India and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

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INDIA AND THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Executive Summary

This monograph examines India’s position toward the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and explores the sources of India’s initial enthusiasm and subsequent opposition to the treaty in the period 1994–96. It concludes with a discussion of India’s nuclear tests of May 1998 and New Delhi’s expressions of support for the CTBT thereafter.

When negotiations on the CTBT commenced in 1994, New Delhi was enthusiastic about the treaty; its main concerns were technical issues such as the threshold below which nuclear tests would be banned, the duration of the treaty, and a nondiscriminatory verification system. In 1994 New Delhi suggested that “key” countries should be included in the CTBT, an indication that India, which was certainly a key country, would be a party to the CTBT. Early Indian statements only vaguely referred to linking nuclear disarmament with the CTBT.

Following the indefinite extension of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995, New Delhi took a tougher stand on the CTBT. It argued that because the NPT Extension Conference did not extract a time-bound commitment toward disarmament from the declared nuclear states, such a commitment should be made in the CTBT context. New Delhi also sought a broader scope in the CTBT to prohibit laboratory and subcritical testing. Both of these demands aimed at more completely halting further development of the nuclear weapon states’ nuclear arsenals, thereby quickening and consolidating the process of their elimination. This position of placing the CTBT within a disarmament framework and calling for a ban on subcritical tests was also adopted by many nonaligned and nonnuclear states.

Eventually, most nonaligned states signed the CTBT while New Delhi backed away from the treaty. On June 20, 1996, New Delhi stepped aside from the CTBT by linking its disarmament-related reservations with national security considerations. New Delhi made the case that it was not in its national security interests to sign CTBT because the treaty was not linked to disarmament. It would permit the declared nuclear powers to retain and make qualitative improvements to their nuclear weapons, which were suggested to be a source of security concern for India.

The entry into force (EIF) provisions introduced in the CTBT on June 28, 1996, requiring forty-four nuclear-capable states (including India) to ratify the treaty before it entered into force, became the source of New Delhi’s strongest objections to the CTBT. New Delhi had three concerns with these provisions. First, they suggested the possible use of sanctions against India if it did not sign the CTBT. Second, and more important, they violated Indian sovereignty by appearing to force it to enter a treaty to which it objected. Third, concessions had been made in July 1996 to (partly) accommodate Beijing’s position regarding on-site inspections, but no similar concessions were made toward New Delhi’s alternative formula for EIF. Declarations by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) chair and by Washington that the EIF provisions did not violate sovereignty and that they did not imply the use of sanctions did not assuage New Delhi’s concerns on the EIF issue.

Domestic politics as they relate to the Indian elections of May 1996 further explain New Delhi’s assuming a stronger line on the CTBT. The anti-CTBT rhetoric that prevailed in the run-up to the Indian elections made it hard for any Indian political party to take a more conciliatory stand on the treaty. The CTBT issue remained politicized after elections produced a weak minority United Front coalition government. It was at this point that the issues of national security and sovereignty, both reflecting concerns of India’s security and foreign policy communities, but also having a broader domestic appeal than that of disarmament, appeared in New Delhi’s CTBT declarations. The post-election minority government benefited from public and Parliamentary support when it was seen as upholding India’s security and sovereignty by opposing a domestically unpopular treaty.

Until 1998, India’s nuclear policy was that of its political center—comprising the Congress Party, the parties of the United Front coalition, and India’s foreign policy bureaucracy. India’s political center had
emphasized issues of nuclear disarmament, refrained from overt nuclearization, and instead viewed India’s nuclear option based on its extensive nuclear infrastructure and its emerging missile capability as a sufficient guarantor of national security. In March 1998, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) assumed office in India. This party representing India’s political right authorized a series of nuclear tests in May 1998 and declared India to be a nuclear weapons state, representing a break from the nuclear policy of previous Indian governments. It also indicated a willingness to join the CTBT. In the posttest situation, the CTBT would be useful in restraining the further advancement of India’s nuclear program. Ultimately, India’s future nuclear strategy, including India’s compliance with the CTBT and a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), will be influenced by the prevailing domestic political situation, external incentives and sanctions, economic constraints, and security considerations.
INDIA AND THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Introduction

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is part of a series of treaties providing the institutional foundations for the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation regime. In 1994 when negotiations on the CTBT commenced, India was enthusiastic about the treaty, but by 1996 India became the treaty’s strongest opponent. On June 20, 1996, India declared its unwillingness to sign, noting that because the CTBT “is not conceived as a measure toward universal nuclear disarmament . . . [India] cannot subscribe to it in its present form.” On September 10, 1996, when the CTBT was adopted at the United Nations, India took an even stronger position, stating that it would “never sign this unequal Treaty, not now, not later.” In May 1998 India, followed by Pakistan, conducted a series of nuclear tests. India immediately noted that it “would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the undertakings in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” At the United Nations in September 1998, India more strongly emphasized its commitment to the CTBT. Indian Prime Minister Ataj Bihari Vajpayee stated India was prepared to bring negotiations on joining the CTBT to a “successful conclusion, so that the entry into force of the CTBT is not delayed beyond September 1999.” This monograph examines India’s approach toward the CTBT and explores various explanations for the shift in India’s stand on the treaty between 1994 and 1998.

In May 1995, the unconditional indefinite extension of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was accompanied by, and indeed made possible because of, commitments from the declared nuclear weapon states to a set of principles aiming to curb the nuclear arms race. These principles called for the attainment of the CTBT no later than 1996 (emphasis added), to be followed by negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), positive and negative security guarantees for nonnuclear states, and measures toward further nuclear force reductions. The first step of this process began on schedule with the adoption of the CTBT by the UN General Assembly in September 1996. The CTBT was built upon a number of nonproliferation successes attained in the 1990s, such as nuclear rollbacks by numerous states and nuclear arms control initiatives by the declared nuclear weapon states. More significantly, it marked the beginning of a series of initiatives outlined in the NPT Extension Conference’s principles that are intended to further advance the nuclear arms control agenda.

The CTBT strengthens a moratorium on nuclear testing. Yet in the middle term, constraints against nuclear testing may weaken if the CTBT does not enter into force. The CTBT’s EIF would also result in several practical benefits with significant political implications: it would allow the verification and monitoring system to become legally effective and would create a momentum toward additional arms control. If the CTBT’s entry into force is delayed, states would begin questioning the operations and costs (and cost-effectiveness) of the verification mechanism. This in turn would jeopardize funding and political support not only for the CTBT, but also for other nonproliferation and disarmament initiatives such as a future FMCT and its accompanying verification regime. For these reasons, the CTBT’s EIF becomes an important issue.

Under its current provisions, the CTBT must be signed and ratified by forty-four states (members of the CD having nuclear reactors) before it enters into force. By July 1998, forty-one of the forty-four required states had signed the treaty as a first step toward ratification, although India, Pakistan, and North Korea had not signed the treaty; only a small number of states had actually ratified the treaty. If the CTBT is ultimately ratified by all the required states and enters into force, it would generate a momentum for additional nuclear arms control that would contribute to strengthening the nonproliferation regime.

This monograph begins with a historical discussion of nuclear test ban issues, notes the links between the CTBT and NPT, and examines India’s enthusiasm for the CTBT from the 1950s through the early 1990s. It then reviews in some detail India’s pro-CTBT statements in the period 1993–94 and its anti-CTBT position following the May 1995 NPT Extension Conference. Thereafter, an examination of domestic politics relevant to India’s position on the CTBT in the period 1994–96 is undertaken, including an analysis of the role of the Indian press, bureaucracy, and security analysts. The final section of this monograph discusses India’s nuclear
tests of May 1998, analyzes India’s nuclear weapons capability in the posttest situation, and concludes by noting the continued significance of the CTBT.
Nuclear Test Ban Issues, 1954–93: A Primer

Overview

Following a U.S. thermonuclear test on March 1, 1954, in which a Japanese trawler was exposed to radiation, a number of prominent international leaders and organizations called for an end to nuclear testing. These began with Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s suggestion for a “standstill agreement” on nuclear testing, made in the Indian Parliament on April 2, 1954, and similar declarations or endorsements by the British Labor Party, the West German Bundestag, Japanese and West German scientists, the International Labor Organization, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Pope, and the World Council of Churches.

From 1958 onwards, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union undertook negotiations seeking a test ban. Although these negotiations were primarily trilateral, a conference of scientific experts and the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) also discussed and made recommendations on the issue. The neutral states, particularly Sweden and India, were among the active participants in the test ban process and in the ENDC discussions. Eventually consensus on a comprehensive test ban was not attainable because of disagreement over verification. The United States sought a large number of on-site inspections (OSIs)—initially proposing some twenty per year, finally reducing the number to seven—while Khrushchev would not agree to more than three OSIs per year. Negotiations were also set back because of deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relations following the downing of an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union in May 1960. Test ban talks resumed after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Ultimately, in lieu of a CTBT, a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) that prohibited nuclear testing in the atmosphere and underwater and which did not require OSIs for verification was signed in Moscow in August 1963. France and China did not sign the PTBT and continued to conduct atmospheric tests until 1974 and 1980, respectively, and then moved their subsequent tests underground (see Appendix A for a table of nuclear test activity).

Although a series of nuclear arms control agreements followed in subsequent years—the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), the NPT (1968), and bilateral U.S.-Soviet nuclear force limitation agreements under SALT 1 (1972) and SALT 2 (1979)—a comprehensive test ban remained out of reach. Instead, the superpowers agreed upon two test-limitation treaties. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of July 1974 limited the yield of nuclear test explosions to 150 kilotons; the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) of May 1976 allowed multiple 150-kiloton-yield explosions as part of a single test. The Carter administration’s enthusiasm for a CTBT encountered domestic opposition and ultimately failed to result in a treaty. The Reagan administration opposed a CTBT and formally announced that it would not resume CTBT talks in June 1982. The international community, however, continued to press for a test ban. International appeals for a test ban were manifest through UN General Assembly resolutions; a May 1984 declaration by six nonnuclear states (Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, Tanzania); and a suggestion by Mexico in August 1985 to amend the PTBT so that it would include a ban on underground tests. (This effort was fulfilled when a conference of PTBT parties was held in January 1991 to expand the PTBT into a CTBT, but was unsuccessful.) These appeals combined with domestic pressure on the Reagan administration through U.S. congressional resolutions led to the eventual resumption of test ban negotiations. However, no significant progress was made toward achieving a test ban in the 1980s.

The end of the Cold War saw renewed interest in a test ban treaty. The U.S. Senate ratified the TTBT and PNET in September 1990. In August 1992, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution permitting no more than five nuclear tests annually (primarily to check safety and reliability), and proposing a halt on all nuclear testing by September 1996. Following the last U.S. nuclear test in September 1992, President George Bush signed this congressional legislation in October 1992. Previously, three other nuclear states had ceased testing: the then Soviet Union conducted its last nuclear test in October 1990, France began a moratorium in July 1991, and the U.K. conducted its last test in November 1991. After 1992, China was the only state that conducted nuclear tests, until France announced the resumption of a short series of tests in 1995–96 (and India and Pakistan conducted tests in May 1998).
Sweden submitted a draft CTBT to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in June 1993, with a revised draft in December 1993. On July 3, 1993, President Bill Clinton announced his intention to extend the U.S. test moratorium and seek a CTBT. On August 10, 1993, the CD in Geneva gave its ad hoc test ban committee a mandate to begin CTBT negotiations in 1994. In November 1993, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly approved by consensus a resolution calling for CTBT negotiations to commence. On December 16, 1993, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution (UNGA Resolution 48/70) seeking a CTBT; this was the first time that a consensus resolution for a CTBT was adopted at the United Nations. Negotiations aimed at drafting the treaty finally began at the Conference on Disarmament in January 1994.

The Test Ban, Vertical and Horizontal Proliferation, and the NPT

The nuclear test ban’s fundamental importance is states that have nuclear weapons would be constrained from modernizing and advancing their nuclear programs if they cannot conduct nuclear tests. Further, states which do not have nuclear weapons (nonnuclear states) may not be able to build or have confidence in nuclear weapons without testing, and therefore would be restrained from embarking on a nuclear weapons program. (These issues are discussed in greater detail later in this monograph.) These horizontal nonproliferation aspects (restraining and preventing nonnuclear states from acquiring nuclear weapons) and vertical nonproliferation issues (curbing further development of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear states) were understood to be particularly important from the time when test ban negotiations first began in the 1950s. During test ban discussions in the 1950s, Washington held the view that a test ban could form the initial stage of a broader disarmament agreement; this position reflected the vertical nonproliferation aspects of the test ban. A few years later, President John F. Kennedy highlighted the horizontal nonproliferation significance of a test ban, noting that it was particularly important to prevent other states from developing nuclear weapons. Kennedy’s concerns were with preventing China from crossing the nuclear threshold, while earlier the Soviet Union had been similarly concerned about France’s nuclear ambitions.

The CTBT assumed particular prominence as a vertical nonproliferation measure in the NPT context. During the NPT negotiations in the 1960s and at NPT review conferences in 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990 the commitments of the nuclear states under NPT Article VI—to pursue “effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”—were implicitly understood by many nonnuclear states to refer to a CTBT. The 1985 NPT Review Conference “deeply regretted” that a test ban treaty had not been concluded and called upon the nuclear states (mainly the United States and the U.K.) to resume negotiations on a test ban. The 1990 NPT Review Conference ended without a final document because of the lack of firm commitments toward a CTBT.

India and the Test Ban, 1954–93

New Delhi enthusiastically supported a test ban treaty in the decades after Prime Minister Nehru’s call in April 1954 for a standstill agreement on nuclear testing. Although it should be noted that during the 1960s and 1970s, India desired that further consideration be given to the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions. In the 1950s, New Delhi sought to play a moderating role between the Western and Eastern blocs, a role intended to further progress on then prevailing test ban negotiations. In 1957, India and Sweden suggested a moratorium on nuclear tests, and later that year India suggested a verification system that would ensure impartiality. In the 1960s and 1970s, when the concept of peaceful nuclear explosions was being closely examined in a number of states and had greater international legitimacy, New Delhi held the view that although there should be “a total prohibition of all nuclear explosions for all states . . . the conduct of explosions considered necessary for peaceful purposes should be dealt with as exceptions and should be under international supervision and with safeguards equally applicable to all.”

New Delhi was aware of the detrimental environmental effects of such peaceful nuclear explosions, noting that “the economic value of underground explosions is being studied . . . [and their] possible effects on the environmental and ecological conditions are also being studied. It is only after satisfactory answers to all these problems are available that the question of actual underground tests for peaceful purposes can be considered.”

The Indian nuclear test in May 1974 was described as a peaceful nuclear explosion. New Delhi stated that "as part of the program of study of peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, the Government of India had taken a program to keep itself abreast of developments in this technology, particularly with reference to its use in the field of mining and earth-moving operations. . . . India reiterated its strong opposition to military uses of nuclear explosions."

In 1997, a leading Indian nuclear scientist stated that the "peaceful" label came from the political side.

In May 1978, New Delhi noted that the CTBT should not be viewed as an end in itself, but should be "followed by other measures such as cessation of fissile materials." In June 1978 at the UN Special Session on Disarmament, Prime Minister Morarji Desai outlined a proposal for the formulation of a time bound program, not exceeding a decade, for gradually reducing nuclear stockpiles and achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty. In May 1984, six nonnuclear states—Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania—called for a halt to the nuclear arms race and an end to nuclear testing. In January 1985, the six states again called on the nuclear states to end the "testing of all kinds of nuclear weapons and to conclude at an early date a treaty on a nuclear test ban. Such a treaty would be a major step toward ending the continuous modernization of nuclear weapons." In October 1985, the six states noted that "we are ready to offer our good offices in order to facilitate the establishment of effective verification arrangements. Third party verification would provide a high degree of certainty that testing programs have ceased. We propose to establish verification mechanisms on our territories to achieve this objective." In October 1991 at the United Nations, New Delhi stated that "we would strongly urge that the ad hoc committee on a Nuclear Test Ban is reestablished next year with positive negotiating mandate."

In summary, New Delhi's longstanding nuclear arms control policy was to give importance to the issues of both horizontal and vertical proliferation when discussing the CTBT, but it did not rigidly link them to the CTBT. New Delhi was particularly active in promoting a test ban during the 1950s, under the leadership of elder statesman, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and in the mid-late 1980s during a young and enthusiastic Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's term in office. More generally, New Delhi has consistently been a strong supporter of a nuclear test ban treaty right through the 1990s.
Indian Statements on the CTBT,
Pre-NPT Extension Conference

Background

When negotiations on a CTBT began at the first Conference on Disarmament session of 1994 (January 25–March 31, 1994), completing the treaty before the NPT Extension of May 1995 was an objective of both the nonnuclear and the nuclear states. A CTBT was essential to prove the nuclear states’ commitment to ending their nuclear buildup; this in turn would allow nonnuclear states to support the NPT’s long-term or indefinite extension. Although progress on the CTBT was positive during the first CD session, the CTBT encountered several obstacles during the next CD session (May 16–July 1, 1994). Despite these obstacles, a heavily bracketed draft treaty (the brackets representing areas of disagreement) was obtained by the end of the third CD session on September 7, 1994. The attainment of this draft treaty provided positive momentum leading into the NPT Extension Conference’s third PrepCom (September 12–16, 1994). Although it was by then recognized that the CTBT would not be complete before the May 1995 NPT Extension Conference, the fact that tangible progress had been made on the CTBT was extremely significant for (and facilitated positive outcomes during) the fourth NPT PrepCom (January 23–27, 1995) and at the NPT Review and Extension Conference (April 17–May 12, 1995). In the absence of a draft CTBT text, nonnuclear states would have doubted that a test ban was within reach, and this in turn would have adversely affected the NPT PrepComs and jeopardized prospects for the NPT’s indefinite extension.

In the period 1993–94, Indian statements at the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations reflect support for both a CTBT and an FMCT. India cosponsored UNGA resolution 48/70 seeking a test ban, along with the United States and more than 100 other states.\textsuperscript{21} India’s CTBT-related statements of 1993–94 focused largely on early issues on the CD agenda—those of duration, verification, and thresholds. India and other nations did not want to derail progress on a CTBT at this stage by raising more contentious issues.\textsuperscript{22} The CD had a longstanding involvement in the CTBT verification system, having sponsored experiments dealing with verification in the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{23} Therefore, the topic of verification was a prominent early issue during the CD’s 1994 discussions on the CTBT; consequently, initial Indian statements focused on technical issues such as verification that were then prevailing on the CD agenda. The following discussion reviews the 1993–94 Indian position on the CTBT’s duration, verification, scope, links to disarmament, security assurances, and entry into force.\textsuperscript{24}

Indefinite Duration, Nondiscriminatory and Effective Verification

New Delhi’s July 1993 statement at the CD noted that the CTBT should cover “all states for all time” (July 1993 CD statement, para 5)—this was a somewhat standard phrase in international nuclear arms control discussions, adopted (as noted in the Indian statement) from the preamble of the PTBT of 1963. However the call for a treaty of indefinite duration was also aimed at Washington’s then prevailing position seeking a ten-year opt-out clause in the treaty, which Washington finally abandoned in January 1995 in the run-up to the NPT Extension Conference. India also indicated a desire for a nondiscriminatory verification system, meaning that all countries should have access to data used for verification.

On another aspect of verification indirectly linked with the CTBT’s scope, New Delhi noted that a test ban “would go a long way in arresting the nuclear arms race and bringing to an end the development of more lethal warheads” and called for an “effective and verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty, which has long been a goal of [the] international disarmament community” (July 1993 CD statement, para 6). This statement implied that India would not demand a ban on subcritical tests, compliance with which cannot be easily verified. Monitoring a ban on subcritical tests would require strict and round-the-clock observation of possible test sites or research laboratories. These measures, besides being prohibitively expensive, would be politically unacceptable to most states. One should note here that the phrase “effective and verifiable” is commonly used in the disarmament
community, and therefore a deeper reading should not automatically be imparted to its implications concerning India’s stand on the CTBT.

Scope: Threshold and Yield

Early discussions in the CD on the scope of a CTBT addressed the diverging positions of a no-test, zero-yield treaty (the position of the nonnuclear weapon states, especially the nonaligned) versus allowing for some tests and having a low threshold treaty (the positions of the declared nuclear states). In June 1994 at the CD, Indian Ambassador Satish Chandra declared that New Delhi desired a comprehensive treaty with no thresholds—implying a zero-yield treaty. In September 1994, Ambassador Chandra stated that “there should be no exceptions for carrying out nuclear tests under any circumstances” (September 1994 CD statement, para 3). These Indian statements were directed at the then existing P-5 positions—the U.K.’s and France’s position on allowing tests related to warhead safety in exceptional circumstances, China’s desire to permit tests related to peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), and Russia’s insistence on a ten-ton threshold. Although the United States had indicated as early as 1993 that it would work toward a zero-yield treaty, the declared nuclear powers formally committed themselves to the zero-yield position much later. To summarize, in its 1994 statements, India did not take a stronger position on the scope of the CTBT, nor did it seek more than a zero-yield treaty. It made no calls for the prohibition of subcritical tests or for a closure of test sites, provisions which nonaligned countries such as Indonesia, Iran, and Nigeria sought to include in the CTBT.

Disarmament and Negative Security Assurances

Although maintaining that disarmament was an important issue, New Delhi did not initially make its acceptance of the CTBT conditional upon P-5 commitments to disarmament. Indian policy makers and the Indian Parliament have generally recognized the significance of U.S.–Russian treaties such as START in halting the nuclear arms race, but have simultaneously urged the nuclear states to move beyond incremental reductions. In July 1993 at the CD, New Delhi noted that the aim of the CTBT was to prevent the testing of nuclear weapons and thereby inhibit both vertical and horizontal proliferation. A June 1994 Indian statement at the CD placed the CTBT within the framework of the Rajiv Gandhi Action plan for disarmament (also called the India Action Plan—CD/859). This statement gave recognition to the fact that significant strides had been made by the nuclear powers in the field of nuclear disarmament and that many of the nuclear reduction goals envisaged in the first phase of the India Action Plan had been achieved (June 1994 CD statement, para 7). It added that the CTBT “has a very important place in the context of nuclear disarmament. It finds a place in the first stage of India’s Action Plan for achieving the goal of a nuclear weapon free and nonviolent world order” (para 3).

Further, the Indian declaration went on to imply that negative security assurances were a short-term alternative in the run-up to disarmament. New Delhi recognized that “complete nuclear disarmament is a complex issue,” and therefore “pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, it is for the Nuclear Weapon States to provide all security assurances to Nonnuclear Weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in an internationally and legally binding form, i.e. without any qualification or discrimination” (para 18). The last clause reflects a long-standing Indian position that security assurances should be given not only to NPT signatories, thereby leaving India outside their scope, but rather to all states. Other countries had also raised the issue of security assurances in various contexts.

In light of these Indian declarations, it is clear that disarmament was an important concern for India. To cite another example, India’s Minister of State for External Affairs R. L. Bhatia noted at the United Nations that, while nuclear cuts under the START treaties were “particularly heartening,” much more needed to be done toward the elimination of nuclear weapons (October 1994 UN statement, para 3). Yet India did not initially make its acceptance of the CTBT conditional upon P-5 commitments to disarmament.

Entry into Force

Indian statements on the issue of the CTBT’s entry into force (EIF) suggest that New Delhi fully expected to be a party to the CTBT in 1994. New Delhi stated that the CTBT should enter into force upon ratification by a “reasonable and representative group of countries” (June 1994 CD statement, para 16); this was a commonly
used phrase in the disarmament community and resembled a pragmatic position on EIF. The Indian position is best indicated in its September 1994 statement at the CD:

Different views have been expressed for EIF, from a limited requirement of ratification by the five declared nuclear-weapon States to the expanded membership of the Conference on Disarmament. Our view has been that while the former is too limited, the latter would unnecessarily delay the EIF of a CTBT. Certain other countries which are key to the success of a universal and nondiscriminatory CTBT must be included at the outset. We therefore believe that EIF should be based on ratification by a reasonable and representative group of countries (September 1994 CD statement, para 10).

Although this statement did not define which countries were “key” or “reasonable and representative,” it is plausible to assume that India would be among this list of key countries. Clearly, one aspect of India’s EIF proposal—calling for key countries to be included in the EIF—would bind India (a key country) to the CTBT. This suggests that in 1994, New Delhi expected to be a signatory to the CTBT. Another aspect of India’s EIF proposal—that ratification by the entire CD would unnecessarily delay the treaty’s EIF—effectively kept open India’s options of signing the treaty.

Assessment

India’s position in 1994 on a proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) reflected a desire to be engaged in, and enter into, the FMCT as well as the CTBT. In its June 1994 and September 1994 CD statements, India called for a convention on fissile material cutoffs that would be nondiscriminatory, multilaterally negotiated, internationally and effectively verifiable (language adopted from UN General Assembly Resolution 48/75 L of 1993 on the FMCT). At this stage, New Delhi gave no indication that its signing of the fissile material cutoff would be conditional upon P-5 commitments to disarmament.

As late as April 1995, just before the NPT Extension Conference, a statement made by New Delhi in its capacity as a coordinator for the G-21 essentially repeated the key issues made in Indian declarations of 1993 and 1994. This statement emphasized that the CTBT’s scope should contain “a complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all times” (April 1995 CD statement, para 5). It added that the “CTBT should be able to attract universal adherence” and that “EIF should not be complicated to delay the process” (para 8). The statement concluded with the hope that “the pace of negotiations will be accelerated by an exhibition of political will by all States, particularly the Nuclear Weapon States, especially on the Scope, so that a CTBT can be concluded in 1995” (para 9).

Thereafter, speaking on behalf of India alone, Indian Ambassador Chandra repeated Indian views on security assurances and disarmament that were made earlier in India’s June 1994 CD statement. Chandra stated New Delhi recognized that

complete nuclear disarmament is a complex issue. Accordingly, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is imperative that the nuclear-weapons States provide unconditional security assurances to all nonnuclear-weapon States irrespective of whether or not they are NPT signatories, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding form, that is, universal and without any qualification or discrimination (para 10).

To summarize, India’s primary concern in 1993 and 1994 was with attaining a zero-yield indefinite CTBT. This stand, together with India’s EIF position for the CTBT and its statements on the FMCT, indicate that in 1994 India was keen on participating in both the CTBT and the FMCT and did not rigidly link these treaties with disarmament objectives. Eventually, however, a conservative approach to disarmament at the NPT Extension Conference caused New Delhi to more strongly introduce the disarmament issue in the CTBT context.
The NPT Extension Conference

The NPT Extension and Review Conference was held in April–May 1995 with the purpose of determining whether, and for how long, the NPT would be extended; eventually the NPT was indefinitely extended. The following paragraphs discuss India’s stand on the NPT, and the outcome of the NPT Extension Conference.

India, the NPT, and the NPT Extension Conference

Since the 1960s, New Delhi has been an opponent of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty because of what it argues is the discriminatory nature of the treaty. Its opposition relates to the issue that the NPT does not provide for a balance of obligations and responsibilities between the nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states, and that while all the obligations are imposed on nonnuclear weapon states, the nuclear weapon states had not accepted any. These objections were pointed out by Indian Ambassador Azim Hussein at the UN First Committee on May 14, 1968. Ambassador Hussein further criticized the NPT because it did not impose any curbs on the development of nuclear weapons by the declared nuclear states; it did not create a juridical obligation in regard to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date; it did not remove the special status of superiority associated with power and prestige conferred on nuclear weapon states; and the treaty was also discriminatory in regard to the safeguards and controls, which were all imposed on the nonnuclear weapon states but not on the nuclear weapon states. For these reasons, India could not subscribe to the NPT. Yet another reason for India’s not signing the NPT in the 1960s–70s was its security concerns about China.

The deep-rooted ideological opposition to the NPT has caused New Delhi to stay away from NPT review conferences even as an observer. Whenever Indian governments consider such a step, they have come under domestic pressure in the Indian Parliament and faced opposition by the foreign policy bureaucracy, causing them to backtrack on the issue. For example, before the 1990 NPT Review Conference, India’s Janata Dal government was keen on sending official observers to the conference. It changed its position after then foreign minister Inder Gujral (who again became foreign minister and then prime minister in 1996–97) was advised against such a move by the bureaucracy.

Similarly, in 1994, then Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao indicated that India might attend the 1995 Extension Conference as an observer, but this decision was soon reversed. Rao had informed a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader that India would work toward shaping the NPT in line with its own thinking and had stated before the Indian Parliament that New Delhi could attend the conference as an observer. This policy was not well received by some sections of the foreign policy bureaucracy and by security analysts. Prior to Prime Minister Rao’s May 1994 visit to the United States, there was also anxiety among New Delhi’s bureaucracy and security community that Rao might be “coerced to foreclose or compromise India’s nuclear option.” Thereafter, a number of anti-NPT statements were made in mid-1994 in the Indian Parliament, and New Delhi abandoned the idea of attending the NPT conference. Yet New Delhi also informed Washington that it would not play a negative role at the NPT Extension Conference. India kept these commitments.

In the months before NPT Extension Conference, the Indian press carried a number of articles supporting New Delhi’s opposition to the NPT. Two main reasons justifying India’s remaining out of the NPT are discernible in these press reports. First, arguments based on issues of principle stated, “Let us not spoil our unique record of unrelenting opposition to nuclear weapons by even giving an iota of our recognition to the NPT by sending an official observer.” Second, more substantive arguments, but some of which were inaccurate, called attention to the apparent drawbacks of the NPT regime in failing to stem proliferation. For example, one commentary stated that the NPT was not worth signing because “the NPT has failed to stop the flow of materials to Pakistan, Iraq, North Korea, Israel, and South Africa.” A related theme popular in the Indian press in April 1995 was the alleged inadequacy of safeguards. Commenting on an April 1995 Washington Post article on nuclear activity in Pakistan (reports emerging during Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s visit to the United States), the Indian press noted that “India has time and again cautioned against the inadequacy of NPT safeguards . . . the fact that the U.S. administration was not unaware of the exchange of atoms [nuclear collaboration between China and Pakistan] . . . makes mockery of the U.S. efforts to
end horizontal proliferation and on that pretext perpetuates a flawed regime through unconditional and indefinite extension”; in practice NPT safeguards do not apply to (and therefore were not responsible for) Pakistan’s nuclear activity.\(^{37}\)

Only the isolated article in the Indian press highlighted the merits of the NPT, noting that “India’s security interests are served by the number of nuclear weapon states being small, seven or eight, and by countries prone to nuclear adventurism, notably Iran and Iraq, not gaining access to dual use fission technology . . . the NPT is the only hedge against the spread of nuclear weapons.”\(^{38}\) (See Appendix D for further press coverage).

New Delhi could not officially take any position on the outcome of the NPT Extension Conference because of its long-standing opposition to the NPT. Privately, Indian officials and analysts, including those who argued against India’s attending the conference, hardly wanted to see the NPT fall apart, and thus supported the treaty’s extension, albeit not an unconditional and indefinite extension. An example of this ambivalent position is reflected in an editorial which argued that India “should stay clear of the controversial process of extension and should not participate as an observer. But it is to be hoped that the parties to the treaty would work for a harmonious decision so that the cause of nonproliferation is not jeopardized.”\(^{39}\)

### The Outcome of the NPT Extension Conference

The NPT Extension Conference was attended by almost all states party to the treaty. Further, most nonsignatories, including threshold states Pakistan and Israel, as well as Angola, Brazil, and Cuba, attended the conference as observers;\(^{40}\) India was the prominent absentee.

In the run-up to the NPT Extension Conference, U.S. diplomacy had influenced a number of states to support unconditional, indefinite extension, but many states had not clarified their position on the issue. The nuclear states also made certain concessions on the CTBT and announced positive and negative security assurances (under UN Security Council Resolution 984, as well as separately) in order to increase support for their preferred outcome of indefinite extension of the NPT.\(^{41}\) Yet when the conference began in April 1995, it was assumed but still not certain as to whether a majority of states would support for the NPT’s indefinite extension. On May 5 (the deadline for submitting extension resolutions) 103 states officially appeared to support indefinite extension of the treaty (these states were cosponsors of the Canadian resolution on extension).\(^{42}\) Yet uncertainty remained as to how some of these apparent supporters, as well as other key nonaligned states, would eventually vote.\(^{43}\)

In general, the nonnuclear states’ acquiescence to indefinite extension was facilitated by (and linked to) certain commitments made by the nuclear states, the most important of which were contained in a South African-sponsored set of “principles” (discussed below) first introduced at the NPT PrepComs in the months before the NPT Extension Conference. The principles did not contain a stronger commitment to disarmament that many nonnuclear states—not just the nonaligned, but also western states such as Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, and New Zealand—indicated would be desirable.\(^{44}\) Despite a majority favoring indefinite extension of the NPT, a majoritarian extension decision that left behind a dissatisfied minority was not the optimal outcome sought by parties at the conference, because this development would weaken future support for the NPT.\(^{45}\) Besides the proposal for indefinite extension and its accompanying “principles,” two other proposals were also on the table: a Mexican plan for indefinite extension with stronger recommendations on disarmament, and an Indonesian resolution having eleven cosponsors for twenty-five-year rolling extensions.

The NPT Review and Extension Conference eventually concluded on May 11, 1995, with a package of four measures. First, indefinite extension of the treaty was adopted by consensus. This extension by consensus arrangement was accompanied by (and in fact made possible when agreement was reached on) three other documents: the South African-initiated “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament,” a second text calling for a strengthened NPT review process, and a third calling for a Middle East nuclear-free zone and for states not party to the treaty (read Israel) to accede to the NPT, all of which were also adopted without a vote.\(^{46}\) The innovative procedural action of passing measures by consensus, and thereby avoiding a final vote, allowed both proponents and opponents of indefinite extension to save face. Advocates of indefinite extension could claim that the treaty had been indefinitely extended by consensus, while opponents
could argue that the decision merely reflected the views of the majority. The Mexican and Indonesian proposals were not acted upon.

The Principles and Objectives, reflecting some of the concerns of nonnuclear states, created a number of yardsticks against which future progress on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament could be measured. These principles were a set of objectives that the NPT parties agreed could be achieved in the contemporary context, objectives that would result in halting the development of P-5 nuclear arsenals and thereby set the stage for disarmament. They included the completion of a CTBT “no later than 1996,” the “immediate commencement and early conclusion of a convention banning the production of fissile material,” and “the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.” The principles also called for negative security assurances that “could take the form of an internationally legally binding document.” These set of principles had in fact been on the international agenda for decades. They were, however, particularly important in the prevailing context because they served as politically binding (though not legally binding) objectives to which the P-5 would be held accountable at the 1997 NPT PrepCom and at all future NPT PrepComs and review conferences.
A little over a year after the NPT Extension Conference, the CTBT was finally attained in September 1996. It was the most important among a number of nuclear arms control developments in 1995 and 1996, a few of which should be noted.

In January 1994, the Henry L. Stimson Center launched a multi-year project “intended to encourage serious consideration of the conditions under which all states might move toward the progressive elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.” Its report on “An Evolving U.S. Nuclear Posture” (December 1995) noted that “U.S. national security would be best served by a policy of phased reductions in all states’ nuclear forces and gradual movement toward the objective of eliminating all weapons of mass destruction from all countries.”

In October 1995, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Pugwash movement and its president, Joseph Rotblat, “for their efforts to diminish the part played by nuclear arms in international politics and in the longer run to eliminate such arms.” The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs consist of groups of international scientists who emphasize the social responsibility of scientists and have long highlighted the need for movement toward nuclear disarmament. Pugwash views itself as an epistemic community with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge on nuclear disarmament issues, and supplies technical expertise and insights for decision makers.

In the period 1992–96, Pugwash sent “open letters” on nuclear testing to the leaders of the declared nuclear states and to Indian Prime Minister Rao.

In November 1995, the International Court of Justice took up a case on the legality of nuclear weapons. The court issued an advisory opinion on July 8, 1996, which declared that the nuclear states had an obligation to pursue and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, under strict and effective international control. The court stated that it could not determine whether the use of nuclear weapons was illegal under all circumstances, noting that it was illegal in most situations, but not under the extreme circumstances when the survival of a state is at stake.

In November 1995, the Australian government sponsored an international group of nuclear arms control experts—the Canberra Commission—to make recommendations on the issue of the elimination of nuclear weapons. The group produced a report on August 14, 1996. This report outlined a series of steps that could be adopted by the nuclear states in pursuit of nuclear disarmament, such as taking nuclear forces off alert, separating warheads from delivery systems, issuing no-first-use and nonuse guarantees, and developing a verification system for (and in anticipation of) a nuclear-free world. The commission also noted the importance of target time frames for implementing nuclear reductions leading to disarmament, but elected not to specify such time frames.

At the regional level, nuclear-free zones were created in South East Asia (December 1995) and Africa (April 1996). These developments of 1995–96 supplemented nuclear arms control successes of previous years, such as nuclear rollbacks or the signing of the NPT by Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and Ukraine.

In December 1996 calls for greater progress on the disarmament agenda were made by prominent military commanders. General Lee Butler, former Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), and then of the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) (successor to SAC), made a “direct public case for elimination as the goal, to be pursued with all deliberate speed.” Another “Statement On Nuclear Weapons By International Generals And Admirals” declared that “remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapons states and in de facto nuclear weapons states; long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.”

Nuclear arms control and disarmament were also prominent themes on the UN and CD agenda in 1995–96, partly because the fiftieth UN General Assembly sessions in 1995 coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of Hiroshima–Nagasaki, and also because of the commitments to work toward disarmament that the P-5 made at the NPT Extension Conference. Following the conference, the primary issue of contention between the P-5 and the nonaligned was whether the pace of nuclear disarmament was in keeping with commitments that the P-5
made at the conference. At the nonaligned summit in October 1995, the more than one hundred participating states declared that “the time has come for the entire stockpile of these deadly [nuclear weapons] to be destroyed once and for all” and further called for “the adoption of an action plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.”\(^{53}\) Reflecting this nonaligned perspective, the UN General Assembly passed a nonaligned-sponsored resolution calling for the nuclear states to “stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, stockpiling and production of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems” and to “carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons within a time-bound framework.”\(^{54}\) On December 12, 1995, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 50/65 by consensus, calling on the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a CTBT by the outset of the fifty-first session, which was to begin in September 1996.

Another important development concerning the test ban was President Clinton’s support for a zero-yield test ban, announced on August 11, 1995. This position reversed the prior U.S. stand on retaining the right to conduct low threshold nuclear tests. This announcement followed a report by U.S. scientists—the JASON report—which noted that subkiloton threshold tests were of marginal utility in maintaining the reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Although this U.S. concession gave a boost to the CTBT negotiations, the timing of Clinton’s announcement was diplomatically mishandled and alienated the United Kingdom and Russia.

