Peace Confidence Index (PCI)

TOP-LINE RESULTS

Social Indicator

JANUARY 2002
While many studies have been conducted on various aspects of this conflict, none have attempted to capture the changes in public perception over a period of time. The lack of such a study was identified as a significant void by Social Indicator (SI), the social research unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA). The Peace Confidence Index study (PCI) seeks to fill this lacuna. The study, funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) under the Governance and Institutional Strengthening Project, (GISP) Sri Lanka, will be conducted bi-monthly to gauge the impact of local and international political developments on public attitudes towards the peace process.
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OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this study is two-fold. One is to develop a numerical indicator of the level of public confidence in the peace process using a set of standardised questions which will remain unchanged with each wave. The other is to use a set of questions related to recent social, economic and political developments in order to gauge public opinion in the peace process, which by definition will change from one wave to another.

Such information, when collected over a period of time, will provide civil society and policy makers a useful barometer of the opinions of the Sri Lankan polity, and ensure that the collective opinions of the masses are given due importance and incorporated into the policy debate.

SCOPE & METHODOLOGY

The study is carried out using a structured questionnaire administered through face-to-face interviews amongst a 1,200 respondent sample distributed throughout 17 administrative districts. Care has been taken to reflect the actual ethnographic makeup of the country in the respondent sample other than the 3 districts in which opinion was not surveyed. In addition, SI surveys the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and border village communities, given the importance of ascertaining the opinions of those directly affected by the on-going war. Furthermore, a structured questionnaire was used in the gathering of information from the respondents.

The entirety of the Northern province, barring the welfare centres in Vavuniya, is not covered in the survey due to inaccessibility as well as problems of logistics related to the on-going war. Areas with a high-concentration of Tamils, like Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Amparai could not be fully covered.

Five waves of the PCI study were conducted in May, June, September and November of 2001. The latest wave, the results of which are in this publication, was conducted in January 2002. The results of these five waves offer us data for a comparative study on changing public opinion regarding key issues, ranging from perceptions of war and peace to the proscription of the LTTE. The results are subject to a 3% margin of error.
KEY NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS INFORMING THE OPINION POLL

- The LTTE and the Government unilaterally announce an extension of the ceasefire by a month.
- The government and the LTTE engage with Norwegian facilitators to draw up a Memorandum of Understanding that is expected to provide the basic foundation for a stable, mutually agreed ceasefire. G.L. Peiris, the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, says the agreement will be the precursor to the commencement of peace talks.
- In an address to Parliament, the Prime Minister hints at his government’s intention to de-proscribe the LTTE to facilitate the peace process.
- Relatives of soldiers missing in action travel to uncleared areas in the Vanni seeking the release of prisoners held by the LTTE.
- Mahinda Rajapaksa appointed the Leader of the Opposition.
- Australia names the LTTE as a terrorist organisation whose assets will be frozen along with twenty-four other international terrorist organisations.
- The Sri Lankan Air Force reports an increase in the number of people visiting Jaffna since the ceasefire on the 24th of December 2001.
- The US Ambassador and the British High Commissioner, in separate statements issued days apart, say the lifting of the ban on the LTTE in Sri Lanka would not automatically prompt them to lift the ban on the LTTE in their respective countries. Both stated that the ban on the LTTE would only be lifted after considering local conditions in their countries.
- Reports in the media highlight the fact that the LTTE manages to bring in a full shipment of weapons and ammunition into Mullativu.
- Three security personnel and seven civilians held in the Vanni by the LTTE were released.
- The LTTE request India, through Norwegian facilitators, that future peace talks be held in South India.
- The Most Ven. Udugama Sri Buddharakkhita Mahanayake Thera of the Asgiriya Chapter says the Government should consider removing the LTTE proscription if the LTTE was for negotiations with the Government without any pre-conditions.
SELECTED FINDINGS

- The perception that war is a means of achieving peace continues its steady decline from 16.8% in June 2001 to 3.5% in January 2002.

- January 2002 shows an increase in the level optimism regarding the imminence of peace - from 10.6% in June 2001 to 18.9% in January 2002. This increase in optimism is predominantly amongst the minority communities.

