Review Essay

The Transgressive Allure of White Gold in Peruvian Amazonia: Towards a Genealogy of Coca Capitalisms and Social Dread

Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug

Coca’s Gone: Of Might and Right in the Huallaga Post-Boom

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“I have tested this effect of coca, which wards off hunger, sleep, and fatigue and steels one to intellectual effort, some dozen times on myself; I had no opportunity to engage in physical work.”—Sigmund Freud, from ‘Über Coca’, Centralblatt für die ges. Therapie, 2, 1884.

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Circulating through multiple regimes of value, the transgressive allure of coca has gripped the Occidental imagination for more than a century and a half, shaping the contours of modernity; first as a magical elixir, then to a demonized underground drug, and eventually being transformed into a lucrative global commodity with grievous effects. Coca and cocaine have “real histories” comprised by “chains of cause and effect over time” (Taussig 2004:313). To wit, the U.S. initiated century-old ban on cocaine has had monumental geopolitical implications, not to mention the unintended effects of setting into motion the 1970s resurrection in its world demand, a time corresponding to Nixon’s infamous 1971 declaration on the “War on Drugs.” While the “cocaine problem” has been a part and parcel of numerous U.S. government’s ideologically driven projects, historicizing the complex issue from a Peruvianist perspective yields distinctive views of the social life of coca leaves and their various derivatives.

As written elsewhere (Dean 2011: 2013c) the basic material for cocaine, coca leaves, are culturally indigenous to Andean and some Amazonian peoples. Their circulation among Andean consumers and cultivators in the montaña (tropical east Andean foothills and Amazonia) dates back for thousands of years (Rivera et al 2005). In this area of astounding bio and cultural diversity, coca has played a crucial role in local people’s materia medica (Mariátegui 1997), systems of kinship (ayllu relations), production, exchange, consumption and local and regional patterns of political alliance. Coca leaves have a veritable social history of sacred cultivation and use: chewing coca leaves have long been known for their nutritional components, capacity to assuage cold, appease hunger and counteract exhaustion (Seki and Yoshito 2012). Throughout many parts of Peru, daily consumption and ritualized use of coca leaves remains essential to customary healing, divination, fertility rites, and elaborate shamanic practices (Morales 1989; Allen 2002).

Notwithstanding what Paul Gootenberg calls its “home-grown” Andean nature, cocaine has long been a significant and extremely volatile factor in inter-and intra-American geo-political relations. Embracing a longitudinal approach spanning from 1850–1980, Gootenberg’s Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug (2009) provides the definitive account on the initial development, reception, decline and subsequent reemergence of cocaine as a prohibited global commodity. His book meticulously documents the contradictory and convoluted relation cocaine has had for the
region and the globe ever since the Franco-Peruvian Alfredo Bignon, the 1885 inventor of coca-sulfates (equivalent to PBC)\(^1\) assisted in the transformation of the country into the epicenter of coca leaf production (see also Gootenberg 2007; Young 1996; Gagliano 1994).\(^2\)

Gootenberg’s archival-based text uncovers the presence of a historically durable and deeply politicized “commodity-chain” between the United States and the eastern tropical Andean slopes, which has been essential to coca’s commercial transformation into cocaine ever since the mid-nineteenth century. Rather than an orthodox history, the book transcends mere macro-economic analysis by highlighting the agentive dimension of people “on the ground,” such as the infamous cocaine magnate, Andres Soberon, who became a central driving force in the establishment of Peru as the world’s foremost leader in the cultivation of coca leaves and the elaboration of cocaine (see also Gootenberg 2007). With a keen eye for documenting the socio-economic, political, and cultural structures triggering the “reformulation” of cocaine into an illicit commodity, *Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug* interweaves local perspectives with national and global concerns of substantive and timely import.

Despite the fact that over the past four decades cocaine trafficking has become one of the region’s most profitable “domestic” ventures, “outsiders” did not primarily control the coca trade, as Gootenberg demonstrates. Hence, understanding the trans-Andean-Amazonian historical legacies are critical in formulating feasible responses to the challenges posed by the increase of coca-leaf cultivation and cocaine elaboration and distribution. In chronicling the assemblages behind the commodification of coca, Gootenberg uncovers key linkages between the United States and coca, including the nationwide drink Coca-Cola, and describes the role of other external forces shaping the global allure for coca leaf, including amongst others: French connoisseurs of coca wine (such as the renown Vin Mariani); German pharmaceutical firms; Bolivian coca nationalists; Dutch and Japanese colonial entrepreneurs; and Latin American smugglers of various stripes.

