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A Perfect Storm: Pinkertons, the Evolution of Violence, and the Homestead Strike of 1892

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A Perfect Storm: Pinkertons, the Evolution of Violence, and the Homestead Strike of 1892

The savagery of the violence that often accompanied labor disputes in the late 19th and early 20th century is frequently viewed as a symptom of growing tension and unease as industrialization transformed American society and the economy. But this violence must also be viewed diachronically, as an outgrowth of an evolution of violence in the United States, fomented by Western frontier society in the 1870s and 1880s. The Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency and the changing nature of its activities exemplify this evolution of violence. Very little in the Pinkertons’ antebellum or Civil War espionage activities foreshadowed the violence that would characterize their later involvement in labor disputes. Yet the nature of the Agency’s work in the West in the 1870s exposed the Pinkertons to violence more brutal than they had previously seen, not only from criminals but also from mobs of civilian vigilantes. Interaction with vigilantes in the West not only exposed and accustomed Pinkerton operatives to brutality, but, as Pinkerton records and agent correspondence show, it also encouraged the Agency to adopt extralegal methods of violence as part of their modus operandi, particularly in labor disputes in the late 19th century. Alongside the evolution of this kind of violence and its adoption by the Pinkertons, as agents of law enforcement, however, was another, related development: the growing rejection of private policing agencies such as the Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency and the growing demand for a more effective and powerful governmentally administrated public police. In large part, the growing violence of Pinkerton’s Agency, especially in labor disputes, was responsible for this trend, shifting public opinion as to the appropriate measure of violence to be employed and the appropriate agent of law enforcement in
labor strikes. All of these forces converged in July of 1892, at Homestead, Pennsylvania, in one of the most notorious strikes in the history of American labor: while Homestead itself is not necessarily emblematic of overwhelming Pinkerton violence, it is an instance in which the Pinkertons’ violent tendencies, the reputation which their violence had garnered, and growing aggravation at private policing came to a head.

Late in June of 1892, contract negotiations between the Carnegie Steel Company, Ltd., and the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers (AAISW), to which the overwhelming bulk of the 3800 workers at Carnegie Steel’s plant at Homestead, Pennsylvania, belonged, ground to a halt. On the 29th of June, Henry Frick, the chairman of the Carnegie Steel Company, locked the workers out of the plant. The next day the striking workers gathered outside the plant and set up perimeters around the town of Homestead to prevent the entry of other workers or foremen to the town and plant.\(^1\) Up until this point, the events at Homestead largely resemble any of the other major strikes that had previously occurred in the US. But throughout the end of June, Frick had quite literally transformed the plant into a fortress, with a miles-long fence topped with barbed-wire, searchlights, and a water cannon,\(^2\) which became known as “Fort Frick,” “the mill transformed into a fort.”\(^3\) Early in July, rumors began to circulate among the strikers about the impending arrival of watchmen, whom Frick had contracted out from the Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency to guard the plant, the Carnegie Company’s property. Around 4 AM on July 6th, an alarm was sounded, with the news that barges were heading down the Monongahela River to the plant.\(^4\) Literally thousands of townspeople, armed with various firearms and clubs, converged on the banks of the river; at around 4:30 AM, two barges containing about 300 Pinkerton watchmen came ashore in front of a mob of thousands of workers, who were shouting and throwing rocks at the barges and their passengers.\(^5\)
As the Pinkertons attempted to disembark and head up the bank to the plant, a confrontation broke out between the strikers and the watchmen, and, as the Pinkerton captain attempted to come down the gangplank, shots were fired. The Pinkertons armed themselves and began to fire on the workers, who returned their fire. An all-out siege had broken out; the violence continued throughout the day as the Pinkertons fired on the strikers, who responded with their own volleys, attempts to light the barges on fire, and dynamite. At 5 PM the Pinkertons requested to surrender: as they were taken into custody by the strikers, the mob turned against them, forming a gauntlet through which the Pinkertons would have to pass—the strikers began to physically assault the Pinkertons with clubs, sticks, and stones as they marched up to the mill, to their makeshift prison. Witnesses reported that among the Pinkertons there was not a single one who was not injured in some way. Two men died from their wounds; another was committed to an insane asylum as the result of his injuries. The rest of the Pinkertons struggled to the railroad station and hospital to escape from Homestead. By the end of the day, ten strikers and between three and seven Pinkertons were dead.

The “Battle for Homestead” became a legend in the folklore of American labor, largely because of the extremity and scale of its violence. But a number of factors combined to make the strike at Homestead a particularly violent one: in large part it is due to the growing perception of private law enforcement agencies—such as the Pinkertons—as illegitimate sources of authority, enforcement, and violence. This trend is an organic trend that was part of an overarching transition in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century away from mistrust of a strong, large, centralized government towards increased government involvement in Americans’ lives. But it is also the product of the growing public revilement at the Pinkertons’ violent nature, which particularly came to the fore of public opinion with their involvement in labor disputes. Both of these factors combined to
heighten the stakes of the clash between the strikers and the Pinkertons; but still other factors combined to make the tinder at Homestead particularly live. Latent tensions around race and class came to a head at Homestead, as well, providing even more flashpoints for violence.

But it is not only because of its violence that Homestead is significant. Homestead was a turning point in the history of labor as well as in the broader scheme of American law enforcement in the 19th century. In Homestead’s wake, the public, many states, and eventually the country fully rejected the model of private law enforcement, and embraced the growing legitimacy of governmentally-administered public police. The end of the era of the private police agency spelled the end of the era of the Pinkertons as well: what had begun as a slightly mad-cap agency of detectives who worked undercover to catch dishonest railroad employees by 1892 was reviled as a private army of violent mercenaries. The Pinkertons ultimately fell victim both to the broader trend towards strong central government and their own predilection for violence, and it was at Homestead that these factors converged to effect a major transformation in American law enforcement. But to determine how the Pinkertons reached this stage, it is necessary to understand their origins in the milieu of 19th century law enforcement.

“What the law will not do for men they must do for themselves,” Terence V. Powderly, the Grand Master Workman of the Knights of Labor, wrote in the North American Review in the wake of the Homestead Strike of 1892. In light of that context, his statement may seem incendiary, encouraging laborers to engage in measures outside of legal bounds to achieve their ends. And while the comment is unmistakably incendiary, it is perhaps not as blatant or single-minded as it appears now, over a century later. In the 19th century, mistrust of a strong central government and fear of the formation of large standing armies restricted the scope of the law, particularly law enforcement, and the public police were often either hamstrung, incompetent, or
altogether nonexistent. They were also plagued with corruption, given that urban public police departments were “closely intermeshed with local political machines and with the Catholic church” and its employees were “dependent on these institutions, especially the political machines, for their jobs,” making the public police at best, overtly political and at worst, outright corrupt. These factors meant that where public police did exist, they were unable to keep up with the rapid growth of the urban and industrial institutions they were meant to protect. In rural areas, public law enforcement was sometimes incompetent, but more often nonexistent.