- For a majority of Sri Lankans the root causes of the war are communal politics (33.1%) and discrimination against the Tamils (34.5%), the latter in particular increased significantly in January 2002 (24.3% in November 2001 to 34.5% in January 2002).

- 80.7% of Sri Lankans feel the war can be ended and peace brought about in Sri Lanka through peace talks. This confidence in peace talks has increased notably from 59.1% in May 2001, while confidence in a war effort establishing peace has declined.

- Overall, the opinion that the Government is committed to peace through negotiations has increased significantly in January 2002 (58%) in comparison to it remaining static in September 2001 (43.8%) and November 2001 (44%).

- There is a dramatic increase in Sri Lankans who believe in the commitment of the LTTE to peace through talks - from 9.8% in November 2001 to 22.2% in January 2002.

- From 45.2% in November 2001 to 64.2% in January 2002, the findings indicate a substantial rise in the opinion that the Government should declare a ceasefire for peace talks.

- The percentage of Sri Lankans are against the proscription of the LTTE declined to 56.3% in January 2002 from 64.6% in November 2001.

- 57.1% of the population approve of the Government’s decision to lift the restrictions on certain essential items to the Vanni, including food and medicine, as a prelude to peace talks.

- 65.9% of Sri Lankans disapprove of the Government and the LTTE engaging in peace talks whilst fighting, a considerable increase in opinion from November 2001 when the figure was 45.7%.

- In January 2002, 33.9% feel that negotiations, as opposed to a more inclusive process, should only be between the Government and the LTTE.

- In contrast to the high level of uncertainty (59.1%) that prevailed prior to the General Elections, 58% of Sri Lankans in January 2002 feel the new United National Front (UNF) government will have a positive effect on the peace process.

- 32.9% of Sinhalese believe that co-habitation will have a positive impact on the peace process, as opposed to 41% of Tamils, who are unsure of the effects of co-habitation.

- 63.1% of those who are aware of the ceasefire believe it will have a positive impact on the peace process.
Peace Confidence Index: Changing Perceptions from May 2001 to January 2002

THE MEANING OF WAR AND PEACE

In January 2002, peace means ethnic harmony for a majority of Sri Lankans (52.7%). But for a significant proportion of the population, peace also means freedom (35%) and an end to the war (29%). The perception of peace as one of ethnic harmony and feeling safe increased from November 2001, while peace meaning an end to the war and freedom remains unchanged.

For a large majority of the Muslims (84.7%), rather than amongst other ethnic groups, peace is considered to be ethnic harmony. In January 2002, as opposed to November 2001, there is a striking increase in the perception amongst the Up-country population that peace means feeling safe (15.5% to 45.6%) and an end to the war (6.2% to 21.4%).

What does 'peace' mean to you? [Multiple Answers]
In the January 2002 poll the majority (51.3%) view war as death and destruction, a figure that has increased since November 2001. A notable proportion of the population views war as being disharmony amongst the races and a fight for rights, the latter showing a sharp increase from 12.3% in November 2001 to 21.5% in January 2002. The perception that war is a means of achieving peace continues its steady decline from 16.8% in June 2001 to 3.5% in January 2002.

The opinion that war means death and destruction persists largely amongst a majority of the Sinhalese (53.5%) and Up-country Tamils (72.8%) rather than amongst the Tamils (30.6%) and Muslims (27.4%). Interestingly, from November 2001 to January 2002 there is over a two-fold increase in the opinion held amongst the Up-country Tamils of war meaning death and destruction (33% to 72.8%). Amongst the Tamil community, the perception that war is disharmony amongst the races shows a steady decline from 59.8% in September to 23.1% in January 2002.

The opinion that war means death and destruction persists largely amongst a majority of the Sinhalese (53.5%) and Up-country Tamils (72.8%) rather than amongst the Tamils (30.6%) and Muslims (27.4%). Interestingly, from November 2001 to January 2002 there is over a two-fold increase in the opinion held amongst the Up-country Tamils of war meaning death and destruction (33% to 72.8%). Amongst the Tamil community, the perception that war is disharmony amongst the races shows a steady decline from 59.8% in September to 23.1% in January 2002.