By and large cocaine was not a controlled substance in the United States during the nineteenth century. However, this was soon to change by the first decades of the twentieth century when state-endorsed pharmacy regulations, drug control protocols, medical controversy and consumers’ mixed reactions marked an epochal shift: initial cocaine fever in the United States was now on the wane. This was consolidated by the
federal prohibition of cocaine in the U.S. at the time, well under way with the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914 and the Jones-Miller Act of 1922 (Bagley 2012: 3).

Following World War II, the U.S. government’s determined cocaine prohibitionist policy began to gain international traction, but Cold War saber rattling propelled the spread of illicit cocaine across the Americas. Ironically, Gootenberg’s book makes obvious that the United States’ campaign of demonizing cocaine had the unintentional effect of stimulating a massive surge in the market for a new generation of urbanite consumers. As the author explains in this exhaustive account, a number of cocaine’s innovations—technical, commercial and later on criminal—emerged in the area, giving way to an explosion in cocaine trafficking ever since the start of the 1970s. 

Notwithstanding a half-century lull in the desire for cocaine in the U.S., its allure was rekindled, “in the 1970s, as hedonists from Hollywood to Wall Street turned cocaine into ‘the Champagne of drugs’, as The New York Times declared in 1974” (Perkinson 2010: 21). Soon to follow the “cosmopolitan” demand for powered cocaine was the 1980s launch by producers and vendors of a cheaper version of cocaine “for the people”—crack or rock. This in turn unleashed social panic, violence and dramatic transformations throughout the Americas as the War on Drugs, whose genealogy spans the twentieth century, fell into full swing. 

**TO THE SOURCE: COCA’S CONTEMPORARY RESURGENCE IN PERUVIAN AMAZONIA**

As a “transgressive substance” (Taussig 2004), cocaine has had a malign effect on the world, particularly in the Andean nations of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Despite more than a decade of Peruvian governmental claims of the successful response to minimizing the scourge of cocaine, current President Ollanta Humala Tasso entered office in 2011 precisely at a time when the country was reemerging as the world’s leader in coca leaf production. According to a joint 2011 DEVIDA (Peruvian Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida sin Drogas)/United Nations Drug Control Programme and the Centre for International Crime Prevention (UNODC) report, the Peruvian government’s eradication program of coca leaf crops dropped from 14.5% to 10,290 hectares, declining from 12,033 hectares in 2010. The total quantity of sun-dried coca leaf output was estimated at about 131,300 tons in 2011, up some 4.3% from 2010. About 9,000 tons of coca leaves were estimated for traditional, “customary” purposes, whereas a staggering
122,300 tons were allegedly destined for illicit markets animated by the convoluted flow of PBC, cocaine and the power it wields.\textsuperscript{5}

Humala’s counter-narcotics strategy was at first characterized by its ostensible unpredictability (cf. Cameron 2009). As president-elect, he referred to the United States as a valued “strategic partner” in counter-narcotics efforts. Humala’s initial unequivocal stance on coca was demonstrated by his defense of coca eradication programs during his 28 July 2011 inaugural address to the country. However, in August 2011 his first chief of DEVIDA, the progressive attorney Ricardo Soberon, proclaimed that the Humala government was putting on-hold its coca eradication program. While this rattled those who supported the eradication and interdiction approach, many, especially those tied to the cocalero (peasant-based coca growers) social movement,\textsuperscript{6} were seemingly content. Needless to say, Washington was perturbed by this development,\textsuperscript{7} particularly given that the U.S. government had funded about $10 million in coca eradication programs initially emphasizing the Alto Huallaga Valley region.

Despite the preliminary indications that Humala was pursuing a novel approach to the proliferation of Peruvian coca, the suspension of coca eradication lasted just over a week (Quigley 2011). In early 2012 the hard-liner Carmen Masias had replaced Ricardo Soberon as chief of DEVIDA, and announced the country’s new five-year (2012–16) anti-narcotics strategy. Setting a goal of increasing the destruction of illicit coca 200% by 2016, eradication continues to be the backbone of Peru’s current counter-narcotics plan. With a five-year budget of roughly $1.05 billion, Masias announced in February 2012 that Peru’s counter-narcotics strategy would focus on encouraging cocaleros to substitute coca crops with economically sustainable commodities, like cocoa and coffee (Andina Peru News Agency 2012).\textsuperscript{8} Lima’s resumption of eradication was supplemented by bold assertions that the central government would resume a “sustainable” eradication program emphasizing economically viable crops such as cocoa and coffee, lauding the putative success of such a strategy in the Department of San Martín. Some analysts like Whittington suggest that Peru’s “policy retreat” was provoked by the desire not to alienate Washington, which is quite plausible.\textsuperscript{9}

Today, unabated world demand for coca-based commodities (cocaine and PBC), coupled with a chronic rural agricultural crisis, rapid rates of migration, urbanization and social pathos have generated the unprecedented spread of coca leaf (as well as poppy and marijuana) cultivation, processing and circulation in Peruvian Amazonia (Dean 2013c) In
so doing, this has exacerbated long-standing patterns of inequality; corruption; social disruptions; horrific violence; and trauma associated with the illicit drug trade in Peruvian Amazonia.