Without public police to maintain order or prevent and punish crime, the landscape of law enforcement in the late 19th century looked considerably different than it does today. Private police organizations began to sprout around the same time as the urban private police departments did in the early 1800s, and largely, these private agencies were the more trusted and capable alternatives. Private agencies proved more competent and more technologically advanced than the public police, nor were they hamstrung by jurisdictional boundaries as were the public police. Moreover, the private police were more trusted. The strong connection between the urban public police and the predominantly Irish political machines and Catholic Church meant that the public police tended to be predominantly comprised of Irish and Italian immigrants. Its immigrant nature and overwhelming prejudice against the Irish and Italians meant that the middle and upper classes and businesses tended to shun the public police. Secondly, fear of government expansion deterred many from the public police. Private agencies were a preferable alternative: “Historically, people protected their own property,” and so for an individual or corporation to employ a private agency to recover their property seemed more in keeping with that traditional ideal than did turning to a public government agency.
Allan Pinkerton, then, was filling a much-needed niche when he formed the Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency in the mid 1850s—the void “between the lack of rural law and the incompetence of corrupt urban law-enforcement organizations.” By 1854, most Midwestern railroads were contracting with Pinkerton, who had hired a small corps of detectives, to protect the railroads’ passengers and stock from thieves and enemies of the railroad and to prevent theft by railroad employees. Urban public police could only protect a train within the bounds of their jurisdiction: the lack of rural police meant that a train lost all protections of urban society until it reached its destinations. If valuable cargoes and passengers were waylaid on the road, the railroad company had little redress from the official police... Occasionally, rowdies burned terminals. More frequently, irate farmers, ex-employees, or young hooligans derailed trains. Of greater concern was the lack of control over the growing number of employees.

While the Agency occasionally apprehended the odd train wrecker, it was primarily concerned with “the honesty of railroad employees,” punishing “theft of time,” “delinquency of duty,” “allow[ing] friends free rides,” or “pocket[ing] money they collected.” It also worked with the Postal Service, detecting employee theft of envelopes containing money.

By and large, the early activities of the Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency consisted of espionage and undercover work. In the Agency’s first major case, the theft of $40,000 from an Adams Express Company train, in order to garner enough evidence to indict the suspect, Pinkerton devised a network of undercover spies so elaborate that it bordered on “ludicrous and melodramatic.” One operative, disguised as a “dull-witted Dutchman,” tailed the suspect’s wife across much of the South, while another set up a shop where the suspect’s relatives lived. Kate Warne, the nation’s first female detective, worked undercover to win the suspect’s wife’s confidence. A fourth operative flirted with the suspect’s wife, while another was placed as the suspect’s cell mate and yet another as the cellmate’s attorney. All the while, Pinkerton sent
anonymous letters to the suspect, telling him of his wife’s flirtations and encouraging him to order his wife to turn over the stolen money to her confidante Warne— an operation far closer to slapstick than violence. Even in its involvement in the Civil War, the Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency continued its record of nonviolent espionage, having hardly any connection with the violence that so vividly characterized the war. Pinkerton’s close personal friend General George B. McClellan arranged for Pinkerton to form a Secret Service for the army. Pinkerton and his operatives went undercover in the South—operative Pryce Lewis, for instance, undertook a tour of the South disguised as the son of an English lord on a cotton-buying mission—and also worked to apprehend Confederate spies in Washington, DC. Very little violence ensued: the most action Pinkerton saw was chasing a Union army officer who was turning information over to his Confederate spy lover through the rainy streets of Baltimore in his socks.

It seems, then, that the Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency first began to depart from its model of nonviolent espionage after the Civil War, particularly in the West. Once the Agency had withdrawn from the war, it occupied itself much as it had before with embezzlement and robbery cases. But the environment in the West following the war was a dramatically different scene. It was here that they first encountered real, widespread violence—violence that, for several reasons, was especially brutal. It was also here that the Pinkertons first came into contact with vigilante violence. Most importantly, it was here that the Pinkertons first displayed hints of their tendency to adopt both of those types of violence into their operations.

The Civil War changed the landscape of criminal activity, particularly in the West; here the Pinkertons saw drastically more violent action than they had before the war. An unprecedently large number of young, fighting-age men had been discharged from both armies at the end of the war; particularly in the former Confederacy, few had homes and work to which
they could return. Poverty and unrest were prevalent. Many men had ridden with Confederate
guerilla units and had become accustomed a violent, transient lifestyle; most were not granted
amnesty and so were still considered outlaws after the war. The environment was ripe for them
to turn to crime, and their backgrounds as fighting men primed them for this new line of work.
The violence that they had seen and participated in during the War increased the brutality of
these newly made criminals, as did the desperation of their situations. Whether this desperation
existed in reality or in criminals’ own self-portrayals, the result is the same: an unprecedented
level of violence plagued the post-Civil War West. Joseph Whicher, for instance, a Pinkerton
operative sent to infiltrate Jesse James’ family’s farm, was murdered by the James gang: the
shots that killed him were fired from such a close range that they burned his skin, clothes, and
hair. By the time his body was found near Independence, Missouri, wild hogs had gnawed away
part of his face—a shocking initiation for the Pinkertons into the violence of the West.

The shortcomings of the public police were also a major factor in fostering an
environment of lawlessness in the American West, specifically giving rise to widespread
vigilante violence. Law enforcement was sparse in the West, and, where law enforcement was a
presence, it was slow. Many felt that the law did not speak for the rest of the community—that
its punishment was slow, ineffective, or insufficient, or that deputies or the system itself were
corrupt, which often was true. All of these factors combined to encourage townspeople to take
policing into their own hands, often with vigilante or extralegal violence—in many cases,
because law enforcement was not present, inadequate, or corrupt, but also because the
community preferred to mete out retribution and take vengeance itself. Because the law was a
force from outside the community, and townspeople wanted whatever form of justice they
delivered to be local, organic, and from those the criminals had harmed, communities in the West frequently generated vigilante forms of violence.

