improved through operational changes, such as better recruitment and training processes. However, improvements in the unit itself can not affect the success of the CIVPOL with regard to their overall mandate. Evaluating the successes and failures in the Cambodian and El Salvadoran missions has shed insight into the plausibility of the CIVPOL mandate, and has succeeded in bringing important institutional questions to the fore. These questions raised at the end of the paper must be continually addressed by the UN and other scholars so that future missions utilize CIVPOL effectively. The best legacy the CIVPOL

component can leave behind is to lay the foundations for a stable and sound civilian security institution.
GENERAL


Phone Interview: Erwin Schmidl, Austrian Foreign Minister and Historian, 11/12/96.

Phone Interview: Harry Proer, UN Deputy Civilian Police Advisor under Commissioner Hadhor, 11/13/96.

Phone Interview: Michael Emery, UN Training Consultant and former Commissioner of UNPROFOR CIVPOL, 11/13/96.

Phone Interview: Niel Pouliot, CIVPOL Commander in Haiti, 11/16/96.


CAMBODIA


Doyle, Michael W., UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado, 1995)


Heder, Steven and Ledgerwood, Judy, Propaganda, Politics and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under UN Peacekeeping (East Gate Books: Armonk, NY, 1996)


EL SALVADOR


Phone Interview: William Stanley, Professor of Political Science at the University of New Mexico 11/14/96.


United Nations Secretary General Report, 50th session, agenda item 45, A/50/517, 10/6/95.