Developments that hurt the credibility of the CTBT endeavor and caused an unexpectedly strong political fallout were nuclear tests by China and France.\(^{55}\) China conducted nuclear tests on May 15, 1995, August 17, 1995, and June 8, 1996, and then declared that it would conduct one additional test, which took place on July 29, 1996. France conducted six tests between September 5, 1995 and January 27, 1996. Japan’s characterizing of the tests as a “betrayal of the trust of nonnuclear states” who had, just a few days before the May 15 Chinese test, agreed to indefinite extension of the NPT, reflects the attitude of most nonnuclear states toward the issue. The diplomatic aftermath and strains on interstate relations were severe, and included UN resolutions condemning nuclear testing, trade sanctions imposed on France by Australia and South Pacific states, and cuts in aid to China undertaken by Japan. It should also be noted that President Jacques Chirac’s positive spin on this issue, by emphasizing that France would stop testing and that it was willing to conclude a CTBT in 1996, also facilitated continuing progress on the treaty at the CD.\(^{56}\)

The Nonaligned Perspective

New Delhi has long sought to transform the nonaligned movement into a voice for the nuclear “have-nots,” although by retaining its own nuclear option—a symbol of prestige and great power aspirations—New Delhi also tried to claim status as a potential nuclear “have” in an attempt to be viewed as a major player in world politics. The NPT Extension Conference’s conclusion with a gradual and incremental approach toward disarmament fell short of the expectations of many of nonaligned states including India, although other nonaligned states were more accepting of the outcome of the conference.

The nonaligned were, and continue to be, split on whether to seek a moderate, gradual, step-by-step approach to disarmament or to adopt a stronger position such as seeking a time-bound commitment toward disarmament. The former position is represented in the NPT Extension Conference’s “Principles” and favored by South Africa, Chile, occasionally other Latin American states, and Egypt. The latter position is usually taken by Mexico, Indonesia, Iran, and Nigeria.\(^{57}\) At the May 1995 Bandung nonaligned meeting just before the NPT Extension Conference’s conclusion, of the twenty nonaligned countries participating in NPT-related discussions, twelve (headed by Indonesia) supported fixed twenty-five-year extensions, and eight—including Singapore, Benin, Madagascar, and Tunisia—favored indefinite extension. Of the 112 nonaligned states as a whole, some sixty appeared to support indefinite extension at the Bandung conference;\(^{58}\) these numbers increased in the subsequent week during the conclusion of the NPT Extension Conference. New Delhi’s position shifted from the moderate stand in 1994 to the stronger perspective from mid-1995 onwards in response to the NPT Extension Conference as well as to domestic pressures.
India’s Position on the CTBT
Following the NPT Extension Conference

New Delhi’s stronger position against the CTBT is reflected in statements made at the Nonaligned Conference in Colombia (October 16–20, 1995), at Conference on Disarmament sessions where the CTBT was negotiated (the 1995 CD sessions took place from January 30–April 7, May 29–July 7, and July 31–September 22; the 1996 sessions were held between January 22–March 29, May 13–June 28, and July 29–September 13), at the United Nations (where the CTBT was introduced on September 9 and voted on September 10, 1996), and in the Indian Parliament. The following discussion reviews Indian declarations concerning the CTBT’s links to disarmament, the treaty’s scope and effect on curbing the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, the CTBT’s links to horizontal and vertical proliferation, its impact on Indian national security, and the treaty’s entry into force provisions and Indian sovereignty.

Disarmament

At the October 1995 nonaligned summit, Indian Prime Minister Rao deplored the fact that the extension of the NPT was undertaken “without even obtaining an expression of intent to eventually abolish all nuclear weapons” (October 1995 Cartagena statement, para 3). Referring to the NPT Extension Conference’s set of principles, Rao added that while the goals of achieving a CTBT and a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty were laudable, these treaties were also an opportunity to “obtain a commitment to universal and comprehensive nuclear disarmament.” In another October 1995 statement at the United Nations, New Delhi noted that it could not ignore the unconditional extension of the NPT which, in its opinion, perpetuated and legitimized the division of the world into nuclear haves and have-nots. This extension of the NPT without commitments to disarmament was a “serious development that is bound to impact on all disarmament negotiations, unless the nuclear weapon states commit themselves to further measures toward the elimination of their nuclear weapons within a time-bound phased program” (October 1995 UN statement, para 2). New Delhi stated that it recognized the significance of the progress made under U.S.–Russian nuclear arms control treaties, but that even after these reductions a large number of nuclear weapons remained with the nuclear states.

Earlier in a September 9, 1995, statement at the CD, New Delhi expressed similar concerns. It noted that the CTBT should be accompanied by a “sincere effort toward building a universal, comprehensive and nondiscriminatory disarmament regime” and that “the Preamble of the treaty will have to clearly define the linkage of the CTBT to the overall framework of nuclear disarmament.” Thus in 1995 New Delhi was still not directly calling for a time-bound disarmament program to be included in the CTBT, but it was placing the issue of disarmament high on the agenda, implying that seeking disarmament was just as important as halting nuclear tests.

New Delhi further clarified its position on the issue of disarmament through a number of statements made in 1996. In January 1996, it began indicating that if the CTBT did not contain a time-bound commitment to nuclear disarmament, then it would oppose the treaty, a position that many delegations feared would jeopardize prospects for attaining the treaty. Indian Ambassador Arundhati Ghose stated that the CD should start negotiations on a time-bound program for the elimination of nuclear weapons (January 1996 CD statement, para 9) and that India was committed to a CTBT that would “promote the universally enunciated goal of total nuclear disarmament” (para 11). The statement added that “to be meaningful, the Treaty should be securely anchored in the global disarmament context and be linked through treaty language to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework.”

In March 1996 at the CD, Indian Foreign Secretary Salman Haider noted that India, along with other G-21 states, had put forward a proposal calling for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament at the CD (March 1996 CD statement, para 8). Haider added that the next objective for the CD was not “the mere mechanical task of completing a [CTBT] text but the need to place the CTBT . . . in its proper context . . . as an integral step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time bound framework” (para 10).
In June 1996 when it stepped away from the CTBT, New Delhi noted that

We are concerned that any attempt to introduce substantive disarmament provisions in the treaty have been blocked . . . Weak and woefully inadequate preambular references to nuclear disarmament . . . cannot meet our concerns. We are only too aware that nonbinding references (to disarmament) in other treaties have been treated with complete disregard. How can we escape the conclusion that the nuclear weapon states are determined to continue to rely on nuclear weapons for their security and visualize the CTBT not as a serious disarmament measure but merely as an instrument against horizontal proliferation? (June 1996 CD statement, para 3).

In a plenary statement at the CD on August 20, 1996, New Delhi was clearer on the disarmament measures it desired. India’s representative Arundhati Ghose noted that the CTBT was intended to address the issues of both horizontal and vertical nonproliferation, but in its existing form only reinforced the ends of horizontal nonproliferation. This statement added that India sought to define the CTBT as the first step in the process of disarmament, but was not rigid about the specifics of the issue:

We were not seeking to prescribe a rigid time frame, which we realize requires detailed consideration. What we were seeking was a commitment which could have acted as a catalyst for multilateral negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a reasonable span of time (August 20, 1996, CD statement, para 7).

A similar point was made at the June 1997 Carnegie Conference in Washington, when Indian Ambassador to the United States Naresh Chandra stated that New Delhi recognized the considerable costs and time involved in attaining nuclear disarmament and therefore accepted that disarmament could be pursued at any given pace, as and when the financial resources became available—implying that the process itself could be flexible. Ambassador Chandra emphasized that the commitment to (rather than the pace of) disarmament was the key issue of concern for India. The above statements reveal that while New Delhi consistently indicated the necessity of time-bound commitments to disarmament, the specific time frame of the process was less important than a firm commitment to the process.60

Scope: The Effect of Banning Qualitative Development and Subcritical Nuclear Testing on Horizontal and Vertical Nonproliferation

New Delhi sought to address the issue of vertical nonproliferation through its above-mentioned position on disarmament and also through the inclusion of a wider scope for the CTBT. It noted that although “disarmament cannot be achieved while proliferation continues . . . nonproliferation cannot be an end in itself and loses moral credibility unless it is unambiguously linked to disarmament” (January 1996 CD statement, para 7). New Delhi added that it would seek to ensure that the disarmament agenda is not lost in a purely nonproliferation agenda (March 1996 CD statement, para 9). Before proceeding further, it would be useful to examine the CTBT’s impact in curbing horizontal proliferation and on vertical proliferation that leads to disarmament.

By bringing a halt to P-5 nuclear tests, the CTBT was restraining the growth of their nuclear programs and thus contributing to vertical nonproliferation. The extent to which P-5 nuclear weapons programs are constrained depends upon the scope of the CTBT. The banning of nuclear explosions—a zero-yield treaty, representing the maximum possible scope that could be verified under the monitoring system—would continue to permit, to a small degree, the qualitative improvement and further development of nuclear weapons through laboratory and subcritical tests. These tests may also be necessary for checking the safety and reliability of existing nuclear stockpiles. Addressing this issue, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director John Holum noted that “the safe maintenance of existing weapons designs is a far cry from the confident development of new ones” and further stated that the “CTBT’s fundamental effect is . . . to constrain the advancement of nuclear weapons capabilities by any country.”61 Holum added that under a zero-yield CTBT, several nuclear-weapon-related military projects and new nuclear programs would be severely constrained or abandoned, including directed energy weapons like the nuclear-explosion-pumped x-ray laser, the nuclear shotgun, enhanced electromagnetic pulse weapons, microwave weapons, and enhanced radiation weapons.

Other analysts note that while the nuclear states will continue to maintain their nuclear arsenals and that some states could possibly even modernize them under a CTBT, the treaty will also foreclose the use of a number of technologies by these states. Moreover, the treaty would create a norm against nuclear modernization and thereby reinforce other political efforts to restrict nuclear activities.62
India and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

A full-scope CTBT going beyond the zero-yield CTBT and banning subcritical and laboratory tests would further restrain nuclear weapons development, but compliance with a ban on subcritical and laboratory tests is hard to verify even with intrusive verification. Thus, even if a ban on tests is included in the CTBT, it is quite possible that a country could continue tests without these activities being detected.

The CTBT addressed the issue of horizontal proliferation by preventing all other states (the nonnuclear NPT signatories and the threshold states) from testing, and thereby curbing the development of these states’ nuclear weapon programs. The nuclear weapon options of all declared nonnuclear states (NPT signatories) are effectively checked by the NPT, so the CTBT is not absolutely necessary to further curb their nuclear options. The CTBT particularly affects the threshold states whose nuclear weapon options are not constrained by the NPT, but would be greatly, though not completely, contained under a test ban.

Ultimately, the extent to which a state’s nuclear program is constrained depends on its goals and ambitions. A state whose nuclear ambitions are limited to crude, first-generation Hiroshima-type nuclear weapons, which do not absolutely require nuclear testing, would be marginally affected by the CTBT. A state desiring more advanced nuclear weapons that require nuclear testing for their development would be greatly affected by the CTBT. In addition, the programs of the nuclear states that have collected data from prior tests and have alternative means of testing, such as computer simulations and subcritical tests, would be less restricted under a test ban.

India’s Stronger Position on Subcritical Testing

The first indications of a stronger Indian position on the CTBT’s scope came in June 1995, when New Delhi proposed that the scope of the CTBT should include prohibiting “any release of nuclear energy caused by the assembly or compression of fissile or fusion material by chemical explosive or other means.” This indicated India’s desire for a wider scope to include a ban on subcritical tests. In October 1995 at the United Nations, New Delhi noted that the CTBT, the proposed fissile material cutoff and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons were essential steps toward the process of disarmament, because of which “developing new warheads or refining existing ones after a CTBT is in place . . . would be as contrary to the spirit of CTBT as the NPT is to the spirit of nonproliferation” (October 1995 UN statement, para 6). India added that the CTBT’s scope should cover the complete cessation of nuclear tests. In January 1996 at the CD, New Delhi stated that just as the PTBT drove testing underground, it did not wish the CTBT to drive testing into laboratories. It therefore defined its objective to be a treaty which will bring an end to nuclear weapons development, not constrained by artificial limits on verification (January 1996 CD statement, para 13; emphasis added). This was the clearest Indian declaration on the difference between ending nuclear testing (a zero-yield CTBT) and completely halting all aspects of the development of nuclear weapons (by banning subcritical and laboratory tests).

In March 1996, New Delhi added that the technical limitations of verification technologies should not constrain efforts toward achieving a treaty that prohibited improvements or upgrades of nuclear weapons (March 1996 CD statement, para 5). India’s desire to broaden the CTBT’s scope, even though this would decrease prospects for verifiability, reversed India’s 1993 references to an “effective and verifiable” treaty. Indian negotiators felt that by early 1996, the balance between verification and scope had been lost, and because India’s human resources (negotiators) were limited, they opted to focus on the big picture, which related to scope, rather than on narrow issues concerning verification. An Indian statement at the CD on August 20, 1996, clearly explained that New Delhi sought a treaty that went beyond a ban only on nuclear explosions, because otherwise “technologies relating to subcritical testing, advanced computer simulation using extensive data relating to previous explosive testing and weapon related applications of laser ignition will lead to a fourth generation of nuclear weapons, even with a ban on explosive testing” (August 20, 1996, CD statement, para 8).

Linkage and the CTBT Preamble

Two points on the linkage between the CTBT, nuclear disarmament, and halting the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, should be noted. First, linkage jeopardized the attainment of a test ban, a view expressed by John Holum in January 1996:
Today’s threat to the test ban wears a benign face. It masquerades as even deeper devotion to arms control. The test ban, it has been suggested, should be linked to, if need be even sacrificed on the altar of, a time-bound framework for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons . . . [However,] holding one important goal hostage for another is a sure way to fail at both.67

Second, because the inclusion of an enhanced scope provision (involving prohibiting qualitative development) under the treaty’s main articles could cause verification and compliance ambiguities, key nonaligned states and the CD’s test ban committee chair (Netherlands Ambassador Jaap Ramaker) eventually pushed for such provisions in the CTBT preamble rather than in the main body of the treaty. Thus, largely reflecting the Indian statements of March 1996 seeking an end to the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons as an objective of the treaty (a position supported by the majority of G-21 countries but opposed by the United Kingdom, France, and the United States), the chair’s draft of May 28, 1996, contained the following preambular clause:

Convinced that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in all its aspects.68

On June 27, 1996, thirteen G-21 states submitted proposals calling for a stronger preambular commitment:

A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should end the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, thereby constituting an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in all its aspects . . . [and] that an end to all nuclear weapon tests explosions and all other nuclear explosions is an indispensable step towards the larger goal of a nuclear weapon free world and should be complemented by negotiations, to be conducted on a high priority basis, on comprehensive phased program with agreed time-frames for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery at the earliest possible time.69

This proposal was rejected by the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. New Delhi had by then declared that it was withdrawing from the CTBT and appeared to be less actively engaging nonaligned states in building a common front against the P-5 for such stronger preambular language on disarmament. However, New Delhi continued to work with the nonaligned in emphasizing the issue of disarmament outside the CTBT framework, through measures such as the nonaligned “Proposal for a program of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons,” which was submitted to the CD on August 7, 1996. This proposal called for the completion of a nuclear disarmament treaty by the year 2000, the entry into force of such a treaty and deep nuclear reductions in the period 2000–2010, and the elimination of nuclear weapons and the consolidation of a nuclear-free world in the period 2010–2020.70

June 1996: Introducing National Security,
New Delhi Steps Aside from the CTBT

In 1995 and early 1996, New Delhi’s position on the issues of disarmament and on seeking a ban on the qualitative development of nuclear weapons had not been linked with its national security considerations. As late as March 1996, New Delhi stated that “we do not believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is essential for [India’s] national security. . . . We are also convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons diminishes international security” (March 1996 CD statement, para 9). In contrast, in June 1996, New Delhi specifically linked the issues of disarmament and qualitative development to its national security considerations, and these were then cited as reasons for its decision to step away from the CTBT. In New Delhi’s June 20, 1996, CD statement, Indian Ambassador Ghose noted that the CTBT’s scope of banning nuclear weapon test explosions was too narrow, that nonbinding references to disarmament in other treaties had been treated with disregard, and that there was continuing talk of new doctrines and targeting strategies for nuclear weapons. Thus within and outside the framework of the CTBT, the P-5 had not committed to eliminating their nuclear weapons. The statement added that

Under such circumstances, it is natural that our national security considerations become a key factor in our decision-making. . . . Countries around us continue their weapon programs, either openly or in a clandestine manner. In such an environment, India cannot accept any restraints on its capability if other countries remain
unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons. . . (The CTBT) is not conceived as a measure towards universal nuclear disarmament and is not in India’s national security interest. India, therefore, cannot subscribe to it in its present form (June 1996 statement, para 7–8).

In summary, New Delhi cited two national security reasons for not signing the CTBT—first, that countries around India (a reference to China and Pakistan, although New Delhi did not directly specify these countries) continued their nuclear programs; and, second, that the CTBT was not a measure of disarmament and thereby permitted the declared nuclear powers to retain and make qualitative improvements to their nuclear weapons, which were suggested to be a source of security concern for India.

**Entry into Force, Sovereignty, and Procedural Issues**

India’s strongest objection to the CTBT was related to Article XIV, the EIF clause, which required forty-four nuclear-capable states (the list of states included India) to ratify the treaty before it entered into force and which New Delhi claimed violated its sovereignty. This objection arose after India had declared its intention not to sign the CTBT on June 20, 1996. The EIF provision in Article XIV appeared in the “take-it-or-leave-it” draft CTBT text introduced by the chair of the CD’s Test Ban Committee on June 28, 1996.

In general, a group of five states—United Kingdom, Russia, and China supported by Pakistan and Egypt—insisted that the CTBT should enter into force upon ratification by at least the P-5 and the threshold states. The rationale for this EIF criterion was that the treaty should encompass a core group, at least the nuclear states and also the threshold states, in order to be effective. Achieving universality or the inclusion of important states in nuclear arms control treaties was a prominent theme in 1995–97. For example, in their declarations at the NPT Extension Conference, many NPT member states indicated their desire for the NPT to be universal, thus implicitly calling upon nonsignatories, and often explicitly referring to the threshold states and especially Israel, to sign the treaty. A similar theme was manifest at the 1997 NPT PrepCom, where the nonaligned states noted that “the universality of the Treaty has become more important for the effective implementation of its provisions.” This statement further stressed the need for Israel’s inclusion in the NPT, but avoided references to nonaligned members India and Pakistan by noting that “with the exception of one country, all states in the Middle East region are parties to the NPT. It is therefore essential to call upon this country to accede to the Treaty.”

Thus a desire for the universality of nuclear arms control treaties is widespread. However, requiring universality or the participation of certain key states as a specific provision in a treaty text is a different issue; such provisions are sometimes found in treaties, but only if the states involved give their consent to this. Some observers noted that the United Kingdom’s and Russia’s insistence on their EIF formula, even after India declared that it would not sign the treaty, increased the likelihood that the treaty would not enter into force, and thereby indicated the sponsoring states’ lack of enthusiasm for the treaty. Another perspective is that China was most insistent on the EIF clause, especially because it considered itself to have already made concessions on the issues of verification and peaceful nuclear testing, and that the United Kingdom (assuming the role of a consensus facilitator) took the fall for the strong Chinese position. Although Russia’s CD statements do not indicate the reasons for its EIF position, United Kingdom, Pakistan, and China all clarified their stand through their CD statements.

The United Kingdom’s declared policy on this issue was:

The CTBT should be universal . . . [and] should not enter into force without the adherence of those countries who could potentially test a nuclear device . . . [because] the international community should not miss the opportunity to make a real contribution to non-proliferation and global stability by the establishment of a universal treaty.

Pakistan may have considered signing the CTBT even if India did not sign the treaty, a position that caused an internal debate on the issue in Pakistan. Eventually Islamabad stressed that all the eight nuclear-capable states—the P-5 and threshold states—should sign the CTBT before it entered into force, because:

A comprehensive test ban treaty can be effective and permanent only if it is accepted by all States. If one country tests, or retains the right to test, others whose security interests are affected cannot be expected to accept a one-sided restraint . . . unless each one of these eight States signs and ratifies the CTBT, a test ban will
not be comprehensive or sustainable. As we have said before: the CTBT is an all or nothing treaty. My delegation has thus adopted, from a former colonial power [the U.K.], the formula that the treaty should enter into force once it is ratified by 40 States including all the eight States. 76

China’s position on entry into force also stressed the need for all nuclear-capable states to be part of the CTBT:

The CTBT has two main objectives: to promote nuclear disarmament and to prevent nuclear proliferation. . . . Undermining either objective may affect the realization of the other. The accession of all nuclear-capable states to the treaty is the legal guarantee for the realization of the above-mentioned objectives. Therefore we support the formula whereby the CTBT shall enter into force after . . . ratification by all nuclear-capable States, as specified in a relevant IAEA list. 77

A majority of states in the Conference on Disarmament preferred a more flexible EIF because they did not want entry into force to be held hostage by, or delayed because of the nonsignature of, any particular state. The United States, most European Union (EU) states, Japan, Canada, and most of the G-21 held the view that a more flexible provision, combined with political pressure once the rhetoric against the CTBT in the Indian press had died down, would be more likely to deliver India’s future accession than imposing a structural condition in the treaty itself. 78 An opposing perspective was that political pressure had not resulted in the threshold states signing the NPT and was similarly unlikely to make India sign the CTBT. Eventually, because the treaty was largely finalized by June 1996, Washington did not want negotiations on any issue reopened, and therefore this rigid EIF provision remained in the treaty.

The June 28 draft was a follow-up to the chair’s May 28 draft (which New Delhi declared unacceptable on June 20) that was an attempt to force the pace of negotiations in order to ensure the timely completion of the CTBT. 79 The EIF provision in the May 28 draft represented a British suggestion that EIF should be contingent upon ratification by forty-seven states which hosted either a primary seismic station, or a radionuclide laboratory, that was part of the International Monitoring System. A revised Article XIV in the June 28 draft noted that forty-four nuclear-capable states would have to ratify the CTBT before it entered into force. India was (like the P-5 and other threshold states) on both lists—the thirty-seven-state list in the May 28 proposal, as well as the forty-four-state list of the June 28 draft. On June 26, New Delhi announced a withdrawal of its monitoring stations from the IMS network. This step would have removed India from the list of states with monitoring stations, and therefore would not have made the CTBT’s EIF contingent upon India’s ratification. Thus it would allow the treaty to enter into force (a measure which India desired) but would not require India to sign the CTBT for EIF. The June 28 draft text with a list of forty-four nuclear-capable states (including India) negated the above option, and thus forced New Delhi back into the treaty, by requiring it to ratify the CTBT for the treaty’s entry into force. New Delhi then opposed the June 28 draft far more strongly than the May 28 draft.

New Delhi’s position on Article XIV was elaborated upon in an August 8, 1996, statement at the CD. Ambassador Ghose stated that out of all its grievances with the CTBT, New Delhi’s strongest objections were to Article XIV. New Delhi noted that “the present text not only ignores our substantive objections but also contains an article, Article XIV, to which we have the strongest objections” (August 8, 1996 CD statement, para 4). It added that New Delhi had proposed an amendment to Article XIV with an alternative EIF formula that “would follow the precedent of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” with EIF upon “ratification by sixty-five states.” If Article XIV were not modified, India would oppose the treaty.

Spelling out more clearly why Article XIV violated Indian sovereignty, New Delhi noted:

After the Indian decision to not subscribe to the CTBT draft was announced on June 20, “the article on entry into force was modified . . . apparently at the insistence of a small number of countries with the clear aim of imposing obligations on India and placing it in a position in which it did not wish to be. Such a provision has no parallel. This procedure . . . has been perceived very negatively in our capital. . . . It is unprecedented in multilateral negotiations and international law that any sovereign country should be denied its right of voluntary consent on adherence to an international treaty (August 20, 1996, CD statement, para 10).

Besides the position that Article XIV violated Indian sovereignty, New Delhi had a further objection to this article. It interpreted Article XIV’s provisions as permitting the possible use of sanctions or other coercive measures against India. 80
In order to assuage India’s concerns regarding sovereignty and the issue of sanctions, the chair formally stated that Article XIV “did not impinge on the sovereign right of any State to take its own decision about whether or not to sign and ratify the treaty. Nor did [it] impose any legally binding obligations on a State not Party to the treaty—regardless of whether or not ratification by that State was a condition for entry into force of the treaty. Finally . . . article XIV, paragraph 2, did not refer to United Nations Security Council measures [such as sanctions] in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.” A number of states made similar statements in their declarations at the CD. Washington went further to address Indian concerns: Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in an August 8 letter to then Indian External Affairs Minister Gujral, clarified that the United States “does not interpret Article XIV as providing for the possibility of international sanctions against India,” and that Christopher’s assurances could be formalized through an exchange of notes. Gujral replied that a bilateral assurance (given by the United States to India) could not address New Delhi’s concerns because the CTBT was a multilaterally negotiated treaty. Gujral also noted that although the draft CTBT text was modified to meet China’s position on on-site-inspections, no consideration was given to modifying the CTBT text to meet India’s concerns about Article XIV. Essentially the above statements of clarification by various states that could have provided the Indian government with the necessary means to support the treaty may have come too late, because by early August the CTBT had become highly unpopular in India, as discussed later in this monograph.

Endgame: New Delhi Blocks the CTBT; The United Nations Adopts the Treaty

In July and August 1996, four points of controversy remained in the CTBT: the issues of on-site inspections (OSIs), peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), disarmament, and entry into force. Beijing was particularly concerned about the first two issues, while New Delhi opposed the EIF provisions. Eventually, the verification-OSI issue was resolved, as was the PNE issue. By then, the P-5 were largely engaged in talks with each other and did not enter into deeper dialogue with New Delhi. Conversely, it was unclear as to whether New Delhi would engage the P-5 such as by more comprehensively working with the nonaligned to extract concessions from the P-5 on the disarmament issue. On August 9, the chair of the CD’s ad hoc committee on the test ban presented his report to the CD, noting that continuing negotiations would not yield further results. The controversial Article XIV on EIF remained in the CTBT text for three main reasons. First, Washington did not want negotiations on any issue reopened because this would jeopardize the already reached agreements on other issues. Second, the weight of numbers counseled against modifying Article XIV—four states (Russia, U.K., China, Pakistan) insisted on retaining it, while one state (India) strongly opposed it. Third (and based on the above two reasons), the chair’s judgment was that the existing text was the only remaining alternative, given time constraints (the treaty was to be completed before September, when the fifty-first session of UN General Assembly opened) and that the treaty with its EIF provisions was accepted by at least the P-5.

When the CD considered adopting the CTBT on August 16, 1996, New Delhi and Tehran voted against this measure. India blocked the adoption of the CTBT and also the treaty’s attachment to the CD report forwarded to the United Nations. Thereafter, India and Iran blocked the passing of a truncated CD report without the CTBT text to the United Nations. Since the CD operates by consensus, this action effectively blocked further initiatives on the treaty at the CD.

India’s decision to block the treaty at the CD revolved around three points. First, the procedural aspects surrounding the EIF issue were unacceptable to New Delhi. The controversial EIF provisions were introduced on June 28, after India’s June 20 declaration that it would not subscribe to the CTBT draft text and its June 26 announcement of withdrawing its monitoring stations. Second, the substantive aspects of the EIF measures were also important grounds for New Delhi’s blocking the treaty. India’s UN representative Prakash Shah noted that, despite India’s decision not to subscribe to the treaty (its June 20 decision), it would have let the treaty go forward if the EIF provision, which was perceived as an attempt to restrain a voluntary sovereign right and enforce obligations on India without its consent, was excluded from the treaty (September 9, 1996 UN statement, para 10). Third, as mentioned in Gujral’s letter to Warren Christopher and in Gujral’s statements to the Indian Parliament, New Delhi noted that although the June 28 draft was assumed to be the final draft which could not be altered, concessions were in fact made in July 1996 to (partly) accommodate China’s position regarding on-site inspections, but no similar concessions were made on India’s alternative formula for EIF.
The CTBT was then forwarded by Australia to the UN General Assembly on August 22, 1996. A UN General Assembly resolution on the CTBT, cosponsored by 127 states, was passed on September 10, 1996. Prominent cosponsors included Britain, France, the United States, Israel, Kazakhstan, and South Africa. Although the nonaligned movement was underrepresented among cosponsors, some significant nonaligned cosponsors included Brazil, Colombia, Peru, the Philippines, and Venezuela. Russia and China withheld cosponsorship on the grounds that they did not want to endorse the “unprecedented process” of bypassing the CD. In the final vote, 158 states voted for the treaty, 3 voted against, and 5 abstained. India, Bhutan, and Libya voted against the treaty; Tanzania, Cuba, Syria, Lebanon, and Mauritius abstained. In addition, 19 countries including North Korea were diplomatically absent; of these, several cosponsors and Iraq were not permitted to vote because of serious arrears in payments to the United Nations. The treaty was opened for signature on September 24, 1996. It has been signed by 149 states, and ratified by 8, as of January 1998.

Many states signing the CTBT also expressed four important reservations: bypassing the Conference on Disarmament and taking the treaty to the United Nations should not set a precedent and should not be perceived as undermining the CD; the treaty’s entry into force remained a concern; the treaty was inadequate regarding the prohibition of nonexplosive testing and the prevention of qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons; and more progress was needed on nuclear disarmament. These concerns are best reflected in statements by Colombia and Canada. Colombia noted that “the Preamble to the treaty seems weak and not to reflect the importance attached by all parties to having a world free of nuclear weapons . . . the operative part mentions no definite time-frame to achieving that aim. It is not clear to us whether the treaty is to form part of a set of international norms leading to the total elimination of these weapons of mass destruction.” Canada stated that “we strongly believe a more progressive and dynamic reference to nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation should have been included in the preamble . . . we are even more concerned over the draft EIF provisions. Those provisions may result in a prolonged and serious delay in the treaty’s entry into force . . . on the other hand we remain committed to the best achievable CTBT.”

One final Indian reservation about the CTBT was that the treaty should have been adopted at the CD and not forwarded to the United Nations. New Delhi noted that this procedural move of forwarding the CTBT to the United Nations “erodes the standing of the Conference on Disarmament. . . . Treaties are made through voluntary agreements, not by procedural maneuver and political persuasion” (September 9, 1996, UN statement). New Delhi desired that the CTBT should have been passed at the CD, where India would have stepped aside and not blocked the treaty if it had not contained the sovereignty-violating Article XIV EIF provisions.
Domestic Politics

New Delhi made some impressive arguments against the CTBT in 1995–96. The question then arises as to why these were not made earlier. Domestic pressures were a major factor in New Delhi’s stronger position on the CTBT after mid-1995. Anti-CTBT rhetoric generated by political parties, and manifest in the Indian press, prevailing during election year (1995–96) and after India’s May 1996 elections made it hard for the Indian government—both the Congress government, and the postelection United Front government—to take a conciliatory stand on the CTBT. Nuclear issues, and defense and foreign policy issues in general, are of far less concern to the Indian public than economic issues; yet nuclear issues strike deep chords of nationalism and are linked to national security and sovereignty. Therefore, they can be easily politicized.

Four sources or components of domestic opposition to pro-CTBT approach should be briefly noted: political parties, the bureaucracy, a security community, and the press. Their role is manifest in the discussion that follows. Political parties seize any opportunity to politicize nuclear issues, largely to score political points. Sections of the foreign policy bureaucracy oppose steps to alter India’s long and principled opposition to the nonproliferation regime. A security community—analysts, academics, strategic thinkers—opposes diluting India’s nuclear option (some even argue for overt weaponization and are therefore against the foreign policy bureaucracy), in part because of security considerations over a Chinese threat. This community also remains concerned about U.S. hegemony in world politics, particularly after the display of U.S. military power in the Gulf War and U.S. diplomatic success at the NPT Extension Conference. The press serves to carry the voices of the security community often at the instigation of the bureaucracy, and selectively frames the nuclear debate in order to protect the status quo. Thus a more accommodating nuclear policy by any Indian government is criticized in the press. Political parties, especially the BJP, then make hawkish declarations, often citing the above press reports, that moderate nuclear policies are jeopardizing Indian national security; this causes the Indian governments to back away from accommodating policies.

It should also be clarified that only the right wing of the Indian political spectrum favors overt or formal weaponization; the center and left has not supported such a policy under most circumstances. Yet all Indian political parties oppose relinquishing the nuclear option. Opinion polls conducted in 1994 showed that 33 percent of the Indian elite favored overt nuclearization, while a further 57 percent supported New Delhi’s status quo nuclear policy of neither weaponizing nor relinquishing the nuclear option; 58 percent of this status quo opinion favored giving up the nuclear option if the declared nuclear states agreed to a time-bound disarmament framework. In other polls conducted in 1995–96, some 50 to 60 percent of the urban population expressed support for an Indian nuclear test, and 36 percent of the Indian population as a whole favored an overt nuclear weapons program.

Given this structure of public opinion, few Indian political leaders would risk appearing weak by showing conciliation toward the nonproliferation regime, especially at critical junctures such as during the run-up to an election or under a minority government whose future term in office is always uncertain. At other times, Indian governments can in fact stand up to the anti-nuclear regime lobby. In this regard, it should be noted that there was domestic opposition to New Delhi’s pragmatic nuclear policy of 1994 (two years before the Indian elections), but despite this, New Delhi persisted in supporting the CTBT until mid-1995. In 1993–94, New Delhi was enthusiastic about the CTBT, was considering attending the NPT Extension Conference as an observer, and had halted Agni missile tests in February 1994 and Prithvi tests after June 1994. These policies were criticized by opposition parties and analysts in the domestic press. For example, in March–April 1994, Indian newspapers highlighted the fact that India–U.S. talks held in London in preparation for Prime Minister Rao’s May 1994 visit to Washington were “secret talks.” Opposition members of parliament turned the heat on India’s Congress government by calling these talks a “disgrace and humiliation” and claiming that the government was bowing to U.S. pressure. One opposition member of parliament even went so far as to call for the cancellation of Prime Minister Rao’s visit to the United States.

Such statements put India’s Congress government on the defensive, prompting it to declare in Parliament that India would not make any compromise under pressure. Yet despite going on the defensive, the
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government was strong enough to maintain, and not reverse, its accommodating policies. Thus during the same time (in 1994) at the CD in Geneva, New Delhi remained enthusiastic about the CTBT. This suggests that the timing of the CTBT issue, and the strength and vulnerability of the government at different times, was important in explaining New Delhi’s ultimate opposition to the treaty. If the CTBT had been completed during 1994–95 when the government was less susceptible to domestic pressure because it had a majority in Parliament and did not have to face elections that year, New Delhi could have signed the CTBT. In election year 1995–96, the government was strong because of its majority, but nevertheless vulnerable because it could not afford to appear weak during election year; thus it may have been harder to sign the CTBT during that time. In the postelection period, if any party or coalition had a stable parliamentary majority, then New Delhi could have overcome domestic pressure, concentrated on negotiating the best possible CTBT, and signed such a treaty. Only when Indian governments (comprised of parties from the center and left of India’s political spectrum) were vulnerable to domestic pressure—the majority government in election year and a minority government after elections—did India back away from the CTBT. This pattern of strong centrist governments being able to support nuclear accommodation and weak centrist governments being forced away from accommodating nuclear policies was also manifest in the 1960s (Table 1).

Under Nehru’s leadership, India constrained its nuclear option by signing and ratifying the PTBT in 1963; this is significant because it came at a time when India faced serious security concerns, just after the Indian Army had been routed by Chinese forces in 1962. Following Nehru’s death and China’s nuclear test in 1964 (which was in no way directed at India, but nevertheless caused increased threat perceptions in New Delhi), the Indian nuclear program was moderately accelerated. This increase in nuclear activity was pushed upon a newly installed and initially weak leader—Shastri—who succeeded Nehru. Further, although a few Indian leaders were in favor of signing the NPT, India eventually backed away from this treaty by 1967–68, again at a time when a somewhat weak newly appointed prime minister—Indira Gandhi—was in office. Security considerations were important in New Delhi’s backing away from the NPT; yet the strength of New Delhi’s leadership (and its varying ability to stand up to domestic anti-NPT lobbies) also influenced Indian nuclear decision making in the 1960s.

New Delhi’s CTBT Stance: Gradual Escalation

Leading to Elections, Populism Following Elections

The NPT Extension Conference had domestic ramifications that partly explain New Delhi’s stronger stance on the CTBT after mid-1995. New Delhi had badly misjudged the outcome of the conference. In March 1995, an editorial in the Indian press noted that “fewer and fewer people are talking of unconditional extension . . . the United States may settle for twenty-five year extension in line with this reality.” This reflects the view held by New Delhi’s foreign policy community and security analysts, who were then shocked by the relative ease with which the NPT was extended. What was particularly disconcerting was that India’s nonaligned partners did not put up a stronger fight and that states such as South Africa, with whom India has strong ties, actively promoted

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<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Government Strength</th>
<th>Security Concerns</th>
<th>Nuclear</th>
<th>Approach Toward Nonproliferation Regime</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962–63</td>
<td>Strong (Nehru)</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Favor: signed PTBT (1963)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(1962 military rout by Chinese army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964–66</td>
<td>Weak (Shastri)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Assumed</td>
<td>Oppose: accelerated Indian nuclear program</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(China stayed out of 1965 India–Pakistan war)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967–68</td>
<td>Weak (Indira Gandhi)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Assumed</td>
<td>Oppose: anti-NPT</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Strong (Congress majority)</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Diminished</td>
<td>Favor: pro-CTBT</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Strengthened Indian conventional forces)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Weak (UF minority)</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Diminished</td>
<td>Oppose: anti-CTBT</td>
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a consensus toward an indefinite extension. This “defeat” caused New Delhi’s longstanding opposition to the NPT to be transferred to the CTBT.

Immediately following the NPT Extension Conference, nuclear tests by China and the announcement of renewed testing by France provided India’s security community and bureaucracy with the necessary ammunition to recover lost ground. On the Chinese test, an editorial in the Indian press noted:

The test underlines the hypocrisy of the nuclear powers and their hype on how the treaty would prevent the spread of atomic weapons. . . . Such cynical manipulation by nuclear powers of the NPT lends credence to this country’s oft repeated stand that the treaty would remain discriminatory. . . . Under the circumstances, those who participated at the recent NPT conference have little moral authority to give lectures to this country about an international imperative to fall in line with the treaty.98

A second commentary stated that

The NPT conference was only a sideshow or at best a public relations exercise in as much as [China’s and France’s] hard decisions had already been taken to carry on with testing. This fully justifies India’s decision not to participate in the NPT Extension Conference. India’s opposition is not to the nonproliferation clauses of the NPT but its discriminatory character. India favors a time-bound nondiscriminatory disarmament agreement.99

A September 1995 seminar in New Delhi concerning “External Pressures on India’s Nuclear Options,” attended by Indian strategic thinkers and some government officials, recommended that in the post-NPT extension situation, India should oppose the CTBT and FMCT unless they were part of a time-bound framework for disarmament. The seminar also suggested that even if India did not resume nuclear testing, it should continue the development of its missile program.100

India’s stronger stance on the CTBT may also be explained by the fact that, as noted earlier, Indian political parties could hardly afford to appear weak during the 1995–96 election year. Thus India’s tougher stand in October 1995 at the nonaligned meeting and at the United Nations appears to be the first of a series of steps signaling that the Congress party was holding firm on India’s nuclear option. Some two months later, a December 15, 1995, New York Times article indicating that India was preparing for a nuclear test may have spurred New Delhi to take an even harder line on the CTBT.101 Although the Indian government denied any intentions of testing, some activity was taking place in the Rajasthan desert around India’s 1974 nuclear test site.102

Eventually, no Indian nuclear test actually took place; the threat of sanctions was one factor restraining the Indian government from proceeding with a nuclear test.103 Nevertheless, in subsequent months, the Indian government took a tougher stand on the CTBT. In its January 1996 and March 1996 declarations at the CD, New Delhi called for including a ban on the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in the CTBT and for linking the CTBT to a time-bound disarmament framework. This tough position, and the 1995–96 nuclear test preparations, conveyed the message domestically that the Congress government was not conceding ground on India’s nuclear option. The nuclear test preparations may also have been intended as a signal to the international community that excessive pressure would cause India to toughen its stand and proceed with testing—there was in fact some reduction of U.S. “pressure” on India in 1996.