When it comes to Peru’s failed U.S.-backed War on Drugs, arguably the greatest challenge facing the country’s counter-narcotics policies’ is systematically addressing the economic, cultural and sociopolitical factors undergirding the continued expansion of coca, particularly in to Amazonia. For example, DEVIDA/UNODC’s 2011 report identified the country’s largest coca producing regions of the country as the trans-Andean-Amazonian zones—the Ene-Apurimac Valley (VRAE) and the Huallaga Valley—which were said to represent roughly half of country’s coca leaf production. The increase in total cultivation in Peru cannot be attributed to the extensive eradication efforts conducted in the Alto Huallaga Valley (which involved 59.1% of total eradication in 2011). Indeed, coca-cultivation was reportedly up by an astounding 40.4% in the northern Amazonian regions of Peru (including the Marañón, Putumayo and Bajo Amazonas), where no eradication campaigns were implemented in these regions of lowland Peruvian Amazonia (DEVIDA/UNODC 2011; Dean 2013c).

The 2013 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime’s World Drugs Report notes that Peru once again has become the world’s largest producer of coca leaf, with approximately 64,400 hectares under production based on 2011 estimates. In a similar vein, the 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report produced by the U.S. Department of State claimed that Peru has the highest production potential of pure cocaine in on the planet. A cursory review of recent local media accounts about coca-conflicts in the Huallaga illustrates that the social dread and violence associated with coca continues to proliferate. The active participation of members (former or otherwise) and empathizers of the Maoist Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and the MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru)—two insurgent groups with historical presence in the Huallaga Valley, has further confused the socio-political dynamics shaping the expansion of coca leaf cultivation in Amazonia. Moreover, there have been signs that members of the Shining Path are increasingly serving as intermediaries between the cocaleros and the cartels for financial gain, rather than for ideological motivations (Masterson 2010; Williams 2012: 34–36; Meléndez and Sosa Villagarcia 2013).
Notwithstanding these assertions, a dearth of ethnographic research has been conducted on the role of insurgents in contemporary Peruvian drug trafficking. During the zenith of the civil war, it is well known that *cupos*—or taxes—were customarily charged *narcos* and *cocaleros* in return for the insurgent’s protection against State eradication efforts. Clearly, qualitative ethnographic research is much needed to assess the growing coca crisis in Peruvian Amazonia. The Bajo Huallaga Valley seems eerily akin to Kernaghan’s description of the Alto Huallaga in what he aptly deemed in his outstanding book *Coca's Gone: Of Might and Right in the Huallaga Post-Boom* (2009), as the “in-between time” (pre-and post-coca boom) marked by omnipresent fear and intense local insecurity, pitting *narcos*, *campesinos/cocaleros*, state security forces (police and army) and remnants of senderistas (members of Sendero Luminoso) in a low-intensity fight over competing claims to legal authority, political domination and socio-economic power.

Spotlighting Peru’s Marginal Highway in the Alto Huallaga during the apex of the civil war (1980s and early-1990s), Kernaghan exceptional book *Coca’s Gone* provides an entry point for assessing “the lived topographies of law in state frontiers” (see also 2012). His book relies on the subtle interpretation of narratives about the coca boom to convey a viciously violent time in Peru from the perspective of those who actually experienced the Huallaga’s social trauma. In so doing, it relays the liquid state of power intertwined with barbaric violence that reigned supreme during the meteoric boom in the illicit coca economy, which had previously fueled a two-decade old economic bonanza. Kernaghan’s text is useful precisely because it underscores ethnographic “thick” interpretative analysis for pondering the cultural construction of violence, particularly in times of lawlessness and rampant fear, thanks to the presence of senderista rebels (*terrucos*), *cocaleros*, drug couriers (*traqueteros*), and hired gunmen (*sicarios*), not to mention the likes of the murderous army captain “Esparza.”