When will there be peace in Sri Lanka?
When asked to stipulate a time-period for the onset of peace in Sri Lanka a majority are unable to do so. This uncertainty arises mainly amongst the Sinhalese rather than amongst the minority communities, who appear more optimistic as they feel that peace will come about soon to Sri Lanka.

However, the inability to specify a time-period has declined in January 2002 in comparison to the upward trend observed in previous months. Furthermore, the findings in January 2002 indicate an increase in optimism that peace will come about soon to Sri Lanka (from 10.6% in June 2001 to 18.9% in January 2002). This increase in optimism is predominantly amongst the minorities rather than amongst the Sinhalese.

For a majority of Sri Lankans the root causes of the war are communal politics (33.1%) and discrimination against the Tamils (34.5%), the latter in particular
increased significantly in January 2002 (24.3% in November 2001 to 34.5% in January 2002). The notion that the origin of the war lies in the discrimination against the Tamils is held mainly amongst the Tamil community (59% Tamils and 52.4% Up-country Tamils) while most Sinhalese and Muslims feel the war originated as a result of communal politics.

What was the origin of the war in Sri Lanka? [Multiple Answers]

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Discrimination against Tamils</th>
<th>Discrimination against Sinhalese</th>
<th>Tamil chauvinism</th>
<th>Sinhala chauvinism</th>
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<td>31.2</td>
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<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solutions to the Conflict

A majority of Sri Lankans feel the war can be ended and peace brought about in Sri Lanka through peace talks (80.7%) rather than a war effort (10.8%) and devolution of power (6.5%). This confidence in peace talks has increased notably from May 2001 (59.1%) to January 2002 (80.7%) while confidence in a war effort establishing peace has declined. The increasing confidence in negotiations bringing about peace is demonstrated predominantly amongst the Sinhalese throughout the study.

In comparison to other ethnicities, more Tamils (50.5% Up-country Tamils and 48% Tamils) are of the view that there has been no solution for the past 15 years as a result of corrupt military and political leaders. On the other hand 30% of the Sinhalese feel that there has been no
solution due to a lack of political will. On the whole most Sri Lankans feel a solution to the war has not arisen as a result of corrupt political and military leadership (36.7%) and a lack of political will (34.8%) rather than war being essential for people in power (21.2%).

Can total victory be achieved by one of the parties in this war?

In January 2002 though 49.3% continue to feel that total victory cannot be achieved by one party, this view has declined slightly from 53% who felt the same in November 2001. Interestingly 64.2% of Muslims, 55.5% of Tamils, 48.8% of Sinhalese, and 31.1% of Up-country Tamils hold the view that total victory cannot be achieved by either party.

Amongst Sri Lankans who feel that total victory is achievable by one party, a majority are of the view that victory will be the Government’s rather than the LTTE’s. This view is held chiefly by the Sinhalese (90.3%) rather than the Tamils. 63.6% of Up-country Tamils and 57.1% of Tamils feel that total victory will be achieved by the LTTE.
ON CREDIBILITY

Overall the opinion that the Government is committed to find peace through negotiations has increased significantly in January 2002 (58%) in comparison to it remaining static in September 2001 (43.8%) and November 2001 (44%). It is interesting to note however that in January 2002 many Tamils (41%), more than any other ethnic community, are unsure of the Government’s commitment to bringing about peace through peace talks.

In contrast, 42.7% of Sri Lankans in January 2002 do not believe that the LTTE is committed to bring about peace through negotiations. But what is interesting to note is that this view has decreased sharply in January 2002 after a steady growth from May to November in 2001 (50.6% to 68.5%). However, there is a striking increase in Sri Lankans who do believe in the commitment of the LTTE to bring about peace through talks - from 9.8% in November 2001 to 22.2% in January 2002.

In January 2002 though a majority of Muslims (67.4%) and Up-country Tamils (67%) feel the LTTE is committed to bring about peace through talks, many Tamils (44.5%) and Sinhalese (23.9%) remain unsure. 13.4% of Sinhalese in January 2002 show optimism that the LTTE is committed to establishing peace through talks, an increase from the 5.9% in June 2001.