India’s strongest opposition to the CTBT, and the most intense politicization of the CTBT issue domestically, was manifest during and after the April–May 1996 elections.104 These elections resulted in a succession of governments: the Congress before the May 1996 elections, the BJP between May 18–31, and then a United Front (UF) minority coalition from June 1 onwards.

The BJP prominently raised the CTBT issue in the run-up to elections. In its pre-election manifesto of April 7, the BJP declared that it supported the Congress government’s attempts to link the CTBT with firm and detailed disarmament commitments. On April 20, BJP leader Atal Behari Vajpayee stated that his party would deploy the Prithvi and Agni missiles and that “the BJP stands committed to a nuclear-free world but it rejects the very concept of nuclear apartheid. In fact, my government will exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons as a deterrent.”105 On May 15, just before assuming office as prime minister, Vajpayee stated that “no country should have nuclear weapons . . . [but] if nuclear bombs get piled up in some countries, then we will
take whatever measures [that are] necessary for our defense.” On May 20, Defense Minister Pramod Mahajan (in the BJP government) declared that “our party manifesto says that after studying the defense needs of the country, we will exercise the nuclear option.”

Not to be outdone by the BJP rhetoric, the UF government’s first general policy statement on June 5, 1996, noted that it would continue to work for universal disarmament and that India had the right to retain the nuclear option until this goal is achieved. Ultimately, all political parties jumped on the anti-CTBT bandwagon and thus appeared unified, at least in their opposition to a treaty that did not go far enough on the disarmament issue. This apparent domestic unity meant that as they pursued negotiations at the CD, the Indian bureaucracy did not encounter contradicting positions from different political parties. Later that month, in its June 20, 1996, CD statement, New Delhi indicated that it was stepping away from the CTBT because of national security considerations. At this time, the more populist security and sovereignty issues were introduced into New Delhi’s CD statements. These issues represented an attempt to speak to a domestic constituency and were thereby intended to mobilize the Indian public against the CTBT and gain domestic support in the face of India’s increasing isolation at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The Indian press and polity did not immediately or excessively bandwagon with the security issue (that was introduced on June 20), nor did they highlight any serious concerns about nuclear-related security threats from Pakistan or China. It was the sovereignty issue (that arose in response to the EIF clause introduced on June 28 in the CTBT text) that gave rise to the most intense anti-CTBT rhetoric in India.

Finally, at a time of domestic political uncertainty caused by changing governments and ultimately a weak minority government, India’s bureaucracy assumed prominence in shaping India’s approach to the CTBT. In general, Indian foreign policy making is dominated either by senior political leaders or by the bureaucracy. The prime minister or foreign minister broadly outlines the general contours of foreign policy. The bureaucracy—mainly the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), but also the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Intelligence Agencies—implements policy. Bureaucracies are by nature more permanent and specialized institutions, while ministers and governments keep changing. Bureaucrats also consider themselves to be defenders of the national interest and oppose government initiatives that disturb the status quo, such as those which seek to reverse India’s longstanding objections to the nonproliferation regime. In mid-1996, in the absence of a stable government, the more permanent bureaucracy influenced by the security community assumed prominence in framing India’s CTBT stand.

Thus by mid-1996, the CTBT had become domestically unpopular under the influence of anti-CTBT remarks by political parties and hostile press coverage, which was itself fueled by sections of the government and bureaucracy. The weak UF coalition risked political losses if it supported the resulting domestically demonized CTBT—it actually benefited from public and parliamentary support when it was seen as opposing the unpopular CTBT and thus upholding India’s security and sovereignty. Foreign Minister Gujral (who, under calmer or more stable political circumstances, could have favored the CTBT) was left with the immediate task of damage control, in which he was successful. Gujral’s diplomatic skills limited the damage to India’s ties with other states resulting from New Delhi’s anti-CTBT stand.

The CTBT Debate in the Indian Press

The CTBT debate in the Indian print media contained a few arguments favoring the CTBT juxtaposed alongside more voluminous anti-CTBT opinion. For example, on the pro-CTBT side, a letter stated that New Delhi “must firmly resist hawkish pressure to move toward exercising the nuclear option . . . New Delhi must discharge the moral and political responsibility it assumed in 1954 by securing a good CTBT through a constructive, consensual approach.” Another article emphasized that “our strategic experts—who cannot be credited with a single original idea—have been spreading disinformation.” A deeper reading of some Indian press articles even suggested that the CTBT might benefit rather than jeopardize India’s security. Commentary by former Army Chief General K. Sundarji suggested in passing that “it is in [India’s] interest if an effective CTBT is in place even if it is flawed,” because the CTBT had halted further development of the nuclear programs of “China, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, Central Asian states, and North Korea.” This commentary added that just because the CTBT is in the interests of the West or the United States, does not alter
the fact that the CTBT is also beneficial to India. The above nuanced analysis is contained in the fine print of articles that appear on op-ed pages and are read by, and of interest to, a relatively small group of analysts and scholars that closely follow nuclear issues. The broader news reading Indian public (like that in any other country) is less likely to read op-eds. Further, may not easily understand the technical details of an argument on nuclear issues or may lack the background knowledge or context within which to place these issues. On the other hand, they can easily understand and consequently are more influenced by headlines and article titles.

If one analyzes the front pages and headlines of Indian press articles that largely framed the issue for most of the Indian public, a somewhat different pattern emerges (see Table 2 and Appendix D). Most headlines framed the CTBT as being a measure of U.S. pressure on India. Others suggested that India was being blackmailed and highlighted the need to preserve sovereignty in the face of this external pressure. Another set of headlines reinforced New Delhi’s official position by suggesting that the CTBT was deficient, or diverted attention from India’s isolation by noting that Pakistan was not signing the treaty. Only a few headlines were conciliatory and indicated that the CTBT should be given further consideration.

On the issue-framing aspect, one should also note that no mention was made, in either the pro- or anti-CTBT articles, of India’s support for the CTBT in 1993–94. Further, the domestically appealing anti-U.S. perspective was prominent in the Indian press while criticism of other states was muted. For example, only the occasional editorial noted that Russia, the United Kingdom, and China (rather than the United States) were behind the EIF clause of Article XIV, which India so strongly opposed.116 There was little reporting of statements by Russia strongly warning India against nuclear tests.117 Moreover, no indication was ever made of the fact that the CTBT was part of a process called for under the NPT Extension Conference’s set of principles—rarely is anything positive mentioned about the NPT in the Indian press.

At other times, a similar trend in issue framing has been manifest in the Indian press. The Indian broadcast media—radio and television—which are the news sources for much of the Indian population, are voices for the state and never mention the positive aspects of the nonproliferation regime (it should be noted that private TV channels and the internet are emerging as alternative news sources but their overall impact on the nuclear debate has been minimal).118 The Indian press is far more autonomous and has no qualms about aggressively confronting the government on most issues, including nuclear issues—such as domestic nuclear issues related to the safety aspects and environmental consequences of India’s nuclear program. Yet the press has also been reluctant to disturb the status quo on (and thus tilted toward the Indian bureaucracy’s standard policy on) the Indian nuclear option and the NPT issue.119 Therefore, while the Indian press has offered a slightly broader debate in op-ed pages, it nevertheless persists in screening and selectively framing nuclear issues, such as the CTBT debate noted above. This is manifest by exaggerating populist anti-U.S. perspectives in article headlines; by neglecting arguments that the NPT contributes to international security; and by leaving the Indian public in the dark about nuclear rollbacks in other countries as well as international support for the NPT, and India’s consequent international isolation on nonproliferation issues (see also Appendix D). Such selective press and media coverage has resulted in the Indian polity’s “socialization” on nuclear issues along the lines noted above—the Indian public therefore rarely questions (and consequently is in favor of) New Delhi’s longstanding position on the NPT (and thereafter on the CTBT). When nuclear issues are excessively politicized in the Indian press and opposition members of parliament then cite these press reports to pressure the government against

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<td>Victory for U.S., Splendid Isolation for India</td>
<td>U.S. vs India contest</td>
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<td>Blackmail</td>
<td>H, 7/23/96</td>
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<td>Sovereignty, independence</td>
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<td>Flawed Treaty</td>
<td>Deficient treaty</td>
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<td>Diversion to Pakistan</td>
<td>IE, 9/11/96</td>
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<td>Why India Must Think again on the CTBT</td>
<td>Conciliation</td>
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Sources: TI: Times of India; IE: Indian Express; H: Hindu; P: Pioneer.
concessions on nuclear policy, it also becomes harder for pro-regime groups in the bureaucracy and government to pursue an accommodating nuclear policy.

### Comparing Chemical Weapon, Missile and Nuclear Issues: Factors behind the Politicization of Nuclear Issues

In the mid-1990s, the Indian government showed some degree of moderation on a number of national security issues—nuclear, chemical weapons, the Indian missile program, and defense budgets, which have been steadily declining as a proportion of GNP over the past decade. India’s defense budget was $6.5 billion (which is 3.5 percent of India’s GNP) in 1985, $8.2 billion (2.9 percent of GNP) in 1994 and $10 billion (2.54 percent of GNP) in 1998. However, chemical, missile and defense budget issues were less politicized and did not result in even a fraction of the debate that was generated by the CTBT.

On the missile issue, no Prithvi missile tests took place for a twenty-month period in 1994–95. Following the thirteenth Prithvi test in June 1994 (immediately after Prime Minister Rao’s return from Washington), Prithvi tests were halted until January 27, 1996, partly for technical reasons. Yet throughout 1994–95, domestic lobbies argued that the freeze in Prithvi activity was a sign that New Delhi was succumbing to U.S. pressure. In another step toward moderation, on December 5, 1996, just as the CTBT debate was stirring up, New Delhi announced the suspension of the Agni program. This decision was opposed by an All-Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense, which in April 1997 urged the Indian government to take the Agni program to its “logical conclusion.” Op-ed pieces in the Indian press also routinely called for the government to reverse its decision. Yet New Delhi could pay less attention to (and indeed had frequently ignored) domestic criticism of its missile policy, especially because there was no risk of losing political ground on this issue. Missile issues do not have the broader public appeal and support that is found in the case of nuclear issues.

A similar situation is manifest in India’s chemical weapons declaration. India is one of only ten states, as of mid-1998, to have declared their former or existing chemical weapons production facilities. (The others being Belgium, Britain, China, France, Italy, Japan, the United States, Russia, and South Korea—the latter three and India have also declared plans for the destruction of their chemical weapon stockpiles.) In June 1997, India unilaterally declared the contents of its small experimental chemical research activity as required by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). (Pakistan called the Indian declaration “very serious and disturbing” and within Pakistan opposition emerged on the issue of ratifying the CWC.) This Indian declaration was significant because it was made at a time when Pakistan had not even ratified the CWC (this finally occurred in October 1997), much less made any declaration on its chemical weapons program. If one follows the reasoning behind the politicization of India’s nuclear and CTBT debate, then India’s chemical weapons declaration would have been politicized and criticized by Indian politicians as jeopardizing India’s security versus Pakistan. Yet no such opposition arose, and all major political parties supported this decision, or at least have not publicly opposed it. Statements by India’s defense and foreign affairs ministries noted that New Delhi supports “nondiscriminatory” treaties such as the CWC, while some commentaries in the Indian press noted that India had lost credibility through its chemical weapons declaration.

There is little evidence as to why the above issues, which are just as important to Indian national security as nuclear issues, do not come close to the CTBT and nuclear debate in striking a responsive chord with Indian politicians, the bureaucracy, and the Indian public. Only territorial issues, particularly Kashmir, appear to mobilize Indian politicians and the public to the same extent as nuclear issues. Therefore, making concessions on nuclear issues or on Kashmir is much harder for any Indian government. A number of reasons may explain this phenomenon—bureaucratic politics, symbolism and nationalism behind India’s nuclear program, real security needs and an insecurity syndrome related to China’s nuclear program, and public apathy and ignorance. These are discussed below.

First, bureaucratic politics and a nuclear lobby partly explain the politicization of nuclear issues. In this regard, India’s bureaucracy and security analysts find common ground with some of India’s nuclear scientists in opposing the nonproliferation regime. The Indian nuclear establishment has many reasons to oppose the CTBT. One analyst notes that, in recent years, the establishment’s pride and credibility have suffered from reduced public investment in nuclear power and increased doubts about the safety, efficiency, and affordability of the
civilian nuclear industry. Others note that the Indian nuclear establishment would have no incentive to proceed with its work if India signed the CTBT. Thus opposing the CTBT represented a public relations opportunity for the nuclear establishment.

It should be clarified that the Indian nuclear establishment, which includes some 20,000 technicians and scientists, is diverse. One component of this establishment is a small group of a few hundred highly trained research scientists, most holding advanced or doctoral degrees in nuclear science or other natural sciences, who are based at research centers such as BARC. This group would naturally work on theoretical and technical issues such as weapons design related to India’s nuclear option. Their research would be curtailed if India gave up its nuclear option, and their skills are not easily transferable to the nuclear energy sector although they could move to other general scientific research institutes. Another component of the Indian nuclear establishment is the larger number of nuclear technicians and managerial staff, many of whom hold no more than basic bachelor’s degrees, operating India’s nuclear reactors. It should also be noted that while a few senior nuclear scientists have secured access to the political arena, and thereby have been able to influence nuclear decision making, most Indian scientists are largely concerned with the technology and not the politics of their work. Indian scientists did not figure prominently in the press debate on the CTBT.

A second underlying reason for the politicization of nuclear issues is that India’s nuclear program has been regarded as a representation of its independence, sovereignty, and great-power potential. An indigenous nuclear program is prestigious because it has long been regarded as a display of India’s technical prowess and symbolically signifies India’s leadership among developing nations and in the world community (although this notion is outdated given the new worldview on proliferation, the Indian elite continue to maintain it). Further, technological autonomy is seen as essential for maintaining economic independence (which New Delhi sought to acquire through socialist economic policies until 1991), which in turn is a natural follow-up to political independence. Thus the nuclear program is strongly tied with Indian sovereignty and independence, and whenever New Delhi opposes global treaties such as the NPT and the CTBT (treaties that appear to take away or constrain India’s nuclear weapons option), this opposition is viewed as preserving or upholding Indian sovereignty. Issues related to sovereignty are easily politicized, and nuclear issues such as the CTBT are no exception.

A third explanation for nuclear politicization may be found in the fact that India’s political community and its public have had a three-decade-long period of socialization on the official, largely all-party and cross-national, anti-NPT perspective as discussed above. This perspective excessively and solely highlights the fact that the global nuclear regime is discriminatory because it draws a line between nuclear haves and have-nots, but neglects to recognize the merits of the nonproliferation regime. Consequently, the anti-NPT anti-nonproliferation regime perspective is deeply rooted in the Indian national psyche and stirs up an emotional response more easily than other national security issues.

On this issue, three points should be noted. First, for a long time New Delhi was hardly isolated in its opposition to the NPT. Other states—in particular, France, China, Argentina, and Brazil—also objected to the NPT on account of its discriminatory nature and, therefore, did not sign the treaty. Thus India’s objections that the NPT was discriminatory were very similar to those made by Argentina, which noted that “from the very beginning we [Argentina] rejected the Nonproliferation Treaty because of its discriminatory character, since, for the first time in history, it legitimized a division of the world into two categories: countries which can do anything as regards nuclear affairs and countries which have their rights curtailed.” Yet in the 1990s, the above states have diminished their ideological opposition (which was often sustained by entrenched bureaucracies) to the NPT and signed this treaty in recognition of its nonproliferation benefits. The world-view of the 1990s is best reflected in a NAM statement noting that “members of the Nonaligned Movement are conscious of the reality that the treaty is a key international instrument in stemming both vertical and horizontal proliferation.” Large sections of the Indian foreign policy and security community and the Indian media and elites have been slow to recognize the prevailing global recognition of the NPT’s merits. Some deliberately ignore this development; others simply remain unaware of the issue because their main news source, the Indian media, has not covered the pro-NPT worldview of the 1990s.

Second, New Delhi’s arms control bureaucracy has shown some consistency on this issue: it supported a nondiscriminatory Chemical Weapons Convention. Yet besides the arms control bureaucracy, other
bureaucracies in New Delhi are less concerned about signing discriminatory treaties. New Delhi has signed another “discriminatory” treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, which allows only states having a presence in Antarctica to sign the treaty, thus discriminating against developing countries who cannot afford and may never be able to establish such a presence. India sent a scientific expedition to Antarctica in 1983 and then signed the treaty.

Third, the politicization of and bureaucratic opposition to the reversal of longstanding policies was hardly restricted to Indian nuclear policy, but was also manifest in economic policy. In the 1960s–80s, economic reforms generally mandated by the United States, the IMF, or the World Bank, were viewed as threatening national sovereignty (not just in India but almost all other states). Consequently, reforms had to be undertaken by stealth in the hope that they would not be noticed and politicized to the detriment of the government. Yet in the 1990s, reforms are introduced in a very public way, and every time the Indian government runs into political trouble, it reacts by announcing more economic liberalization rather than drawing back. The reversal of economic policy demonstrates that another longstanding policy—India’s nuclear policy—has a fair chance of being moderately adjusted if not radically altered. On the issue economic of reforms, the shift was top-down rather than bottom-up, in the sense that the Indian leadership was ahead of the bureaucracy and public opinion in leading the policy change. The recognition by India’s political leaders of a changed international economic order was instrumental in causing the shift in India’s economic policy. Similarly, perceptions among the Indian bureaucracy and security community about a changed world view on proliferation, and a different world order where power and international status rest on economic rather than military might, could become a key factor shaping a shift in nuclear policy and attitude toward the nonproliferation regime. However, by 1998 such a shift was not consolidated as the BJP placed what it perceived to be “security” (achieved through nuclear testing) before economic considerations (such as economic losses incurred due to sanctions).

Security Issues—Pakistan and China

The above discussion leads to a fourth reason for India’s desire to retain its nuclear option and the consequent opposition to relinquishing this option—a combination of real security needs and an insecurity syndrome. These arise from the perceptions of a security threat from China’s and Pakistan’s nuclear programs and strong Pakistan–China ties that include nuclear and missile technology transfers from China to Pakistan. The Chinese threat is magnified by an insecurity syndrome that stems from India’s defeat at the hands of China in the 1962 India–China war and from a continuing (though dormant and de facto resolved) border dispute with China. Further, the fact that China is strengthening its ties with Burma causes additional fears among New Delhi’s security community that India is being surrounded by a Chinese threat.

Theoretically speaking, the issue of Islamabad’s nuclear program, including any technology that Pakistan receives from China, could have long been resolved in a rather straightforward manner through the NPT itself or via a regional nuclear-free zone. Both of these arrangements would involve mutual inspections of Indian and Pakistani nuclear facilities to account for all nuclear material and imported technology, thus ensuring both states that their neighbor has not diverted nuclear materials toward a weapons program. This simple and yet very effective logic of reciprocal restraint from nuclear weapons activity, backed by inspections to verify compliance, has provided for the security of a large number of states under the NPT regime. Yet New Delhi did not subscribe to a nuclear free zone on the grounds of a perceived security threat from China.

One damaging consequence of India’s (and consequently Pakistan’s) staying out of the NPT or a nuclear-free zone throughout the 1970s–80s was that New Delhi thereby lost its best chance to curb Pakistan’s nuclear program and thus maintain strategic superiority (based on its conventional armed force advantage) over Islamabad. In the 1990s, Pakistan has acquired a nuclear capability to counter India’s conventional force advantage and has therefore comes close to strategic parity with India. This situation has somewhat diminished Indian security by allowing a weaker neighbor to become strategically equal, thereby giving it greater confidence in its ability to confront India on issues such as Kashmir. In the net analysis, the costs to India of such diminished security versus Pakistan should be weighed against any security benefits from its nuclear option that India derives against China.

The Chinese factor in Indian security planning should be more closely examined. It appears that China’s nuclear status, rather a Chinese conventional threat, is of most concern to India’s political community. This is demonstrated by the fact that, despite the Indian Army’s rout at the hands of China in the 1962 war, New Delhi...
(both Nehru and the Indian Parliament) had no reservations about signing the partial nuclear test ban treaty (PTBT) in 1963. India was the first country to ratify this treaty after its Parliament approved ratification within a week of the PTBT’s opening for signature. Indeed, one may argue that even if the PTBT had in fact been a comprehensive test ban, India’s position would not have changed and India would also have signed and ratified such a treaty. It was only after the Chinese nuclear test of 1964 that India’s political community became more concerned about China. The Chinese test was followed by an intense parliamentary debate in 1964 on pursuing the nuclear option, the moderate acceleration of India’s nuclear program, and India’s staying out of the NPT in 1967–68.

Generally speaking, India faced important security concerns about China in the 1960s–70s. At the same time, India also enjoyed the support of a nuclear superpower, the Soviet Union, to counter China. In the 1990s, this comforting Cold War framework and the Soviet nuclear umbrella has disappeared. On the other hand, the nature and seriousness of the Chinese threat also diminished for a number of reasons.

First, Beijing has unconditionally given a nuclear no-first-use guarantee to all states; therefore, India does not directly face (and actually has never encountered) a declared Chinese nuclear threat. Second, Sino–Indian relations have considerably improved in recent years, and the two states have reached a de facto understanding on their disputed border through the 1993 Treaty of Peace and Tranquillity. This treaty notes that, pending an ultimate solution on their disputed boundary, both states will respect and observe the line of actual control. A follow-up treaty in 1996 reaffirms that both countries will not use or threaten to use force against the other or seek unilateral military superiority. Third, New Delhi retains (and has de facto steadily been increasing the size of its) virtual nuclear deterrent against China, because its nuclear infrastructure is not affected by signing the CTBT or FMCT. In a worst-case scenario given the deterioration of Sino–Indian relations, New Delhi could establish a credible nuclear deterrent based on technology and material borrowed from its civilian nuclear and space programs. A number of other states, for example Japan and Sweden, retain similar virtual deterrents based on their civilian nuclear infrastructure. Fourth, India has a relatively strong military that could counter a conventional military threat from China. Further, Indian air and space assets can detect Chinese troop and armor movements days in advance, and thus India would never be surprised by a Chinese military attack. Indian armed forces would always have time to position themselves to counter a very unlikely military attack from China.

Finally, it should be noted that New Delhi’s case is not unique. A number of nonnuclear states live in the shadow of China’s and Russia’s nuclear arsenal; these nonnuclear states also have border disputes with, and long-term security concerns about, their nuclear neighbors. However, most of these states have not sought nuclear programs. For example, although there are some differences across the cases, the basic structural nuclear asymmetry between India and China is similar to that between Vietnam and China or Ukraine and Russia. And yet Ukraine has actually given up its nuclear weapons, while Vietnam never sought them.

In short, especially since the mid-1990s, India has not faced a serious military or nuclear threat from China. In the long-term, it remains possible that Sino–Indian relations may deteriorate, that their border understanding may unravel, and that India may get embroiled in the Tibet issue. Some 100,000 Tibetans reside in India, and in case of a Chinese crackdown in Tibet, more Tibetans could cross the border and engage in anti-Chinese activity from Indian territory, greatly complicating Sino–Indian relations. These possible sources of future tension, added to the basic structural nuclear asymmetry and perceptions that India is surrounded by (and could one day face a threat from) not only China but also a Chinese-backed Pakistan and Burma, give rise to long-term strategic concerns. These concerns are (at least for India’s political right and its security community) far stronger than the security-enhancing Sino–Indian confidence-building measures (CBMs) that have been undertaken in the mid-1990s primarily by governments comprising India’s political center.

Ultimately, security policy is based on perceptions of a threat rather than the substantive existence of a threat. Thus it is the perceptions of a future Chinese threat that give rise to an insecurity syndrome and a desire to retain the nuclear option in New Delhi, but not in other states with nuclear neighbors, states such as Vietnam, Ukraine, or Sweden. In the Indian press, the normalization in Sino–India relations has largely been ignored, and the 1993 and 1996 Sino–India CBMs received very little coverage. Only the occasional article noted improvements in Sino–Indian relations, for example observing that China’s recognition of Indian sovereignty over the Indian state of Sikkim is “an indication that India can look forward to the dividends of last
year’s agreement. . . . This will not mean the removal of all irritants in Sino-Indian relations but the benefits of narrowing down differences cannot be overemphasized.\textsuperscript{139} The security threat actually has different meanings for different sections of the Indian population. The Chinese threat is of greater concern to India’s defense ministry and security analysts than it is for the Indian foreign affairs bureaucracy. The average Indian is far more concerned about Pakistan than about China.\textsuperscript{140} These differences in threat perception and the technical arguments concerning security—such as the fact that the CTBT hardly jeopardizes Indian security vis-à-vis either Pakistan or China—become inconsequential when political leaders and the press raise the bogey of a nebulous threat to score political points. Thus, whenever political leaders make statements to the effect that “if nuclear bombs get piled up in some countries, then we will take whatever measures necessary for our defense” (BJP leader Vajpayee’s May 15 1996 speech) and New Delhi takes the populist line that it cannot sign the CTBT because “countries around us continue their weapon programs, either openly or in a clandestine manner” (India’s June 20, 1996, CD statement), these statements have considerable domestic appeal, especially because no prominent political leader challenges them. The first major public challenge of the security issue by leading Indian political leaders arose following India’s nuclear tests of 1998, and is discussed in a later section of this monograph.

U.S. Nuclear Rhetoric

Our discussion of the CTBT debate in the Indian press revealed that India’s reference point on the CTBT issue in 1996 was the United States and not its apparently threatening neighbors. The Indian press inaccurately cast the CTBT as a U.S.-versus-India contest. The anti-U.S. line is taken largely because it has a broadly popular appeal, but the tendency to frame the global nonproliferation regime in hegemonic terms is partly also the result of New Delhi’s prior experience with the United States. The fact that nuclear issues are invariably raised by Washington during bilateral India–U.S. dialogues is objected to by New Delhi’s policy makers and receives negative publicity in the domestic press. For example, one news report stated that a 1992 meeting between Indian Prime Minister Rao and U.S. President George Bush was “needlessly soured by the U.S. insistence that India accept either the NPT or Pakistan’s proposition inviting the nuclear powers arbitration in India–Pakistan differences on proliferation. . . . America is currently enforcing Pax Americana in the Southern Hemisphere.”\textsuperscript{141} Conversely, when states downplay nuclear issues in their talks with New Delhi, this draws a positive response. For example, during official visits to India in 1993, the heads of state of Britain and Russia did not publicly call upon India to sign the NPT, while Germany noted that its ties with India would not be affected if India did not sign the NPT. These positions were all received positively in the Indian press.\textsuperscript{142} Similarly, the fact that nuclear issues were downplayed during Prime Minister Rao’s May 1994 U.S. visit, where the focus was more on trade and the need for a warmer bilateral relationship, was also well received.\textsuperscript{143}

Washington had actually somewhat changed its nonproliferation objectives for South Asia. In April 1993, the Clinton administration’s report to Congress outlined that its goals were to “cap, then reduce over time, and finally eliminate weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery from the region.” This more pragmatic emphasis on capping was a departure from the earlier goal of focusing solely on elimination through signing of the NPT. Yet even the lesser U.S. objective of capping is not well received in the Indian press. Rather, outspoken public declarations on this U.S. policy, combined with excessive rhetoric about “counterproliferation” and “rogue” states, which fuels concerns among the Indian security community, has further encouraged the anti-U.S. perspective through which nuclear issues are framed in the Indian press.

Domestic Anti-Treaty Lobbies and
the Role of External Incentives

Generally speaking, the security-sovereignty rhetoric during the CTBT debate in India was not dissimilar to that in other states concerning the signing or ratification of treaties, and not just nuclear treaties, but also nonnuclear security treaties or even economic and environmental treaties. For example, the issues of sovereignty and security were prominent during domestic debates in Japan and Germany on their signing and ratification of the NPT. In 1997, the U.S. domestic debate on nonnuclear issues such as the landmine treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention included national security considerations. Domestic debates in the United States on nonsecurity treaties such as NAFTA and the WTO have included concerns about the ceding of sovereignty to an
international regulatory authority. What was different from the above cases and the CTBT debate in India was that at least one major political party or an important domestic constituency supported the respective treaties and therefore countered the security-sovereignty stand of anti-treaty forces; in India, no political party supported the CTBT.

External incentives can greatly help a government in countering an anti-treaty campaign launched by domestic opponents. The similarities and differences between Ukraine’s accession to the NPT in 1994 and India’s opposition to the CTBT in 1996 illustrate this point. In 1993–94, when Ukraine was considering giving up its inherited nuclear arsenal and signing the NPT as a nonnuclear state, the ownership of nuclear weapons became a debate over sovereignty, which was a central political issue activating many constituencies. Further, Ukrainian nationalists initiated a discussion on an (imagined) Russian nuclear threat to Ukraine, which stirred up greater hysteria. Moderate political parties in Ukraine emphasized that confrontation with Russia was the result of “artificial provocation by conservatives and national chauvinists.” Nevertheless, public opinion was more influenced by the security-sovereignty hysteria raised by nationalists and therefore favored a pronuclear policy in 1993. Under these conditions, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk’s May 1992 letter to President Bush and his signing of a trilateral agreement with the United States and Russia in January 1994, whereby he agreed to give up Ukraine’s nuclear weapons, was criticized in Parliament.

In both the Indian and Ukrainian cases, political parties used the issues of security and sovereignty to stir up important differences in domestic support for the respective treaties. In Ukraine, moderate politicians opposed the anti-NPT, pronuclear stance of the nationalists. In India, no political party opposed the prevailing anti-CTBT rhetoric; rather, all parties joined the anti-CTBT bandwagon. In Ukraine, the nationalists (holding anti-NPT views) were defeated during elections in July 1994, which made the new Parliament slightly more inclined toward the NPT, though even then there was considerable uncertainty as to whether the Parliament would ratify Ukraine’s accession to the NPT.

External incentives allowed the favorable resolution of the issue. Ukraine received hundreds of millions of dollars in aid from the West, security guarantees, and debt forgiveness and territorial assurances from Russia in exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons. These incentives, which were released under different agreements over a period of time, may initially not have been sufficient to influence nationalist parties who opposed the NPT or to counter the security-sovereignty rhetoric that mobilized public opinion against the NPT. Consequently, the Parliament in early 1994 embraced only START I, but did not ratify the NPT despite the incentives. Yet eventually, after anti-NPT rhetoric died down and nationalists were defeated in the July 1994 elections, this combination of incentives helped President Leonid Kuchma (elected in July 1994) gain parliamentary support for the NPT. The benefits and security guarantees that Ukraine received served to legitimize and increase public acceptance of the Ukrainian Parliament’s decision to accede to the NPT in November 1994. In India’s case, no comparable package of incentives was offered by the international community (although India had not actually indicated that it sought any incentives), and thus the prevailing government had no tools through which to mobilize the Indian public or other political parties in support of the CTBT.

Assessing Domestic Politics

India backed away from the CTBT in 1996 for one basic reason: “Any government proposing to sign the treaty would have to expend major political capital. Nuclear issues simply do not rank highly enough for a weak government to gamble its capital on.” Would supporting the CTBT actually have been politically suicidal under different circumstances, especially for a majority government or one that did not have to face elections? No scholarly analysis has actually supported what is assumed to be the conventional wisdom, that public support for a political party declines when it takes an accommodating line on nuclear issues and vice versa. In fact, the conventional wisdom may not hold for a number of reasons.

First, the strongly anti-CTBT and anti-nonproliferation regime rhetoric manifest in the Indian press is only spuriously reflective of broader public opinion; rather, it is the voice of a small group of analysts. The apparently high public support for India’s nuclear option is largely the result of a long period of the Indian public’s socialization through media coverage of nuclear issues that had never been seriously challenged by a
leading political party. Second, it is likely that if any leading Indian political leader makes a case for the benefits of nuclear moderation such as by signing the CTBT, these arguments would carry considerable weight and change public opinion. It should be clarified that in 1998 India’s centrist and leftist parties finally challenged the BJP on the issue of India’s nuclear tests, but this was a case of “too little, too late” since the opposition’s challenge could do little to reverse the already conducted nuclear tests. Third, because economic issues are far more relevant to the Indian voter, a government which delivers the goods on economic issues may not really lose public support by taking a moderate line on nuclear issues.

For the above reasons, Indian governments are unlikely to face political damage or electoral losses simply because they take a pragmatic stand on nuclear issues. This is especially true if all coalition partners in a government are committed to (and derive benefits for their constituencies from) a win-win situation, say a pro-CTBT policy in exchange for technology transfers. Therefore, under stable political circumstances, Indian governments can in fact stand up to domestic opponents and be more accommodating toward the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Substantive versus Procedural Issues

Besides domestic political factors, India’s objections to the CTBT in 1996 were based not only on substantive issues but also concerned the process through which the treaty was ultimately adopted. India certainly disagreed with the CTBT’s substance—the fact it did not go far enough toward promoting disarmament. However, in June 1996 India had indicated that it would step aside on account of these disagreements. India’s strongest opposition to the CTBT was on procedural issues: the entry into force provisions were unacceptable to New Delhi; they appeared in the text after India had stepped aside; a veto at the Conference on Disarmament was overcome by a procedural maneuver; and the treaty was then taken to the United Nations. On the EIF issue, both the pro-CTBT groups and the anti-CTBT forces in India were more unified in their opposition to such steps that were aimed at scoring diplomatic points against India by isolating it at the CD. In fact, this attempt to pressure or isolate India gave more credibility to the anti-CTBT forces in India and thus indirectly hurt the cause of pro-CTBT groups.

Indian leaders bolstered their case by noting that similar concerns on procedural issues were also expressed by other nations. After the September 1996 UN vote adopting the CTBT, India’s External Affairs Minister Gujral stated in Parliament that countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Mexico had not cosponsored the UN resolution adopting the treaty and that a large number of countries expressed dissatisfaction with the CTBT’s EIF. “We have the distinct impression that even after the adoption of the text, there is an uneasiness on the part of many delegations about what had really been achieved by the CTBT and the manner in which it had been brought about.” Thus its eloquent substantive arguments against the CTBT notwithstanding, New Delhi’s main objections to the CTBT in 1996 appear to be toward the process through which the treaty was ultimately adopted.

India and Nuclear Arms Control, 1997–98

India continued to press the issue of disarmament and opposed the FMCT and CTBT. During which time the CD failed to establish even a single committee to deal with outstanding issues such as the FMCT and disarmament, largely due to differing priorities of the nonaligned and the declared nuclear weapon states on these issues. In May 1997, then Prime Minister Gujral, speaking before Indian nuclear scientists, stated that India would not enter into the FMCT. Thus New Delhi was not repeating the CTBT experience of initially engaging in talks and then ultimately withdrawing from them. Although occasional editorials in the Indian press suggested that India could participate in the FMCT, New Delhi’s declaratory policy was to abstain from this treaty.

At the CD, New Delhi led a nonaligned move to press for steps on disarmament before negotiations on the FMCT could commence. It should be noted that both New Delhi and Islamabad had largely similar positions on the disarmament issue for much of the CTBT debate in 1994–96 (this convergence of positions between rivals resembles the Argentina–Brazil anti-NPT axis of the 1970s–80s). Nonaligned states Brazil, Myanmar, Egypt, and Syria also noted that they would attach a high priority to disarmament. The Western nuclear weapon states and Moscow were strongly against the CD convening any committee on disarmament. The specifics of the
FMCT issue were also controversial. Pakistan, Egypt and other states sought to go beyond a mere cut-off of future production and include existing nuclear stockpiles in an FMCT. The P-5 sought a treaty that would cut-off only future production and would not deal with the size of stockpiles (as this could directly affect their nuclear forces)—on this issue India held a position similar to that of the P-5 and differed from the positions of Pakistan and Egypt.

Two other events during 1997 should be noted. First, U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited New Delhi in November 1997. An Indian press report noted that “The first visit in more than a decade by a high ranking, high profile government leader from the United States did achieve some measure of success. More substantially, it helped clear apprehensions in this country about American intentions over the Kashmir issue which were tending to vitiate the wide ranging bilateral relationship. . . . Absent during the visit or the run up to it was the belligerence over nuclear nonproliferation that had marked earlier Indo–American interaction.”

Second, press reports following India’s May 1998 nuclear test have noted that India’s United Front government was considering conducting a nuclear test in 1997 (apparently following a request by Indian nuclear scientists on the issue). Eventually a change of government (Inder Gujral replaced H.D. Deve Gowda as Prime Minister in April 1997), the scheduling of elections for February–March 1998, as well as the risks of sanctions, caused the United Front government to back away from authorizing a nuclear test. On this issue, former Prime Minister Deve Gowda stated that he did not endorse a nuclear test because “the time was not ripe as the country was facing many political and economic problems. I declined to give clearance for demonstrating India’s nuclear capability not because of the likely adverse reaction from the international community but on account of my concern for improving the economic situation.”

India’s nuclear policy changed when the BJP assumed power in March 1998. Indian’s nuclear policy changed when the BJP assumed power in March 1998 (see Table 3).

**TABLE 3. Indian Governments and Parliamentary Composition, 1985–98**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Term of Government</th>
<th>Party in Government</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Composition of Parliament (540 seats)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov 1990–June 1991</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chandra Shekhar</td>
<td>Cong: 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 1996–Apr 1997</td>
<td>United Front</td>
<td>Deve Gowda</td>
<td>Cong: 140</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cong: 160*</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UF: 95*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: *Includes Major party and electoral allies. Parties: Cong: Congress; BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party; UF: United Front coalition; JD: Janata Dal. The National Front coalition of 1989 and the United Front coalition of 1996 and 1998 were largely similar in terms of political composition, comprising the Janata Dal and regional and left parties.
India’s May 1998 Nuclear Tests

Shortly after the BJP government assumed power in March 1998, India conducted a series of nuclear tests on May 11 and May 13, 1998, (see Appendix E for technical details on the tests). India then declared itself to be a nuclear weapons state and also stated that it could formalize a moratorium on nuclear testing and sign the CTBT. In contrast, during 1996–97 New Delhi had stayed out of and opposed the CTBT, though it also refrained from testing or declarations on overt nuclearization. Further the groups that opposed India’s signing the CTBT in 1996—security analysts, the foreign policy bureaucracy, and the Indian press—played little role in the actual decision on India’s nuclear tests. Thus the forces that were against India signing the CTBT were generally different from those that authorized India’s nuclear tests. Ultimately, the decision on testing was taken by a small group of BJP leaders who were not directly influenced (at least in the short term run up to their decision) by domestic lobbies. Moreover, while national security considerations were the main reason cited for the decision to test, security issues were actually largely irrelevant to the timing of the tests (India faced few security threats in 1998) and were only a somewhat distant consideration. Domestic political factors were far more influential especially in explaining the timing of the tests.