The Pinkertons’ major experience with vigilantes in the West was in their pursuit of the Reno gang, a far more successful predecessor to the James gang.\textsuperscript{34} The Renos were unique in that they managed to stir up not one but two vigilante factions: one anti-Reno faction comprised of those whom the Renos had harmed or robbed, and a pro-Reno faction of those who stood to gain from their robberies and counterfeiting ring.\textsuperscript{35} The Pinkertons apprehended three members of the Reno gang in July of 1868. They were transporting their prisoners to Indianapolis when they became stranded in Seymour, Indiana, where hundreds of masked men overpowered the detectives and lynched the three victims.\textsuperscript{36} When five more gang members were captured, the town of New Albany where they were held became a war zone between pro- and anti-Reno factions: Men in the community were attacked, mutilated, and tortured; their wives and children, threatened. “Rocks wrapped in paper with the warning ‘If the Renos are lynched you die’ were hurled through the windows of the homes of county officials.”\textsuperscript{37} In December of 1868, a crowd of masked men attacked the county sheriff, secured the keys to the jail, and overpowered the few guards. Frank, William, and Simeon Reno and Charlie Anderson were hanged. The coroner estimated that Simeon Reno must have taken at least half an hour to die. The token investigation of the lynching turned up nothing\textsuperscript{38}—in this case as in others, vigilante violence rather than legitimate law enforcement held sway in the West.

It was in the West, then, where Pinkertons became acquainted with extreme and vigilante methods of violence, and it was there as well that the Pinkertons tried their own hands at it. By 1874 it had become clear that the James gang had declared war on the Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency. After the death of Joseph Whicher and at least two more operatives, Allan
Pinkerton declared his own war on the James gang. In a letter dated April 17, 1874, Pinkerton wrote to George Bangs, superintendent of the Pinkerton’s New York Office:

I know that the James” (sic) and the Youngers are desperate men and that when we meet it must be the death of one or both of us, they wait, my blood was spilt and they must repay, there is no use talking, they must die.39

In January of 1875, the Pinkertons again decided to attack the farmhouse where the James’ mother and stepfather, Dr. Reuben Samuels, lived and where the James gang was occasionally based.40 The preparations resemble nothing less than all-out war, which is how Pinkerton himself framed the attack: in one letter, he writes of the imminent “battle.”41 Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, of Civil War fame, wrote a letter of introduction to the Rock Island Arsenal on behalf of Robert J. Linden, a Pinkerton, explaining that Linden wished “to obtain certain materials from Rock Island Arsenal, to aid him in arresting certain Railroad robbers.”42 Pinkerton was clear about the goal of the attack: “Above everything destroy the house, blot it from the face of the earth. Here the logs will burn, let the men run no risk, but burn the house down. Robert [J. Linden] has charge of the ammunition in the shape of Greek fire.”43

The night of January 25, 1875, on a night when Frank and Jesse James were supposedly hiding out at the Samuels farmhouse, the Pinkertons made their raid. At the coroner’s inquest the next day, the residents of the household, including Mr. and Mrs. Samuels and their black servants, described waking to noise between midnight and 1 AM, then seeing men outside throw a “ball” or “bowl of fire” into the kitchen, which spread fire throughout the house.44 Mr. Samuels managed to fling the ball of fire into the fireplace, where it then exploded. Gunshots from outside the house followed. The explosion maimed Mrs. Samuels, shredding her arm, and her young son, Archie, was killed, but neither of the James brothers nor any of their gang was present at the time of the raid.45 The Agency insisted that the device the operatives had thrown had been a flare,
intended to illuminate the room; given Pinkerton’s own description of the item as “ammunition in the shape of Greek fire,” and the fact that Linden required an introduction to a federal arsenal to obtain it, it seems undeniable that the device was meant to spread fire throughout the house, but a too-tight band on the device caused it rather to explode.

The attack on the Samuels’ farmhouse is notable in that it is the first major instance in which the Pinkertons knowingly and deliberately employed violent action against not only their targets but against their targets’ family, which included women, children, and uninvolved bystanders. While previously the Pinkertons were merely passive as vigilantes lynched bandits such as the Renos, in this incident they actively incorporated such violence into their strategy of pursuing the James gang. Their actions at the Samuels’ farmhouse resembled the vigilante violence the Pinkertons had witnessed in pursuit of the Renos: they were intent on not only meting out justice as law enforcement agents but also retribution for the murders of Pinkerton operatives. The Pinkertons’ attempt to employ their usual strategy of infiltrating the gang had been an undeniable disaster, resulting in the deaths of at least three Pinkerton operatives; when this failed, the environment in which the Pinkertons had been operating for so many years had primed them to resort to all-out violence that of the kind that the Pinkertons had witnessed in the West—the attack on the Samuels’ farmhouse is the first indication of a trend of the Pinkertons’ increasing willingness to employ extreme and vigilante-inspired violence.

It is also worth noting that the attack on the Samuels’ farmhouse is the first major instance in which the Pinkertons drew negative publicity—from a small but vocal demographic in the West. Public opinion in Clay County swung dramatically against the Pinkertons: the Pinkertons quickly replaced the James gang as the villains in some of the most dramatic condemnations. State Representative Jefferson Jones introduced a measure proposing amnesty
for the James” and Youngers’ actions during the Civil War, revoking their status as outlaws, calling them, “men too brave to be mean; too generous to be revengeful, and too gallant and honorable to betray a friend or break a promise.” The measure also condemned the Pinkertons, decrying the “government which forces them to the very acts it professes to deprecate and then offers a bounty for their apprehension and arm foreign mercenaries with power to capture and kill” and suggesting that “most, if not all, the offences with which [the James gang] are charged have been committed by others, and perhaps by those pretending to hunt them.” 49 Jefferson Jones was known to be overtly sympathetic to the James gang, 50 but the general revilement of the Pinkertons and the outpouring of sympathy for the James” murdered stepbrother nearly won the day: the motion gained a majority of votes, but not the two-thirds majority required to pass. 51 Other sentiments were more moderate: the Kansas City Times wrote that, “If the [James brothers] should be killed resisting lawful arrest, they would deserve their fate.” 52

In reality, this swing against the Pinkertons in the public eye was quite limited in scope, despite the vehemence of the Pinkertons’ ardent denouncers. As with Jefferson Jones, many of those who supported the James gang in favor of the Pinkertons were known to be sympathetic to their cause if not in the gangs’ pockets—the corruption of officials and the sparse law enforcement was well attested. Following the murder of Joseph Whicher, a St. Louis, Missouri, newspaper speculated that Whicher had been betrayed to the James gang by law enforcement, saying, “It is the common talk down there, around and about Liberty, that that was done by the Sherriff. He was an old friend of theirs [the James Gang].” 53 More moderate detractors, although they condemned the Pinkertons’ actions in this particular incident, did not extend their sentiments to include the Agency as an institution of law enforcement. The Pinkertons were, despite their violence, the most authoritative and least partisan law enforcement in the region,
and the James gang’s status as outlaws, to many, sanctioned more violent measures against them, particularly in the remote and undeveloped West. In that same vein, given that the West was remote and undeveloped, these pockets of negative opinions towards the Pinkertons remained isolated from the main currents of national public opinion in a way that the incident at Homestead and its fallout, near urban and well-developed areas on the East Coast, could not.