41.7% Sri Lankans believe that the Government would go in for talks as a result of their commitment to peace, which is the predominant view held amongst the Up-country Tamils (51.5%) and Sinhalese (43.1%). On the other hand, a majority of Muslims and Tamils feel the Government would go in for talks as a result of economic hardship. A significant slide can be
observed from November 2001 (18%) to January 2002 (8.4%) in the opinion that the Government goes in for talks to fool the people.

In January 2002, 27.9% feel that the LTTE would go in for negotiations to fool the people. 22.4% believe it is on account of economic hardships while 19.1% believe it is because of international pressure. Only 15.5% attribute it to a lack of manpower. From November 2001 to January 2002 a significant fall can be observed in the view that the LTTE’s need to fool the people would result in them participating in talks (18% to 8.4%), while a notable increase can be observed in it being as a consequence of economic hardship (27% to 35.5%). In January 2002, the perception that the LTTE would go in for talks as a result of a commitment to peace is held mainly by the minorities rather than amongst the Sinhalese.

**ON CONDITIONS FOR PEACE TALKS**

The findings indicate a striking rise from 45.2% in November 2001 to 64.2% in January 2002 in the opinion that the Government should declare a ceasefire for peace talks. In contrast to the minorities, amongst whom over 90% think the Government should declare a ceasefire for peace talks, only 56.9% of the Sinhalese think the Government should declare a ceasefire for peace talks.

66.9% of Sri Lankans hold the view that the LTTE should declare a ceasefire for peace talks, a view that has increased from 56.5% in November 2001 to 66.9% in January 2002. This view is reiterated mainly...
amongst the minorities rather than amongst the Sinhalese.

81.2% of Sri Lankans feel that both parties should declare a ceasefire through a mutual agreement, indicating that support for a bilateral ceasefire is higher in comparison to the 69.3% in November 2001.

In January 2002 56.3% of Sri Lankans are against the deproscription of the LTTE. However, 30.8% nationally and 80.4% of Tamils, 81.6% of Up-country Tamils and 59.5% of Muslims think the LTTE should be de-proscribed before peace talks. Overall the percentage of Sri Lankans who are against deproscribing the LTTE declined to 56.3% in January 2002 from 64.6% in November 2001.

More than half the Sri Lankan population (57.1%) approve the Government’s decision to lift the restrictions on certain essential items, including food and medicine, to the Vanni as a prelude to peace talks. 22.1% disapprove of this decision. This decision is hailed largely by the minority communities. 49.7% of the Sinhalese also approve of the same.

In your opinion do you feel the Government should de-proscribe the LTTE to start peace talks?

What is your opinion of the Government's decision to lift the restriction on certain essential items including food and medicine to the Vanni as a prelude to peace talks?

LEVEL OF TOLERANCE AND PLURALISM

In January 2002 the opinion that all communities can live together remains virtually unchanged from November 2001 (84.5% to 86.6%). 7.9% of the population hold the opposite view in January 2002. 76.3% of the population do not identify the Tamil community and the LTTE as one, a view that has increased since May 2001. 24.3% of Tamils identify the Tamil community
and the LTTE as one.

Though many Sri Lankans in January 2002 (38.9%) identified the Government as a Sinhala Government, this figure has declined since November 2001, for which month the figure was 44.7%

A steady increase can be observed from June 2001 to January 2002 in the opinion that a LTTE cadre is an enemy (46.6% to 61.9%) rather than a human being or patriot. The view that a LTTE cadre portrays an enemy exists largely amongst the Sinhalese (72.4%) rather than amongst the other communities. Furthermore, in January 2002, notable proportions within the minorities identify a LTTE cadre as a patriot - 43.9% of Tamils, 46.6% of Up-country Tamils and 40% of Muslims hold this view.

In contrast most people (58.1%) identify a soldier as a patriot. At the same time those who identify them to be human beings has increased considerably in January 2002 (30.6% in November 2001 to 50.4% in January 2002).

**THE PEACE PROCESS**

As opposed to 78% in November 2001, a slight increase (83.5%) in approval of the Government and the LTTE going in for peace talks can be observed in January 2002. In January 2002 this approval exists across all the ethnic groups, in contrast to November 2001, when it was held predominantly amongst the minorities.