The following discussion begins with an overview of the formation of the BJP government in March 1998 and examines national security events in the weeks prior to India’s nuclear tests. It then reviews the BJP’s nuclear policy, differences in foreign policy across India’s political spectrum, official Indian statements citing security considerations for its nuclear tests, and India’s shifting stand on the CTBT and FMCT. Thereafter, an assessment of the factors behind the nuclear test decision—including domestic political factors, technical compulsions, and foreign policy considerations—is undertaken. This leads to an examination of the domestic and world reaction to India’s nuclear tests, Indian diplomacy in the posttest situation, and Indian press coverage. The concluding section of this monograph examines India’s nuclear capability and domestic and international political and economic factors influencing India’s future nuclear strategy including its stance on the CTBT and FMCT.

The BJP Government and the Run-Up to Nuclear Testing

Following the Congress party’s withdrawal of support for the United Front coalition in November 1997, India’s President announced new elections that were scheduled for February–March 1998. In these elections, the BJP won 179 seats and together with its allies held over 250 seats; the Congress gained 140 seats and with its allies attained a combined strength of 160 seats, while the UF held 95 seats. A BJP-led coalition government assumed office on March 19 and narrowly won a vote of confidence by a margin of 274 to 261 on March 28.

Key events relating to national security in the period March to May 1998 were the BJP’s “National Agenda” of March 18 which made references to nuclearization, Defense Minister Fernandes’ statements on May 4 that China was India’s primary security threat, and Pakistan’s Ghauri missile test on April 6. Shortly after the Ghauri test, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson visited India and Pakistan.

The BJP’s “National Agenda for Governance” of March 18, drafted in consultation with its alliance partners, noted:

We will establish a National Security Council to analyze the military, economic and political threats to the nation, also to continuously advise the government. This council will undertake India’s first ever Strategic Defense Review. To ensure the security, territorial integrity and unity of India we will take all necessary steps and exercise all available options. Towards that end we will re-evaluate the nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons.134

The following week, President K.R. Narayanan’s address to the joint session of Parliament on March 25, which essentially outlined the government’s policy, made no mention of nuclear-related issues and instead concentrated largely on domestic socioeconomic issues. On the issue of security it simply mentioned that the “Security of the nation and its citizens is paramount. My Government will not compromise on this. The nation’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity will be protected at all costs. We will not bow to any pressure on this front.\textsuperscript{155}

In the following days, Union Home Minister and BJP president L.K. Advani, speaking to newsmen before his Government won a vote of confidence in Parliament, emphasized the need for a credible nuclear option. Prime Minister Vajpayee, in his reply during the debate on the motion of confidence (held during March 27–28), noted that “Our party feels India should have the bomb since it will place the country in a strong position vis-à-vis the outside world. But other political parties apparently have a different view and therefore we have decided to keep the issue aside till a national consensus (is reached).”\textsuperscript{156} It should also be noted that on April 4, a three-member task force was set up to explore the parameters of a future National Security Council; this task force submitted its report in late June 1998.\textsuperscript{157}

In the pretest period, the BJP did not clarify the meaning of the phrase “induct the nuclear option”—at one point in March 1998, Defense Minister Fernandes noted that “I don’t think we need to test at this point.”\textsuperscript{158} In an interview in the \textit{Frontline} in April, in response to the question “How is your Government’s position on the nuclear issue different from that of the previous Government? The I.K. Gujral Government also talked about keeping the nuclear option open,” Fernandes suggested that nuclearization was inevitable. His reply was:

We have gone one step further. What they said in a general kind of a way, we have made specific. We keep our nuclear options open and we cite our national positions on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the CTBT, both of which India refused to sign. Implied in that position is the truth that India, if need be, will go in for a nuclear weapon. All that our National Agenda has said is that at the end of doing a strategic review, which will be the first of its kind, if we come to the conclusion that things have reached a stage with China and Pakistan—one an acknowledged nuclear power and the other claiming to be a nuclear power—and that India now needs to take the plunge, then so be it. What we are saying in so many words is what is implied in the national position. So why are some people now saying “Oh God!” and talking about international sanctions, and posing the question whether poverty alleviation or the weapons program is more important. All this is a lot of hot air because our national policy implied in no uncertain terms such a development at some point in time. The only question is, has that point in time arrived. We have not said that it has arrived. In the course of the strategic review, if we believe that the time has come, so be it.\textsuperscript{159}

Some of the Indian press cautioned against overt nuclearization. One editorial titled “Avoid hasty decision on nuclear policy” noted that

While the BJP manifesto, especially in rejecting the NPT, CTBT, FMCT and any other treaty that focuses entirely on nonproliferation in a discriminatory fashion, has countrywide support, the policy of seeking to exercise the nuclear option through induction should be undertaken with circumspection and only after a careful review of the country’s ability to withstand pressures on the defense, technology, commercial and economic fronts in a worst case scenario is undertaken by the Strategic Defense Review which is contemplated by the new government. Any hasty decision merely to fulfill its election promise or to divert attention from the travails of a wobbly coalition could end up putting the country in a disadvantageous position.\textsuperscript{160}

Others doubted that the BJP would actually carry out its pledge on nuclearization and also questioned the feasibility of nuclearization, noting:

The BJP’s decision to churn out a national review of India’s nuclear policy is a step in the right direction. The review, however, must have due representation of those who do not favor weaponization…. If Mr. Vajpayee determines that India be a nuclear power, he cannot deny the same status to Pakistan if Pakistanis too want their country to go nuclear. His dismissal of adverse reactions of the external powers including the United States and Japan need not be taken as more than timely bravado. If India goes nuclear, it will have to pay the price for going nuclear, without being admitted to the exclusive club of N-states until, with a series of tests, and recasting its military forces with a new command-control system as well as a nuclear doctrine, India can gate-crash into it. It is a long and expensive road to that goal, and the lifespan of the BJP government must necessarily be too short for it.\textsuperscript{161}

It should be clarified that some calls for nuclear testing were in fact made in the Indian press, but there these simply represented the routine pro-nuclearization perspective that had also been present in previous years. Reflecting this perspective, one editorial noted:

India’s response to the launching of the Ghauri [Pakistan’s ballistic missile tested on April 6] should therefore be unequivocal. Instead of pretending that nothing much has happened, or worse, that the Pakistanis may be lying, a
Pakistan’s Ghauri missile was tested on April 6. Islamabad stated that the missile’s range was over 1,000 kilometers, although the actual range during the test was approximately 700 kilometers. The BJP was considerably restrained in its response to this test. Whereas in previous years the BJP would have reacted by calling for the immediate acceleration of India’s missile program, in April 1998 it did not issue such calls and instead noted that Pakistan’s missile test posed no threat to Indian security. In fact both the BJP and the Indian press did not feed frenzy on the missile issue (some observers hold differing views on this point), in sharp contrast to their hawkishness on the issue in previous years. In the Indian press, an article titled “Ghauri will improve ties with India: Pak” reported that Pakistan’s Foreign Minister had stated that the Ghauri test “will help ease tension” between the two countries. Another article titled “PM discounts threat from Pak. Missile Test” noted that “The Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, today said the reported test-firing of the Ghauri missile by Pakistan did not pose any threat to the country’s security.” Defense Minister Fernandes simply noted that “steps would be taken at appropriate time to counter this threat” from the Ghauri missile.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited India on April 15, 1998; he discussed economic issues as well as nuclear issues, and called on India to continue its policy of nuclear restraint. In response, New Delhi “conveyed to the United States its sovereign right to adopt an appropriate security posture in the subcontinent taking its national interest into account. Indian officials said here today that the country’s position on the nuclear and missile issues was conveyed to the visiting high-level U.S. delegation led by President Bill Clinton’s special envoy Bill Richardson which urged India to continue its policy of restraint.”

Another national security issue concerned Defense Minister Fernandes’ May 4 remarks on China, where he characterized China to be India’s primary security threat (although Fernandes later clarified that “threat” did not mean “enemy”). On this issue, India Today noted:

Fernandes’ frenetic pace began in early April with the charge that Chinese patrols were intruding into (the Indian state of) Arunachal Pradesh. Then came the blunt assertion that China was “the mother of (Pakistan’s) Ghauri missile.” Even after interacting with the visiting People’s Liberation Army Chief General Fu Quanyou and appreciating Beijing’s “seriousness” in resolving bilateral issues through negotiation, Fernandes kept up the offensive. In a forceful interview on Home TV’s “In Focus with Karan program,” he lucidly argued that it was not in India’s interest to understate problems with China. Lamenting the “reluctance to face the reality that China’s intentions need to be questioned,” he repeated the charge of Chinese perfidy—missiles to Pakistan, military aid to the junta in Myanmar and a virtual land and water encirclement of India. Fernandes’ declaration of China as the potential threat No. 1 rocked the (Indian) foreign policy establishment and rattled Beijing. It completely overshadowed his restrained appeal at the V.K. Krishna Menon memorial lecture in Delhi for resolving all pending disputes with Islamabad and Beijing through “decisive” dialogue. . . .

The Opposition was quick to react. The CPI(M) [India’s communist party] accused Fernandes of “disrupting the nationally accepted course of improvement of relations” between India and China. Former Prime Minister I. K. Gujral charged him with “adventurism.” Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s low-key approach to foreign policy, Gujral lamented, was encouraging his defense minister to take over foreign policy-making and ride roughshod over the “meekish protests by the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office).”

Gujral’s sly assertion had the desired result. The PMO let it be known that the defense minister’s views were “not a reflection of a considered view of the Government” and that there had been no rethinking on India’s China policy. A PMO official even termed Fernandes’ remarks as “uncalled for and unprovoked.”

Official Declarations Following India’s Nuclear Tests

Within weeks of the formation of a BJP-led government, India conducted a series of nuclear tests. Official statements after India’s nuclear tests made a number of key points: First, the tests were undertaken for national security reasons. Second, India had established a proven capability for a weaponized nuclear program, which could be maintained in the future through computer simulations and subcritical tests. Third, India was declared to be, and sought recognition as, a nuclear weapons state. Fourth, India could adhere to the CTBT and
participate in talks on the FMCT. Fifth, New Delhi’s statements did not mention any nuclear doctrine or planned force size. Although New Delhi indicated it had a capability for weaponization, it did not specify any intent to weaponize in the short-term but nevertheless refused to accept any formal constraints on weaponization. The key points of India’s posttest statements concerning security, status considerations, and stand on the CTBT and FMCT, are reviewed below; thereafter an assessment of differences in foreign and nuclear policy across India’s political spectrum is undertaken.

Security Issues

New Delhi claimed a security threat from China as justifying its nuclear tests, although as discussed previously in this manuscript, India faced no direct or pressing security threats from China or Pakistan especially during the mid-late 1990s. New Delhi made the case that

The Government is deeply concerned as were previous Governments, about the nuclear environment in India’s neighborhood. These tests provide reassurance to the people of India that their national security interests are paramount and will be promoted and protected. Succeeding generations of Indians would also rest assured that contemporary technologies associated with nuclear option have been passed on to them in this the 50th year of our Independence. 169

Prime Minister Vajpayee’s letter to Bill Clinton on May 12 explicitly made the case that India faced security threats from China and Pakistan:

In this letter I would like to explain the rationale for the tests. I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security environment, specially the nuclear environment, faced by India for some years past. We have an overt nuclear weapons state [a reference to China] on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust that country has materially helped another neighbor of ours [a reference to Pakistan] to become a covert nuclear weapon state.

This letter was drafted by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) rather than the Indian foreign policy bureaucracy. The letter actually shocked, and was objected to by, the foreign policy bureaucracy that, in the interests of maintaining cordial diplomatic relations, traditionally did not single out particular countries on any issue. (The letter was published in the New York Times, and the PMO may have anticipated that the letter would remain unpublished and confidential.) It is worth recalling that in New Delhi’s June 20, 1996 CD statement when it stepped away from the CTBT, New Delhi simply referred to security threats from “countries around us” rather than specifying China or Pakistan.

It should also be clarified that the BJP did not totally discount the disarmament issue, but rather, repeating some of the points made by the Indian bureaucracy in the CTBT debate of 1996, noted that India’s previous initiatives on nuclear arms control had been ignored. India, therefore, faced security concerns causing it to conduct nuclear tests:

Since independence, India has been a staunch advocate of global nuclear disarmament. We have participated actively in all such efforts, convinced that a world without nuclear weapons will enhance both national and global security. India was the first to call for a ban on nuclear testing in 1954, for a nondiscriminatory treaty on nonproliferation in 1965, for a treaty on nonuse of nuclear weapons in 1978, for a nuclear freeze in 1982, and for a phased program for complete elimination in 1988. Unfortunately, many of these initiatives were not accepted by the nuclear weapon states who still consider these weapons essential for their own security, and what emerged has been a discriminatory and flawed nonproliferation regime which affects our security adversely. For many years, we have conveyed our apprehensions to other countries but this did not lead to any improvement in our security environment. As a result, we were left with no choice but to develop the capability that had been demonstrated 24 years ago.

Today, India is a nuclear weapon state. This adds to our sense of responsibility as a nation that is committed to the principles of the UN Charter and promoting regional peace and stability. 170
Security through Nuclear Weapons Capability:
Status Considerations

New Delhi’s desire to be viewed as a nuclear weapons state ties in with official announcements on its weaponization capability. New Delhi’s May 11 statement declared that its nuclear tests “have established that India has a proven capability for a weaponized nuclear program. They also provide a valuable database that is useful in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields for different applications and for different delivery systems. Further they are expected to carry Indian scientists toward a sound computer simulation capability which may be supported by subcritical experiments if considered necessary.” This reflects the policy of India’s political right, which formally views nuclear weapons as an essential and integral component of Indian security policy, and is in sharp contrast to New Delhi’s March 1996 CD statement, which reflected the policy of India’s political center, where New Delhi had noted that nuclear weapons were not essential to its national security.

Given that it considered nuclear weapons as an integral component of Indian security policy, the next logical step was to formalize this stand. On May 15, Prime Minister Vajpayee stated that “India is now a nuclear weapons state.” In a May 27 speech to Parliament, Prime Minister Vajpayee again emphasized that “India is now a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and engineers. It is India’s due, the right of one-sixth of human-kind.”

Two other aspects of the nuclear weapons status issue should be noted. First, as discussed earlier, India’s political elite had long believed that India’s nuclear program was a sign of technological prowess, prestige and great-power status, and thus the BJP’s desire for recognition of India as a nuclear weapons state simply reflects this long standing perspective.

Second, formal recognition as a nuclear weapons state also had practical benefits such as an expected reprieve in the long-term from nonproliferation sanctions. This is because proliferation-related sanctions are primarily imposed on states categorized as “nonnuclear states” under U.S. legislation. Supplier-group restrictions against nuclear transfers also apply to nonnuclear states that do not have full-scope safeguards and, significantly, do not always apply to China which is formally recognized as a nuclear weapons state. (Although it should be clarified that U.S. law does in fact prohibit the transfer of select munitions and satellite and missile technologies to China.) Therefore New Delhi seeks not to be categorized as a nonnuclear state in the hope that in the long-term, it would not be subject to supplier-group restrictions and also not incur sanctions on account of any further nuclearization or nuclear testing. In fact in subsequent weeks New Delhi dropped its demand for formal recognition as a nuclear weapons state and mainly sought to obtain relief from supplier-group restrictions in exchange for signing the CTBT.

New Delhi’s Shifting Position on the CTBT and FMCT

New Delhi’s emphasis on seeking tangible practical benefits (such as a lifting of sanctions and access to dual use technology) rather than adhering to long-standing principles is reflected in its stand on the CTBT and FMCT. In the posttest situation, New Delhi made fewer references to its disarmament-related objections to the CTBT. New Delhi’s position on the CTBT made in its May 11, 1997 statement was:

The Government would like to reiterate its support to efforts to realize the goal of a truly comprehensive international arrangement which would prohibit underground nuclear testing of all weapons as well as related experiments described as subcritical or “hydronuclear.” India would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the undertakings in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But this cannot obviously be done in a vacuum. If would necessarily be an evolutionary process from concept to commitment and would depend on a number of reciprocal activities. . . . We shall also be happy to participate in the negotiations for the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Geneva based conference on Disarmament.

New Delhi thus sought the best of both worlds—symbolically it retained its previous position seeking a truly comprehensive test ban to include prohibition on subcritical testing. Yet in practice, as noted in the May 11 statement, the Indian nuclear tests “are expected to carry Indian scientists toward a sound computer simulation capability which may be supported by subcritical experiments if considered necessary.” In short
because New Delhi has acquired the capacity to carry out subcritical tests to maintain its nuclear option, it may not insist on a ban on subcritical tests in the CTBT.

In the posttest situation New Delhi also offered to participate in discussions on the FMCT, largely as a bargaining chip in exchange for the practical benefits of improving India’s international image and securing the lifting of sanctions. This again contrasts to New Delhi’s position in 1997 and early 1998 when it insisted that disarmament be discussed before it would even begin talking on an FMCT. In August 1998 at the CD, India supported the establishment of an ad hoc negotiating committee for the FMCT:

> We (India) welcome the establishment of an ad hoc committee on FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament. . . . India has been fully supportive of the mandate contained in the UNGA resolution 48/75L, a resolution which it cosponsored. Our support for the mandate contained in this resolution was reiterated in 1995, following the adoption of CD/1299. While remaining ready to work on the basis of the mandate contained in CD/1299, let me make it clear again that India will participate constructively in negotiations for a nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning future production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.\(^{174}\)

**A Nuclear Doctrine**

Some three months after India’s nuclear tests, the BJP leadership announced a tentative nuclear doctrine during an August 4, 1998, speech to Parliament, containing two main aspects. First, India would maintain a “minimum but credible nuclear deterrent” and Prime Minister Vajpayee stated that “We can maintain the credibility of our nuclear deterrent in the future without testing.” The size of the nuclear force required for this deterrent was not clarified. Second, India adopted a policy of no-first-use against nuclear states, and nonuse against nonnuclear states. Prime Minister Vajpayee noted that India “will not be the first to use the nuclear weapons. Having stated that, there remains no basis for their use against countries which do not have nuclear weapons.”\(^{175}\)

**Differences in Foreign and Nuclear Policy across India’s Political Spectrum**

The above statements reveal the differences across India’s political spectrum on foreign and security policy and on nuclear issues. On this, *India Today* noted:

> The Pokhran tests and their aftermath have radically redefined India’s image . . . of being a benign democracy—slow to anger and action. That image is being replaced by an India that is hawkish in the pursuit of its national interests, driven by a government capable of taking profound decisions to achieve it. “The transformation,” says Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Jaswant Singh, one of the architects of the government’s new policy, “has been from the moralistic to the realistic. It is one-sixth of humanity seeking its rightful place under the sun in the calculus of great powers.”

(The changed foreign policy has been undertaken) Even if that meant unceremoniously jettisoning India’s foreign policy initiatives in the recent past. Former prime minister I.K. Gujral’s doctrine of India giving more than it takes has been (replaced because) “Frankly, it was a lot of toothless waffle,” explains one of Vajpayee’s aides. P.V. Narasimha Rao’s policy of “nothing but the economy” has been modified to read “security first and the rest will follow.” In a bid to muscle its way into the big boys’ (great power) club, the BJP-led Government appears even willing to dump the hubris of India being a great moral leader that Jawaharlal Nehru had wanted. “What is emerging is a more self-centered India that is single-minded in its pursuit of national interests, rather than on abstract universal goals.”\(^{176}\)

India’s political right, comprising the BJP, generally places overt nuclear weaponization, which it perceives to be a national security interest, to be a higher priority over issues of principle such as the more distant goals of disarmament. (Although at times BJP leaders do echo themes of disarmament and adherence to nondiscriminatory regimes.)\(^{177}\) In contrast, the disarmament issue was of greater concern to India’s political center—such as the Congress party, the United Front coalition, and the foreign policy bureaucracy—as reflected in Indian nuclear arms control policy of previous years. On this, a Congress party leader noted:

> We were able to credibly refuse to sign the NPT and the CTBT, and hold back on the fissile materials cut-off treaty, because we argued that in the absence of a time-bound commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons all such
measures were not measures of disarmament but of discriminatory nonproliferation. Pokhran II [nuclear testing] has destroyed our credibility to press that trade-off any further. At the same time, it has not given our armed forces nuclear weapons. We have closed our nuclear option without going nuclear. Fifty years of foreign policy is being junked because Vajpayee thinks he can win the mid-term polls (now inevitable) with his patakas (fireworks).

The differing approaches to nuclear policy across India’s political spectrum are also tied to different perceptions of a security threat from China. On the Chinese threat, it has been noted that “Although China would strive to tie New Delhi back with Islamabad, giving itself greater diplomatic maneuverability, it would be loathe to provoke any direct confrontation. India, on the other hand, would seek to acquire a strategic equivalence (or sufficient deterrence) with China. In other words, India would not seek military parity with China, but would enhance its capability such that in the event of a conflagration, it could engage China in a holding pattern until external intervention prevents the crisis from escalating into a full-blown military conflict.”

India’s political center maintained and supported the technological advancement of India’s nuclear program. Yet this technical capability providing India with a nuclear option was considered to be a sufficient guarantor of India’s security against China. India’s political center also accepted the possibility of cooperation with China and had successfully pursued a security dialogue with Beijing; if relations with China could be handled diplomatically, India had no pressing reason to pursue overt and declared nuclearization. On the other hand, India’s political right and its security analysts perceived future conflict with China as inevitable, and therefore justified (and implemented) nuclear testing en route to overt nuclearization as a hedge against a Chinese threat.

An Assessment of Costs, Benefits, and Timing

A number of political and economic factors were likely to have influenced the BJP leadership’s decision both on whether to authorize nuclear testing and, more importantly, on when to conduct the tests. In the short-term they may have been undertaken in part out of technical considerations, which also resulted (or were expected to result) in domestic political benefits; domestic political factors generally explain the timing of India’s nuclear tests.

Domestic Political Considerations

Domestic politics were an influential factor, if not the sole factor, behind the timing of the BJP leadership’s decision to test within a few weeks of assuming power—the nuclear tests served to shore up the position of a weak BJP government. On March 28, the BJP-led coalition government narrowly won a vote of confidence by a margin of 13 seats, 274 to 261. (At the last minute, the BJP gained support of a 12 member group previously in the United Front that moved over to support the BJP.) Yet the coalition remained shaky as its key alliance partners, particularly the AIADMK party which held over 25 seats, continued to challenge the BJP on domestic political issues; the BJP leadership even had to dismiss a few ministers from its cabinet to appease its coalition partners. Thus the BJP government could well have fallen at any time if even one major ally withdrew support. The nuclear tests had beneficial domestic political consequences since the BJP’s previously critical allies such as the AIADMK temporarily suspended their anti-BJP rhetoric in the immediate aftermath of the nuclear tests, thus consolidating the BJP’s hold on power for the short term. Further, Indian public opinion was strongly behind the nuclear tests, and this would strengthen the BJP’s position in the event of any mid-term election (see the section below on Mixed Domestic Reactions for a more detailed discussion of public opinion and electoral issues).

Technical Considerations and Narrowing Windows of Opportunity

On technical-security grounds, India’s nuclear tests were beneficial because they enabled Indian security planners to establish confidence in at least a first-generation nuclear weapon and also provided technical data that would enable India’s nuclear scientists to continue and to advance their work on weapons design. On this issue, it has been noted that
It seems that pressures from the scientists in the Atomic Energy Commission/Defense Research & Development Organization were operating. They urged that the skills acquired in making nuclear devices needed to be proven. The older generation of scientists was passing into retirement, and the younger ones needed to establish their credentials. Besides the new, post-Pokhran (post-1974) weapon designs that had been developed through computer simulation and laboratory (hydrodynamic?) tests had to be field-tested. This was especially necessary to prove the thermonuclear (hydrogen) device, and the subkiloton devices. Together the five tests conducted have, apparently, provided the data needed by the scientists to conduct subcritical (hydronuclear) tests.

Moreover, the window of opportunity for conducting these tests was closing. Article XIV (2) of the CTBT (states) that if this Treaty did not enter into force by September 1999 a conference of the subscribing states would be called to “consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process.” Indian policy makers believe that the latent threat in this formulation is that sanctions will be applied upon critical nonentrants into the CTBT. Hence these nuclear tests had to be conducted urgently before that trap closed.181

It is uncertain as to whether future sanctions—related to the CTBT’s EIF provisions—were in fact a concern for the BJP leadership, and why they were a concern. As discussed previously, a number of states had clarified repeatedly at the CD during 1996 that the September 1999 conference would not entail sanctions against states not signing the CTBT.

**Security and Foreign Policy Considerations**

On security grounds, India’s nuclear tests have not altered the India–Pakistan military balance. India and Pakistan had a nuclear capability before their May 1998 tests and have simply formalized and somewhat advanced their respective nuclear capabilities after their tests (see conclusions for a further discussion of this issue). Another point to note is that India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests simply formalize a previously existing nuclear deterrence on the subcontinent and do not necessarily make deterrence more or less stable.

India’s nuclear tests may cause the strengthening of Sino–Pakistan ties. It should be clarified that during Bill Clinton’s visit to China in June 1998, Beijing actually repeated its earlier pledge to not transfer nuclear or missile technology to Pakistan. However, in the middle-term a nuclearized India may cause China to resume assisting Pakistan’s nuclear and missile program, thus jeopardizing Indian security. In addition, India’s tests at least temporarily set back previously improving Sino–India relations as China responded harshly to India’s nuclear tests (see Appendix G); continued Chinese hostility would be detrimental to Indian security.

Another consequence of the tests (which may not have been anticipated) was the internationalization of the Kashmir issue, as Pakistan placed Kashmir on the international agenda and the international community obliged by referring to Kashmir in numerous statements on the South Asian tests—to India’s disadvantage. In the state of Jammu and Kashmir itself, the nuclear tests did not influence the prevailing insurgency. As one-press report notes, “What enthusiasm there was for the Pokhran tests in BJP-dominated Jammu evaporated on June 1, when a massive explosion on Tilak Raj road killed three people . . . and injured 30 others. This blast made clear to ordinary people that, whatever the BJP’s rhetoric might be, fighting terrorism in Kashmir had nothing to do with India’s nuclear abilities.”182

On diplomatic grounds, conducting the tests at a time closer to Bill Clinton’s planned visit to India (anticipated for late 1998) would result in the cancellation of his trip. Thus conducting the tests as early as possible before the Clinton visit would provide enough time for the U.S. reaction to subside and thus keep open the possibility of a trip to South Asia. More broadly speaking, India’s nuclear tests alienated Washington and turned back progress on an emerging India–U.S. political dialogue. Some observers noted that “The BJP government had believed that India could weather the mandatory sanctions that the United States would impose if India tested; but that India’s acquisition of nuclear status would cement Indo–U.S. ties to counter China. This has proved a serious miscalculation. American nonproliferation concerns have taken precedence once again over its foreign policy calculations, at least over the short run.”183

On economic grounds, sanctions, estimated to have an impact of $2 billion per year (see Appendix H), would hurt India’s economy and set back India’s economic development goals.
The above discussion suggests that the costs from testing outweigh the benefits (although not all the above costs and benefits were known to or expected by decision makers). The decision to proceed with nuclear tests may largely be attributed to the BJP leadership’s determination to fulfill their long-standing agenda of pursuing nuclearization and formalizing India’s status as a nuclear weapons state. The domestic political compulsions of testing sooner rather than later explain the timing behind the tests.

Public Opinion, Elite Opinion and Social Movements

India’s public initially strongly supported its nuclear tests, but public enthusiasm decreased over time. In a May 15 opinion poll, “a massive 91 percent of respondents felt proud of the country’s achievement while 76 percent felt more secure because of it. Only 7 percent opposed the tests while 2 percent refused to comment.”

By early July opinion poll figures had changed, and some prominent members of India’s intellectual elite came out opposing the decision on nuclear tests. An opinion poll on the BJP’s first one hundred days in office noted that 76 percent of the Indian public supported and 21 percent opposed the government’s decision to conduct nuclear tests. Another press report (which also represents one section of elite opinion) noted:

An opinion poll carried out this week (early July) shows that about 60 percent of Indians support the bomb. Only a month ago, another survey had shown the figure to be around 90 percent. More important is that a clear 30 percent of Indians now oppose the bomb, a rise of about 20 percent. Even granting the limitations of such surveys, the indications are that the support may decline further, even if it does not reach the ‘normal’ level reported in a survey less than a year ago about India acquiring a nuclear capacity, 36 percent.

By now, most national dailies have opposed the tests. The two or three that have given unconditional support, or described the dissenters as ‘traitors’ backed by American dollars, are discovering, to their chagrin, that the list of traitors is growing every day. From (former Chief of Naval Staff) Admiral Ramdas and the former Chief of Military Operations General Raghavan to Justice Krishna Iyer, Air-Vice Marshal Zaheer, and some of the most respected Indian intellectuals already constitute a rather embarrassing list of traitors for the conspiracy theorists. Indeed, over-enthusiastic partisans of the bomb in the media and among the national security community are themselves getting discredited—as short sighted, self-serving jingoists.

In general, elite opinion was supportive but also divided (as noted above) over endorsing India’s nuclear tests. Further, protest public opinion did not translate into electoral gains. In by-elections for forty-seven seats in state legislatures in June 1998, the BJP won eleven seats compared to nine seats that it had held going into the elections, while its alliance partners won another four seats. The Congress party won fifteen seats. Further, by late June 1998, the AIADMK’s challenge to the BJP resumed, and the United Front members also expressed support for a Congress-led coalition to form a government replacing the BJP.

Social movements arose against nuclear testing, although these were largely ad hoc rather than part of any sustained anti-nuclear campaign. For example at the town of Pokhran (the nuclear test site) that is a BJP stronghold, the nuclear tests were initially greeted with jubilation. However, after a speech and display of Hiroshima exhibits at the town by a nonofficial Japanese delegation that included Hiroshima survivors, the town members issued a declaration calling for a worldwide cessation to nuclear testing and for the Indian government to consult the townspeople before any decisions on testing. On this issue, Frontline reported that “The warm reception given to the Japanese delegation in Pokhran is not inconsistent with the possibility that many local residents consider the recent tests as being justified. However, the Pokhran gathering brings out another aspect of the public mood: when presented with the facts, most people strongly support universal nuclear disarmament and an immediate end to all nuclear tests. It remains to be seen whether the (Indian) Government’s nuclear strategy will do justice to this overwhelming popular concern.” In early August during Hiroshima remembrance day, a number of rallies were held to protest India’s nuclear tests—the largest of these took place in Calcutta and involved over a hundred thousand participants. In response, a headline called the protestors “anti-nuclear zealots” and quoted Indian nuclear scientist Abdul Kalam as stating “These intellectuals should have held demonstrations in Washington and Moscow to put pressure on those governments. Once those countries become zero-level then everyone becomes zero-level.”
India’s opposition parties initially supported the nuclear tests and also sought to claim credit for their role in nurturing India’s nuclear program in previous years. Yet by mid-late May they initiated a scathing attack against the BJP government and pointed out numerous adverse consequences of the tests—they would lead to a deteriorating security environment, hurt relations with China, and posttest sanctions would set back India’s economic development goals. India’s political center was also concerned about the BJP’s scoring political points, and of the “hysteria” and “jingoism” that has accompanied public reaction in support of the nuclear tests. Finally, some made a strong case against nuclear weaponization. For example, former Finance Minister Chidambaran called for the government to “abjure weaponization until there is a full-fledged debate in this country . . . I am not worried as much about the impact of sanctions, as the unbearable cost to satisfy the vanity of a political party.”191 (See Appendix F for a discussion of the opposition response.)

On the parliamentary debate, one analyst observes that “The debate largely remained at the level of accusations by the opposition about bad faith by the BJP and its attempts to arouse communal frenzy, and charged responses by the government benches, long on bombastic versions of patriotism and short on policy. Therefore, the House lost an opportunity for informing and preparing the country for issues and questions of the utmost importance which are going to trouble us for a long time.”192

India’s political center and left only diminished their criticism of the BJP following Pakistan’s tests of May 28. The Indian Express noted that “In the Lok Sabha earlier, what was steadily progressing into an Opposition versus Government debate on Pokhran II, swiftly turned around into one of solidarity for the country’s sake as news of Pakistan’s nuclear tests practically shocked the House.”193 The Hindu noted that “The Congress (I) regretted the incipient nuclear arms race in the subcontinent, and the Left warned strongly that deployment of nuclear warheads in this region could bring disaster to both the countries.” The Congress party’s statement advocated caution and solidarity:

Pakistan’s nuclear tests are as expected as they are regrettable. This is a grave development. We appear to be poised on the edge of the kind of arms race involving nuclear weapons which should have been avoided. At this critical juncture, the Congress stands with the nation united and determined to safeguard the country’s independence, security and sovereignty. The Congress calls upon the Government to deal with the emerging scenarios with responsibility, maturity and restraint. . . Ten years ago in 1988, Rajiv Gandhi presented to the United Nations his Action Plan for a nuclear-weapons-free and nonviolent world order, and journeyed to China and Pakistan to begin a new era of friendship and cooperation in our neighborhood. A return to the spirit of those times is an urgent necessity in 1998.194

In short Pakistan’s nuclear tests rescued the BJP government and caused all Indian political parties to rally around the flag of Indian national security. As discussed earlier in this manuscript, while no Indian political party would relinquish the nuclear option, the Indian political center generally remained cautious about testing and overt nuclearization. Yet there was little that this group could do to prevent the nuclear tests. Thus the opposition by India’s centrist political parties to the BJP’s nuclear tests was a case of too little, too late.

Two additional points are worth noting. First, while India’s political center and left opposed nuclear testing, they support establishing a nuclear deterrent capability. In June 1998, India’s All Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense (forty-three members from all major political parties) noted that “the government should proceed in a time bound manner to develop the full range of missiles in addition to variants of Agni . . . as a deterrent to potential enemies from using their ballistic missile capability against any of our assets.”195 The report also stated that DRDO budgets (DRDO is in charge of India’s military research and development including the Indian missile program) should be increased from Rs.18 billion ($400 million), which is 5 percent of the defense budget, to 8 to 10 percent of the defense budget. It added that India’s defense budget should be increased from $10 billion (the budget for 1998), which was 2.54 percent of GDP, to a higher level of 3 percent of GDP.

Second, the opposition was also somewhat unified with the government on the issue of facing up to external pressure and sanctions—thus Prime Minister Vajpayee’s statement that “The country has the strength to overcome sanctions” was met with a “thunderous applause” in the Indian parliament.196 Similarly, Indian parties were more unified on the issue of U.S. visa denials to Indian scientists. India’s Upper House of
Parliament, the Rajya Sabha, “unanimously condemned the United States for denying visa to the Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, Dr R. Chidambaram, and for expelling seven Indian scientists.” The House also called for restraint rather than retaliation against what one member termed as “an unfriendly act by a friendly country.”

In response to internal and external criticism, the BJP assumed a tough, counterattacking stand. For example BJP leaders noted that Pakistan’s tests had vindicated the BJP’s nuclear policy and criticized India’s political center for its moderate foreign policy. In an interview BJP leader Advani noted that “More than the pseudo secularists, the real threat now comes from the pseudo liberals . . . [such as] Those who would like to hand over Kashmir and buy peace.”

The United States and the international community strongly condemned India and Pakistan for their nuclear tests. These included condemnations by the UN Security Council, the G-8, and by almost all other countries (see Appendix G). In general, the international community showed their disapproval through sanctions. They did not recognize India and Pakistan as nuclear states and called on both states to sign the CTBT and also the NPT. Occasionally Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee seemed to warn of retaliation against U.S. firms, noting that “if the sanctions declared by some countries are indeed imposed, India would have no option but to take measures that minimize their impact on the Indian economy. . . . It would be a pity if economic cooperation between India and the United States were to be adversely affected, both countries would stand to lose a lot.”

Yet the BJP leadership also sought to negotiate with the P-5 and to explain India’s position to the international community.

Indian Diplomacy in the Posttest Situation

In the posttest situation, New Delhi’s foreign policy bureaucracy was mobilized to make India’s case before the international community. After the May 13 tests New Delhi noted that “this completes the planned series of tests.” Thereafter, “in a move to placate neighbors and world opinion rattled by its nuclear tests, India offered negotiations on a ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons with Pakistan, sought revival of talks with China and formalized a moratorium on nuclear testing.” In August New Delhi also enunciated a no-first-use doctrine.

One early “success” for Indian diplomacy came at the Nonaligned meeting in Cartagena on May 21. The Indian press highlighted the fact that the nonaligned had not criticized India but instead aimed their statements at the declared nuclear states. Thus an article headlined “NAM attacks nuclear powers’ monopoly” noted that the Nonaligned declaration “did not even mention Indian nuclear tests and only about ten delegations made reference to the tests, four of them directly and rest indirectly, despite intense lobbying by Pakistan which held up the declaration for several hours on the issue.”

Indian envoys were sent to the capitals of P-5 states to explain India’s position and to negotiate terms for joining the CTBT; these envoys (from the BJP leadership) largely negotiated autonomously without daily input from either India’s foreign policy bureaucracy or its security analysts. BJP leader and foreign policy expert Jaswant Singh held a series of meetings with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, which he told the Indian press were “entirely satisfactory.” The Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary Mr. Brajesh Mishra was dispatched to Paris, London and Moscow and also described his mission as a great success. “He claimed that after he put across the Indian point of view in the right perspective, decision makers in the West had a better understanding of the Indian position on the security environment in South Asia and the reasons which prompted this country to test nuclear devices.” It should be noted that this diplomacy did not prevent the G-8 from endorsing a freeze on loans to India.

Eventually, Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott engaged in a sustained series of talks in Washington, Frankfurt, and New Delhi to discuss India’s signing the CTBT. In early July, the Indian press seemed to suggest that Indian government initiatives were paying dividends, implied in a headline “Govt measures to cushion nuclear fallout proving successful.” This article noted that “dialogue between India and several important countries, interrupted in the wake of the nuclear tests, has now been restored. . . . there is now better appreciation of India’s security concerns in the United States . . . it was Russia and France, two of the five established nuclear powers, who have openly foiled all moves to diplomatically isolate India.” The next day Indian newspapers reported that talks with Strobe Talbott would continue on July 20, with an official statement
noting that “Mr. Jaswant Singh, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission of India, and Mr. Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, met in Frankfurt on July 9 and 10. They continued discussions that began in Washington on June 12 on matters related to disarmament and nonproliferation as well as regional and international development. Both sides have agreed that these very useful and constructive contacts will continue. In that context, they also discussed the agenda for Mr. Talbott’s forthcoming visit to New Delhi on July 20–21, 1998.”

The July 20–21 talks were described by a headline noting that “Jaswant, Talbott term talks constructive, to meet again in August.” This article noted that “There is now a clearer understanding of each other’s concerns and certain steps in the direction of addressing those concerns are contemplated. The talks had covered wide-ranging security, arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation issues. . . . All aspects of bilateral issues and regional and international security issues were discussed. In Washington (on June 12), Frankfurt (on June 9–10) and here we have established a very wide canvas of what we are seeking to attain.”