But the Pinkertons’ adoption of extralegal, vigilante violence was not limited to interaction with criminals, nor was it isolated to the West, where law enforcement was sparse and corrupt. The pivotal case of the Molly Maguires demonstrates that Pinkerton violence had been transmitted from the West back East, where law enforcement maintained a greater, more established presence. It also shows that this violence was edging into the margins of more lawful society, while in the West it had been directed at known criminals or those affiliated with outlaws. In 1873, Benjamin Franklin Gowen, the president of the Reading Railroad, which owned tens of thousands of acres of coal land in Pennsylvania, contracted with Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency: growing labor unrest over low wages and the sinking price of coal had generated a wave of crime in the Pennsylvania coal fields. Allan Pinkerton reported that a secret society of Irish coal miners known as the Molly Maguires was linked to the beatings and murders of mine superintendents, the derailing of trains, and the burning of coal tipples. The Molly Maguires were part mafioso, part terrorist cell—anyone who slighted or offered violence to the Mollies would be assigned an executioner and murdered, including two members of the community police force and a justice of the peace, shot in front of his young daughter.

Initially Pinkerton employed his tried-and-true strategy of infiltrating the organization. Operative James McParland, a highly skilled immigrant from Ulster, was sent to infiltrate the Molly Maguires, where he remained for two and a half years, even becoming head of the
Shenandoah lodge of Molly Maguires, and accomplice to conspiracy, murder, arson, and train derailments in an effort to gain enough information to convict the Mollies. But by summer of 1875, the evidence that McParland had scraped together was still insufficient to gain felony convictions for the Mollies, and law enforcement was hamstrung by fear and incompetence or sympathetic to the Mollies or outright corrupt: the high constable was also a Molly Maguire.

Once again, Pinkerton’s frustration with a stagnating case led him to resort to more extreme and violent measures, this time in a region less untamed than the Western frontier of the country, although still wild, and against workers, not outlaws, although the Molly Maguires’ crimes were widely known. Pinkerton perceived that the residents of the Pennsylvania minefields were growing disgruntled with the Mollies’ violence and the inability and disinclination of local law enforcement to deal with it. Pinkerton wrote to George Bangs in August of 1875: “The only way then to pursue [the Molly Maguires] is to treat them as the Renos were treated in Seymour.” He suggested, “If [Robert J.] Linden [who was undercover as a member of the “coal and iron police” in the region] can get up a vigilance committee that can be relied upon, do so. When M. M.’s meet, then surround and deal summarily with them. Get off quietly. All should be securely masked.” He also recommended, “Let him get those who are prepared to take fearful revenge on the M. M.’s. I think it would open the eye of all the people and then the M. M.’s would meet with their just deserts.” With McParland’s list of Mollies in hand, Linden spent October touring the coal towns “with a view of giving necessary information to the leading citizens advising them as to who the parties are who have committed the recent assassinations.” On December 10th, masked men broke into the home of the O’Donnell family, a family connected to high-ranking Mollies and whose sons had participated in the Mollies’ murders. The men pistol-
whipped Mrs. O’Donnell and murdered her daughter and son, whose head was crushed with fifteen bullets. A letter from McParland to Benjamin Franklin, written later that day, reads:

This morning at 8 AM I heard that a crowd of masked men had entered Mrs. O’Donnell’s house, Wiggans Patch, and had killed James O’Donnell alias Friday, Charles O’Donnell and James McAllister [untrue], also Mrs. McAllister whom they took outside the house and shot. Now as for the McDonnells (sic) I am satisfied that they got their just deserves (sic). I reported what those men were. I gave all information about them so clear, that the courts could have taken hold of their case at any time, but the witnesses were too cowardly to do so. Now I wake up this morning and find that I am the murderer of Mrs. McAllister. What had a woman to do in this case? Did the Sleepers [Mollie Maguires] in their worst time shoot down women? If I was not here, the Vigilante committee would not know who was guilty. And when I find them shooting women in their thirst for blood, I hereby tender my resignation to take effect as soon as this message is received… I will no longer interfere as I see one is the same as the other and I am not going to be accessory to the murder of women and children… Of course you may expect burning and murdering all over. Where we have had a little quietness and now innocent men of both parties will suffer and I am sure the Sleepers will not spare the women, so long as the Vigilantes have shown the example.

The Pinkertons had not only adopted the “vigilance committee” but had perfected it.

The breaking of the Molly Maguires, which followed soon after the incident at Wiggan’s Patch, was a particularly pivotal moment in the evolution of Pinkerton violence. Pinkerton’s facilitation of vigilante violence in dealing with the Molly Maguires represented a much more willing adoption of extralegal violence. That this incident took place in the East, in Pennsylvania, and that the Pinkertons were dealing with targets who were, at least legally, not outlaws signifies that the Agency was willing to turn their vigilante violence against members of lawful society, albeit marginally. But this trend had not yet fully developed. The Mollies’ criminal activity was common knowledge; as in the West, the presence and authority of law enforcement were still spotty. Furthermore, the Irish of the Pennsylvania coal fields were recent immigrants who had come to the United States before, during, and after the potato famine of 1846-1852, at a time when anti-immigration sentiment was at fever pitch, particularly against Irish immigrants.
Racism likely was not a factor for Pinkerton or McParland, as Pinkerton was a Scottish immigrant, and McParland a recent Irish immigrant. But prejudice against Irish immigrants doubtless enabled Pinkerton to stir up resentment and encourage a “vigilance committee” from among the other dwellers in the region—a fact that Pinkerton likely knew and intentionally exploited, and a tactic that may have come into play later at Homestead. The breaking of the Molly Maguires foreshadows another element in the Pinkertons’ later violence at Homestead: the willingness of the Agency’s upper echelons to deliberately aggravate situations or create potentially explosive situations without the knowledge of its operatives on the ground. Despite the mitigating factors of lawlessness and racism, the investigation of the Molly Maguires marks the introduction by Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency of vigilante violence into the periphery of accepted and legal society.