77.6% approve of the Government and the LTTE going in for talks after a ceasefire - an increase from 56.7% in November 2001. A substantial decrease is apparent amongst those who
disapprove of the two parties engaging in peace talks after a ceasefire (from 22.5% in November 2001 to 5.7% in January 2002). From 36.1% September 2001 to 73.7% in January 2002, the Sinhalese increasingly approve of the Government and the LTTE negotiating after a ceasefire.

On the other hand, as shown in the graph above, the high rate of disapproval amongst Sri Lankans of the Government and the LTTE engaging in peace talks whilst fighting continues in January 2002, with a considerable increase in opinion from November 2001. Only 62.1% of the Sinhalese, in comparison to 82.5% of the Tamils, 79.8% of the Up-country Tamils and 78.5% of the Muslims, disapprove of the Government and the LTTE engaging in talks whilst in combat. It is interesting to note that there is a drastic increase in the disapproval rate of this strategy amongst the Sinhalese from 39.1% in September and 32.7% in November 2001 to 62.1% in January 2002.

Who should be involved in the negotiations?
When asked in January 2002 who should be involved in negotiations 33.9% feel that it should be only between the Government and the LTTE. Only 2.1% of the population think there is no need for peace talks. In comparison to other ethnic communities, many Tamils (37.6%) feel the widest spectrum of involvement is necessary for negotiations whereas 25.2% Up-country Tamils state that only the Government, the LTTE and an international third party should be involved in negotiations.

**INTERNATIONAL THIRD PARTY FACILITATION**

35.8% and 28.9% of Sri Lankans feel that to solve the north east war an international third party’s involvement is necessary and will add a positive impact on the peace process respectively. In January 2002 while there is a notable increase in those who feel that such an involvement will add a positive impact to the peace process (16% in November to 28.9% in January 2002), the findings indicate a sharp decline in those who are uncertain of an involvement of this nature to solve the north east war (24.2% in November 2001 to 28.9% in January 2002). The absolute necessity of an international third party’s involvement is stated chiefly amongst the minorities while most Sinhalese are of the view that it will have a positive impact on the peace process.
**Norwegian Facilitation**

Of the 81.7% of the Sri Lankan population aware of Norway, most approve the assistance given by them to the Sri Lankan peace process. This high rate of approval exists chiefly amongst the Up-country Tamils (95.5%), Tamils (83.7%) and Muslims (80.3%) as opposed to only 46% of the Sinhalese. At the same time, 24.5% amongst the Sinhalese disapprove of Norway’s assistance, while 17.4% are unsure of the same. Hence, most people in January 2002 hold the view that Norway has a positive impact on the peace process.

![Approval Rating Chart](chart.png)

**Commitment**

In January 2002, the motivation for people to join the armed forces continues to be economic hardship (69.9%) and the need to defend the motherland (61.5%), rather than revenge (1.9%).

On the other hand, equal proportions of the population feel people join the LTTE to defend the motherland (38.3%) and as a result of forced recruitment (38.6%). Only 18.8% of the population feel people join the LTTE as a result of revenge, a perception that continues to steadily decline from 26.5% in September 2001. 44.7% amongst the Sinhalese believe people are recruited into the LTTE by force.

An increase can be observed in January 2002 amongst the Muslims who feel economic hardship to be the primary reason that motivates people to enlist in the forces (48.5% in November 2001 to 58.6% in January 2002) or the LTTE (4.9% in November 2001 to 15.3% in January 2002).
What motivates the people who join the forces? [Multiple Answers]

- Economic hardship
- Defending the motherland
- Revenge
- By force
- Do not know

What motivates the people who join the LTTE? [Multiple Answers]

- Economic hardship
- Defending the motherland
- Revenge
- By force
- Do not know
Recent Developments: An Opinion Poll Conducted from 23rd to 29th January 2002

Impact of the New Government on the Peace Process

In contrast to the high level of uncertainty (59.1%) that prevailed prior to the General Elections, 58% of Sri Lankans in January 2002 feel the new United National Front (UNF) government will have a positive effect on the peace process. At the same time 31.1% are uncertain of the effect the new UNF government will have on the peace process. 5.9% believe the UNF will not have an effect on the peace process, while 4.9% believe the new government will have a negative effect on the same.