In the run up to the fourth round of talks on August 24, the BJP party “urged the Government to be cautious in its approach toward the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), asking it to bear in mind national security concerns and the discriminatory character of the Treaty before making India a signatory to any multilateral control regime.” In response the BJP leadership expressed ideological opposition to the nonproliferation regime—a contrast to its more substantive and nonideological positions of previous months—with Jaswant Singh stating that India would not accept a “flawed” nonproliferation regime.

The fourth round of Talbott-Singh talks on August 23–24 were described as “serious and constructive with a view to putting relations between India and the United States on a sound and secure footing for the future . . . an Indian embassy press release said the two sides discussed issues of disarmament and nonproliferation as well as current regional developments and the international situation. Another press report quoted an Indian official as saying “Nothing went wrong [at the talks] . . . we just did not advance as much as we had hoped to.” An essay by Jaswant Singh criticizing the NPT and CTBT published in Foreign Affairs was nevertheless described by the Washington Post as “the most visible sign of progress in negotiations—which U.S. and Indian officials describe as intense and detailed—about how to reconcile India’s security needs with the U.S. commitment to limit nuclear proliferation.”

In early September, during and after a fifth round of talks, the Indian press carried a number of editorials and articles suggesting that the BJP was keen on signing the CTBT but that domestic consensus was lacking and should be obtained before such a step was taken. The press also sought domestic consensus more broadly on all foreign policy issues. Thus one article title noted that India was “Inching toward the CTBT” (Times of India, September 10, 1998). However, another article with the title “Consensus needed for signing CTBT” noted that “There is considerably weighted opinion within sections of the government in favor of signing the CTBT, but having said it will adhere to certain provisions of the treaty the government is finding it hard to find a similar sentiment cutting across party lines.”

The Congress party did not publicly strongly attack the CTBT nor formally oppose its signing, but instead issued a declaration that “cautioned the Government against taking any precipitate decision on acceding to the CTBT, keeping in mind that no final decision [is] called for over the next twelve months [until the September 1999 conference of states ratifying the CTBT] and that, in any case, the decision will have to be taken in consultation with all political parties.” In an interview, former Prime Minister Inder Gujral “assailed the Vajpayee Government for not taking the Opposition into confidence on the course it planned to take on the controversial Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty . . . . [Gujral stated that] This is sad because ultimately the strength of Indian democracy emanates from national consensus. It is unfortunate that of late the well-structured consensus mechanism has been fractured.”

Subsequently, the BJP leadership made some references to the disarmament issue and the “discriminatory” nonproliferation regime, issues that the Congress and UF governments had previously emphasized in the CTBT context. BJP leader and Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra noted that “Our security interests have now been taken care of . . . we don’t need any more tests, so we can go forward toward CTBT. Now remains the question of linkage to disarmament.” Prime Minister Vajpayee publicly took a strong line, but also held out the prospect of a deal involving the lifting of technology transfer restrictions on India in
exchange for signing the CTBT. He noted “India will not sign the CTBT in its present discriminatory form... we would like some changes to be made, particularly regarding transfer of high technology.”

On September 24, 1998, at the United Nations, Prime Minister Vajpayee strongly emphasized India’s commitment to the CTBT. Vajpayee noted that

In 1996, India could not have accepted the obligation as such a restraint would have eroded our capability and compromised our national security. India, having harmonized its national imperatives and security obligations and desirous of continuing to cooperate with the international community is now engaged in discussions with key interlocutors on a range of issues, including the CTBT. We are prepared to bring these discussions to a successful conclusion, so that the entry into force of the CTBT is not delayed beyond September 1999. We expect that other countries, as indicated in Article XIV of the CTBT, will adhere to this Treaty without conditions.

After protracted discussions, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is now in a position to begin negotiations on a treaty that will prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Once again, we are conscious that this is a partial step. Such a treaty, as and when it is concluded and enters into force, will not eliminate existing nuclear arsenals. Yet, we will participate in these negotiations in good faith in order to ensure a treaty that is non-discriminatory and meets India’s security imperatives. India will pay serious attention to any other multilateral initiatives in this area, during the course of the negotiations in the CD.

In Pakistan, similar themes were manifest in early September and “Amid strong indications that an in-principle decision to ratify Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been taken by the (Nawaz Sharif) government, the cabinet... decided to hold a debate in the National Assembly on the issue.” During the debate, the opposition “flayed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and raised pertinent questions during the four-hour-long briefing... given by Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Siddique Kanju. At the end of the briefing... the opposition leader in the senate, Mr Aitzaz Ahsan, confined himself to saying that all the parliamentarians are utterly disappointed by the official briefing.” Pakistan’s opposition parties sought to link signing the CTBT to some progress on the Kashmir question, and both the opposition and government called for the lifting of sanctions before Pakistan signed the CTBT. On September 23, 1998, at the United Nations Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif essentially committed to signing the CTBT, indicating that Pakistan would sign the CTBT within one year in exchange for the lifting of sanctions.

Another development in early September was the Nonaligned summit held in South Africa, where Pretoria attempted to caution about a “nuclear arms race” in South Asia and to call on India and Pakistan “not to weaponize or deploy” their nuclear options. “After a massive effort, India did finally manage to prevent the summit from adopting the nuclear formulations of South Africa.” The Indian press somewhat screened the issue by claiming that South Africa was adopting a Western rather than nonaligned perspective, that “South Africa has played ball with the West,” and suggested that other countries such as France were more accepting of India’s nuclear actions.

Press Coverage of Domestic and International Reactions: Hints of Nuclear Learning?

India’s press initially expressed euphoria but then immediately assumed a more moderate line on the Indian nuclear tests. They made few references to the widespread external criticism of India’s nuclear tests and also largely downplayed the possible adverse impact of sanctions.

The typical headlines immediately after the May 11 tests were euphoric: The Times of India declared “India joins nuclear club”; The Hindu, “President congratulates scientists”; and the Indian Express, “Indians overseas swell with patriotic pride over nuclear tests.” A representative headline on sanctions stated that “India will emerge unscathed say experts.” One editorial titled “Road to Resurgence” noted that the tests would elevate India to great power status. Other editorials were more cautious, a theme reflected in the title “First casualty is democracy” that expressed concern about the secrecy and unilateralism surrounding the BJP government’s decision to test. Eventually most editorials settled down to counseling the government on managing the posttest situation, a theme reflected in the title “Pokhran-II: managing the fallout.” India’s press also covered domestic opposition and criticism (see Appendix F) and advocated signing the CTBT.
Although they have no qualms in reporting internal opposition, the Indian press, as in previous years, considerably downplayed the depth of external criticism of India’s nuclear tests and instead excessively highlighted positions supportive of India. During May and June such coverage effectively kept India’s public in the dark about the extent of India’s isolation in the international community. For example, articles highlighted the fact that not all countries supported sanctions against India. Headlines such as “Russia Against Sanctions” and “United States slaps sanctions on India: Russia, France not to toe line” and “Russia may help India as world bashing continues” seemed to suggest that India was not isolated in the broader international community but simply being subject to Western or U.S. pressure. Other reports highlighted the fact that the international community was calling for steps toward disarmament along with its condemnation of India’s nuclear tests, implying that the tests were only being mildly condemned. Thus following the July ASEAN meetings headlines noted that “India, Pak N-tests draw mild rebuke from ASEAN,” “ASEAN targets the big nuclear powers too,” and “ASEAN resists West’s pressure on N-rap.” The ARF statement was moderately critical of South Asian nuclear tests.

The Indian press also diminished its anti-U.S. stand especially in June and July. Thus Bill Clinton’s references to India’s democratic trappings and civilizational moorings were received positively by some of the Indian press, suggested in the title “In the Clinton Cabinet, India has only one friend—Bill.” Even this article, however, seemed to assume that such positive gestures were a sign that Washington was beginning to (or should) “appreciate India’s security concerns” and did not make note of the fact that not all of the Washington establishment would easily concede ground on the proliferation issue. Similarly, another article on the exemption of wheat sales from sanctions was titled “Clinton endorses Senate move to ease sanctions: Most senators pitch for removing all curbs” suggesting and assuming that the easing of sanctions meant an easing of the United States stand on nonproliferation.

Finally, it should be noted that Indian press coverage in 1998 did not contain the excessive ideological or populist anti-nonproliferation regime rhetoric that was manifest in the Indian press in prior years. Instead, the Indian press highlighted cost-benefit issues noting that because India has acquired partially greater confidence in its nuclear capability, it may now sign the CTBT. This may be an indication that “nuclear learning” is taking place among the Indian elite and political communities, albeit very gradually. These themes are reflected in an editorial that noted:

Unlike the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which discriminates between the five recognized nuclear powers and others and, as such, was and continues to be unacceptable to India, the CTBT does not distinguish between the nuclear haves and have-nots though the consequences of some of its provisions work to the disadvantage of the latter. . . . The treaty would not come in the way of New Delhi’s plans for nuclear weaponization or the development of the missile program. In a way, India has already accepted the obligations that would be cast on it under the CTBT. What else is the meaning of the repeated unilateral announcements of a moratorium on tests and of the willingness to give it a legal form? Adherence to the CTBT, along with the other measures, New Delhi is inclined to take—like the willingness to join the negotiations in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament for a treaty on the fissile material production cut-off and its readiness to accept controls on the export of fissile material and nuclear technology—is certain to add up to a package that would go a long way in assuaging the concerns of the nuclear powers. . . . Islamabad sees merit in signing the treaty so as to be able to bargain for concessions from the U.S. and other key nations and to bail itself out of the problems created by the sanctions. Any such action by Pakistan is certain to generate new pressures on India. Instead of its being seen as following suit, an early initiative by India would credit it with the independence of judgment.

Conclusions: India’s Nuclear Capability and Future Nuclear Options

Following India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests, Washington noted that its policy objectives were as follows:


India agreed to items 1, 5, and 6 and conditionally agreed to the CTBT, albeit in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and access to dual use technology, and sought no constraints in building a minimum deterrent against
China. An official Indian statement noted that “the positive gestures made by the Government of India in recent weeks . . . include, inter alia, the institution of a moratorium on nuclear testing; our willingness to explore ways and means for de jure formalization of this undertaking [item 1 above]; readiness to engage in negotiations on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva [item 5 above]; maintenance and further development of strict export controls on nuclear related materials and technologies [item 6 above].”

On India–Pakistan relations, the Indian statement noted “India remains committed to developing a framework of peaceful relations with Pakistan through a broad-based and sustained bilateral dialogue. This provides an effective means of identifying the possibilities of mutually beneficial cooperation and resolving outstanding issues through bilateral negotiations. It would also include consideration of CBMs such as our proposal for a no-first-use agreement. In this process of dialogue, there is no place for third party involvement of any kind whatsoever.” Pakistan has sought third party involvement in India–Pakistan talks including those on Kashmir, and could not accept the no-first-use CBM because it prefers to keep a “credible deterrence” against Indian conventional force superiority; Pakistan also preferred to settle the Kashmir issue before considering a no-first-use undertaking.

Generally speaking, New Delhi noted that while it would eventually sign the CTBT, it could undertake a number of positive steps before doing so.

India is ready to take other steps: turning India’s pledge not to conduct further nuclear tests into . . . a legally binding international commitment; making a similarly binding pledge not to transfer nuclear technology to other countries, and pledging to join negotiations in Geneva on a new treaty to limit the production of the fuels required for nuclear weapons. But . . . India would not accept the main demand by the United States: that India give up development of a nuclear arsenal. (India) also rejected another American demand, a halt to missile tests, because India sees the tests as essential to develop a deterrent.

On the CTBT itself, while the BJP government indicated that it would sign the CTBT, it has sought to negotiate terms under which it could take this step. The BJP initially sought some recognition as a nuclear state and the lifting of sanctions, without necessarily or strongly insisting on steps to address the disarmament issue. Such a move may face opposition from India’s political center, including its foreign policy bureaucracy, who remain concerned with issues of principle and maintain that India’s original disarmament-related objections to the CTBT and FMCT must be addressed first before New Delhi signs these treaties. In July 1998 New Delhi indicated it would not insist on disarmament-related concessions and even conceded ground on formalizing its status as a nuclear weapons state. Instead, in exchange for signing the CTBT, it sought purely practical benefits such as access to dual-use technology and the removal of curbs on nuclear energy transfers.

It should be noted that India’s centrist and leftist political parties may politicize and not easily allow any moves by the BJP leadership to make deals on signing the CTBT. For example, following the July talks between Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh in New Delhi, a Congress party statement spelled out the party’s general approach as follows: “national interest to dictate foreign policy, which means India must have the autonomy to decide for itself; no signature to the CTBT in its present form; sanctions unwarranted and uncalled for; the recent U.S.–China communiqué, and its South Asia content, unacceptable; hegemony of any country in South Asia to be opposed.” In response, the BJP had to declare that “All parties (would) be taken into confidence on signing (the) CTBT.” Similarly before the fourth round of Talbott–Singh talks in August, the BJP actually preempted domestic opposition by echoing the ideological themes of opposing a “flawed” nonproliferation regime.

To comply with the main outstanding issues beyond a CTBT—ceasing missile testing and deployment (item 3), and actually ceasing fissile material production (item 4)—Indian decision makers would more carefully assess India’s middle-term security requirements.

India’s Nuclear Capabilities

India’s and Pakistan’s May 1998 nuclear tests allowed both states to have greater confidence in previously untested weapons designs, and to advance their programs from air-deliverable to missile-deliverable nuclear systems. Thus both states do not absolutely require additional nuclear testing in order to establish a minimum deterrent against each other, and this explains their willingness to sign the CTBT.
India has enough nuclear material for at least fifty nuclear devices, with its nuclear material stockpile increasing at the rate of at least four weapons annually; this may be sufficient to meet its nuclear deterrent requirements against both China and Pakistan (see Appendix H). It should be clarified that only a fraction of this nuclear material may be weaponized.

On the issue of the necessity for additional nuclear testing, analysts observe that “It is not known how much India learned from the tests, or what exactly it wanted to learn in the first place. The tests have certainly provided India’s nuclear weaponers with important information. But if India actually deploys nuclear weapons, it may want to conduct additional tests to answer new questions about existing designs or to develop more advanced ones.”

India’s second generation thermonuclear device tested in May 1998 should be assumed to be only air-deliverable. India may eventually require additional nuclear tests if it seeks to develop a second-generation weapon that is compact enough to fit on a missile, which would serve as a more powerful deterrent against China. India would also require additional missile tests to build an extended range Agni missile to provide a more reliable deterrent against China.

In the posttest situation, Indian decision makers have stated that they could consider signing the CTBT (in exchange for the lifting of sanctions as discussed above), implying that they determine their nuclear weapons designs to be adequate for India’s present national security requirement. Even after signing a CTBT, however, India and Pakistan could continue to technically advance their nuclear programs—through subcritical and laboratory testing to develop more refined nuclear warheads (including second generation warheads) and fissile material production to acquire a larger stockpile of nuclear material. At a future date (and especially if security concerns increase) Indian and Pakistani policy makers would have to decide on whether their modest first-generation nuclear capabilities are sufficient to meet their nuclear deterrent requirements. If these capabilities are determined to be inadequate, then either or both states may need additional testing to develop second generation missile deliverable weapons. They may also seek to break out of any future FMCT and acquire a larger stockpile of nuclear material. This is where the CTBT and FMCT become significant. In the absence of a CTBT or if the P-5 states revive testing, India and Pakistan would face fewer constraints about proceeding with additional tests that their scientists may eventually seek. Having the CTBT and FMCT in place and ensuring that India and Pakistan join these treaties, may preclude the above outcomes.

Ultimately, India’s formalizing and continuing to adhere to nuclear restraints through signing the CTBT and a future FMCT, as well as undertaking missile restraints, would depend on a number of external and internal factors (see Appendix H). Briefly summarized, internal factors influencing nuclear policy include the nature of the ruling political coalition and whether India’s political center, which may opt for some restraint, or its political right, which may pursue greater nuclearization, are in power. A second factor determining the direction and pace of nuclearization is economic constraints and the related issue of the impact of sanctions. External factors that would influence Indian nuclear policy may include pressure through sanctions and through international diplomatic isolation and pressure. Here it should be noted that excessive external pressure, both political and economic, may cause all Indian political factions to rally around the flag of Indian national security and lead India to more strongly challenge the nonproliferation regime. Two additional external factors that would influence Indian nuclear decision making in the middle-term are security considerations—the state of India–Pakistan and India–China relations, as well as U.S.–China–Pakistan relations—and movement on the disarmament agenda.

Finally, India’s and Pakistan’s joining the CTBT has implications for the broader nonproliferation regime. South Asia’s May 1998 nuclear tests jolted the nonproliferation regime by signaling the emergence of two additional nuclear powers—if this leads additional states to follow the nuclear path, it could reverse the regime’s previously attained gains and cause the regime to unravel. On the other hand, if India and Pakistan formalize their nuclear restraint by signing the CTBT and undertaking other arms control initiatives and the broader nonproliferation and disarmament agenda continues to make progress, such as along the lines suggested in the NPT Extension Conference’s set of principles, then these measures would contribute to stabilizing the nonproliferation regime. Both India and Pakistan would also have an interest in attaining this outcome since it benefits their national security.
### Appendix A

#### Nuclear Testing, 1945–96

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| Total A & U | 215 | 815 | 219 | 496 | 21 | 24 | 50 | 160 | 23 | 22 | 0 | 1 | 2046 |

*In May 1998, India announced 2 tests involving 5 nuclear explosions (3 of which were subkiloton explosions) and Pakistan stated that it conducted 2 nuclear tests involving 6 explosions (3 to 4 of which were subkiloton explosions).

**Notes:**
- A: Atmospheric; U: Underground. British underground tests were conducted in the United States. The above tests include 27 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) for the United States (1961–73) and 124 PNEs for the Soviet Union (1965–88). Further, some nuclear tests comprised multiple devices; total devices exploded are 969 for the Soviet Union and 1,149 for the United States. The French total includes 12 safety tests (1965–89).
Appendix B
The CTBT—A Chronology of Relevant Events

1990–93

October 1990. Final nuclear test in the then Soviet Union.

July 1991. French nuclear test followed by the beginning of a four-year test moratorium (French testing was resumed in 1995).


August 1992. U.S. Senate passes resolution permitting no more than five U.S. nuclear tests annually to check safety and reliability (these never actually took place) and seeking a halt to all nuclear testing by September 1996.


October 1992. President Bush signs Senate resolution seeking a halt to all nuclear testing by September 1996.

November 1992. France proposes talks among the declared nuclear states (P-5) concerning a CTBT.

June 1993. Sweden submits a draft version of a possible CTBT to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.


November 1993. First Committee of the UN General Assembly approves by consensus a resolution calling for CTBT negotiations to commence.

December 16, 1993. UN General Assembly passes resolution 48/70 by consensus, calling for test ban negotiations.

1994


August–September 7. Third CD session. Ends with a draft ninety-three-page rolling text of a CTBT. Disagreements remain over the treaty’s scope, as the United States still desired a ten-year opt-out clause; the U.K. and France wanted provisions for tests related to warhead safety in exceptional circumstances; China sought the allowing of peaceful nuclear explosions.


1995


January. The United States renounces its previously held CTBT position on a ten-year opt-out provision, and thus supports an indefinite duration treaty.

April 6. France, Russia, the U.K., and the United States issue a joint statement reaffirming their “commitment, as stated in NPT Article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.” They also call for the CTBT to be concluded “without delay.”

April 7. The U.K. and France give up their CTBT position of seeking nuclear testing in exceptional circumstances.

April 11. UN Security Council passes resolution 984 containing updated positive security assurances provided in a common statement by the P-5.

April 17–May 12. NPT Extension Conference. NPT indefinitely extended. The conference’s Principles and Objectives called for a CTBT “no later than 1996.”

May 15. Chinese nuclear test.
Appendix


June 13. France announces intention to resume nuclear testing.

July 31–September 22. Third CD session.

August 11. U.S. scientists (JASON) report that subkiloton threshold tests are of marginal utility, upon which President Clinton announces U.S. support for a zero-yield treaty not permitting subcritical tests. The announcement was diplomatically mishandled and alienated Britain and Russia.


September 5. French nuclear testing resumes.

September 14. U.K. announces support for zero-yield CTBT.


October 16–20. Nonaligned Movement (NAM) conference at Cartagena, Colombia. NAM declares that “the time has come for the entire stockpile of these deadly [nuclear weapons] to be destroyed once and for all” and further calls for “the adoption of an action plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.”

October 18 and 26. India adds disarmament to CTBT agenda in its NAM and UN statements.

October 27. Third French nuclear test.

November 16. UN General Assembly resolution GA/DIS/3043 calls for the nuclear states to “stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, stockpiling and production of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems” and to “carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons within a time-bound framework.”


December 12. UN General Assembly passes resolution 50/65 by consensus, calling on the CD to conclude a CTBT by the outset of the fifty-first session, which begins in September 1996.


December 27. Fifth French nuclear test.

1996

January 22–March 29. First CD session of 1996. Major issues remaining include disarmament, qualitative development, on-site-inspections (OSIs), entry into force (EIF).

January 25. Indian statement at CD takes a stronger position on disarmament, qualitative development. New Delhi calls for a CTBT which will bring an end to all nuclear weapons development, thus implicitly calling for a ban on subcritical and laboratory testing.

January 27. Sixth and final French nuclear test.

January 27. Prithvi missile test in India, the first after a twenty-month hiatus.

February 29. Iran and Australia submit draft CTBT texts to the CD.

March 14. Nonaligned proposal (CD/1388) calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to begin negotiations on a framework for nuclear disarmament immediately after the CTBT negotiations are complete.

March 21. Indian statement at the CD reemphasizes a stronger position on the CTBT and calls for going beyond the mere mechanical task of completing a CTBT text, by placing the CTBT in its proper context as an integral step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.

April 27–May 15. Indian elections. No party has a majority. Following elections, the BJP and its allies hold approximately 190 seats, the Congress 140 seats, and the thirteen-party coalition United Front (UF) 180 seats in the 540-seat legislature.

May 18–31. BJP forms a government in India

May 28. Chair’s draft CTBT introduced, containing preambular language on disarmament and an EIF criterion based upon ratification by thirty-seven states that have monitoring stations.

June 1. UF minority coalition government assumes office in India.

June 5. UF policy declaration opposes the CTBT and announces its intention to preserve India’s nuclear option.

June 8. Chinese nuclear test, accompanied by a statement that next test would be the final test.

June 20. India announces that it will not sign the CTBT unless the issues of prohibiting the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and disarmament are addressed, because these jeopardize its national security; it adds that will not block the treaty.

June 26. India withdraws monitoring stations from CTBT system, thereby removing itself from the CTBT’s then existing EIF criterion.

June 27. Thirteen G-21 states submit a proposal calling for a stronger preambular commitments in the CTBT, stating that the treaty should end the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. It added that the CTBT should be complemented by negotiations on a comprehensive phased program with agreed time frames for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery at the earliest possible time (proposal sponsored by Brazil, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Myanmar, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela).

June 28. “Take-it-or-leave-it” draft CTBT introduced by the CD chair. The EIF criterion in this draft is that forty-four nuclear-capable states (this list includes the P-5 and threshold states) must ratify the treaty before it enters into force. The OSI criterion is that OSIs are permitted when approved by a simple majority (50 percent) of states. The then prevailing U.S. position was 50 percent; Russia, U.K., France supported three-fifths (60 percent), while China and Pakistan desired two-thirds (67 percent). India objects to the EIF clause and proposes an alternative EIF criterion similar to that for the Chemical Weapons Convention, that is, ratification by any sixty-five states.

July 1996. The United States supports the chair’s draft to deter further negotiations on the CTBT.

July 29. Final Chinese nuclear test.

July 29. The United States accepts three-fifths position for on-site-inspections, which is closer to China’s position. India is angered that the chair’s draft is being amended to accommodate China’s OSI position but has not been changed to accommodate India’s EIF position.

August 7. Nonaligned “Proposal for a program of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons” (CD/1419) submitted to the CD by Egypt on behalf of twenty-eight nonaligned states; South Africa and Chile did not agree to the program.

August 9. CD test ban committee chair notes that no further progress is likely through continuing negotiations.

August 16. CD considers adopting the CTBT and passing its report to the United Nations. India blocks the adoption of CTBT by the CD and also blocks allowing treaty to be attached to the CD report being submitted to the UN General Assembly. India and Iran block the passing of a truncated report without the CTBT text to the United Nations.

August 22. Australia submits CTBT to the UN General Assembly.

September 10. UN General Assembly adopts the CTBT. The resolution is cosponsored by 127 states, including Britain, France, the United States, Israel, Kazakhstan, and South Africa. Nonaligned cosponsors include Brazil, Colombia, Peru, the Philippines, and Venezuela. Russia and China withhold cosponsorship on the grounds that they do not want to endorse the unprecedented process of bypassing of the CD. The final vote is 158 for, 3 against, 5 abstain. India, Bhutan, and Libya vote against the treaty; Tanzania, Cuba, Syria, Lebanon, and Mauritius abstain. Nineteen other countries including North Korea are diplomatically absent; of these, several cosponsors and Iraq are not permitted to vote because of large arrears in payments to the United Nations.

September 24. CTBT opens for signature.
1997
January–December. CD deadlocked over the issues of FMCT and disarmament. India firmly opposes any discussion of the FMCT unless the CD simultaneously discusses the issue of disarmament. The Western nuclear states and Russia oppose an ad hoc committee on disarmament at the CD.
April 22, 1997. Inder Gujral replaces H.D. Deve Gowda as India’s Prime Minister.
Mid-1997. India’s United Front government considers but then backs away from a nuclear test.

1998
March 19. A BJP-led coalition government assumes office in India following Indian elections.
March 28. BJP-government wins vote of confidence by a margin of 274 to 261.
April 6. Pakistan tests its Ghauri ballistic missile over a 700 to 1,000 km range.
April 6. France and Britain deposit their ratification to the CTBT.
May 11, 13. India announces that it has conducted five nuclear tests.
May 28, 30. Pakistan announces that it has conducted six nuclear tests.
Appendix C
Documents on India’s CTBT Position

October 1995 Cartagena statement: Address by Prime Minister of India P. V. Narasimha Rao at the Eleventh Nonaligned Summit, Cartagena, Colombia, October 18, 1995.
October 1995 UN statement: Statement by Atal Behari Vajpayee, member of parliament and member of the Indian Delegation to the fiftieth UN General Assembly, at the First Committee, October 26, 1995.
Appendix D
Press Coverage of the CTBT, NPT, and Nuclear Issues

This appendix contains an annotated list of the CTBT debate during 1996 in the Indian press; a review of the CTBT in the world press; an examination of the NPT Extension Conference in the Indian and Pakistani press; and an analytical discussion of issue framing in the Indian press.

The CTBT debate in the Indian Press

This section contains an annotated list of Indian press articles grouped into several categories. It includes summaries of articles expressing support for the CTBT, or against New Delhi’s anti-CTBT position; articles on nuclear testing; headlines framing the CTBT as a measure of U.S. pressure against India; and headlines highlighting national consensus behind the CTBT and the issue of sovereignty.

Headlines Framing the CTBT as a Measure of U.S. Pressure against India

U.S. May Urge Moscow To Link Indian Defence Deals With CTBT. *The Times of India*, July 15, 1996.


U.S. Will Not Allow India To Block Test Ban Treaty. *The Times of India*, August 2, 1996. This article began with the line “U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher adopted a combative stance singling out India as the only country which was creating problems by insisting on a time-table for total nuclear disarmament.”

U.S. Warns India, Others Against Conducting N-Tests. *The Times of India*, September 12, 1996; with subtitles “We will dispel India’s concerns, says Clinton,” and “We will not succumb to any pressure: Gujral.”


Victory For U.S., Splendid Isolation For India. *The Indian Express*, September 12, 1996.

Having Had His Way, Clinton Tries To Soothe India. *The Indian Express*, September 12, 1996.

U.N. Vote On CTBT A Message To Hold-Outs. *The Hindu*, September 12, 1996, p. 13. This article begins with the first sentence clarifying that the UN vote “has allowed the Clinton administration to make the point that the big vote will make it clear to the small number of countries which are holdouts that they were alone in opposing the CTBT.”

Fissile Material Cut-Off Pact, Next U.S. Target. *The Indian Express*, November 10, 1996. This article, in the post-CTBT period, began with the line “The United States has begun the push to obtain a fissile material cut-off treaty” and ended with the line “the United States is offering to sell China modern, state of the art nuclear power reactors . . . if it joins the other recognized nuclear powers in a common frontal organization to obtain a fissile material cut-off treaty as soon as possible.”

Headlines Highlighting National Consensus behind the CTBT and the Issue of Sovereignty


Positions Supporting the CTBT, or against New Delhi’s Declaratory Position

No Weapons, No Fight. Sadanand Menon, in Economic Times, June 23, 1996. This article noted that “finally it is out that India wants to retain its option to make nuclear warheads. It cloaks this illicit passion in a rhetoric of virtue and nobility. Contributing to a consensus on the CTBT would have been a chance to prove we are serious about dismantling the engines of destruction. Today we have merely exposed our juvenile politics of expansionist dreams and our infantile science which stays a slave of the weapons-lab lobby.”

Toads Under A Nuclear Mushroom. Praful Bidwai, in Economic Times, June 23, 1996, p. 13. This article stated that “our strategic experts—who cannot be credited with a single original idea—have been spreading disinformation.”

Posturing On CTBT. G.S. Bhargava, in The Times of India, June 26, 1996. This article noted that “the intellectual atmosphere in respect of the CTBT has become so inhospitable that it has come in handy for posturing by political parties” and that “thanks to thoughtless posturing in Geneva, India has painted itself in a no-win situation.”

Sign The CTBT. Jagat Mehta, Krishna Raj, Bhabani Sengupta, A. Gopalkrishnan, and twenty-four others, in The Times of India, July 19, 1996. This letter noted that India “must firmly resist hawkish pressure to move toward exercising the nuclear option” and that “if the CTBT talks fail, the post-Cold War momentum toward nuclear restraint would be undermined and existing arms-control agreements could unravel. New Delhi must discharge the moral and political responsibility it assumed in 1954 by securing a good CTBT through a constructive, consensual approach.”

Why India Must Think Again On The CTBT. The Pioneer, September 12, 1996. This article argued that India could not afford the financial, environmental or political costs of developing a nuclear arsenal.

Gains From Iniquity: India No Better Or Worse From The CTBT. The Indian Express, September 12, 1996. This article noted that, although some of the treaty’s provisions are flawed, “even India, bitter though it has reason to be for being put on the rack in Geneva, may find that this incomplete treaty is better than no treaty.”

Drifting Into Deterrence: Perils Of Populism. Praful Bidwai, in The Times of India, July 4, 1997. This article, in the post CTBT era, argued that U.S. subcritical tests do not vindicate, and should not translate into support for, India’s anti-CTBT stance.

On Nuclear Testing

CTBT: Sign, With A Condition For Testing. Vijai Nair, in Economic Times, June 1996. This article noted that India should sign the CTBT, with the provision that it would carry out a limited number of tests in the next two years.

Lead Us Not Into Tests. R. Ramachandran, in Economic Times, July 4, 1996. This article argued that India should not rush into nuclear tests while there was still time to extract a commitment to disarmament.

Other Articles on the CTBT

Why India Should Sign The CTBT. The Times of India, June 26, 1996. This article began by noting that “the stand taken by India on the CTBT is a classic example of the traditional Indian approach to security issues, namely, make a grand symbolic gesture meaningless in its content but one which gets substantial domestic acclaim and accolades.” It ended with the comment that “not signing the CTBT gains India nothing except an interim period in which it loses by bearing the costs of isolation, opprobrium, shifting attitudes towards Pakistan, etc.”

CTBT And Indian Security: Flawed Concepts Foreclose Options. G. Balachandran, in The Times of India, September 3, 1996. This article critiqued Indian declaratory policy on the CTBT, but also noted that Indian security may be jeopardized without testing.

A House Needs A Front Door. M. D. Nalapat, in The Times of India, September 11, 1996. This op-ed took a position against India’s signing the CTBT.
The CTBT in the World Press

The CTBT coverage in other states had some similarities and a few differences with that in the Indian media. The differences were that in most countries, the CTBT was largely restricted to analysis in editorials, mainly in September 1996 when the treaty was finally adopted at the UN General Assembly. In India (and to some extent in Pakistan), the CTBT received consistent front-page coverage, and over a wider period of time for much of mid-1996. The similarities were that editorials in other countries expressed views not unlike those in the Indian press. These editorials also partly reflected positions taken by respective national delegates at the UN. The Foreign Media Reaction Daily Digest described CTBT coverage in various countries as ranging from:

The celebratory jubilation of the influential Jordan Times, which termed the endorsement “a major triumph for humanity,” to Russia’s neo-communist Pravda’s estimation that the vote “smacked of arm-twisting attempts to perpetuate world domination by the United States and its partners.” Many editorialists cautioned that the ultimate goal of a nuclear-free world was still distant.

A number of opinion makers expressed sympathy for the Indian government’s argument that the CTBT freezes an unequal nuclear status quo and does not force the nuclear “haves” to commit to a specific timetable for the destruction of their nuclear arsenals. Vietnam’s army newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan declared unequivocally, “The complete elimination of the nuclear armories is also urgent, so that no country . . . [can use] this type of weapon as a kind of ‘magic wand’ to deter others. It is on this point that the protest shown by India and some other nations against the CTBT is understandable.” Thailand’s independent Nation, however, asserted, “India’s opposition to the CTBT would make sense if India were to propose a serious alternative to what it strenuously maintains is a flawed, loophole-ridden measure that is not seriously linked to disarmament. But it has not done so.”

Media from the subcontinent expressed surprising agreement, with Pakistani commentators concurring with Indian pundits in praising India’s “principled stance” in voting against the CTBT and allegedly holding out for total global nuclear disarmament. The editor of Pakistan’s center-right Nation, affirmed India’s “fight against exclusiveness,” querying, “Why should the . . . [‘nuclear haves’] decide the fate of the world?” Many voices in the Indian media viewed their country’s stance as not unlike that of “an Indian David” facing “a U.S. Goliath,” while others fretted about India’s “diplomatic isolation” following the UN vote.

A few other reactions to the treaty discussed in the Foreign Media Reaction Daily Digest, September 23, 1996, are worth noting. In Russia, a Pravda editorial, “U.S. Arm-Twisting at UNGA” (Pravda, September 19), noted that “Computer technologies have split the nuclear powers into two unequal groups. Some can improve their weapons, and others, including Russia and China, cannot . . . Russia fell hostage to its own good will, finding itself at a disadvantage with the United States, Britain and France . . . Statements by the White House and the Pentagon that in two to three years the United States will have even more powerful equipment to substitute for nuclear testing leave no doubt whatsoever about their hegemonistic ambition as well as posing a direct threat to Russia’s sovereignty.” Another editorial, “Hour of Triumph” (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, September 14), declared that “a historic breakthrough has happened. The treaty, however, is not a goal unto itself but the first step to the ultimate goal, the complete destruction of nuclear weapons.”
In Jordan, a report titled “Israel’s Nuclear Baton Must Be Broken” (Jordan Times, September 14) stated that “the UN General Assembly’s endorsement of a treaty that places a total ban on nuclear testing is a major triumph for humanity.” It also cautioned about ratification because “the treaty leaves Israel as the only nuclear power in the region which could threaten the region’s long-term security and stability. Something must therefore be done to neutralize this before the Arab countries proceed to ratify the treaty. It is one thing to sign the treaty as an expression of support for its broad principles and objectives, and quite another thing to ratify it and make it binding.”

In Indonesia, an article titled “Free Nuclear World Still Obscure” (Merdeka, September 17) stated that U.S. spokesperson Nicholas Burns had “confirmed that the United States would continue to develop and produce nuclear weapons in the laboratory. This is very odd, since U.S. negotiators for disarmament in Geneva stated that, when ratified, the treaty would not be merely symbolic but, rather, would have real authority. The international community may dream about enjoying air free of radioactivity, but nuclear war threats still loom. Why? Because men cannot stop competing in the nuclear laboratory.”

In the Philippines, an editorial titled “CTBT Perpetuates Nuclear Monopoly” (Manila Chronicle, September 17) noted that “what India wants is a totally nuclear-free world. Instead, the CTBT will make sure that the nuclear powers can retain their monopoly over nuclear weapons while the rest of the world will never have the opportunity to build their own arsenals.” Another editorial, “CTBT Could Lead to Total Destruction of N-Weapons,” (Manila Bulletin, September 14) stated that currently “there is no agreement among the five nuclear powers to destroy their stockpiles for good. India is well aware of this situation. But the pressing clamor by the rest of the world, including [India’s] friendly neighbors, to join the movement to banish, before it is too late, the stockpiling of nuclear armaments for war purposes, may yet lead to a change of heart despite the real threat of her next-door neighbor, China.”

In Argentina, an op-ed titled “Doubtful victory” (La Prensa, September 18) stated that “the total success obtained at the United Nations toward the banning of all nuclear tests leaves, nevertheless, a disquieting taste. . . . The UN vote—although important—neither justifies the optimism shown by Washington nor merits the most desolate pessimism. One can say that [the CTBT vote] is a considerable step toward a world without lethal radioactive mushrooms, but one that should be accompanied by maximum caution. The 158 countries [that voted for the CTBT], including Argentina . . . should form a powerful mutual safeguard bloc, [and] exercise political pressure on those who want to continue experimenting with the weapons and on those who already have tested them. Not one nuclear warhead should remain on this planet, so that the UN vote can really mean ‘a new era after the Cold War,’ as it was announced by the United States.”

The NPT Extension Conference in the Indian and Pakistani Press

In the run-up to the NPT Extension Conference, the Indian press carried a series of articles that served to provide intellectual support for New Delhi’s opposition to the NPT. A quantitative analysis of the NPT debate in the Indian Express and the Statesman during January–June 1995 observed that in the Indian Express, 30 articles agreed and 4 disagreed with the official Indian “nuclear line,” while in the Statesman 7 articles agreed and 1 disagreed with the official nuclear line. Three main reasons justifying India’s remaining outside the NPT are discernible in these press reports: issues of principle; more realist arguments noting, often inaccurately, alleged drawbacks of the NPT regime in failing to stem proliferation; and security concerns from Pakistan’s nuclear program and a long-term Chinese nuclear threat, especially after Chinese tests resumed following the NPT Extension Conference. Only the isolated analysis pointed out the merits of the NPT.