The investigation of the Molly Maguires also marks a turning point in the type of work and employers the Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency took on. In the late 19th century, the financial situation for the Pinkertons was grim, big business was booming, and, more importantly, the Agency, due to the breaking the Molly Maguires, had earned the trust of big business. The Agency, now under the control Allan Pinkerton’s sons William and Robert, eagerly expanded its scope to suit the changing demand, and in doing so entered into the most fractious period of conflict between labor and business in American history. While workers’ rights to organize and strike had been recognized as legal, they were still not necessarily popular among the public at large, and certainly not within business. Plagued with strikes and labor disputes, American business required “watchmen for strikebound plants, mines, railroads, and corporations,” to prevent strikers from destroying machinery and secure the plant for the importation of “scabs,” or non-union workers used to break a strike. But in providing watchmen...
to private corporations, the Pinkertons were entering an environment fraught with contention. According to the legal theories of the late 19th century, in labor disputes, “it was the duty of local law-enforcement bodies or the government to protect the lives of nonunion employees and the company’s property; and if the law or the government failed to do this properly, the employer was justified in hiring a private police force to provide protection.”71 In reality, however, the government had looped itself and local enforcement out of the equation: during the mid-19th century, “Pennsylvania’s railroads and industrial corporations were adopting the Coal and Iron police commission as a device to build up” what historian Robert P. Weiss dramatically but fairly accurately calls, “their own formidable private armies… commissions under the Coal and Iron Police Act merely required a petition to the governor with a list of names for appointment. After 1871 there was a fee charged… for one dollar the state sold police power to railroads and mining companies.”72 It was a contract that required “no investigation, no regulation, no supervision, no responsibility.” It “literally created ‘islands’ of police power which were free to float as the employers saw fit.”73 It was the practice of corporations to have their local law enforcement, which was, of course, another of these “islands,” “deputize” hired Pinkerton watchmen, putting the force of law behind their actions and incorporating them into the “coal and iron police.” As the Agency made its name in providing armed guards for seventy-seven strikes between 1869 and 1892,74 the practice of deputization made the Pinkertons one of these “islands.”

The state in which the Pinkertons entered into this environment of labor-business conflict, particularly at Homestead, was already one that was considerably disadvantaged. Involvement with robbers and bandits in the West and the Molly Maguires had largely cemented the Pinkertons’ willingness to resort to extreme, extra-legal, and vigilante forms of violence—
and they had also acquired a wider-spread reputation as being willing to employ violence that extended beyond what was necessary or a proportionate response. They were also gaining a reputation as being close to business, which did not endear them to labor. What endeared the Pinkertons to labor even less was their involvement in seventy-seven strikes, over the course of which three strikers, a bystander, and a young boy were killed. Partly as a result of its reputation for pro-business, anti-labor violence, and partly due to the unfortunate violence that occurred during the strikes in which it was involved, the Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency became an incredibly controversial and hated organization, especially within labor. The influential union, the Knights of Labor, for instance, argued that “violence was… a matter of Pinkerton policy,” while the labor-oriented Populist Party agitated for national legislation to “prevent the conferring of police power on Pinkerton guards.”

But the Pinkertons were not only crippled as a result of the resentment and prejudice their previous actions had generated. The late 19th century was also witness to a broader movement away from the mistrust of a strong centralized government that had previously characterized the United States; part of this trend included a growing rejection of private law enforcement agencies and a demand for nation-wide governmentally-controlled and funded public police departments. While no doubt the Pinkertons’ increasingly negative press alienated the public and contributed to this trend, it is also the product of the broader political sentiments of the era. By the time of the Homestead Strike in 1892, the Pinkertons already had a considerable sector of public opinion arrayed against them, both because of changing perceptions about the legitimacy of private police organizations and because the Pinkertons had garnered a reputation for violence. But what made Homestead such a particularly explosive situation was not only the confluence of both of these diachronic factors, but also tensions specific to labor disputes, which
both exacerbated the situation at Homestead and were exploited by Pinkertons, specifically, to create circumstances that would easily degenerate into violence—and did.

The Homestead Strike of 1892 is a watershed moment, then, not only in terms of the history of the Pinkertons, but in the history of American labor and politics. It is, on a most basic level, remarkable because of its violence. In the seventy-seven strikes in which Pinkertons had been involved before 1892, they had killed three strikers. At Homestead alone they killed ten. But it is not only the violence of the Pinkertons that seems to have occurred on a wildly amplified scale. Strikers had directed violence towards Pinkerton watchmen before Homestead: in 1886, during a strike at the Chicago stockyards, four Pinkertons were beaten. But at Homestead their violence reached a fever pitch, culminating in the gauntlet the strikers forced the surrendering Pinkertons to run. John W. Holway, one of the Pinkerton guards, said in his testimony during the hearings on the strike in the House Judiciary Subcommittee, “As we all went by they commenced to strike at us again, and a man picked up a stone and hit me upon the ear… there were tremendous crowds on both sides and the men were just hauling and striking our men.” The Pittsburgh Post reported that, as the Pinkerton men surrendered they were helped along with kicks and cuffs… No mercy was shown them… The men… were punched by every man that could get a lick at them… They were knocked on the head and struck in the face. The men plunged wildly onward, begging for the mercy which they received not. No distinction was made. They were hit on the heads with hand-billies and clubs and sticks and stricken to the ground.

The report also testifies to the widespread press coverage the strike garnered, yet another way in which Homestead was so extraordinary: the Homestead Local News reported that, in the week after the strike, around 135 journalists converged on Homestead. The strike occupied the front pages of most major newspapers for weeks after it occurred. The ubiquity of its coverage was partially due to its violence, to its central location in the Northeast, and finally, to the enormous
legal battle and public outcry that it precipitated against “Pinkertonism” and big business’’
employment of private agencies to protect property and non-union workers. Both the House of
Representatives and the Senate conducted investigations to determine the sequence of events
leading up to and during the strike, the causes, and whether national legal action should be taken
in regards to the legality of corporations’’ use of private police. Ultimately they deemed both the
Pinkertons’’ actions at Homestead and the use of private police in labor disputes legal. But public
opinion had turned decisively against the Pinkertons, prompting the Agency to shy away from
similar involvement in labor disputes in the future. Soon thereafter, a number of states enacted
legislation that outlawed armed private watchmen—effectively ending the era of “Pinkertonism”
and private law enforcement, and signaling the beginning of the era of public law enforcement.