From an ethnic viewpoint, the minorities are more optimistic than the Sinhalese, of whom 36% are sceptical of the effect the new government will have on the peace process.

For the first time in Sri Lankan political history the General Elections resulted in the advent of a system of cohabitation i.e. the President and the Government belonging to two different political parties. Though 31.3% of Sri Lankans state that this formation will have a positive impact on the peace process, 29.8% of the population are sceptical of this political formulation. This scepticism is expressed predominantly by the Tamils - 41% of whom are unsure what the effects of cohabitation. The greatest optimism on the other hand, is shown by the Sinhalese, 32.9% of whom believe that cohabitation will have a positive impact on the peace process.

77% of Sri Lankans in January 2002 are aware of the existence of post-election violence, but 35.1% do not think that post-election violence has an effect on the peace process. At the same time 33.3% think the contrary. The percentage of those who do not think there is a link between post-election violence and the peace process is considerably higher amongst the Muslims and the Up-country Tamils, with 46.8% and 43.4% stating they do not believe that post-election violence has a bearing on the peace process.
CEASEFIRE

91.9% Sri Lankans are aware of the unilateral ceasefires declared by the Government and the LTTE. But 17.5% of the Up-country Tamils are unaware of the declaration of ceasefires.

Furthermore, over half of those who are aware of the ceasefires believe they will have a positive impact on the peace process. This optimism is found mainly amongst the minority communities, rather than the Sinhalese, of whom 26.1% are doubtful of the impact the ceasefires will have on the peace process. At the same time 13.6% and 11.8% amongst the Muslim and Up-country Tamil communities assume the ceasefires will have no impact on the peace process.

REMOVAL OF TWO MAJOR ROADBLOCKS IN COLOMBO

An overwhelming majority in the Colombo district (88.3%) are aware of the removal of two major roadblocks as part of the peace process. The highest level of ignorance of this removal is demonstrated amongst the Sinhalese community (13.2%). 38% disapprove the removal of the

If aware of the ceasefires, the impact of the ceasefires on the peace process.

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<th>Up-country Tamil</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
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<th>Sinhala</th>
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Approval or disapproval of the removal of 2 major roadblocks in Colombo

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<thead>
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roadblocks while 16.4% are unsure of what effects the removal might have. While a majority (44.1%) in the Sinhalese community show disapproval at the removal of the roadblocks, 17.8% do not know what to make of it. Furthermore, while 81.3% of Tamils approve of the removal of the roadblocks only 36.4% of Sinhalese concur.

**POSTER CAMPAIGNS**

Have you seen the posters put up by the JVP about the Government’s initiatives towards peace talks with the LTTE?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
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The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) poster campaign on the Government’s initiatives towards negotiations with the LTTE captured the attention of 34.2% of Sri Lankans; the highest level of awareness is demonstrated amongst the Sinhalese community, 36.8% of whom had seen the JVP posters.

Have you seen the posters that say 77% of the population are for negotiations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up-country Tamil</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinhala</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the other hand, an overwhelming majority (90.4%) were ignorant of the poster campaign conducted by the Initiative for Political and Conflict Transformation (INPACT). Again, the highest level of ignorance is demonstrated amongst the Sinhalese community, 91.4% of whom had seen not seen the INPACT posters.

The January poll shows that people who had seen the INPACT posters were influenced by their message - that peace talks were a means to bring peace. In contrast, the JVP posters influenced people to believe that an outright military victory could be claimed by the government. While only 9.2% in January had seen the INPACT posters, 34% had seen the JVP posters.

* (Statistically significant at a 5% level)
Social Indicator (SI) is an independent social research organisation, which conducts polls on socio-economic and political issues. Operating under the Board of Directors of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), SI was established in September 1999, and filled a longstanding vacuum for a permanent, professional and independent polling facility in Sri Lanka on social and political issues.

Polling is an instrument of empowerment, a means by which the silent majority of the public can express their opinions on issues affecting their lives. Our mission is to conduct surveys on key social issues, thereby providing a means through which public opinion can influence the public policy debate.