First, commentators argued that New Delhi should remain absent from the NPT Extension Conference because of issues of principle and ideology, stating that “India’s objections on principle have been proved by the historical record concerning the failure of the nuclear states to pursue steps toward disarmament. . . . Let us not spoil our unique record of unrelenting opposition to nuclear weapons by even giving an iota of our recognition to the NPT by sending an official observer.” Others noted that India should remain absent from the NPT Extension Conference but must also not disregard its nonproliferation objectives—rather, India should use the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) to pursue its goals—“India has the responsibility of encouraging the nonaligned members to demand an end to discrimination and confront the nuclear weapon states with charges of
double standards. India should advise its NAM colleagues to support no more than a limited extension tied to a time-bound framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{252}

A second source of opposition to the NPT was less ideological and more “realist”—alleging that the treaty was not working and would never work in preventing proliferation—and was therefore flawed and not worth signing. In this regard, some analysts highlighted pessimistic worst-case scenarios. For example, a 1993 article stated:

The NPT is beginning to unravel because North Korea took the option of withdrawing . . . [in] Ukraine and Kazakhstan, although they agreed to forego the nuclear weapon option under U.S. pressure, there is great reluctance in the two capitals to implement the agreement. The process of dismantling these weapons will in any event take several years to accomplish. Both these countries are loath to give up an acknowledged currency of power. Ukraine has not signed the NPT nor ratified SALT I.\textsuperscript{253}

These speculations were generally baseless and proved to be incorrect in the subsequent year: North Korea did not eventually leave the NPT, and Ukraine and Kazakhstan actually gave up their nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, this trend of inaccurately or unnecessarily highlighting prior drawbacks of the nonproliferation regime, some of which were in no way the fault of the NPT, and most of which have in fact been addressed, continued in the Indian press. Thus an April 1995 article noted that “the NPT has failed to stop the flow of materials to Pakistan, Iraq, North Korea, Israel and South Africa. . . . France and Germany have been merrily exporting nuclear technology with the United States and Russia not far behind.”\textsuperscript{254} Although such exports did take place until the 1980s, and were in no way a violation of the NPT in any case, the safeguards regime has become much stricter since then. Yet this fact of tighter transfer restrictions in the 1990s, which India actually opposes, was not pointed out.

Other commentators in the Indian press further emphasized an apparent Pakistani nuclear threat to India, while ignoring the fact that if India and Pakistan fell under effective safeguards, then such a threat would never have arisen. Such perspectives stated that Pakistan had “developed nuclear weapons with the connivance of some of the signatory states of the NPT in utter disregard of civilized behavior and inter-state relations.”\textsuperscript{255} A somewhat different but partly related issue that gained prominence in the Indian press in April 1995 was that the NPT safeguards system was inadequate. This issue arose when, during Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s visit to the United States that month, the Washington Post carried a story on the construction of a plutonium production reactor in Pakistan.

The Washington Post report was initially denied but then confirmed by Bhutto. The Indian press seized this opportunity to make the allegation that “India has time and again cautioned against the inadequacy of NPT safeguards . . . the fact that the U.S. administration was not unaware of the exchange of atoms [that is, nuclear collaboration between China and Pakistan] . . . makes mockery of the U.S. efforts to end horizontal proliferation and on that pretext perpetuate a flawed regime through unconditional and indefinite extension.”\textsuperscript{256}

Only the isolated article questioned India’s anti-NPT stand and highlighted the merits of the NPT:

India’s security interests are served by the number of nuclear weapon states being small, seven or eight, and by countries prone to nuclear adventurism, notably Iran and Iraq, not gaining access to dual use fission technology . . . the NPT is the only hedge against the spread of nuclear weapons. . . . One has to build on its moral force and not fritter it away. . . . One has to get into it and play the game, may be with a better moral record than that of the U.S. and other nuclear weapon states . . . [the] External Affairs Minister has made the amazing statement that since India is against the indefinite extension it will not have observers at the conference where retired IFS [Indian Foreign Service] officers as nonofficial experts will repeat the theme song. If this is India’s nuclear policy towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons, God save our future generations.\textsuperscript{257}

Interestingly, the topics covered in the Indian press were almost exactly mirrored in the Pakistani press, where issues of principle were found alongside comments on the NPT regime’s alleged drawbacks in failing to stem proliferation, and references to a security threat from India. Thus one article combined these three issues:

The world in 1995 faces a graver threat than what it did in 1970 . . . today [nuclear technologies] have become fairly commonplace with nuclear weapons being added to the military might of several states . . . India, Israel, South Africa, North Korea—the list continues to expand. The euphoria that the NPT will easily deter clandestine nuclear developments lasted barely for the time it took India to explode a nuclear device in 1974. . . . The majority of the nonnuclear countries are reluctant to give an across the board extension to the NPT. The nuclear powers
should set an example by destroying their own arsenals. Universal conformity cannot be expected by having a regimen of haves and have nots.\textsuperscript{58}

**Issue Framing in the Indian Press**

Nuclear issues discussed in the Indian press concern (1) nuclear energy issues, mostly discussed in the business-economics-financial sections of newspapers; and (2) India’s nuclear option policy of maintaining a threshold status—neither going overtly nuclear nor relinquishing the nuclear option—and New Delhi’s opposition to the global nonproliferation regime. These aspects are highlighted to a far greater extent than nuclear energy issues, although in recent years the topic of nuclear energy has found prominence in the Indian press.

Although the discussion of energy is not politicized, even this has populist overtones by linking it to concepts such as external pressure, national sovereignty, and self-reliance. For example, an article highlighting the peaceful nature of India’s nuclear activities (“Nuclear program for peaceful purposes: PM,” *Deccan Herald*, August 10, 1997) noted:

Prime Minister I. K. Gujral yesterday asserted that “India will not be deterred in following its nuclear policy, whether there is pressure, direct or indirect.” . . . India’s program was being pursued for peaceful purposes. . . . Some countries are not positive towards India getting nuclear power technology [from Russia] and were coming in our way. . . . Referring to the expertise that India had achieved in the field of heavy water production, Mr. Gujral said New Delhi believed in self-reliance in the area.

**Occasional Cautioning Against Overt Nuclearization**

On India’s nuclear option, the domestic press is cautious about arguments calling for India’s going overtly nuclear. For example, this word of caution is reflected in the title of an op-ed—“Gujral should guard against Nuclear Hawks” (T. T. Poulose, in *The Times of India*, August 21, 1997)—which called for nuclear restraint. Another commentary titled “Nuclear Illusion” (*The Times of India*, September 2, 1997) noted that while some Indian analysts “peddle the illusion that nuclear bombs will make the country a superpower [India could not] be oblivious to the fate of the erstwhile USSR . . . which followed similar policies and has ended up in the dustbin of history.” This article further pointed out that Indian security analysts are not qualified to argue for an overt nuclear option, because:

None of India’s leading security analysts have ever been involved as scientists or engineers in the nuclear program. Even the retired military officers have scarcely any knowledge of the nuclear program . . . the nuclear deterrence debate in India is a charade . . . in the absence of strategic studies experts who have studied all the issues connected with the question of having a nuclear deterrent, the argument for an overt [nuclear] status is lopsided. . . . [Further] the social costs of going nuclear need to be factored in. Nuclear deterrence will spawn an entirely new theology, which India’s minuscule community of strategic studies experts can hardly master.

**Downplaying External Criticism of New Delhi’s Nuclear Policy**

Although opinions for and against New Delhi’s nuclear policy are both represented in the Indian press, dissenting opinions are fewer during times when key events such as the CTBT take place; they are largely relegated to the op-ed pages and in the fine print of articles. Positions supportive of New Delhi’s nuclear policy are prominently highlighted in article headlines and on front pages.

Three examples illustrate this framing of nuclear issues in the Indian press: first, the very different emphases given by Reuters and the Indian press to statements by Japanese Foreign Minister Ikeda, during his July 1997 visit to India and Pakistan, that both states should sign the CTBT; second, the highlighting of remarks by visiting officials or nongovernmental organizations that support the Indian position on its nuclear option; and third, the downplaying of pro-CTBT remarks made by ASEAN states and instead the highlighting of India’s anti-CTBT stand in reports of the July 1997 ASEAN summit.

On the first example, Reuters began its report with the headline “Japan cautions India, Pakistan over Nuclear treaty.” This report noted that the Japanese foreign minister remarked that “the affinity of the Japanese people with India and Pakistan is hampered to a large degree by the fact that India and Pakistan, inflicted with
tension over the Kashmir issue, and competing in missile development and deployment, have yet to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),” and that India and Pakistan “should heed the voice of the international society which deems the CTBT an important step towards nuclear disarmament” (Reuters, July 25, 1997, New Delhi).

An Indian press article on the issue largely downplayed the above mentioned criticism of Indian nuclear policy and did not mention references to the CTBT’s merits and international acceptance. Instead, the article was titled “India, Japan to form panel to enhance bilateral ties.” The third paragraph of this article noted that the Indian–Japanese discussions “broadly covered four topics: bilateral exchanges on political issues, the need to enhance economic ties, regional issues and reforms in the United Nations.” The fourth paragraph noted that “while appreciating India’s reiteration of its known stand against signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Japanese spokesman said it was conveyed that nonetheless, India should strive for a more realistic approach. A similar appeal was made to the Pakistani Prime Minister and President during Mr. Ikeda’s visit prior to arriving here yesterday” (“India, Japan to form panel to enhance bilateral ties,” The Hindu, July 25, 1997, p. 11).

Another newspaper was more outspoken on the issue, with its article titled “CTBT: India rejects Japanese proposal” (The Deccan Herald, July 25, 1997). Only a business newspaper suggested that New Delhi’s stand was potentially harmful, with the title “India’s stand on CTBT—Ikeda warns of shrinking ties” (Business Line, July 26, 1997).

In regard to the second example, an article on the visit of the past president of the American Nuclear Society, Don Miller, was titled “India needs N-arms for protection” and began with the line “It makes sense for a country like India to have nuclear weapons for self-protection considering the strength of its neighboring country” and stated that this view “has not been expressed by an Indian atomic scientist or a minister, but for a change by an American” (The Times of India, July 26, 1997). Such reporting attempts to vindicate New Delhi’s opposition to the global nonproliferation regime.

On the third issue, Indian news reports on the July 1997 ASEAN meetings stressed a self-righteous perspective concerning Indian nuclear policy. One article was titled “India defends stand on CTBT at ASEAN meet.” The first three paragraphs highlighted Indian arguments opposing the CTBT; only thereafter in the next three paragraphs were references made to Malaysia’s and ASEAN’s arguments in support of the CTBT (“India defends stand on CTBT at ASEAN meet,” The Times of India, July 28, 1997; the same article was carried in The Indian Express, July 28, 1997). Another newspaper relegated the CTBT issue to a subtitle. This article was titled “U.S. sees merit in India’s stand” referring to and beginning with a paragraph on U.S. support for an Indian seat on the UN Security Council. One issue section in this article was subtitled “Stance on CTBT clarified” and contained reports on the Indian opposition to the CTBT, but made no reference to ASEAN support for the CTBT (“U.S. sees merit in India’s stand,” The Hindu, July 28, 1997, p. 1).

Finally, another July 1997 story defending New Delhi’s CTBT stand was titled “India must not be forced on CTBT deadline: Australia” (Deccan Herald, July 24, 1997). This article accurately reported the Australian prime minister’s statements that he recognized that internal political circumstances made it hard for New Delhi to sign the CTBT. However, the article added that New Delhi was also justified in not signing the CTBT because Pakistan and China have not signed the treaty. The reference to Pakistan and China simply served to divert attention from New Delhi’s isolation; moreover, the reference to China is incorrect.

The above slant to nuclear topics has served to “socialize” India’s news-reading public on New Delhi’s official long standing nuclear line, and also results in public unawareness of arguments concerning the merits of the nonproliferation regime and India’s isolation on nonproliferation issues in the international community.
Appendix E
Technical Aspects of India’s Nuclear Tests

India conducted a series of nuclear tests on May 11 and May 13, 1998. The decision to conduct the tests was kept secret, and may have been taken sometime in March 1998 when the BJP assumed power. The decision was made by a handful of senior BJP leaders including Prime Minister Vajpayee and Home Minister Advani. Beyond this core group of leaders, perhaps only Indian scientists who conducted the tests, and at a later date Defense Minister Fernandes (who is not a member of the BJP party but rather a coalition ally with a Socialist background) were actually informed or aware of the test decision.

Indian scientists stated that they were briefed and given the go-ahead authorization thirty days before the tests took place, and that they had plotted the path of U.S. satellites and coordinated their activities to avoid detection by these satellites. The New York Times noted that Indian nuclear scientists “Kalam and Chidambaram had met with Vajpayee on the afternoon of his swearing-in, on March 19, nearly eight weeks before the tests.” If Vajpayee ordered the Indian nuclear blasts within two or three days of (but not necessarily as a direct response to) the Pakistan missile test, that would have set the Indian tests for about May 8 or May 9, which the Indian scientists said had been the original target dates for the Indian blasts. They said the dates were chosen because the full moon expected on the night of May 8 to May 9 was regarded as auspicious. The tests were delayed by poor weather conditions in the area until May 11 for the first series and May 13 for the second.259 It should be noted that since the shafts for the tests had been built in 1995–96 (during the Congress government’s term in office), few additional preparations were required for the May 1998 tests. Ten days prior to the tests, the plutonium cores were airlifted by Indian Air Force AN-32 aircraft from Bombay airport to Jodhpur, Rajasthan, and then carried in trucks to the Pokhran test site.260 On May 11, a strategic diversion was enacted when an Indian surface-to-air missile test diverted U.S. and other surveillance and monitoring systems to India’s east coast, thousands of miles away from the Pokhran test site in Rajasthan in Western India where the nuclear tests were conducted.261

A series of five nuclear tests were conducted on May 11 (three tests) and May 13 (two subkiloton tests); a sixth subkiloton test on May 13 was reportedly aborted and the unexploded device was recovered. Although the May 11 tests were recorded by seismic stations as a single seismic event (indicating a simultaneous detonation of all 3 devices), the May 13 tests were not picked up by seismic sensors; if these tests were in fact subkiloton explosions, they may have been too small for detection.

The tests were described in a “Joint Statement by Department of Atomic Energy and Defense Research and Development Organization” on May 17 as follows:262

The 3 tests conducted on May 11, 1998 were with a fission device with a yield of about 12 kT, a thermonuclear device with a yield of about 43 kT and a subkilo tonne device. All the 3 devices were detonated simultaneously. It may be noted that the yield of the thermonuclear device tested on May 11 was designed to meet stringent criteria like containment of the explosion and least possible damage to building and structures in neighboring villages. On May 13, 1998 two more subkiloton nuclear tests were carried out. These devices were also detonated simultaneously. The yields of the subkiloton devices were in the range of 0.2 to 0.6 kT.

The current series of testing 5 nuclear devices during May 11–13, 1998 in the Pokhran Range is the culmination of years of pioneering work done by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defense Research & Development Organization (DRDO).

DAE has done pioneering R & D work in various aspects of nuclear science and technology. It has developed comprehensive indigenous capabilities in designing and building nuclear power reactors, fuel reprocessing plants and many other fuel-cycle related activities. . . . The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) is one of the largest multi-disciplinary laboratories in the country with the capability to build new technological systems in a wide range of areas. The fissile material used in these 5 tests are completely indigenous, and have been produced by local mastery over the relevant technologies by DAE establishments.
The design and development of various kinds of nuclear explosives, e.g. fission, boosted fission, thermonuclear and low yield, has been carried out by BARC based on more than 25 years of R & D. BARC has also worked out several new concepts like long shelf life of device components and optimization of the yield-to-weight ratio.

One of the laboratories of the DRDO had the task of weaponizing proven designs. This activity involved design, testing and production of advanced detonators, ruggedised high volt trigger systems, interface engineering, systems engineering and systems integration to military specifications. Three other laboratories have made contributions in aerodynamics, arming, fusing, safety interlocks, flight trials etc. DRDO has, further, conducted a series of trials and achieved the necessary operational clearances. Additionally, DRDO shouldered the burden of field engineering associated with the conduct of the 5 tests along with DAE.

The tests conducted during May 11–13, 1998 have provided critical data for the validation of our capability in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields for different applications and different delivery systems. These tests have significantly enhanced our capability in computer simulation of new designs and taken us to the stage of subcritical experiments in the future, if considered necessary.

Indian scientists clarified that the 43 kT device was a thermonuclear device and not a boosted fission device: “A thermonuclear device has two stages a fission trigger and a secondary stage. This was a thermonuclear device as it had two stages.”

A number of independent estimates have noted that seismic data indicates that the Indian nuclear tests were only about half their claimed yields.

Another issue in the post test situation concerns the separation of India’s nuclear weapons design program based at BARC from its nuclear energy program—both have been previously under India’s Department of Atomic Energy. A press report noted:

With the government’s decision to induct nuclear weapons for (the) nation’s security, the 30-year old secret program at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) will be transferred to the defense ministry, BARC sources said. Along with this, the Defense Research Development Organization (DRDO) is expected to take control of the rare metal plant near Mysore where enriched uranium is being made. The decision to militarize the BARC’s secret program was apparently taken soon after the BJP-led government came to power in March as is evident from the fact that the latest campaign on nuclear tests was carried out under the leadership of DRDO. In contrast, no military official was present during the 1974 Pokhran test which was totally an affair of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE).

So we believe the military project at BARC will be separated from the civilian program, sources said. BARC’s other major involvement in defense is nuclear submarine project for which BARC has designed and built a reactor. The “Advanced Technology Vehicle” as the project is known is under development at a DRDO laboratory at Vishakapatnam.

Another report noted that DRDO laboratories such as the Terminal Ballistics Research Lab in Chandigarh and the Institute of Armament Technology in Poona will carry out a nuclear weapons program.
Appendix F

Domestic Opposition to India’s Nuclear Tests

India’s opposition parties and the Indian President initially supported India’s nuclear tests and congratulated Indian scientists, but did not directly support the BJP for the decision to conduct the tests. India’s President noted that “This event is a major breakthrough in the realm of national security. I extend my felicitations to all scientists and technologists who have made this possible and say to them—India is proud of you.”267 The Congress party noted that “We congratulate our nuclear scientists and engineers on this demonstration, once again, of our scientific prowess.”

On May 12, Congress party leader Sharad Pawar, also head of the opposition in Parliament, noted that the BJP must explain the timing of the tests,268 and from May 14–15 onwards, India’s opposition began strongly challenging the BJP on the tests. The Left parties noted that the tests were intended to “divert the people’s attention away from the fast deteriorating conditions of livelihood and whip up an arms race in the subcontinent with strong communal overtones.”269

In a May 16 interview, former Prime Minister Gujral noted that he could not disagree nor agree with the tests, and it was more important to maintain internal unity in the face of external sanctions: “Today the issue is no longer whether it was wrong or right to have exploded the devices. We cannot present a divided face. India’s foreign policy has been based on national consensus. It would be a mistake to do otherwise.”270

On May 20, former Prime Minister Deve Gowda stated that in 1997 he had not opted for nuclear testing because “the time was not ripe as the country was facing many political and economic problems. I declined to give clearance for demonstrating India’s nuclear capability not because of the likely adverse reaction from the international community but on account of my concern for improving the economic situation. . . . (The Indian people) were intelligent enough to find out the real motives behind the (May 1998) tests that were the outcome of a political and not a military decision.”271 Subsequently during the Parliamentary debate, Gowda added that “Today the House is divided because of your (BJP’s) thoughtless actions. Showing bombs to a neighboring country will not get them to a negotiating table.”

The Congress party, which on May 15 after a meeting with Prime Minister Vajpayee temporarily reverted to supporting the nuclear tests, eventually again came out against the tests. On May 23, Congress party member and former minister of state for External Affairs, Eduardo Falerio, stated:

The tests did not arise from concern for national security, as there had been no change in the security situation in the past few months, but were meant solely to prop up a tottering government driven by internal dissensions. (The tests) were intended to create an atmosphere of euphoria and jingoism which would distract attention from the problems that the government is facing and from its nonperformance. The Congress leader said at this point of time, China was keen on becoming an economic power and as such it was not interested in a war. As for Pakistan, India did have problems with it but then India had conventional arms superiority over that country. Now as a result of the tests, nuclear arms are likely to be deployed against India.272

On May 25 with internal opposition building, Prime Minister Vajpayee met with India’s opposition for a second time; he also had Indian scientists brief the opposition. Yet during the next few days on May 27–28, India’s opposition took the BJP government to task for its nuclear policy. Prominent speakers for the opposition included Congress Party spokesperson Natwar Singh, former Prime Minister (in 1991) Chandra Shekhar, former finance Minister in the United Front government (during 1996–97) P. Chidambaram, and communist party leader Indrajit Gupta. The Parliamentary debate was described in the Hindu as follows:

The Opposition in the Lok Sabha today accused the Government of “inventing” a security threat in order to justify the nuclear tests and rejected the contention that the nuclear option had been exercised in “self-defense. Senior Opposition leaders questioned the Government’s motive behind conducting the tests, and wanted it to explain how the security environment had “suddenly” deteriorated to such an extent as to warrant nuclear tests. Not a “single incident” had occurred in recent months to suggest a deterioration of security environment, the Congress(I) leader, Mr. Natwar Singh, said. . . .The Government was reminded by the Opposition of the heavy political and economic
costs of the tests, and a point sharply made more than once was that acquisition of nuclear weapons was no substitute for economic strength.

“Brave” statements would not help, the former Prime Minister, Mr. Chandra Shekhar said. It was easy to make a bomb but very difficult to face its consequences. . . . The “mighty Soviet Union” had disintegrated because it could not sustain the galloping cost of maintaining the nuclear stockpile, the CPI leader, Mr. Indrajit Gupta, said. Britain remained a “second class power” despite having nuclear weapons whereas Germany and Japan, which were not part of the nuclear club, had far greater political and economic clout internationally.273

The *Hindustan Times* reported:274

Mr. Natwar Singh wondered whether the Chinese threat began between March 19 and April 8, the day the scientists were given the green light to conduct the tests. . . . In the same context, he described Mr. Fernandes as a “human El Nino,” whose diatribes against China in the run-up to the nuclear tests had “thrown into the dustbin ten years of hard diplomatic efforts” towards improving ties with Beijing. Picking up the thread from where Mr. Natwar Singh left, Mr. Chidambaram announced: “Your case, Mr. Prime Minister, is most unconvincing. It’s extremely weak, and it’s based on very shallow presumptions.”

Making out a strong case against nuclear weaponization, the former Finance Minister said the cost of such an endeavor was a matter for concern. “Abjure weaponization until there is a full-fledged debate in this country... I’m not worried as much about the impact of sanctions, as the unbearable cost to satisfy the vanity of a political party,” he remarked.

Mr. Chandrashekhar shared Mr. Chidambaram’s fears that the country was headed in a direction fraught with serious consequences, be it the security situation in the region, or the economy. He noted that decline in the value of the rupee had increased India’s foreign debt from U.S. $102 billion to U.S. $112 billion. “Atomic weapons politics is the politics of destruction,” he said.

Former Prime Minister Gujral noted during the Parliamentary debate that there was no threat to the country’s security when he relinquished office on March 19 and that the BJP government went in for the nuclear tests not on security grounds, but for “political and partisan considerations.” Gujral added that the BJP leadership’s “war-mongering and jingoism” were taking the country to the brink of war.275

Congress party President Sonia Gandhi noted that “no evidence had been furnished to show that the tests were conducted for security reasons. . . . There is no clarity. So many people are saying different things. Unless they explain to us clearly the reasons for the tests and remove our doubts, we cannot support them on this issue.”276 Congress spokesperson and former House speaker P.A. Sangma noted that “Till yesterday we were far more powerful. Today, the world’s greatest democracy is competing with a small country like Pakistan thanks to your actions.” Former Finance Minister (in the period 1991–96 in the Congress government) Manmohan Singh stated that “Needless euphoria has been sought to be created that we have overtaken Pakistan thanks to your actions.” The Congress party immediately advocated caution at this “critical juncture” and noted that the party stands with the nation. The party also asked the government to deal with the “emerging scenario with responsibility, maturity and restraint . . . not hysteria and jingoism.”277

Pakistan’s test on the evening of May 28 rescued the BJP government. The *Indian Express* noted that “In the Lok Sabha earlier, what was steadily progressing into an Opposition versus Government debate on Pokhran II, swiftly turned around into one of solidarity for the country’s sake as news of Pakistan’s nuclear tests practically shocked the House.”278 The Congress party immediately advocated caution at this “critical juncture” and noted that the party stands with the nation. The party also asked the government to deal with the “emerging scenario with responsibility, maturity and restraint.” Prime Minister Vajpayee came out strongly noting that the Pakistani tests “has vindicated our policy and stand.”

It should be noted that two former senior statesmen who had since retired from politics supported Prime Minister Vajpayee on his nuclear test decision. Former Prime Minister V. P. Singh (who headed a Janata Dal government in 1989–90) called Prime Minister Vajpayee from London congratulating him on the tests. Former President R. Venkataraman also congratulated the government on conducting the tests which he noted “had enhanced India’s prestige among the world community and proved its technological excellence to developed countries.” Mr. Venkataraman, also a former defense minister, had added that in 1983 preparations for an underground test at Pokhran were completed and “I myself went down the shaft to see things for myself. It was shelved because of international pressure.”279 Further, one press report headlined “Gujral ‘defends’ N-tests in interview to U.S. daily” noted that “Former Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, one of the severest critics of the present
Government’s decision to go nuclear and take on the USA and China as principal adversaries, told the *New York Times* recently that the United States had been ignoring India’s security concerns.**280**

Although opposing nuclear testing, India’s political center and left do not oppose maintaining a nuclear capability, and support the government on facing up to external pressure and sanctions, as discussed previously in this monograph.
Appendix G
The U.S. and World Reaction to India’s Nuclear Tests

The international community condemned India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests, noted that these were against the trend of nonproliferation successes of recent years, and called upon India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT and NPT. Reactions by the UN, G-8, Japan, Pakistan, China and the world press are discussed below, followed by selected aspects of the U.S. reaction.

The UN Secretary-General noted that he “learned with deep regret” of the Indian nuclear tests. He noted that the moratorium on nuclear testing and the “successful conclusion” of the CTBT had set a “norm with regard to nuclear nonproliferation,” and was concerned that the “latest testing is inconsistent with the pattern (of nonproliferation, a moratorium on nuclear tests and the adoption of the CTBT) which has been firmly endorsed by the international community” (UN Press Release SG/SM/6555, May 11). A statement by President of the General Assembly “learned with dismay and disappointment of a series of nuclear tests conducted by India. . . . Over the past years, there have been encouraging signs in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament. . . . Regrettably, the latest series of nuclear tests runs contrary to that positive trend” (UN Press Release GA/SM/39, May 13).

The UN Security Council began consultations immediately after India’s announcement of its tests on May 11, but only issued a statement on May 14 due to disagreement over the wording. A Swedish draft had expressed “dismay” while China and the United States sought to “condemn” India’s nuclear tests, which was opposed by the other P-5 states; the final Presidential statement settled on the wording “strongly deplore.” The UN Security Council “deplored the three underground nuclear tests conducted by India . . . despite overwhelming international concern and protests (and) urged India to refrain from any further tests. Such testing was contrary to the de facto moratorium on the test of nuclear weapons” (SC/6517, May 14). UN Security Council Resolution 1172 of June 6 stated that the Security Council “Condemns the nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998 . . . Recognizes that the tests conducted by India and Pakistan constitute a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament . . . Urges India and Pakistan, and all other States that have not yet done so, to become Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.”

Initially the G-8 were divided on the issue of sanctions, not because they supported India’s nuclear tests, but primarily because Russia (and China) generally oppose sanctions on any state, while Britain and France were against sanctions because of their adverse socioeconomic impact. Eventually the G-8 took a unified position supporting a freeze on all loans to India and Pakistan.

Japan’s Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto stated that India’s nuclear tests were “extremely regrettable,” and announced that Japan would cut off all aid except humanitarian aid to India (CNN, 13 May 1998); Japan and the United States were the main proponents of sanctions against India. Japan suspended the meeting of the Aid India Consortium (that oversees foreign aid to India, aid that amounted to about $3 billion in 1997–98, with a similar amount was expected for 1998–99) which was scheduled to be held in Tokyo in June. Japan is India’s largest bilateral donor, with annual aid commitments of $1.5 billion.

Pakistan’s response to India’s nuclear tests was that “The news of resumption of nuclear testing by India has not come as a surprise to us. For the past 24 years, Pakistan had consistently drawn the attention of the international community to India’s nuclear aspirations. . . . Pakistan reserves the right to take all appropriate measures for its security.” On May 28 and May 30, Islamabad responded with its own nuclear tests. Defense Minister Fernandes made hawkish remarks on Kashmir including hints of Indian military operations across the line of control into the Pakistan-controlled side of Kashmir, noting that “Terrorism must be, and shall be, crushed without false pity . . . further misadventures (by Pakistan) on Indian territory shall be dealt with in a pro-active manner,” and that Islamabad should roll-back its anti-India activities. These remarks encountered domestic criticism in the Indian parliament.
The Chinese reaction is best described by an editorial in the Indian press:

There was more political sting in China’s reaction to the second round of Indian tests on Wednesday than in its response to the first round last Monday. After the first three nuclear shots were fired by India, China expressed “grave concern”. But the second series of Indian tests drew China to make four important points. One, that India’s action reflected “an outrageous contempt for the common will of the international community” in favor of the CTBT. Two, India is using the “China threat” as an excuse for the development of its own nuclear weapons. Three, India is seeking “hegemony” in South Asia. And four, “the international community should adopt a common position in strongly demanding India to immediately stop its nuclear development program.”

Another Indian press editorial noted:

The Chinese Government believes that it is the victim of baseless political attacks by the BJP-led Government and is deeply hurt by the unjustified rhetoric that has emanated from New Delhi on the China threat. Beijing, however, must recognize that Mr. Fernandes’ remarks have come under as much virulent criticism in India as in China. The Chinese leaders, including the President, Mr. Jiang Zemin, have sought to retain some balance in their assessment of the Indian developments by differentiating among the various segments of the Indian political class in its approach to China, and recalling the warm welcome the Chinese President was accorded in New Delhi at the end of 1996.

The reaction in the world press to India’s nuclear tests was summarized by the Foreign Media Reaction Daily Digest:

Editorialists reiterated fears . . . that by crossing the “nuclear Rubicon,” India was likely to set in motion a destabilizing new arms race on the subcontinent and elsewhere. While the world’s initial reaction to the Indian tests was predominantly one of indignant condemnation, more recent commentary began to question why the “exclusive” club of declared nuclear powers should be limited to only five countries. Opinion-makers in the Middle East and in some Third World countries sounded that theme most strongly, with many arguing that what the West feared most was the development of an “Islamic bomb.” Meanwhile, as the world waits with bated breath to see if Pakistan will follow India’s lead and test a nuclear device of its own, writers in India and Pakistan debated the benefits and downsides of flexing their “nuclear muscles.”

Washington was particularly disturbed by India’s nuclear tests, partly because the U.S. policy community had gradually begun given South Asia greater importance in U.S. foreign policy. At the time of signing the CTBT in September 1996, Washington stated that it would be:

Working very closely with all countries whose ratification is required to enter the treaty into force. . . . And that will include working closely with India. It is our hope over the next two years to show India, first, that the record of disarmament is genuine and is still going forward and that there is more to come. And second, it is our hope that as India looks at the situation itself it will come to accept that it is in its own national security interest to sign this treaty.

Senior U.S. policy makers including Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson had visited India in 1997 and 1998, and Bill Clinton had planned a trip to India and Pakistan; Clinton’s South Asia visit was originally planned for early 1998 but postponed because of Indian elections, and was rescheduled for late 1998. Although not directly related to the CTBT, these high-level visits signaled that Washington was considering a deeper political dialogue with New Delhi in the assumption that this could lead to proliferation restraint. In 1997 and early 1998, Bill Clinton had also specifically called on the U.S. Senate to ratify the CTBT before his South Asia visit, so that he could then make a stronger case with India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT. India’s nuclear tests actually hurt prospects for Senate ratification of the CTBT, which was a top priority for the Clinton administration; they also represented the reversal of Washington’s nonproliferation successes and accomplishments of prior years.

On May 12, Bill Clinton noted that he was “deeply disturbed” by the Indian nuclear tests, called on India to halt testing and sign the CTBT, and noted that he would, as required by U.S. law, impose sanctions on India. In his May 16 radio address Bill Clinton noted that “this (nuclear testing) is especially disappointing to me because I have long supported stronger ties between the United States and India. After all, India will soon be the world’s most populous country. Already it has the world’s largest middle class and 50 years of vibrant democracy to its credit. . . . I hope India will reverse course from the dangerous path it has chosen by signing the CTBT immediately and without conditions.”
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott outlined U.S. objectives:

Our long-range goals here are fairly simple. They are peace in South Asia; military stability and balance, which is to say no arms race between India and Pakistan—particularly given the fact that neither of those countries can afford an expensive, not to mention dangerous, arms race; and also our long-term goals include a political dialogue between India and Pakistan that we all hope would lead eventually to normal and even friendly and genuinely cooperative and mutually trusting and mutually respectful relations between these two very important countries.

Our immediate goals are that the two countries renounce any further testing, since I would hope it would be clear to both of them that this pair of tests has not made either feel more secure; second, that both sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; third, that they take decisive steps in reducing tensions between them; fourth, that they seriously join negotiations on a cut-off of the production of fissile material and a treaty to enshrine that cut-off; and fifth, that they undertake not to weaponize or deploy ballistic missiles.

U.S. Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson noted:

The U.S. calls upon India and Pakistan to take heed of both the P-5 Communique issued June 4 in Geneva and the message contained within the resolution we are about to adopt. They are not calls for punishment or penalty. They are instead a call by the international community for restraint, caution, and good sense. We strongly and sincerely urge the leaders of both nations to resist the temptation to act rashly today so that their children will have the opportunity to live in a stable and peaceful South Asia tomorrow.

Secretary of State Madeline Albright noted that “Unlike the United States and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, India and Pakistan do not have the benefit of a vast ocean between them. They are next door neighbors with a past of conflict and a present of bitter mistrust. Under the circumstances, the citizens of each nation should understand what is obvious to the world—that both Indians and Pakistanis are far less secure today than they were three weeks ago. Right now, the most important thing both sides can do is to cool it and take a deep breath and to begin to climb out of the hole they have dug themselves into.” Albright also noted that “I think that we have to draw a very fine line here between making it clear that what the Indians and Pakistanis did was unacceptable, and that they are not now members of the nuclear group; but at the same time, that they are not to be isolated or treated as pariahs, but that they need to be a part of the solution.”

Washington was the leading advocate of sanctions against India, and also expelled a number of Indian scientists working on technical projects at U.S. research laboratories or universities, but also engaged in dialogue (undertaken primarily by Strobe Talbott) aimed at bringing India and Pakistan into the CTBT and capping their nuclear programs.
Appendix H  
Factors Influencing India’s Future Nuclear Strategy

This appendix analyzes technical, political and economic factors that are likely to influence Indian nuclear decision making and India’s ability to comply with the CTBT and FMCT.

The Size of India’s Nuclear Stockpile

India has no formal nuclear doctrine and thus its nuclear force requirements remain undefined—some studies have estimated that India should retain a force of 60 to 100 nuclear weapons. India may have enough nuclear material from its Cirus and Dhruva reactors to fulfill these requirements, although India has stated that Cirus plutonium would only be used for peaceful purposes. In addition, reprocessed plutonium from India’s civilian Candu reactors is potentially another source of plutonium. David Albright makes the following observation:\textsuperscript{292}  

I estimate that India possessed a stock of about 370 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium by the end of 1997, generated by the Cirus and Dhruva reactors. Assuming the use of about five kilograms of plutonium per weapon, this was the equivalent of about 74 nuclear weapons, of which about 40 could come from Dhruva plutonium. Although Cirus plutonium has probably been mixed with Dhruva plutonium in the past, it may not be once Cirus restarts in a few years. If the estimated current growth of India’s plutonium stockpile is based on Dhruva plutonium alone, then the supply should grow by about 20 kilograms per year. This amount corresponds to four nuclear weapons per year. At that rate, in 2005 India would be expected to have enough weapon-grade plutonium for more than 100 nuclear weapons.

India could produce significantly more weapon-grade plutonium by using its unsafeguarded Candu power reactors and civil reprocessing facilities, although these facilities could suffer significant operating penalties. Although the civil plutonium separation plant at Tarapur has not operated well, India expects to start processing irradiated power reactor fuel this summer in the new Kalpakkam reprocessing plant. This plant is expected to operate better than the Tarapur plant. Another report noted that if plutonium from India’s Candu reactors is included, India would have plutonium sufficient for over 300 nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{293} Although the use of Candu plutonium for nuclear weapons is theoretically possible, under present political circumstances and given that there are no pressing security requirements for an increased nuclear stockpile, India is unlikely to use Candu plutonium for nuclear weapons.

India’s and Pakistan’s Nuclear Force Requirements and the CTBT and FMCT

Even prior to their May 1998 tests, India and Pakistan had developed first-generation Hiroshima-type nuclear weapons that would be delivered on aircraft—Pakistan’s F-16s (that can reach all major targets in Northern and Western India) and India’s Jaguars, Mirage-2000s and Mig-27s. Following their nuclear tests, India and Pakistan acquired confidence in a lighter and miniaturized first-generation device that could be deployed on missiles. These capabilities are generally sufficient to provide each state with a minimum deterrent against the other, and thus neither state may require nuclear testing in the short term and both could therefore sign the CTBT. However Pakistan has not developed nor tested second-generation nuclear weapons; in the future (and also depending on whether it acquires plutonium to augment its uranium based nuclear program) its scientists may seek such a capability which would then require additional nuclear tests.

Two other issues for Pakistan are the size of its stockpile and its missile forces. Pakistan may require additional fissile material to augment its small HEU stockpile, estimated in 1998 to be sufficient for only 5 to 15 weapons, and growing slowly at 2 to 3 weapons annually. At this rate it would take at least 3 years to develop a stockpile of 20 to 25 weapons that would give Pakistan slightly greater confidence in its minimum deterrent; only then would Pakistan be more prepared to comply with fissile-material cutoffs.
Pakistan’s 100 km range Hatf missiles and M-11 missiles (assumed to have a 300 km range with a 1 ton payload) are useful for strikes against Indian military bases or towns located border states, but these missiles may fall short of New Delhi which is 350 km from the India–Pakistan border. New Delhi is within range of Pakistan’s F-16 aircraft. To acquire deeper and more assured missile strike capability into India’s heartland, Pakistan is developing longer 700 to 1,000 km range Ghauri missiles (tested in April 1998) which would require additional testing before operational deployment.

Indian Air Force aircraft and its 150 to 250 km range Prithvi missiles can reach almost all of Pakistan’s major cities and military bases, although it is not certain whether a thermonuclear warhead can be mounted on India’s Prithvi missiles. Although India has a modest nuclear deterrent against Pakistan, its nuclear deterrent against China requires further consideration. Generally speaking India has (or would soon acquire) a deterrent against China based on air-delivered first-generation weapons, and (after additional Agni missile tests) would also have a modest deterrent based on missile-deliverable first-generation weapons; yet developing a second-generation missile-delivered deterrent may well require additional nuclear tests.

India’s Su-30 aircraft, if supported with refueling capability, are its most likely nuclear weapons delivery system against China. These aircraft carry at least a 5 ton payload to a 3,000 km range (giving a combat radius of 1,500 km) without refueling, or have a 5,000 km range (2,500 km radius) with refueling, sufficient to deliver a nuclear payload to China’s most important cities. Yet aircraft are also more easily intercepted and therefore not the most reliable deterrent.