But Homestead is not only significant because of its violence or the attention it garnered
in the press and ensuing legal battle. It is also noteworthy because of the way in which its
extreme violence came about: through the convergence of growing dissatisfaction with private
police and rejection of the Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency, which occurred in an
environment rife with social and racial tensions, all of which served to create a “perfect storm,” a
situation in which the strikers and the Pinkerton watchmen were poised to exacerbate every
possible flashpoint point at which violence could spark. While the overarching trends of rejection
of private law enforcement and revilement of the Pinkertons set the stage for violence, it was in
large part due to the situational factors at Homestead that the violence reached such intensity.

In many ways, it was the attitudes and composition of the workers at Homestead that
made it an environment so conducive to such violence. Throughout the last quarter of the 19th
century Homestead had experienced its fair share of labor agitation: in 1884, Henry C. Frick, the
chairman of Carnegie Steel, had hired Pinkertons to protect the Eastern Europeans he had
imported to displace his Northern European workers;\textsuperscript{84} in 1889, the AAISW struck to secure a more favorable contract;\textsuperscript{85} in 1891, as his workers began to make trouble, Frick again hired Pinkertons to protect Italian strikebreakers.\textsuperscript{86} Part of the agitation at Homestead, then, stemmed from the pervasive contentiousness that plagued labor-business relations at that time. Up until 1892, as well, much unrest at Homestead had stemmed from escalating racial tensions, “as the composition of the Pennsylvania mining population changed, from immigrants of North European origin, to East European—mainly Hungarian and Slavic—and Italian immigrants.”\textsuperscript{87} But the situation among the workers was not necessarily racially charged in the summer of 1892: while certainly a “nativist” bias existed among the workers at Homestead, newspaper articles as well as secondary research suggest that in the wage disputes of 1892 and the years leading up to it, “Anglo” (British, Irish, and Americans) labor groups attempted to foster “interethnic solidarity” against business between Anglos and “Slavs,” as Eastern Europeans, mostly Slovaks, were incorrectly called.\textsuperscript{88} In fact, most Eastern Europeans living at Homestead attended St. Mary’s Church, which was established by Irish-American Catholics in 1881, while a popular pool-hall served both as a meeting place for Eastern European women, male laborers, and Anglo-Irish workers alike.\textsuperscript{89} By 1892, it seemed that workers at Homestead were more united against business than they were divided across racial borders: the \textit{Pittsburgh Post} describes the treatment of a Hungarian accused of spying on a “Slavic” labor organization:

\begin{quote}
During the Evening M. P. Maverek, the Hungarian… who is charged with having sold out his knowledge to Superintendent Potter for a raise in his wages… stepped into the hall and said that he wanted to go to the platform and set himself at rights with the men… [finding] that he would have no chance to make any explanation, started to leave the hall. Just as he got to the door a burly mechanic, Rotrough by name, stopped him, saying, „What are you doing here? You’re the fellow who turned spy on the Slavs and gave everything away to Potter.”\textsuperscript{890}
\end{quote}
Once Mavarek’s name had been cleared, another article announced that, “Maverek, the Hungarian, who has been charged with playing the spy among the Slavs has in a large measure exonerated himself.” Only in the article that assumes Maverek’s guilt is he called “the Hun.” The racial slur seems linked to his status as a spy for the corporation. The Eastern European workers were generally seen by their fellow workers as united in the cause for labor, although they were not part of the AAISW Lodge and were kept as a separate force in the actual strike (as they were in the mills, where they made up the bulk of the brute, low-wage “laborer” force).

The *Pittsburgh Post* reported on “How the Foreigners Stand,” explaining that

The workmen yesterday received more encouragement from the laborers. A committee of foreigners waited on the several lodges of the Amalgamated Association and informed the officers that they had decided to stick by the organization to the last man. Several hundred of these foreign workmen, comprising the better element of Slavs and Hungarians, met last night and voted unanimously to strike when ordered, and to remain out until they were again permitted to go to work by the Amalgamated Association. The spokesman of the party made a clear statement of what his countrymen expected to do should trouble arise. He said they all realize that they must have a head. They were too radical, and as a result suffered the worst. He asked that a representative American workman be appointed to take charge. Their request was complied with, and the laborers were told off into six squads. Over each squad there was placed a cool-headed, conservative American, whose actions will be guided by orders from higher officials, and whose orders the foreigners have sworn to obey.

Certainly racial and ethnic prejudice existed at Homestead, particularly against Eastern Europeans. But in many ways prejudice against the “Slavs” was mitigated by the close quarters in which the ethnicities worked and lived—Eastern Europeans’ liminal “off-white” status meant they had the potential to be viewed as becoming more “white,” although probably not less “Slavic,” in the eyes of their Anglo counterparts. In any case, in 1892, “interethnic solidarity” behind the greater cause against business won the day—this sense of unity among the workers was likely another factor that contributed to the intensity of their violence.
To some extent, this is evident in the subtext of eyewitness accounts of the workers’ violence at Homestead. Many outsiders claimed that it was largely due to the “Hungarians [actually Slovaks, who] were particularly vicious and belted the men left and right,”95 and the women. Many agreed that “among [the mob] the women were the most violent;”96 witnesses were horrified when a woman punched out a Pinkerton’s eye with her umbrella.97 As the *Pittsburgh Post* article suggests, Eastern European workers were often characterized as savage, brutish, and less controllable than their Anglo-American counterparts. Women, in their susceptibility to hysteria, were also seen as difficult to control. As Edward Slavishak has argued, in eyewitness accounts of the violence at Homestead, the strikers are all assimilated to the model of, as the *New York Times* describes it, “healthy, broad-shouldered, dark-skinned fellow with clumsy hands and knotted joints”—in short, exactly the dark, burly, brutish Slav that existed in the imagination of the Anglo-Americans.98 This amounts to a way to disavow the violence at Homestead and attribute it to immigrants or women, as one journalist did:

> It was plain to everyone that the mad, blood-thirsting multitude [who formed the gauntlet] was not composed of the Homestead men who had, at the risk of their lives, fought a battle on the riverfront early in the day, but consisted for the most part of rough, unthinking Hungarians.99

But at the same time this conflation of all strikers with the Eastern European laborers also attests to the unity that strengthened the strikers’ resolve and thereby intensified their violence. It is a conflation that also may have existed in the minds of the Anglo-American strikers—the presence of “Slavic” strikers in their midst and the stereotype of “Hun” workers as “marauding” and uncontrollable100 may well have given others license to act even more aggressively.