India presently does not have missiles capable of reaching China’s most important cities, Beijing and Shanghai. The Agni missile has been tested to a range of 1,500 km, and this may be assumed to be its range with a 1 ton payload (the weight of a typical nuclear warhead). Thus the Agni’s range could be increased to 2,500 km with a lighter 500 kg payload. Beijing and Shanghai are some 2,500 km away from Northeast India (a region of domestic political unrest that would therefore offer somewhat insecure launch sites) and are even further away from East or Central India which would offer more secure launch sites. In order for a missile-based deterrent, India may have to develop lighter and more compact 500 kg warheads or alternatively it would seek to build a missile with a longer range than Agni. Such a missile project would most likely involve adding an additional or more powerful stage to the Agni’s existing first stage, but could still take one to two years to further develop and deploy.

Moreover, if India seeks a thermonuclear missile deliverable nuclear deterrent against China, it may well require additional nuclear tests. It should be noted that in May 1998 India tested a second generation thermonuclear device, although this second-generation device should be assumed to be deliverable only on aircraft. If India requires a compact 500 to 1,000 kg thermonuclear warhead that would fit on a missile, designing such a device would be challenging and may well require additional nuclear testing.

Over the middle-term, a number of external and internal parameters would influence India’s future nuclear policy. Internal political factors to consider are the nature of the ruling political coalition, and whether India’s political center (which may opt for some restraint) or its political right (that would pursue greater nuclearization) are in power, and economic considerations. External factors influencing India’s nuclear policy include security considerations, progress on the disarmament agenda, and membership in international organizations and regimes. These are discussed below.

**Economics, Defense Budgets, and the Impact of Sanctions**

Economic constraints (or the lack thereof) would significantly influence the pace of nuclearization on the subcontinent. In terms of expenditures for nuclear forces, analysts have estimated that developing a nuclear force of 40 missiles, 60 warheads, 5 nuclear submarines and a command and control system with satellite surveillance and targeting would cost $6 billion over a ten year period, or $ 600 million per year (the bulk of the expenditure was estimated for nuclear submarines). This generally low-mid level estimate should be compared against India’s annual defense budget of approximately $10 billion and its GNP of $360 billion. India’s defense budget for 1998–99 remained static at 2.54 percent of GDP, the same share of GDP as the previous year; however the budget for India’s nuclear and space programs were each increased by 60 percent to $350 million.
Another economic consideration involves defense budgets—India’s conventional force budgets have declined as a percentage of GNP, down from 3.5 percent of GNP in 1985 to 2.54 percent of GNP by 1998. In the coming decade, India requires considerable expenditure to modernize its military forces and replace aging and retiring military assets. Thus if nuclear force expenditures are modest, India may find it advantageous to opt for a minimum nuclear deterrent as a substitute for replacing and modernizing some of its conventional forces.

At a macroeconomic level, high economic growth rates (that in part depends on investment, which are influenced by the impact of sanctions) would release greater financial resources for defense expenditures. On the sanctions issue itself, India receives (and would therefore lose because of sanctions) approximately $2 billion in foreign aid and assistance from international financial institutions and Western states, which is a relatively small 0.8 percent of its GNP of $360 billion (1996 figures). However sanctions may have an adverse impact on social sector expenditures, because although foreign aid “is only a small percentage of India’s total planned expenditure, it contributed crucially and qualitatively to social sector development.”

Sanctions would also affect a number of infrastructure-related power and transportation projects that are vital to India’s economic development agenda and would hurt economies of particular states in India. In June 1998, the World Bank cleared $1 billion worth of social development “humanitarian” loans to India but was expected to hold up approximately $1 billion in economic development and infrastructure-related “nonhumanitarian” loans.

In the middle-term, India requires investment on the order of hundreds of billions of dollars for the growth of its energy, communications and transportation sectors; this investment comes largely from multinational corporations and is therefore not directly affected by sanctions. Yet indirectly, private investment would suffer. Sanctions are one factor behind the downgrading of Indian investments ratings, this decreases investor confidence and consequently decreases the volume of investments. In May and June 1998, foreign portfolio investors withdrew $400 million from India. Portfolio investment revived in July 1998 but thereafter again declined. In terms of foreign direct investment, in June 1998 one report noted that “there has been a dramatic change in the flows in June, touching Rs.1,600 crore ($400 million) for the month. This is significantly higher than the foreign investment inflows in May, which was just Rs.860 crore ($230 million).” This was higher than figures for March (Rs.1,013 crore or $253 million) and April (Rs.1,088 crore or $272 million). Finally, economic decline (partly a result of sanctions but also related to other domestic economic reasons) may result in the weakening and devaluation of the Indian currency (which fell by 5 to 10 percent in the first two months after India’s nuclear tests, and further weakened in August), which then worsens India’s debt repayment burden.

To relieve economic pressure, New Delhi may thus opt for some concessions—this may include signing the CTBT, especially if policy makers determine that the economic benefits from the lifting of sanctions considerably outweigh any security risks from capping a modest nuclear capability.

Nuclear Arms Control

An important variable in New Delhi’s nuclearization decision in both the short-term and the middle-term concerns momentum on the nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda. First, in the absence of progress on global arms control, regional arms control may be much harder. Global arms control would involve continued nuclear force reductions achieved through START II ratification by Russia, the completion of START III, and steps toward legally binding security guarantees (in 1998 the CD set up an ad hoc committee to discuss security guarantees, although these would deal primarily with nonnuclear states and India may therefore not fall under this framework). Without the above measures, the positive gains made by the global nonproliferation regime during much of the 1990s will lose momentum. Consequently, New Delhi will be less inclined (and indeed come under less international pressure) to cooperate with the nonproliferation regime. Some of New Delhi’s bureaucracy and security community have previously used or speculated upon U.S. inaction on nuclear arms control to divert attention from New Delhi’s isolation on nuclear issues. In the CTBT context, the treaty must first be ratified by all the required states (here, the treaty’s ratification in the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma is of concern) before New Delhi comes into the international spotlight as the only prominent holdout against the treaty. Second, global nuclear arms control has implications for Indian security. If the disarmament agenda is seen to be moving forward, and if India becomes an active participant in the agenda, Indian security planners...
may perceive fewer threats and may well opt to cap their nuclear capabilities at the level of a “minimum” deterrent.

**Nuclear Safeguards and Technical Incentives**

Indian policymakers have occasionally stated that they may accept safeguards on their civilian nuclear energy facilities—this could be further facilitated in exchange for technical assistance for this program. New Delhi could avail of technical assistance on nuclear safety issues, especially on decommissioning. New Delhi has no experience in decommissioning, and the Tarapur reactor (as well as a few of the CANDU reactors) will come up for decommissioning in 2000–2005. Although India’s nuclear scientists are capable of handling safety and decommissioning, international cooperation and assistance may nevertheless be beneficial because it would considerably ease and enhance indigenous efforts on these issues.\(^{307}\) Nuclear power “islands” (safeguarded power reactors) are a future benefit that New Delhi would also seek. At present, nuclear power is supplying barely 2 percent of India’s electrical energy and is not efficient in per capita terms compared with coal and oil. However, in the middle term (2010–2020), New Delhi will require additional and more environmentally friendly energy sources such as nuclear power. It would therefore begin seriously exploring this issue in 2000–2005. (The lag between construction and the eventual operation of reactors should be noted: construction in 2000–2005 would lead to completion and the commencement of operations in 2010–15). In exchange for the above technical and energy cooperation, New Delhi may reciprocate by allowing a gradually increasing number of its civilian nuclear facilities to be subject to comprehensive safeguards.

Two factors on this issue need further consideration. First, India may still require keeping at least one CANDU reactor partially unsafeguarded to ensure tritium supply (the CANDU reactors are important because they are the source of tritium for New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program).\(^{308}\) Second, reports suggest that during its May 1998 nuclear tests, Indian scientists may have been attempting to test the feasibility of developing a nuclear device from Candu plutonium.\(^{309}\) If this is indeed the case and India seeks to retain the option of using plutonium from its Candu power reactors for a weapons program (because this would at least double the amount of nuclear material available for nuclear weapons development), then India may be reluctant to place all these facilities under comprehensive safeguards.

**Security Considerations, Membership in International Organizations and Regimes**

On purely security issues, the state of India–Pakistan and India–China relations would considerably influence India’s future nuclear strategy. If relations with both states are steady or seen as improving, then India may not rapidly accelerate its nuclear program. On the other hand if India’s relations with China and Pakistan remain cool or antagonistic, and especially if China–Pakistan nuclear and missile transfers resume, or Washington is seen as more closely allied with Beijing, Indian policy makers may opt for greater nuclearization.

In the middle-term, Indian membership in regional and multilateral security regimes—for example, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the ASEAN Regional Forum—may serve two purposes that could lead to some moderation on the Indian nuclear program. First, it would reinforce the perception that India’s status as a major power is being acknowledged and that India is viewed on the same level as China. Second, it may further diminish India’s security concerns over China by involving both states in a common security framework. Membership on the UN Security Council (initially as a nonpermanent member and perhaps eventually as a permanent member) would further alleviate New Delhi’s security concerns, especially on issues such as sanctions. New Delhi viewed North Korea’s and Iraq’s experience with sanctions with some concern. New Delhi certainly has no intentions of allowing itself to be subject to a similar fate if, say, it signed the CTBT or FMCT, but then at some future date sought to remove itself from these treaties on account of security threats from Pakistan or China. Such a move would be legally valid but could well incur a harsh political reaction and the threat of sanctions from the international community via the UN Security Council.\(^{310}\) A seat on the UN Security Council may partly alleviate these concerns because New Delhi would then have a stronger voice in Security Council decisions and thus reduce the possibility of the Security Council taking sanctions-type action against New Delhi.
The above internal and external political economic factors, along with increased certainty about the disarmament-headed direction of the nuclear future (which may well occur before or following the NPT Review Conference in 2000) would increase the probability that India would substantially cap its nuclear program, formalize its missile restraints, and enter into an FMCT.
Endnotes

Introduction

1. These include reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals under START I (July 1991) and START II (January 1993); decisions by South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to give up their nuclear weapons and steps by Argentina and Brazil to reverse their nuclear ambitions, and the joining of the NPT by the above states; the indefinite extension of the NPT (May 1995); and the creation of nuclear-free zones in Southeast Asia (December 1995) and Africa (April 1996). For further background information, see Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute; London, New Delhi: Sage, 1994); SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) (also refer to previous editions); United Nations Association of the United States of America, Issues before the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996); and The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook (UN: Center for Disarmament Affairs, New York, 1996) (see also other editions).

2. The CTBT’s elaborate verification regime—based on a network of more than 300 monitoring facilities including 50 primary and 120 secondary monitoring stations, and also including on-site inspections (OSIs)—becomes legally effective only upon the treaty’s entry into force. Without EIF, while seismic monitoring stations may independently carry on operations, the OSI aspect of verification could not legally proceed. The initial CTBTO budget is approximately $58 million, of which $26 million is allocated to set up and equip 150 of the 320 monitoring sites; the total construction cost of all 320 monitoring sites is estimated to be $100 million.

3. The treaty had been signed by 150 countries and ratified by 17 by July 1998; the ratifying states include 9 of the 44 countries required for the treaty’s entry into force. A number of other states have not signed the CTBT, but their non-signature does not directly hold back the treaty’s entry into force. Prominent Middle East states not signing the treaty (largely because of political considerations arising from Israel being grouped in the Middle East zone) include Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Syria. Israel’s ratification of the treaty may be linked to these states’ eventual signature. Prominent nonaligned states not signing the treaty (partly for reasons other than Middle East politics) include Cuba, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Nuclear weapon states Britain and France ratified the CTBT in April 1998. For an updated list of CTBT signatories, see the ACDA home page on the Internet at http://www.acda.gov/treaties/ctbtsigs.htm and the CTBTO home page at http://www.ctbto.org

Nuclear Test Ban Issues, 1954–93: A Primer

4. For a text of Nehru’s proposal, see “Statement by the Indian Prime Minister to Parliament Regarding Nuclear Tests, April 2, 1954,” Documents on Disarmament 1945–59 (U.S. Department of State, August 1960), 408. This proposal was forwarded to the United Nations on April 8, 1954, and is found in UN Document DC/44.


6. The ENDC consisted of three groups of states—NATO countries (the United States, U.K., Canada, France, Italy), Warsaw Pact countries (USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania), and neutral states (Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden). It was established in 1961 as a successor to the ten-nation disarmament committee, which consisted of the above-mentioned NATO and Warsaw Pact states. France was named but did not participate in committee discussions.


8. The CD is the successor to the ENDC (1962–68) and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969–78), and is the primary international forum for discussing arms control issues. The CD and its predecessors have negotiated such major multilateral arms limitation and disarmament agreements as the NPT, the seabed treaties, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Rebecca Johnson, necessity in the first stage of negotiations for all states to listen to each other’s concerns and take them into account. A rejection of this claim and a call for greater accountability, arguing that “Ramanna must be made answerable whether he violated the Atomic Energy Act that specifically limits nuclear activities to peaceful purposes,” is found in “The Smiling Buddha,” The Hindustan Times, December 5, 1997. This article notes that India’s “Atomic Energy Act [of] 1962 specifically states that energy [is] for the welfare of the people of India and for other peaceful purposes. . . . If Parliament and the people had an inkling [about the not so peaceful implications of the 1974 test] then there would have been a public outcry against the bomb.”

9. Kennedy noted that the losses from a test ban (arising from an assumption, rather than an expectation, of Soviet cheating) were of less importance than the gains from a CTBT in preventing additional nations, particularly China, from going nuclear; the horizontal nonproliferation aspects of the CTBT were not appreciated by many U.S. senators. Glenn Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 188.


14. “Top Indian scientist rejects ‘peaceful’ nuclear test claim,” Clarinet, October 10, 1997. The statement was made by Raja Ramanna, who is the former chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission. A rejection of this claim and a call for greater accountability, arguing that “Ramanna must be made answerable whether he violated the Atomic Energy Act that specifically limits nuclear activities to peaceful purposes,” is found in “The Smiling Buddha,” The Hindustan Times, December 5, 1997. This article notes that India’s “Atomic Energy Act [of] 1962 specifically states that the use of atomic energy [is] for the welfare of the people of India and for other peaceful purposes. . . . If Parliament and the people had an inkling [about the not so peaceful implications of the 1974 test] then there would have been a public outcry against the bomb.”

15. CD/PV.78 (May 2, 1978), 15.


20. New Delhi had for a long time considered the term proliferation to refer to both horizontal and vertical proliferation; Indian officials were surprised and pleased when, in early 1987, George Shultz used these terms in his remarks made at the Embassy of India.

Indian Statements on the CTBT,

Pre-NPT Extension Conference

21. One source suggests that this act only partly reflected India’s enthusiasm for the CTBT; it was also undertaken to ease U.S. pressure on India to join a five-nation conference to discuss the nuclear situation in South Asia. P. R. Chari, “FMCT: issues in contention,” The Hindu (March 4, 1997), 12. Chari also observes that India’s cosponsorship of the UN resolution was partly occasioned by the miscalculation among India’s bureaucracy that the P-5 would not eventually negotiate a comprehensive test ban, and therefore India had nothing to lose by indicating support for a treaty that (in the eyes of India’s bureaucracy) would never materialize.

22. The early stages of the negotiations in 1994 were described as taking place in “a cozy atmosphere, reflecting the necessity in the first stage of negotiations for all states to listen to each other’s concerns and take them into account.” Rebecca Johnson, Acronym Booklet No. 2: A Comprehensive Test Ban: Setback for an Early Treaty (May 1994).
23. These were the GSE experiments; GSE stands for Group of Scientific Experts; GSETT are GSE Technical Tests. The GSEs were developing and testing international seismic networks (that would eventually be used to verify compliance with a CTBT) on behalf of the CD since 1976—GSETT-1 (1984) and GSETT-2 (1989–91) had been completed and GSETT-3 projects began in January 1995.

24. Appendix C lists relevant documents containing the Indian position.


26. National positions on the scope of the CTBT in September 1994 were as follows: Indonesia wanted to ban PNEs and computer-simulated tests; India dropped its previously suggested position desiring the closure of test sites; Iran sought an explicit ban on laboratory testing and closure of test sites; Nigeria desired a ban on any nuclear weapon test explosion anywhere, any time, and in any environment, for all time and places without exception adding that all existing test sites should be declared, verified, and closed down; Pakistan had a broad definition, including a ban on all nuclear explosions in all environments for all times, with no PNEs and no exceptions and also wanted nuclear weapon states to declare and close nuclear test sites. Rebecca Johnson, *Acronym Booklet No. 3: A Comprehensive Test Ban: Disappointing Progress* (September 1994).

27. For example, a resolution passed by the Indian Parliament titled “Treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction,” adopted on August 2, 1991 (immediately after START I was signed on July 31, 1991), is illustrative of the Indian position. The resolution began by noting that the House recognized the “historic importance” of START I and welcomed the conclusion of the treaty and congratulated the U.S. and Soviet leaders. It then expressed the hope “that there would be no interruption in the process of negotiations or nuclear disarmament so that START is followed by even more far-reaching measures for nuclear arms reduction,” and appealed “for the earliest possible initiation of multilateral negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations for a new Treaty eliminating all nuclear weapons within a time bound framework.”

28. China noted that the CTBT should contain security assurances and a binding no-first-use commitment by the nuclear states. Most G-21 states and several states in the eastern and western groups sympathized with this aim and wanted more to be done on negative security assurances before the NPT extension conference, but there was no great support for including these provisions in the CTBT. Rebecca Johnson, *Acronym Booklet No. 2* (May 1994).

29. The 1993 Swedish draft treaty proposed EIF upon ratification by forty states including the P-5. Other initial positions on the number and type of states required to ratify the CTBT for its entry into force included the following: U.K.—all CD members (later it began looking elsewhere); Russia—a list of sixty countries having nuclear reactors or research programs; United States—P-5; Egypt—all states that possess nuclear weapons (implying the P-5 and the threshold states); Indonesia—stressed flexibility; Iran—P-5 and threshold states, but without allowing any country to have a veto; Nigeria—reasonable and representative group of states; Pakistan—P-5 and states on the IAEA list. Rebecca Johnson and Sean Howard, *Acronym Booklet No. 1* (May 1994); Rebecca Johnson, *Acronym Booklet No. 3* (September 1994). Eventual positions on EIF are stated in a later section of this paper.

The NPT Extension Conference


31. The rout of the Indian army in the 1962 Indo–Chinese war (the Chinese military action itself came as a shock to Indian policy makers who had assumed that China would not use force against India) gave rise to security concerns in New Delhi over a long-term Chinese threat. This was magnified after the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, because thereafter New Delhi would have to deal with not only a conventional but also a nuclear threat from China. Thus in the 1960s, India faced serious security concerns about China, concerns which the NPT did not adequately address. The Indian government and Parliament had major national debates over acquiring a nuclear option after the Chinese test of 1964, and later in 1967–68 concerning signing the NPT. India sought a security guarantee from the United States and then Soviet Union, but was not given an adequate guarantee, causing it to stay out of the NPT.


hardly at fault here because Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are not subject to international inspection. What prompted these accusations from Indian analysts about the inadequacy of safeguards was the Reagan administration’s policy of not certifying Pakistan as being engaged in nuclear activity in the 1980s. Strictly speaking, Indian analysts were simply criticizing past U.S. policy but had no real case against safeguards because Pakistan’s nuclear facilities were not subject to any safeguards—neither NPT safeguards nor any U.S. safeguards. Yet the above Indian press commentary wrongly suggests that somehow NPT safeguards were at fault, and thus builds an inaccurate case against the NPT.


40. Of the states that were not NPT signatories at the time of the 1995 review conference, Angola, Andorra, Chile, the Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Vanuatu have since become signatories, and Brazil announced in 1997 that it would accede to the NPT. This leaves the threshold states (India, Israel, Pakistan) and Cuba as the only remaining nonsignatories to the NPT.

41. On April 6, 1995, France, Russia, the U.K., and the United States issued a joint statement on nonproliferation, reaffirming their “commitment, as stated in Article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.” This statement also called for the CTBT to be concluded “without delay.” On April 7, the U.K. and France gave up their CTBT position seeking nuclear testing in exceptional circumstances, clearing the way for agreement on the CTBT’s scope. On April 6, each of the P-5 gave individual statements on negative security assurances. On April 11, the UN Security Council passed resolution 984 containing updated positive security assurances provided in a common statement by the P-5; several nonaligned states complained that the assurances were not comprehensive or legally binding and did not go far enough. “The Intersessionals: No Agreement Yet on Rule 28” (April 17, 1995) from the Acronym Consortium and Disarmament Times, cited at http://www.basicint.org/nptcon95.htm; http://www.basicint.org/npt_up1.htm.

42. This figure was an increase from 79 before the session began; thus a majority of 90 states (of the 180 participants) in support of indefinite extension was passed around halfway through this session. A further 28 states were leaning toward supporting indefinite extension; 23 states were against, and 12 were leaning against, indefinite extension. “NPT Plenary in Review,” news release by the Campaign for the Nonproliferation Treaty, April 26, 1995 (http://www.basicint.org/nptrev.htm).

43. Initially, the voting procedure for the conference itself was in doubt. At the preconference intersessional, some nonaligned states desired a secret ballot, claiming that strong-arm tactics had been exerted by the United States, France, Russia, Japan, and others to win their votes for indefinite, unconditional extension of the treaty and that such pressure would intensify unless voting was confidential. The western and eastern groups argued that an open ballot is essential for accountability, “The Intersessionals: No Agreement Yet on Rule 28” (April 17, 1995), from the Acronym Consortium and Disarmament Times, cited at http://www.basicint.org/nptcon95.htm.

44. Switzerland stated that the extension conference “would be the appropriate moment for all states to reaffirm their commitment to a complete elimination of weapons of mass-destruction within precise deadlines” and added that it expected “that until the review conference of the year 2000 . . . all five nuclear weapons states should have agreed upon a time-frame for progressive substantial reductions in their arsenals.” Sweden noted that “the international community should reaffirm its commitment to progressively eliminate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from all nations, and should initiate a program to make that goal a reality in ten to fifteen years.” New Zealand called for “negotiated and verifiable measures to bring a permanent end to vertical proliferation” before the next NPT review conference in the year 2000.

Russia noted that “with Russia and the United States radically reducing their nuclear arsenals the time has come for other nuclear powers to join in the process of the reduction and limitation of nuclear arms” and that “taking this into account the President of Russia, in his address to the forty-ninth session of the UN General Assembly, put forward a proposal to make the nuclear disarmament talks multilateral and irreversible.” Australia, the Netherlands, the U.K., and France all mentioned the need for disarmament talks in their declarations. Dan Plesch and Stephen Young, “Government Proposals on Nonproliferation” April 25, 1995), cited at http://www.basicint.org/govpropo.htm.

45. China supported indefinite extension, but also stated that it would support rolling extensions for no less than twenty-five years.

Key states that did not favor indefinite extension but instead supported long-term “rolling” extensions included Venezuela, which proposed a twenty-five-year extension; Kenya and Nigeria, which called for long-term fixed-period extensions; Indonesia, which called for extensions linked to the achievement of specific disarmament objectives; and Thailand, which called for fixed period extensions without linkages. Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Sudan, and Zimbabwe proposed linking the NPT’s extension to the negotiation of a timetable for disarmament. Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Libya also opposed indefinite extension in the absence of Israel’s accession to the treaty.

46. The complete text of these four documents may be found on the Internet at “Decision Papers from the NPT Review and Extension Conference” (http://www.acda.gov/decision.htm). The text of the principles may also be found in the

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47. Stimson Center Homepage, http://www.stimson.org/zeronuke/evolve/release.htm


113.

49. Joseph Rotblat, a Manhattan Project physicist who left the project in December 1944, played a key role in forming Pugwash in 1957 and drafted the Pugwash manifesto that scientists must take responsibility for the consequences of their work. Pugwash has some 3,000 members, largely natural scientists but in recent years including an increasing number of social scientists. The group holds seminars and conferences throughout the world, concerning not only nuclear disarmament but also general disarmament and the promotion of peace. It served as an “icebreaker” during the Cold War and played an important role in generating awareness on, creating a momentum toward, and sustaining support for, the PTBT of 1963, the ABM treaty (1972), and Biological Weapons Convention (1972).

50. Pugwash sent open letters on nuclear testing to Jacques Chirac (June 1995), Bill Clinton (June 1993), Chinese leaders (October 1992), and George Bush and Boris Yeltsin (September 1992). In February 1996, Joseph Rotblat and three other Pugwash Council members sent a letter to Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, stating that India should drop its position of making the CTBT contingent on a time-bound disarmament framework because this position might result in a failure to complete the CTBT. The letter also emphasized that Pugwash was, like India, committed to disarmament, but added that the failure to complete a CTBT would be a major setback to the cause of disarmament. The sole Indian member of Pugwash dissented from this position and (specifying that he was speaking in his individual capacity rather than as a spokesperson for New Delhi) supported tying the CTBT in a time-bound disarmament framework. Pugwash Newsletter 33 (4/5) (April–July 1996), 295–299. It should be noted that in the 1960s, when the Indian atomic program was directed by Homi Bhabha, Indian scientists were forbidden from joining Pugwash.


54. The UN Association of the United States of America, A Global Agenda: Issues Before the 51st General Assembly (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), 88–89. This UN resolution also called for the CD to establish a committee on nuclear disarmament that would commence negotiations in 1996 on a phased program of nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 106-39-17; China voted in favor of the resolution; France, the U.K., and the United States voted against; Russia abstained.

55. On technical grounds, the few tests conducted by France and China in 1995–96 made less difference to their nuclear forces, because both nations had long ago achieved key technical milestones such as fission (first-generation nuclear weapons), boosted fission, and finally more advanced thermonuclear weapons. After crossing these thresholds, the main utility of testing is for new warhead designs, and thus the Chinese tests may have been in pursuit of warhead miniaturization. Even on this issue, the small number of tests in 1995–96 were hardly sufficient to reliably develop new warheads. The Chinese and particularly the French tests may largely have been intended to gather data which would be useful in future years for computer simulations.


58. “Indonesia’s Alatas Views Debate,” FBIS-EAS (May 1, 1995). 3. Several delegates also noted that the NPT is not the only nonproliferation institution—the regional approach, for example in the Pacific, is also an important means to nonproliferation.
India’s Position on the CTBT
Following the NPT Extension Conference

59. The nonaligned proposal is found in the UN document CD/1388, March 14, 1996. It called for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to begin negotiations on a framework for nuclear disarmament immediately after the CTBT negotiations were complete.

60. The author’s conversations with current and former Indian officials confirm this analysis.


63. Verifying compliance with a ban on subcritical or laboratory tests requires round-the-clock monitoring of laboratories, either through electronic means or by inspectors. Such an intrusive verification system would be economically prohibitive, politically unacceptable, and still not perfect simply because computer or laboratory simulations are not confined to laboratories which may be monitored—these activities could take place in almost any other facility free of inspectors.

64. This assumes that testing is ultimately necessary for deploying a credible nuclear arsenal; South Africa and Israel did not require a nuclear test during the development of their first-generation nuclear weapons.

65. The CTBT freezes all states to their 1996 status—leaving the United States and Russia with extensive knowledge and a rich database from prior tests, data which are useful in computer simulations. Thus whatever imbalances already exist in the form of computational and experimental capabilities may well be perpetuated into the future. In terms of the relative sophistication of nuclear arsenals, the threshold states fall well behind France and China, who themselves fall far behind the United States and Russia. In the absence of additional nuclear testing, these relative positions will remain frozen perpetually. In absolute terms, France and China still have formidable arsenals, while the threshold states also have a significant nuclear capability in terms of first-generation Hiroshima-type weapons.

66. CD/NTB/WP.244 (June 29, 1995). India, Working Paper, Draft Article on Scope. Conference on Disarmament, Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. In the following week, on July 6, the Indian CD statement cited this working paper as calling for a ban on “low-yield tests”; this Indian CD statement actually made no reference to subcritical tests.


68. Disarmament Diplomacy 5 (May 1996). The eventual CTBT preamble contains the same text and two other points on disarmament: “Stressing, therefore, the need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. . . . (and) Further recognizing that an end to all such nuclear explosions will thus constitute a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament” (http://www.ctbto.org).

69. Disarmament Diplomacy 6 (June 1996), WP.336. The proposal was coordinated by Mexico and undertaken by the thirteen G-21 states in the CD—Brazil, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Myanmar, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela.

France, the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed to allow the preamble to refer to “constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons” as a consequence of the treaty, but rejected any mention of this as an objective or aspiration of the treaty (ibid.).

70. CD/1419 (August 7, 1996). This program was submitted by Egypt on behalf of twenty-eight nonaligned states in the CD; South Africa and Chile did not agree to the program. Disarmament Diplomacy no. 7 (July–August 1996).

71. The CTBT cannot become legally binding without the signature and ratification of forty-four countries which were participating members of the CD on June 18, 1996, and are also listed by the IAEA’s 1995 and 1996 schedules of nuclear research and nuclear power reactors in the world. These countries are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, DPRK, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, U.K., United States, Vietnam, and Zaire. This list omitted Yugoslavia, which was a CD member but barred from participation.


73. Rebecca Johnson noted that “Russia’s” anger about the zero-yield decision taken by Clinton in August 1995 is recognized as a factor in several difficulties thrown up by Moscow since then, including . . . its elevation of the accession of all the nuclear test capable States into a treaty breaking issue. Similarly, the current British Foreign Secretary campaigned very hard (and unsuccessfully) in 1992 and 1993, when he was Defense Secretary, to overturn the U.S. testing moratorium.
which had severely curtailed British testing plans, establishing in the course of his endeavors very close relations with anti-
CTBT factions within the American defense and intelligence agencies.” Disarmament Diplomacy 6 (June 1996).
74. CD/PV.734 (May 14, 1996), 12. The U.K. added that it did not hold its rigid EIF position “because we have some
absurd secret desire to see the treaty collapse so that we can test again . . . we can have no interest in seeing the negotiations
fail—just the opposite” (ibid.). In a later more heated debate, Britain’s Ambassador Sir Michael Weston also stated that the
treaty only concerned the eight nuclear-relevant states (that is, P-5 and threshold states), with the other states being there
merely to share the financial burden of the treaty’s verification, upon which Japan threatened withholding its financial
contributions if implementation of the treaty were unreasonably delayed. Disarmament Diplomacy 6 (June 1996).
75. A Pakistani foreign ministry report of July 18 noted that Pakistan was undecided on whether or not to sign the
treaty, apparently following a letter by President Clinton to Benazir Bhutto on the issue. That month, Pakistan’s ambassador
to the CD Munir Akram was in Islamabad to discuss this issue and made the case that Washington would use economic
pressure, including IMF and World Bank assistance, to force Islamabad into signing the treaty.
This spawned a debate in the Pakistani press. Some editorials argued that Pakistan should unilaterally sign the CTBT
(for example, Dr. Farrukh Saleem, “Say Yes to CTBT,” Dawn Wire Service (August 15, 1996), Issue 02/33). Others noted
that Pakistan’s security interests dictated that it should not sign the CTBT even if India signed the treaty (M. I. Qureshi,
“Pakistan and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” The Nation (September 15, 1996); “Twenty Years of Kahuta: We
shouldn’t sign the CTBT under any conditions,” The Friday Times (July 25–31, 1996), 2).
This press debate was accompanied by hawkish declarations from the opposition Pakistan Muslim League (PML),
stating that “if the government tries to show flexibility on this issue against national interests, it will have to face the wrath
of the people.” Bhutto initially counterattacked, arguing that the PML was politicizing the issue when many of its members
did not even know what the words in “CTBT” stood for. Eventually the Bhutto government and Pakistan’s diplomats
retreated toward their original stance—that Pakistan’s signing the CTBT could only follow a similar step by India (Reuters,
August 1, 1996).
76. CD/PV.735 (May 23, 1996), 4; Disarmament Diplomacy 5 (May 1996).
77. CD/PV.733 (March 28, 1996), 22.
78. Disarmament Diplomacy 7 (July–August 1996). Many other states including Mexico and Nigeria warned that entry
into force conditions should not be used to delay or prevent early implementation of the treaty. Disarmament Diplomacy 6
(June 1996).
79. The rolling CTBT text prior to May 1996 contained some one thousand points of disagreement (or brackets), some
frivolous and others substantive. At a March 1996 press conference, ACDA Director John Holum noted that negotiating
each point separately (the bracket-by-bracket approach) would not result in a treaty by the June 1996 deadline. As such, in
an attempt to speed the pace of treaty completion, the test ban conference chair Jaap Ramaker put together a “clean” text
capturing the middle ground on the most contentious issues. In prior months, draft CTBT texts were submitted by Iran
(CD/1384) and Australia (CD/1386) to the CD in February 1996. In March 1996, Ramaker tabled an “Outline of a Draft
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty” (CD/NTB/WP.321) to “assist states . . . in preparing for the final stage”; this draft
text included national positions in brackets. On May 28, Ramaker presented a complete “Draft Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty,” consisting of a preamble and seventeen articles with no brackets.
While the May 28 chair’s draft reflected much of the previously negotiated aspects of the CTBT, it was resented by
India, Pakistan, China, and Russia on the procedural grounds that it was not a “negotiated” draft but rather an “imposed”
draft. Further, many states expressed concern that the May 28 draft overly represented the “Western perspective.” However
the United States and U.K. complained that the verification provisions were too far toward the positions of G-21.
Scientists (May–June 1996), 11.
80. Article XIV, para 2, notes that if the CTBT does not enter into force within three years of its opening for signature,
“a Conference of the States that have already deposited their instruments of ratification” can convene in order to “consider
and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification
process in order to facilitate the early entry into force” of the treaty. For a text of the treaty, see http://www.acda.gov/treaties/ctb.htm; http://www.ctbto.org.
81. CD 1436, 23; see also Craig Cerniello, “India Blocks Consensus on CTB, Treaty May Still Go to UN,” Arms
82. “U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s letter and the External Affairs Minister I. K. Gujral’s reply,” in T. T.
Poulose, CTBT and the Rise of Nuclear Nationalism in India (New Delhi: 1996), 296.
83. On-site inspections (OSIs) became necessary for the CTBT’s verification because the International Monitoring
System (IMS) has difficulty in reliably identifying low-yield tests below 1 kiloton; therefore, human inspectors are
necessary to examine the evidence (such as signs of radioactivity) concerning any such low-yield activity that is picked up
by IMS sensors. Yet states also expressed fears that inspections could be frivolous or result in espionage. The OSI issue
largely pitted the United States (supported by the U.K.) against China (supported by nonaligned states such as Pakistan, Iran,
and to a lesser extent India). The United States desired that information from sources other than the International Data
Center (for example, information gathered by Washington’s National Technical Means [NTM], a euphemism for intelligence and satellite-derived data) should be included when considering an on-site inspection. China and the nonaligned states, who lacked any significant NTM, were against including NTM data to trigger inspections.

A second, related issue of controversy concerned the number of states required to approve an inspection. Russia, the U.K., and France suggested that approval from three-fifths of the states in the CTBTO should allow OSIs, while the United States desired a smaller number (a simple majority) in order to make OSIs easier, and China (supported by Pakistan) desired a larger number (two-thirds) that would make OSIs harder. The eventual compromise allowed for NTM data to be considered, and OSIs had to be approved by 30 of the 51 states (three-fifths) in the CTBTO.

84. Beijing insisted that the CTBT allow for peaceful explosions, a position that almost all other states opposed. PNEs were not allowed in the final CTBT—the only concession on this issue was that the PNE issue could be reconsidered at a review conference to be held ten years after the CTBT entered into force. The concept of peaceful nuclear explosions held some theoretical promise until the mid-1970s. PNEs were considered to have potential civil engineering and economic development applications such as using nuclear explosives to divert rivers for irrigation purposes, for mining, or for underground storage cavities. However, since the 1980s the concept has been regarded as impractical—a series of U.S. and Russian tests found no real applications for PNEs—and the issue dropped off the nuclear agenda.

86. *Disarmament Times* 8, September 1996.
89. CD 1436, 46.

**Domestic Politics**

90. These four sources are somewhat similar to what one writer describes as “the four corners of the iron quadrangle” that opposes arms control in the United States—hawkish national security specialists, many from the Reagan administration; their allies in Congress; right-wing newspapers, conservative columnists, and editors; and right-wing sections of the bureaucracy. John Isaacs, “Spinning to the Right,” *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 53, (6) (November–December 1997): 14–15.

91. These categorizations are broad generalizations capturing the median position of each group. In practice, both the security community and the bureaucracy encompass a range of views, with some bureaucrats more concerned about security, and some analysts more concerned with issues of principle. On the diverging views among the security community, see Bharat Karnad, “The Quality of Expert Advice,” *Seminar* 444 (New Delhi, August 1996). The bureaucracy, security community, and the press are elite dominated, and consider it a self-appointed task to inform, and if necessary caution, the more whimsical political leaders against disturbing carefully crafted longstanding policies. Opposing the security community is another group of academics and scholars, the “peace lobby,” which argues against India’s nuclear option and favors participation in the global nonproliferation regime.

92. Only 8 percent of the respondents in this poll supported renouncing the nuclear option. When supporters of the status quo official policy were asked what conditions would permit India to renounce a nuclear option, 58 percent cited a time-bound disarmament plan, and 26 percent cited the renunciation of Pakistan’s nuclear option. David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, *India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996). The polls were conducted in September–November 1994, based on one thousand respondents in seven major Indian cities. Academics, scientists, government officials, diplomats, journalists, and officers from the armed forces and police accounted for 72 percent of the respondents.

93. An opinion poll, conducted on December 5–7, 1995 (that is, before the December 15, 1995, *New York Times* story of Indian nuclear test preparations and before the most intense phase of the CTBT debate in the Indian press), of 2,000 respondents in nine major cities showed that 62 percent of the respondents approved and 35 percent disapproved of an Indian nuclear test to develop its nuclear weapons capability. The numbers fell to 54 percent for and 42 percent against testing if this resulted in sanctions by the United States and Japan. On linking India’s nuclear option to disarmament, 68 percent of the respondents supported and 29 percent opposed giving up the nuclear option only if other nuclear powers agree to do the same. “Testing Times,” *India Today* (December 31, 1995), 66–72.

94. In a mid-1996 opinion poll combining both the urban and rural population, 36 percent of the respondents said “yes” and 26 percent said “no” to the question “Should India make the atomic bomb?” The number rose to 64 percent for and 30 percent against for graduate respondents (that is, those holding an undergraduate degree), and 46 percent for and 29 percent against for urban respondents. *India Today* (August 31, 1996), 42.

It was led by Indian Foreign Secretary K. Srinivasan, who had little experience in arms control. The delegation did not include the foreign ministry’s main arms control experts who were involved in prior India–U.S. nuclear dialogue. Some observers viewed this personnel composition, which would naturally result in the raising of idealistic principles rather than substantive issues, as an attempt to scuttle the talks. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1995), 202–206. It should also be noted that the same arms control bureaucracy that was left out of the London talks eventually opposed the CTBT.

The London talks took place at a time when the Clinton administration was attempting to cap India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in 1994, by offering to release to Pakistan its previously paid for F-16s in exchange for verifiable fissile material cutoffs and safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. India was asked to accept fissile material cutoffs and safeguards (on most but not all of its nuclear facilities) in exchange for unspecified science and technology cooperation. This plan failed because of opposition from the U.S. Congress and also from New Delhi and Islamabad.

96. Officials from India’s Congress party made statements before both houses of parliament—parliamentary affairs minister V. C. Shulka in the Lok Sabha, and external affairs minister Salman Khurshid in the Rajya Sabha—that there was no secrecy about the talks and that they were held in London only because it was convenient to both sides. They also assured Parliament that there would be no change in India’s stand on the NPT. “Ministers Assure Parliament on NPT, U.S. Talks,” and “Congress-I Spokesman Comments on NPT,” FBIS-NES (April 29, 1994), 50, citing All India Radio; “Minister Confirms ‘No Change’ in Stand on NPT,” FBIS-NES (April 26, 1994), 50.

97. “India: Commentary Considers Maneuvers Before NPT Vote,” FBIS-NES (March 1, 1995), 54, citing Jasjit Singh, “U.S. Faces No-Win Situation at NPT Meet,” Indian Express (March 1, 1995), 1, 3. This article noted that opposition by Egypt and Arab states over Israel’s nuclear status, and concerns by India, Japan, Germany, and other states seeking six main objectives—the CTBT, FMCT, security assurances, nuclear weapon-free zones, a time-bound disarmament plan, and the elimination of export restrictions—made indefinite extension unlikely.


100. Amitabh Mattoo, “India’s Nuclear Status Quo,” Survival 38, (3) (Autumn 1996): 47. It should be clarified that such seminars are routinely held in the Indian capital and in other Indian cities, and their actual impact on government policy is marginal. The seminars do, however, provide some reflection of prevailing elite opinion.

101. While the Indian press held the opinion that the article was an “inspired leak” by the U.S. government to pressure India into signing the CTB, Michael Krepon clarified that the New York Times story was the result of a leak by an NGO following a December 12, 1995, “off-the-record” meeting at the Stimson Center in Washington D.C.” Michael Krepon, “India, the U.S., and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” The Hindu (January 3, 1996).

102. An in-depth analysis of the issue—comparing media reports with commercial satellite-derived remote-sensing imagery—is undertaken by Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian, who note that the area of the reported test preparations was a military range where conventional force exercises take place. This study notes that, first, the Khotolai military range has seen prior nuclear test activity—the May 1974 test and the building of four shafts for two additional tests (that never took place) in the early 1980s. Second, image-derived evidence supports the claim of planned Prithvi missile tests in the region (the Prithvi has never actually been tested in this area, but the missile is intended to be deployed in this region). Third, image-derived evidence was consistent with nuclear test preparations, planned Prithvi missile testing, or a combination of both. Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian, “Investigating the Allegations of Indian Nuclear Test Preparations in the Rajasthan Desert,” Science and Global Security 6 (1997): 149. See also W. P. S. Siddhu, “India’s Nuclear Tests: Technical and Military Imperatives,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (April 1996), 170–173. In February–March 1996, Pakistan may have been preparing a nuclear test site at the Chagai Hills region in Baluchistan to enable a quick response to any Indian nuclear test. “Pakistan Planning N-test, U.S. Aides Say,” Reuters (March 13, 1996).

103. At the June 1997 Carnegie Conference on Nuclear Nonproliferation, views were expressed that the threat of sanctions (that would be required under U.S. legislation) was one factor persuading New Delhi to back away from a nuclear test. Panel on “Using Sanctions to Support Nonproliferation,” Carnegie Conference, June 9, 1997. India’s finance ministry also cautioned the government on the damaging economic consequences that would result from U.S. sanctions.

104. The Indian elections were held in phases beginning on April 27, 1996; results were announced on May 15, 1996. Following the elections, the BJP and its allies held approximately 190 seats, the Congress had 140 seats, and the thirteen-party coalition United Front had some 180 seats in a 540-seat legislature.

105. Disarmament Diplomacy 5 (May 1996); Disarmament Diplomacy 6 (June 1996).

106. Ibid.


108. While Indian political parties and analysts began linking the CTBT to Indian national security well before Indian elections, New Delhi’s position before the international community—its CD and UN statements—did not cite security or sovereignty concerns until June–July 1996, at the onset of the United Front coalition government. In prior months, New
Delhi’s CD statements had been directed at the international community and toward other delegations at the CD—they contained technical terms on disarmament and pertaining to the CTBT and were largely ignored in the Indian media and were irrelevant to the Indian public.

109. The MEA is divided into territorial and functional sections and is headed by the foreign secretary and other secretaries. On foreign policy making, see J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Allied, 1980); Harish Kapur, India’s Foreign Policy 1947–92: Shadows and Substance (New Delhi: Sage, 1994). On the role of the foreign secretary, see J. N. Dixit, My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary (New Delhi: UBS, 1996).

110. The arms control bureaucracy is a small section within the MEA. It is influential in drafting New Delhi’s CD and UN statements on nuclear arms control (these would usually conform to broader parameters outlined by more senior bureaucrats or the foreign minister or prime minister), with some input from other groups in the MEA or MOD. Any Indian representative—not necessarily an MEA official but also a government minister or member of parliament—may then present these statements at the CD or United Nations.

111. One leading Indian newspaper reported that India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) employed officers to ensure that editorial pages of newspapers carry the government’s point of view; to ensure credibility and variety, these IB officers use real names and addresses. The Indian Express reported receiving such letters from the IB on select issues such as the CTBT, India’s nuclear option, and Pakistan. “IB Plays Impostor, Writes Letters Using Your Name,” Indian Express (July 25, 1997).

112. For further reference on South Asian press reports concerning the CTBT, see the Regional Press Digest on Nuclear Issue in South Asia (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies; Colombo: Regional Center for Strategic Studies). For other recent Indian press coverage on nuclear issues, see the ACDIS home page (http://acdisweb.acdis.uiuc.edu, Internet Resources—South Asia Press Reports).

The CTBT and nuclear arms control coverage in the Indian media contrasts sharply with the broader debate on arms control in the U.S. media, but may be more comparable to a patriotic tilt during reporting on wartime events in other democratic states. For an assessment of the U.S. media, see Robert Karl Manoff and R. Michael Schiffer, “The Media and Arms Control and Disarmament,” in Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, ed. Richard Dean Burns (New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1992), 379–391. For the role of the media in priming the public and the political leadership and in setting the agenda for foreign policy, see Doris Graber, Mass Media and American Politics (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993); Simon Serfaty, The Mass Media and Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990). An opposing perspective is that policy making is elite dominated, and therefore the press and public opinion do not affect policy. Ultimately, public opinion may be more influential in domestic policy and less relevant to foreign policy making.

113. “Sign the CTBT,” The Times of India (July 19, 1996).
115. K. Sundarji, “India’s post-CTBT strategy,” The Hindu (September 30, 1996). In this article, Sundarji was not arguing for or against India’s CTBT position, but instead was commenting on national security issues. Sundarji went on to note that India could also sign the FMCT when it had acquired a fissile material stockpile sufficient to build a minimum deterrent, which he defined as fifteen to thirty 20-kiloton devices that would survive a first strike. Sundarji did not comment on whether India may already possess such a stockpile.

Analysts have estimated that India had produced 170 kg of weapon-grade plutonium from its Dhruva reactor by 1995, a quantity sufficient for thirty-four nuclear weapons; this figure would rise to 250 kg of plutonium by the year 2000, sufficient for fifty weapons. David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 269.

116. An editorial titled “Unfriendly Friends,” The Times of India (August 14, 1996), noted that “at last there is a silver lining to the dark and lingering cloud” of CTBT negotiations, the silver lining being that the United States “has marginally distanced itself from three other nuclear powers, China, Russia and Britain, by beginning to understand the reasons for India’s firm and principled stance on the entry into force clause in the CTBT.”

117. After the adoption of the CTBT at the United Nations, Russia’s Foreign Secretary Yevgeni Primakov called the CTBT a “huge step” and underscored the “principal importance that all countries capable of creating nuclear weapons accede to the Treaty.” Sounding a clear note of warning to India and Pakistan, Primakov stated that the “testing of a nuclear explosive device by any country before the Treaty enters into force will cardinaly change the international situation, greatly prejudice the Treaty itself and may compel many countries to revise their attitude to it.” Specifically for “the attention of the opponents of the treaty,” Primakov emphasized that the CTBT “will not only contribute to the promotion of the nuclear nonproliferation regime but will also objectively stimulate a gradual transition to nuclear disarmament on a multilateral basis.” Disarmament Diplomacy 8 (September 1996).

118. Other TV channels—CNN, BBC, and private channels—barely covered the CTBT and, more generally, rarely report over nuclear issues; thus overall, these alternative sources of news have not really countered the standard Indian bureaucratic perspective on nuclear issues that is manifest through the state’s news channel. By 1998 the internet was becoming a forum for pro- and anti-nuclear activism—see, for example, debates on the rediffusion website at
One reason for this is that a small group of defense and foreign affairs correspondents, known as “defense correspondents,” are accredited to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) or Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and are dependent on these bureaucracies for routine news on military and security issues. They therefore feel obliged to carry MOD/MEA viewpoints whenever requested. Thus while the Indian press does occasionally criticize the MOD/MEA, frequent criticism of these bureaucracies by a particular newspaper or weekly is likely to lead to its exclusion from the MOD/MEA information-dissemination system.

120. The test was originally scheduled for early May 1994, just before Prime Minister Rao’s departure for Washington, but was held back until after the Prime Minister’s U.S. trip. The June 1994 Prithvi test also came immediately after Frank Wisner’s remarks cautioning New Delhi against further Prithvi activity. These were made on May 26, 1994, during Senate confirmation hearings and were criticized in the Indian press. “Papers Condemn U.S. Diplomat’s Remarks on Missile,” FBIS-NES (June 1, 1994), 67.

121. The January 1996 test was the first test of the longer 250-km range version of the missile, while earlier tests had been of the 150-km range version. Thus technical considerations associated with increasing the range may have been partly behind the twenty-month moratorium in Prithvi tests.

122. A representative news article noted that “the short range Prithvi program has been stalled for at least eight months since user trials were completed and American pressure has a great deal to do with it.” “Prithvi in the Fridge?” Indian Express (March 31, 1995), 8.

On the three-year gap between the first and second Agni tests (in 1989 and 1992, respectively) that was partly for technical reasons, a newspaper commented that “the three-year delay in launching Agni-II has had an adverse effect on the morale of our defence scientists and created an impression in the public that our political leadership could not withstand pressure from Western powers.” It added that India should continue missile development, even though “that would mean facing unimaginable pressure and arm twisting. We can put up with all this and undergo consequential hardships if our political leadership shows determination and strives for national consensus.” “Missile Development Viewed,” FBIS-NES (June 12, 1992), citing “After Agni, What?” Patriot (June 1, 1992), 4.

123. An October 1996 Indian defense ministry report recommended that the Agni be suspended, and, citing this report, an Indian parliamentary committee stated in December 1996 that since all the objectives of the Agni technology demonstration project had been met, the project was being terminated. The committee added that the decision to develop and produce a missile system based on Agni technology could be taken at an appropriate time consistent with the prevailing threat perception (Reuters, December 5, 1996).

124. “Deploy Agni, says House panel report,” The Times of India (May 1, 1997); Pravin Sawhney, “India’s Missile Policy: Focus Must Shift to Agni,” The Times of India (March 4, 1997).

125. Pakistan described the Indian declaration as “very serious and disturbing” (“Pakistan concerned over alleged Indian clandestine chemical weapon,” Clarinet newsgroup clari.world.asia.south, October 29, 1997). Later, in January 1998, Benazir Bhutto attacked the Nawaz Sharif government for ratifying the CWC when India had not done the same, claiming this jeopardized Pakistan’s security (“Bhutto accuses Sharif of victimizing her to hide his misrule,” Clarinet newsgroup clari.world.asia.south, January 9, 1998). Bhutto’s remarks were incorrect, because India had ratified the CWC well before Pakistan, but they nevertheless resonated well among an ignorant public, and Nawaz Sharif could hardly afford to counter these by saying anything positive about India—such as the fact that India had signed the CWC.

126. An authoritative case supporting India’s decision is made by Jasjit Singh, “India Has Nothing to Lose by Declaring Chemical Weapons,” The Indian Express (June 19, 1997); Singh is director of India’s Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, which is India’s major quasi-official defense think-tank. Another editorial was more critical of the Indian government, noting that India had always officially stated that it did not have a chemical weapons program, and that therefore the disclosure of past chemical weapons research hurt India’s credibility. “A Chemical Assault on Credibility,” The Indian Express (July 31, 1997).

127. George Perkovich, “India’s Nuclear Weapons Debate: Unlocking the Door to the CTBT,” Arms Control Today (May–June 1996), 11–16. Perkovich also notes that the Indian nuclear establishment had never been satisfied by the government’s decision to halt tests after 1974. Because the 1974 device was rudimentary, Indian nuclear technologists have sought further tests to develop confidence in whatever advances in design and technology have occurred in subsequent years. The military has presumably expressed its unwillingness to rely on untested weapons.


129. Ibid., 50.


131. These remarks were made in a 1978 UN statement, and Buenos Aires continued to hold such views until the 1990s. Julio Carasales, “A Surprising About-face: Argentina and the NPT,” Security Dialogue 27, (3) (September 1996): 325–335. In Brazil, a deep-seated tradition of regarding the NPT as unjust and discriminatory has also resulted in

www.rediffusion.com and www.bharat-rakshak.com. Yet the internet has only tens of thousands (and perhaps eventually a few hundred thousands) of subscribers, a very small fraction of India’s one hundred million middle class population.
considerable inertia in policy making. Therefore, despite signing CBM agreements in 1990–92 (that entered into force in 1994), under which Argentina and Brazil subjected themselves to safeguards more extensive than the NPT, Brazil’s bureaucracy continued to oppose the NPT on ideological grounds for some three additional years—it was only in 1997 that President Cardoso finally announced his intentions to join the NPT. Paulo S. Wrobel, “Brazil and the NPT: Resistance to Change?” Security Dialogue 27, (3) (September 1996): 337–347.

134. In October 1997, China attended a Zangger Committee meeting for the first time, disclosed its past nuclear transactions, and gave its strongest assurances to date on curbing future nuclear transfers. This assurance opened the door for U.S. nuclear exports to China. China News Digest (CND, 10/31/97), cited at http://www.cnd.org:8020/CND-Global97.4th/CND-Global97-11-05.html. The Chinese statement does little to undo past technology transfers, upon which Pakistan has acquired a rudimentary nuclear and missile capability, but it may henceforth distance China from Pakistan concerning weapons usable nuclear technology. It would also restrict Chinese nuclear exports—concerning uranium and heavy water—to India.

135. The India–China agreements also contain military confidence-building measures (CBMs) such as the advance notification of military exercises and force reductions in border areas. Details of the CBM agreements are found on the Stimson Center home page, http://www.stimson.org.

136. For some states, an alliance with the United States, and a U.S. nuclear umbrella, provides an alternative to an indigenous nuclear weapons program, which may partly explain why Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, who all face security concerns from China, have signed the NPT and given up their nuclear option. Yet three other states with access to the U.S. nuclear umbrella should also have refrained from nuclear activity, but have nevertheless developed indigenous nuclear programs—U.K., France, Israel—implying that these states did not place faith in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Further, most states do not enjoy a U.S. nuclear umbrella, and yet have refrained from indigenous nuclear programs.

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137. Despite having a military dispute with Russia over control of the Black Sea Fleet and facing security concerns related to the ethnic Russian population in the Crimea, a territory significant because of its naval facilities which Russia sought to control, Ukraine nevertheless gave up its nuclear weapons, signed the NPT, and thereby voluntarily placed itself in a position of nuclear asymmetry versus Russia.

Vietnam faced a Chinese invasion in 1975, and it has a major territorial dispute with China over the Spratly Islands, a dispute that often erupts into armed clashes; in 1988 three Vietnamese vessels were sunk by the Chinese navy. Thus both India and Vietnam have faced a Chinese military attack and have long-term security concerns about China, factors which should encourage the seeking of a nuclear option. Both states previously enjoyed strong ties with a nuclear superpower (the Soviet Union) to counter the Chinese threat, which partly mitigated the need for an indigenous nuclear option; yet this Russian support is now less relevant. Despite the above similarity in circumstances that would tend to favor nuclearization for both states, the outcomes have been different: India has retained its nuclear option, Vietnam has never sought such an option. Therefore, one must look at factors other than security in explaining the above differences in outcome.

138. The literature on perceptions is extensive; see, for example, Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

140. In the 1994 Indian elite opinion poll, when nuclear weapon advocates were asked why they favored India’s retaining a nuclear option, a large majority of 57 percent identified threats from Pakistan, while only 20 percent expressed concern about China. David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options. Other responses to this question were to improve India’s bargaining power in world affairs (49 percent), to enhance India’s international status (38 percent), and threats from other nuclear powers (27 percent). This last figure implies that concerns about U.S. hegemony in world politics are also significant among the Indian elite.
141. “Editorial Condemns U.S. Insistence on Signing,” FBIS-NES (February 11, 1992), 44. The article further added that even after deep cuts announcements by Bush and Yeltsin, the superpowers both had 45,000 nuclear warheads, “four
times more than the total of the three other nuclear states,” and implied that the superpowers therefore had no moral standing in seeking to obtain India’s relinquishing of its much smaller (and officially nonexistent) nuclear weapons program.

142. “Change in Western Attitude on NPT Assessed,” FBIS-NES (March 26, 1993), 22.


146. Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal (over which it did not have operational control) in stages, beginning with the removal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russian territory in 1991–92; the ratification of START I by early 1994 (on this, the Ukrainian Parliament noted that it was only giving up some 40 percent of its strategic nuclear arsenal); and finally agreeing to total denuclearization by acceding to the NPT in late 1994. In exchange, Ukraine received guarantees over its territorial integrity (which were somewhat tempered by Russian nationalists who publicly proclaimed that Russia should still pursue territorial interests in Ukraine); two sets of security assurances against nuclear threats from the United States, Russia, and Britain (which were political assurances that were not legally binding); a commitment of some $900 million in U.S. financial assistance, and an additional $200 million from European states; continuing technical assistance from Russia for Ukrainian nuclear facilities that supplied some of Ukraine’s energy requirements; and forgiveness of hundreds of millions of dollars of Ukraine’s oil and gas debt to Russia. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1995), 125–128.

147. In this case the Parliament was a “rubber-stamp” for the president (because opposition nationalists were in a minority since losing the elections) and may have approved the NPT even without incentives. The incentives were nevertheless important in increasing the legitimacy and public acceptability of the accords, thus making Ukraine’s accession to the NPT less reversible and less challengeable by a potentially more hawkish Parliament in future years.


149 Statement by Inder Gujral on September 11, 1996 in the Indian Parliament.


151. Occasional editorials in the Indian press suggested that New Delhi should consider signing the FMCT because such a step would still preserve India’s nuclear option, which is based upon previously manufactured nuclear material, and because the FMCT is not “discriminatory.” P. R. Chari, “FMCT: Issues in Contention,” The Hindu (March 4, 1997), 12.


153. “Real motive was political, not military, says Gowda,” Hindustan Times (May 20, 1998), http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/200598/def/RF003.htm; Another report notes that the “United Front government had planned tests in October last year (1997) but they were put off because of elections.” “Opposition mounts attack on Govt,” The Hindu (May 27, 1998), http://www.hinduonline.com/daily/980528/01/01280002.htm. By October 1997, Inder Gujral was India’s Prime Minister, having replaced Deve Gowda on April 22, 1997.

India’s May 1998 Nuclear Tests


157. The Task Force included former Defense Minister K. C. Pant, Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission Jaswant Singh and Director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA) Jasjit Singh. Its final report simply noted that “The National Security Council (NSC) should be formed on a priority basis and should consist of a Cabinet Committee of National Security headed by the Prime Minister in order to undertake long-term strategic planning, formulation of national security strategy, coordination of current decision making and intelligence assessment. The proposed Council should have a National Security Advisor with the rank of a Cabinet Minister to assist the Prime Minister. . . . On the constitution of the proposed NSC, the Task Force in its report has suggested that the Cabinet Committee of National Security, presided over by the Prime Minister, should be the apex body of decision-making. The organization below that level would include a National
Security Advisor to the Prime Minister and three divisions. The divisions will undertake long-term strategic planning and formulation of strategy of national security; coordination of current decision-making and follow-up of policy implementation and coordinated intelligence assessment for national security planning and management. These three wings of the proposed NSC would have a system of boards to examine options and adopt an integrated approach to planning, coordination and intelligence assessments.” “Establishment of NSC mooted: K. C. Pant panel presents report,” Hindustan Times (June 27, 1998).

158. “N-tests ruled out,” The Times of India (March 21, 1998). This news report quoted Fernandes as stating that a strategic defense review would examine security and threat perceptions and then decide on the induction of nuclear weapons, but added that “we shall not fight shy of inducting them.”

163. The Foreign Media Reaction Daily Digest noted that “In commentary after commentary, Indian pundits stressed that the advent of Pakistan’s Ghauri missile had grave implications for India’s security. Many spoke of the event as marking a “decided turn for the worse” in Indo-Pakistani relations. Some analysts agreed with the nationalist Hindustan Times’ assessment that India faced a threat not only from a “trigger-happy . . . military-mullah complex in Pakistan,” but also from China, which that paper claimed had a “vast array of atomic weapons and ballistic missiles . . . targeted at India.” Writers differed in their conclusions as to how India should react to the Ghauri. Some commended India’s “measured” response, claiming that moderation might win India some “brownie points” with the U.S.—and possible U.S. endorsement of a UN Security Council seat. These editorialists tended to side with the centrist Hindustan Times of India, which held that “real security” can never be achieved through an expensive arms race. Other commentators, distressed by what they called Pakistan’s “bad boy” attitude, urged that India “get cracking.” Endorsing that view, a nationalist paper joined others in insisting: ‘We need a state-of-the-art missiles as a deterrent.’” “Richardson To South Asia: Increased Trade Welcomed; Nuclear Arms Race Feared,” Foreign Media Reaction Daily Digest (April 29, 1998).

164. Indian Express (April 9, 1998).
166. “Counter-Ghauri steps at appropriate time,” Hindustan Times (April 10, 1998).
171. “India is now a N-weapons state: PM,” The Times of India (May 16, 1998); “We have shown them that we mean business” India Today (May 25, 1998), http://www.india-today.com/today/25051998/vajint.html
177. In an interview with the Washington Post, Prime Minister Vajpayee claimed that disarmament “was one of the main reasons (for the nuclear tests): We thought that if there is nuclear disarmament it will make the world a better place to live in . . . It will also provide security for us.” “Leader Says India Has A Credible Deterrent,” Washington Post (June 17, 1998); “India will retaliate if sanctions are enforced,” Times of India (June 18, 1998). In August 1998 before the Talbott-Singh talks, the BJP leadership echoed ideological opposition against the nonproliferation


180. While the Indian political right is not unwilling to diplomatically settle differences with China, they choose to simultaneously and overtly maintain a nuclear status. On technical grounds, India’s position as either an overt and declared nuclear state (the BJP policy) or nuclear-capable state (the position of the Indian political center) makes little difference, since India would retain the same technical capability for a nuclear deterrent against China in both situations.


184. India Today International (July 6, 1998), 26. The poll of 960 adults in six Indian cities also noted that 52 percent of the respondents rated the performance of the BJP government in its first 100 days as “good” while 17 percent rated it as “bad”, and 29 percent had neutral opinions. Further, 62 percent of the respondents noted that the government had handled the posttest fallout well, while 30 percent said the government had not handled the situation well. 185. Ashis Nandy, “Decline in euphoria,” Hindustan Times (July 4, 1998), http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/040798/detOpi01.htm


187. “Coalition crisis: Jaya declines to attend meeting,” Times of India (June 27, 1998); “UF backs new front; keen on Cong-led Govt,” Indian Express (June 27, 1998).


197. One news report noted that “The BJP MP advocated strong measures against the U.S. for taking such unilateral actions. These included expulsion of the U.S. scientists working in India or withdrawing the Science and TechnologyAttaché from the U.S. as a measured protest against the decision. Mr. Narendra Mohan of the BJP said the U.S. action was against the Vienna convention and any diplomatic convention followed and practised by the two countries. He called it an “unfriendly act” by a friendly country. . . . The Congress MP, however, requested the Indian Government to refrain from any “tit for tat” exercise as it would only harm diplomatic relations between the two countries. He said any step to recall the Indian Attaché or expel U.S. scientists would be puerile and childish.” “Rajya Sabha deplores U.S. action,” Hindustan Times (July 25, 1998).


199. “PM warns U.S. of retaliation on sanctions,” Hindustan Times (June 18, 1998). Another report notes that “energized Hindu activists have been on the march—sometimes violently—in states governed by the BJP. Activists allied with the (BJP) party have vandalized vending operations of American consumer products to protest U.S. sanctions . . . (BJP) party officials have typically stopped short of condemning the violent protests.” “Hindu Nationalists Target U.S. Products,” Washington Post (June 19, 1998).


203. Ibid.

204. Deccan Herald (July 6, 1998).

206. Besides Deputy Secretary of State Talbott, the U.S. delegation was comprised of “U.S. Ambassador Richard F Celeste, Vice Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Joseph W Ralston, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs Bruce Reidel, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl Inderfurth, Deputy Assistant for Nonproliferation and Political and Military Affairs Robert Einhorn and Special Advisor for South Asian Affairs Matt Daley. On the Indian side, Jaswant Singh was assisted by Indian Ambassador to the U.S. Naresh Chandra, Foreign Secretary K Raghunath, Joint Secretary (America) Aloke Prasad and Joint Secretary (Disarmament) Rakesh Sood. In the morning, the two delegations met for over three hours, followed by a one-to-one post-lunch meeting between Mr Singh and Talbott. While the two leaders held consultations, experts from the two sides met separately. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, called on Prime Minister A B Vajpayee; the visiting delegation also called on Home Minister L K Advani and former prime minister and Chairman of Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs I. K. Gujral. General Joseph W Ralston, Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, separately met Defence Minister George Fernandes, Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal S K Sareen and his Naval counterpart Admiral Vishnu Bhagawat, and Vice Chief of Army Staff Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar.

The two delegations also held informal consultations at the lunch hosted by Minister of State for External Affairs Ms Vasundhara Raje. Those attending the luncheon meeting included Mr Gujral, Leaders of Opposition in two Houses of Parliament Sharad Pawar and Mammoohan Singh, former external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee and former minister of state for external affairs Natwar Singh and Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra. Mr Singh hosted dinner for the delegation.” (“Jaswant, Talbott term talks constructive, to meet again in August”). A second article noted that “After concluding today’s round of talks and before leaving for Islamabad, Mr. Talbott called on the Congress(I) president, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi. She was assisted by Dr. Mammoohan Singh and Mr. K. Natwar Singh.” “Gaps unbridged at Indo-U.S. talks,” The Hindu (July 22, 1998).


210. “No breakthrough in Indo-U.S. talks,” Indian Express (August 26, 1998). This report suggested that the fact “that the two sides are seeking to go beyond the nuclear issue and are looking at long-term security concerns in the region is evident from the enhanced participation of officials from the Department of Defense and the Pentagon in the successive rounds of talks over the last eight weeks. Last evening, Singh met John Hamre, who is the Deputy Secretary of Defense. One active participant in the last two rounds of talks has been the vice-chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Joseph Ralston, who in fact hosted a dinner for the Indian delegation on Monday night.”


212. Deccan Herald (September 12, 1998).

213. “Cong cautions Govt against acceding to CTBT,” Deccan Herald (September 7, 1998). This report added that “This position, approved by the Congress Working Committee when it met to clear the declaration, is in sharp contrast to the party’s hitherto view that the CTBT is discriminatory and India should not sign it in its present form. In fact, the conclave’s subgroup on foreign affairs, after 13 hours deliberations during the last two days, had concluded that the CTBT should not be signed. . . However, by the time the summary of the subgroup’s deliberations were finalized, the change (and milder wording in the official declaration) had come about.

214. “Gujral takes Vajpayee to task on CTBT,” Hindustan Times (September 14, 1998).


216. “India seeks changes in hi-tech transfer over CTBT,” Hindustan Times (September 17, 1998).


221. Ibid.

222. The Indian press highlighted and exaggerated a remark by Laurent Fabius, Speaker of the French National Assembly and a former Prime Minister, who made references to India’s nuclear status. Thus a headline suggested French approval or recognition of Indian nuclear policy—“France: India N-weapon state” (Hindustan Times, September 17, 1998)—while the text of the article reported Fabius as stating that “We recognize the fact that your country (India) is very advanced in the nuclear field. You also proved your weapon capability.”

223. The Times of India (May 12, 1998).

224. The Hindu (May 12, 1998).


226. Indian Express (May 12, 1998).

227. Indian Express (May 12, 1998).
228. *Indian Express* (May 15, 1998).
234. Following the ASEAN meetings, an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting was held that included ASEAN states and Japan, the United States, Australia, the EU, Russia and India. The ARF issued a statement that “expressed grave concern and strongly deplored the recent nuclear tests in south Asia, which exacerbated tension in the region and raised the spectre of a nuclear arms race.” The statement called for the total cessation of such testing and urged the countries concerned to sign the NPT and the CTBT without delay, conditions or reservations. It noted that India lobbied strongly against harsh language, while some Asian countries feared a condemnation would be counter-productive. “But in speeches and in interviews, Western ministers, along with the U.S. and Pakistan nuclear tests destabilized in Asian security forum,” AFP Report, Clari-world.asia.india, July 27, 1998).
235. *Indian Express* (June 22, 1998).
244. “India offers to sign CTBT if curbs on hi-tech transfer are eased,” *Times of India* (July 6, 1998);
248. It is worth noting that the convergence of all internal factions in the face of external pressure occurred in mid-1996 during India’s stand against the EIF provision of the CTBT, and again in late May 1998 when the Indian opposition withdrew its challenge to the BJP government following Pakistan’s nuclear tests. Such convergence of internal factions would hurt the cause of India’s nuclear pragmatists who seek some nuclear restraint.

Appendix D

Press Coverage of the CTBT, NPT, and Nuclear Issues

250. A number of additional articles were not easily categorized as either agreeing or disagreeing. This analysis noted that in the period January–June 1995, the *Indian Express* carried 61 articles (including editorials and commentaries) concerning the NPT, of which 17 were on the front page; the *Statesman* carried 27 articles of which 11 were on the front page. In the United States, the *New York Times* carried 15 articles (3 on the front page) and the *Washington Post* carried 26 articles, 8 on the front page. Monica Prasad, “The Rationality of Nationalism: Debate in Indian and U.S. Newspapers over the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” Paper Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, Chicago, 1998.

Appendix E
Technical Aspects of India’s Nuclear Tests
260. For further details on the tests of May 11, see “The Bomb Makers,” India Today (June 22, 1998), http://www.india-today.com/itoday/22061998
261. For further details on the tests of May 11, see “The Bomb Makers,” India Today (June 22, 1998), http://www.india-today.com/itoday/22061998
263. Press Conference, Dr. R. Chidambaram, Chairman, AEC & Secretary, DAE; Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, Scientific Adviser to Raksha Mantri and Secretary, Department of Defence Research and Development; Dr. Anil Kakodkar, Director, BARC; Dr. K. Santhanam, Chief Advisor (Technologies), DRDO. May 17. Found on the government of India homepage at http://www.mea.gov.in/govt/conf.htm

Appendix F
Domestic Opposition to India’s Nuclear Tests
270. Times of India (May 16, 1998).
271. “Real motive was political, not military, says Gowda,” Hindustan Times (May 20, 1998), http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/200598/defRFO03.htm
278. “India may review moratorium,” The Indian Express (May 29, 1998).
Appendix G
The U.S. and World Reaction to India’s Nuclear Tests


Appendix H
Factors Influencing India’s Future Nuclear Strategy

293. W. P. S. Sidhu, “Asian Nuclear Testing—India sees safety in nuclear triad and second strike potential,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (July 1998); see also Jane’s Intelligence Review (October 1998) reporting that by 1998, India may have 560 kg of weapons grade plutonium.
294. The Indian Air Force signed contract in December 1996 for forty Su-30 aircraft at a total price of $1.8 billion or Rs. 63 billion. The first eight of these were delivered by March 1997, with final delivery to be complete by 2001. India also ordered six II-78 refueling tankers from Russia in early 1998. The Indian navy has twelve slow flying maritime patrol aircraft, the Tu-142 that have a 10,000 km range and an estimated 10 ton payload; these could be modified to carry 50–100 km range subsonic (AS-13/18) or supersonic (AS-17) cruise missiles.
295. One report notes that the Agni has a 1,200–1,800 km range, and India is investing Rs.6 billion (which is $150 million) to pursue a 2,500 km range Agni-II, with flight tests to be conducted in late 1998. The Agni-II program calls for low rate production of 20 missiles by the year 2000, with most of the work done by DRDO. “India to Prepare Nuclear Doctrine, Arsenal for Deployment,” Defense News (June 7, 1998), 14. It should be noted that the Agni’s first stage is a 9 ton solid fuel booster used on India’s PSLV satellite launch vehicle—six such boosters are used on each PSLV, and one PSLV has been (and will continue to be) launched each year since 1993—thus India is already producing boosters used for the Agni at the rate of six per year.
296. The estimates were 20 Agni missiles each costing $5 million, 20 Prithvi missiles each costing $2 million, 60 warheads each valued at $0.25 million, 5 nuclear submarines each costing $1 billion, and $1 billion for a command and control and satellite surveillance system. India Today (June 1, 1998), 22–3. These exclude sunk costs from infrastructure that is already in place.
297. In terms of local currency, the budget increased by 14 percent, of which 7 percent should be discounted due to inflation.
298. For 1998–99, plan allocation for the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was increased by 68 percent to Rs.1391 crore ($350 million) from Rs. 828 crore; India’s space program was allocated Rs. 1381 crore ($350 million), a rise of 62 percent from Rs.850 crore the previous year. Total allocation for defense research was raised by 36.8 percent from Rs.1298 crore to Rs.1776 crore ($440 million). “Massive hike in atomic energy, space allocation,” Times of India, (June 2, 1998).
300. An op-ed titled “The sanctions and the poor” (The Hindu, July 24, 1998), noted that the cut-off in foreign aid from Japan, Canada, Sweden, Australia and the Netherlands would have an impact on India’s social sector expenditures. It noted that “External assistance as a percentage of the social service expenditure of both the Central and State Governments went up from less than one per cent in 1985 to 3.3 per cent in 1995–96. . . Sweden has canceled the Country Agreement, totaling 900 million kroner for the coming three years. In 316 villages in Rajasthan, children, especially girls, were getting education through the Swedish support for the Lok Jumbish and Shiksha Karmik programs. Some 2.55 lakh children benefited by both formal and nonformal schooling. Eventually, this source of support will dry up. . . The latent impact of the sanctions on the poor is also serious. The most important is that India, which enjoyed a favored nation’ status in terms of foreign assistance (several countries have been stepping up assistance), is now facing economic isolation. . . Foreign aid has a definite catalytic role. While the Central and State Government funds were mainly made available for running the establishment, the aid money helped specific programs to be completed in a timeframe, with measurable results. . . A domestic factor which pushes the social sector to a corner is obviously the escalation in defense expenditure in keeping with the BJP’s nuclear calculations. . . The Prime Minister has said no price is too high for ensuring national security. But there can be no national security without building the people’s security. And, that does not come by adding to the burden of the poor majority.”

301. The Indian Express reported that “After clearing the $543 million Andhra Pradesh Economic Restructuring Loan . . . the World Bank is likely to clear 3 other loans totaling over $500 million. . . a $300 million loan for Woman and Child Development Project, a $76 million Orissa health project and a $130 million agriculture loan for Uttar Pradesh. . . The projects which will not have been cleared will be a $450 million powergrid loan, a $130 million loan for IREDA, a $381 million road loan for Gujarat and a $275 million road loan for Haryana. “WB may okay more loans,” Indian Express, June 27, 1998, http://www.expressindia.com/i/daily/19980627/17850694.html. The article added that “Finance Secretary Montek Singh Ahluwalia told journalists that “Power sector reform projects, eventually, are aimed at augmenting power supplies, especially to rural areas and in that sense, help alleviate the misery of the poor. In that sense, we feel they should be considered humanitarian aid.” Indian newspapers made little mention of the fact that U.S. consent allowed the loans to go forward, instead noting that the loans were simply “signaling resumption of lending to India since some industrialized countries, notably the U.S., imposed sanctions against India for its nuclear tests. The World Bank earlier this month has postponed consideration of loans for India worth about $1 billion apparently under pressure from the U.S.” “India expects $506 million WB loans soon,” Times of India (June 27, 1998).

302. In June 1998, Moody’s downgraded India’s economy from Baa3 to Ba2—down from “investment safe” to “speculative grade.” The downgrade was not entirely due to sanctions but also due to conclusions that India’s economic outlook, with its bloated budget and affected by sanctions, was changed from “stable” to “negative,” which also decreases investor confidence.

303. One report noted that “Figures released by the Securities and Exchange Board of India, the markets regulator, showed foreign portfolio investors had pulled out 205 million dollars in June, on top of 218 million dollars the previous month.” “Foreign investors flee India over political, economic uncertainty,” newsgroup clari.world.asia.india (June 24, 1998).

304. “Foreign portfolio investors shunning India,” newsgroup clari.world.asia.india (August 19, 1998). This report noted that $56.3 million “had flown out of the (Indian) markets in the first two weeks of August,” and added that earlier “After losing 440 million dollars of foreign portfolio investments in the three months (May) to June, Indian markets appeared to have rediscovered their allure in July, when overseas investors injected 19.7 million dollars into the local bourses.”

305. Further, by June 1998, the total inflows for the year crossed the $1.5 billion mark, which meant that while originally projected inflows of $6 billion for the year may not be reached, a figure of between $4 and $4.5 billion is a possibility. This should be compared to inflows of $3.2 billion in 1997. The article added that “The Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) has been pushing hard on clearing FDI applications. While in May, clearances worth Rs.2,215 crore were given, proposals worth over Rs. 6,000 crore were cleared in June. This was significantly higher than the approvals of April, which was Rs.1,498 crore ($374 million) and Rs.780 crore ($195 million) in March.” “FDI inflows pour in June, touch Rs.1.600 crore” Economic Times (July 23, 1998).


307. New Delhi’s nuclear sector has come under domestic and international criticism concerning safety. In response, in mid-1997, New Delhi opened two reactors to safety inspections by the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). This step indicates cooperation with the IAEA’s safety regime, which New Delhi has signed but not ratified, and with related treaties concerning issues of liability for accidents in nuclear facilities. “India to Open Its Two Nuclear Power Reactors in Gujarat for Inspection by International Experts,” Business Standard (September 17, 1997).

308. Tritium is required for second-generation boosted weapons, which is system on which New Delhi seeks to maintain its nuclear deterrent. Tritium has a half-life of twelve years, and therefore even if New Delhi acquires and stores a
large quantity of tritium, this deteriorates within a decade. New Delhi would thus have to keep at least one CANDU reactor partially unsafeguarded in order to reliably maintain a nuclear option. A recent article suggests that India may have an alternative source of tritium supply, as Indian scientists are apparently working on extracting tritium from heavy water used in power reactors. “Tritium breakthrough brings India closer to an H-bomb arsenal,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (January 1998), 29–31.


310. North Korea’s attempt to remove itself from the NPT (legally valid but politically suspect) was branded as a threat to international security, and North Korea faced possible sanctions if it withdrew from the NPT. Iraq was subject to excessively intrusive inspections after it violated the NPT; such measures are not palatable in New Delhi.