But the environment among the workers was only one of the factors that made Homestead such a live situation. Frick himself facilitated violence, likely knowingly, when he decided to bring in Pinkerton watchmen: the reputation of the Pinkertons among workers was
unmistakable, and Pinkerton presence during labor strikes had on more than one occasion provoked violence from strikers. It is obvious that Frick was expecting violence, given that he fortified in the plant in June. It is also possible that Frick hired the Pinkertons with the expectation and intention that they would provoke the workers into violence—thereby allowing Frick to shift any blame for violence onto the Pinkertons, given their reputation for violence. Further evidence for this comes to light in the letters exchanged between Frick or the plant’s legal counsel, Philander Knox, and the Pinkerton brothers. The Pinkertons had requested that the sheriff be instructed to deputize the watchmen; Knox assured Robert Pinkerton he would in a letter dated June 30th, 1892. But according to the subcommittee’s report, the sheriff, “agreed that if... the property was attacked and there was liable to be destruction of the same, he would deputize them but the determination of the contingency must be left to his judgment.” As James D. Horan suggests, and as a later letter from Robert Pinkerton reveals, Frick—and the sheriff—had no intention of deputizing the Pinkertons and allowing them to proceed with the force of law behind their actions: Robert Pinkerton, in July of 1893, wrote to Frick requesting reimbursement for the financial losses the Agency sustained at Homestead:

No doubt you will recognize that our foresight in insisting that the sheriff should be made aware of the intention of Carnegie & Co. to bring our men to Homestead and to deputize them should there be an indication of trouble before we would send them there, placed your company in much more favorable light than they would have been placed had they been sent Homestead as originally requested without the sheriff being consulted as to their coming.

Frick’s hiring of the Pinkertons and his reluctance deputize them suggests that he wanted to precipitate violence from the workers, yet be able to disavow the Pinkertons’ violence as illegal, thereby, again, exonerating himself from any responsibility for violence in the labor conflict and shifting the blame onto the Pinkertons and the workers. Consequently violence arose partially as a result of Frick’s calculations in the ongoing conflict between labor and business.
Into this environment fraught with tension between Frick and the strikers at Homestead enter the Pinkertons, whose presence and strategy created even more flashpoints. The Pinkertons had found violence an effective ally in achieving their goals in the past, and it seems that the Pinkerton brothers were attempting to lay the foundation for a violent conflict at Homestead. William Pinkerton had arranged for boxes containing rifles, pistols, and ammunition to be loaded onto the barges as they prepared to depart for Homestead. While the brothers insisted that they had “positively instructed the men and our officers that the arms were not to be used except after they were sworn in by the sheriff and their lives were in danger,” they nevertheless were making preparations not for the possibility of violence but for the certainty of it. In that same vein, the Pinkertons, as they finalized their contract, were insistent that their men would be deputized; similarly, they were, in their testimony before the House, painstakingly careful to establish that the arms were only to be distributed after the men were deputized, and that the men were, in fact, deputized, which was, after the strike, a wild point of controversy. The Pinkertons” insistence in all of these cases demonstrates a careful concern about the legality of their actions—a concern that centers not around the nature of their violence but that simply ensures that, whatever they did, their actions would be deemed legal.

The Pinkerton brothers, much as their father did in the investigation of the Molly Maguires, also seem to have gone out of their way to create a violent situation without the knowledge of their operatives on the ground. As with the strikers, the potential for violence lay in the composition of the men whom the Pinkertons hired as watchmen. In detective work, the Pinkertons could afford to handpick an experienced operative from the “small permanent elite corps, composed of men of intelligence and character.” But work as guards required more men than were even on the Agency”s reserve lists, so “many men were recruited indiscriminately off
the street. Occasionally, seedy characters with short, volatile tempers became guards.\textsuperscript{107} Their lax hiring procedures suggest that the Pinkertons were, at least, not particularly discriminating about avoiding inciting violence. It is also likely that, because the Agency was not discriminating about the watchmen whom they hired, many of the three hundred Pinkerton watchmen held prejudices and biases against the strikers, particularly those of “Slavic” descent: the bulk of watchmen were recruited from Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia, and most of them appear to be of Anglo-American extraction\textsuperscript{108}—it is quite possible that prejudice against newer immigrants of the same or different origin or general prejudice against immigrants colored the watchmen’s interaction with the strikers, although one enigmatic newspaper article suggests otherwise, in which a Pinkerton watchman supposedly reveals in an interview, “I am of the conviction that no matter how large the force… they bring against the strikers, they will only be a marker for them… The Carnegie people are not dealing now with an ignorant mob of Huns and Poles, but with hundreds of intelligent workmen, who are American citizens.”\textsuperscript{109} The Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency was also accused of attempting to keep the barges’ destination a secret from the watchmen. One Pinkerton is quoted in the \textit{New York World} as saying, “We did not know we were to be used to shoot down honest workingmen, for we are honest workingmen ourselves and sympathize with the strikers now that we know the truth.”\textsuperscript{110} If the Agency did attempt to conceal the barges’ destination, it was because they suspected that the men would not fight if they knew they would be fighting against strikers of a similar class and social situation. Altogether it seems that, at Homestead, the Pinkerton brothers deliberately attempted to create a situation in which violence would arise, which had proven an effective strategy; the pains they took to ensure that their watchmen’s actions would be legal suggests, too, that they knew that the situation was of questionable legality and legitimacy, and so needed the official sanction of
deputization. The policy of intentionally creating potential for violence known to border on illegal, as the Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency had dabbled in and eventually perfected, found its full realization in the violence of Homestead on July 6th, 1892.

The extraordinary violence at Homestead arose, then, as the result of a combination of environmental factors, as the social and racial makeup of both the workers and the Pinkerton watchmen, and intentional policies on the part of Frick and the Pinkerton brothers. These factors and policies together created a situation that was already fraught with great potential for violence; the entrance of the Pinkertons, with their reputation for violence and their increasingly questioned legitimacy as a law enforcement agency, essentially loosed a perfect storm, creating a flammable situation that erupted into unprecedented violence. But this violence is not notable merely for its scale. It is also significant because it precipitated an incredible amount of press coverage and legal controversy, which combined to spell the end of the era of the Pinkerton and of private law enforcement. Although Congress deemed the Pinkertons’ role at Homestead legal, the Agency’s legitimacy was completely compromised, and the Pinkertons’ involvement as watchmen in strike-breaking came to an end. As Robert Pinkerton explained to Frick in his letter of 1893, the Agency’s complete loss of the public favor more or less ruined the Pinkertons, “For the almost irreparable injury our business sustained, we make no claim whatever.”

The forces that ended the Pinkertons’ involvement in strikes as watchmen also cemented resolve against private police in general: although the subcommittee ruled that, “One may be lawfully employed to guard the property of his employer, even to the extent of shooting down an incendiary or another person who approaches the same with the intent of destruction, after warning such trespasser to desist,” the majority of the population took issue with what the Irish World and American Industrial Laborer called “the employment of armed mercenaries.”
The subcommittee minority report substantiates this rejection of “Pinkertonism:” “Any foreign force in a local community, except by manner of law, is a danger to the peace and good order of any society.” While the subcommittee report and the minority report disagree on the legality of the employment of private organizations, they do agree on one point: “such use of private armed men is an assumption of the State’s authority by private citizens.” The subcommittee concedes this idea when it laments that, “The practice of employing Pinkerton guards or watchmen by corporations in case of strikes or labor trouble has grown very largely out of the sloth and inability of the civil authorities to render efficient and proper protection in such cases.” It was not a question of the legality of the violence at Homestead, but of the legitimacy of the agency that was carrying it out—and the Pinkertons, as a foreign, private entity, no longer fit that bill:

No principle in our form of government is more firmly embedded in the hearts of our people than local administration. The citizens of every community are imbued with the same spirit of local government … the presence of a force not called in the regular manner, even if clothed with the semblance of authority, is much more likely to impress the peaceful citizen, much more the excited workman with the conviction that his home, his rights are being invaded, than that the laws are being upheld for his preservation.

Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia subsequently passed laws forbidding armed watchmen from entering their borders. Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency, in the legal aftermath of the Homestead Strike, again found itself embroiled in the perfect storm: they had, by fully realizing their gradual evolution toward extralegal violence, rendered themselves totally illegitimate in nearly all circles; combined with the overarching trend of rejection of private law enforcement in favor of government-controlled public police departments, spelled the end of the era of the Pinkerton and of private organizations as the dominant authority in law enforcement.

The demise of the Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency is symptomatic of trends of change in tumultuous 19th century America: as Americans completely revised the role they
believed the government should take in their lives, the Pinkertons, by dint of the nature of their organization, were rendered obsolete, a resented vestigial structure. But the Pinkertons’ own role in bringing about their end is almost poetically hubristic. The Agency throughout much of its existence actively worked to perfect its strategic deployment of violence, against gangs in the West and the Molly Maguires, but at Homestead, where almost more shocking violence was employed against them, they were too steeped in their own violent reputation, and so what sympathy they garnered was more a repudiation of the workers than sympathy for the actual Pinkertons, who were still ruined after Homestead. But it is possible to believe that Homestead would have been unremarkable without the aggravating environmental factors of race and class to further kindle the fire. At Homestead, the Pinkertons found themselves caught in a perfect storm, which was partially a product of the historical and environmental situation, and partially of their own making. As the American frontier came to a close and even “non-white” European immigrants were beginning to be integrated into the fold of “whiteness,” the Pinkertons could no longer sustain their position on the frontier of legal and accepted conduct in law enforcement.

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3 “The Fort that Frick Built,” Homestead Local News (Homestead, PA). 2 July 1892.
5 Krause, 17.
6 Ibid., 19.
8 Krause, 30.
9 Krause, 34-5.
11 Horan (1967), 348.
15 Morn, vii.
16 Johnson, 92.
17 Johnson, 95.
18 Ibid., 93.
19 Ibid., 94.
20 Morn, viii.
21 Horan, 27.
22 Ibid., 31
23 Morn, 25.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 23.
26 Horan (1967), 46.
27 Ibid., 48.
28 Horan (1967), 65.
29 Ibid., 69.
30 Ibid., 86.
33 Horan, James D. (1967), 196.
34 Ibid., 160.
35 Ibid., 167.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 175.
38 Ibid., 178.
39 Allan Pinkerton to George Bangs, April 17, 1874., Pinkerton Papers, Library of Congress.
40 Horan (1962), 70.
41 Allan Pinkerton to Samuel Hardwicke, December 28, 1874, Pinkerton Papers
42 Entry #1152, December 30, 1874, Register of Letters Received, 1863-1906 6, Records of Rock Island Arsenal, National Archives-Great Lakes Region, Chicago, IL.
43 Allan Pinkerton to Samuel Hardwicke, December 28, 1874, Pinkerton Papers
44 Wybrow, 14-15.
47 Wybrow, 27.
48 Horan (1962), 202
49 qtd. Wybrow, 21-2.
51 Wybrow, 22.
52 Wybrow, 21.
53 St. Louis Republican, March 21 1874
54 Horan (1967), 208.
55 Ibid., 213.
56 Ibid., 204.
57 Ibid., 220.
58 Ibid., 222.
59 Ibid., 209.
60 Ibid., 218.
61 Ibid., 223.
62 Ibid., 222.
63 Allan Pinkerton to George Bangs, August 29, 1875, Pinkerton Papers
64 qtd. Horan (1967), 225.
65 Ibid.
66 James McParland to Benjamin Franklin, December 10, 1875, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
67 Horan (1967) 206.
68 Ibid., 209.
70 Horan (1967), 329.
71 Ibid.
72 Weiss, 92.
73 Shalloo qtd. Weiss 92
74 Horan (1967), 329.
75 Ibid.
76 Morn, 100.
77 Ibid., 99.
78 Ibid., 101.
79 Morn, 108.
80 Ibid., 100.
82 Pittsburgh Post, 7 July 1892.
84 Weiss, 92.
86 Weiss, 92.
87 Ibid.
89 Ibid., 64.
90 “Threatened the Hun,” Pittsburgh Post, June 24, 1892
91 Pittsburgh Post, June 27, 1892
92 Krause, Paul, “Eastern Europeans in Homestead,” ed. Demarest, 64
93 “How the Foreigners Stand,” Pittsburgh Post, June 28, 1892
95 Pittsburgh Post, 7 July 1892.
97 Krause, 35
99 Ibid., 343.
100 Roedinger 43.
101 qtd. Horan (1967), 342
102 qtd. ibid.
103 Horan (1967), 357
104 qtd. ibid., 358
105 qtd. ibid, 353
106 Morn, 99.
107 Ibid.
108 Chicago Daily Tribune, July 7, 1892
109 Ibid.
110 The New York World, July 7, 1892
111 Johnson, 97
112 qtd. Horan (1967), 357
113 qtd. ibid., 356
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