Based on personal, wide-ranging talks with local Aucayacu inhabitants, like Carlos and Mariela, as well as the book’s “protagonist” Marusha, a human rights attorney, Kernaghan manages to give narrative form to instances of socially caustic corruption and noxious impunity associated with systematic human rights violations. Determined to inflict its will through a coercive blood-laden battle of “social cleansing” (*limpieza social*), Sendero Luminoso entered the Alto Huallaga in full force, only to be savagely driven back by the Peruvian army, which reestablished state control in the Alto
Hullaga by unleashing a cruel and inhumane scorched-earth counter-insurgency campaign. The Peruvian Armed Forces’ success in undermining Sendero’s operational capacity signaled the Huallaga Valley’s coca boom’s brief 1990s demise. The illicit production and trafficking of cocaine began to alter following what Kernaghan has fittingly deemed the “post-boom apogee” (1990–95) of coca leaf cultivation and cocaine production in the Huallaga Valley (2009; Dean 2011). The measured transformation in Peru’s position in the “commodity-chain” of the supply of cocaine was tied to a move towards cocaine powder refining (as opposed to PBC). This was assisted by the presence of “transnational organized crime” networks (TOCs) that continue trafficking of narcotics—e.g., cocaine, PBC and heroin with virtual impunity (Bagley 2013).

A well-established neo-liberal pattern of privatizing natural resources into marketable concessions, coupled with the Peruvian state’s historical complicity in the region’s complex shadow extractive economies, have provided ample grounds for the boom and bust cycles of coca production. Moreover, the state’s ferocious counter-insurgency campaign forced Maoist guerrilla strongholds in the highland Andes (and the Coast) to retreat to the eastern slopes of the Andes and into the tropical forest of Amazonia (Dean 2013a). In so doing, they became in charge of fertile areas suitable for coca-leaf production—such as the Huallaga Valley, and demanded local officials to acquiesce to a new social “order.” Those who disobeyed were forced to flee, stigmatized, tortured, or extra-judicially executed (most often disappeared, often grotesquely maimed and thrown into the murky waters of the Huallaga River or placed as symbolically overburdened markers along the Marginal Highway linking the coast to the Alto Huallaga). In the meantime, the guerrilla leadership—both the SL and MRTA—started taxing the processing and transportation of cocaine or PBC within zones it had “liberated” from State control, such as large swathes of the Huallaga Valley. Intense coca eradication actions throughout Peru, conjoined with the lack of viable economic alternatives (including access to arable lands) lured many people to empathize or actually join the ranks of the insurgents and cocaleros (Castro de la Mata and Zavaleta 2002; Valderrama and Cabieses 2004: 60–61; Crabtree 2003: 146; Theidon 2013).

In successfully conveying the ambiguity and profound absurdity of fear and senseless carnage in the Alto Huallaga Valley, Kernaghan’s Coca’s Gone reveals the salience of violence in configuring human experience, and perhaps most importantly illuminates the difficult ethical problems posed by its very representation, not to mention
comprehension and (re)action to intervention or social support. Qualitative, participatory field research itself generates complex ethical and moral issues associated with the ethnographic study of the social dread associated with coca capitalism. Unlike other recent figurations on Peru’s civil war (Theidon 2013; La Serna 2012), Kernagahan does not provide a sustained account of those who directly participated in the so-called terrucada (Sendersita way of life).

Forging the trust of producers, traffickers, consumers—not to mention their advocates and beneficiaries, as well as those participating in coca interdiction and eradication, is after all a tall order to fill. Kernagahan conducted fieldwork in a war-torn zone, and as he intimates, he was confounded by the professional dictates of informed consent and the moral conundrums associated with “dangerous” ethnographic encounters (see Dean 2013b). The risky nature of field research in coca growing areas has obviously restricted the quantity and quality of reliable data for measuring coca related deforestation, biodiversity loss (Salisbury and Fagan 2013), not to mention accessing the requisite qualitative information needed to assess the human toll that the continued production of coca leaf production has had in lowland South America.

**RETROSPECT: A PATH FORWARD?**

Based on a number of contemporary accounts by indigenous peoples of southwestern Colombia, Espinosa Arango (2007) has explored the making of the discursive trope “lo indígena” (“the indigenous”) in terms of the genocidal impulses associated with the country’s violent modernity. In a comparable manner, the discursive practices of maintaining los cocaleros and los terrucos (insurgents) as co-constitutive categories are linked to embodied cultural memories and moral worlds where narratives of trauma, appeals to justice, and actions of resistance intermingle in the violent socio-cultural topography of Peru. The political and ethical significance of these identities, consciousnesses, political subjectivities and memories emerge from within historical experiences of real violence, which Espinosa Arango contends gives rises to its institutionalization along a “genocidal continuum” (2007).

This mimics the case for the Peruvian tropical Andes and Amazonian lowlands, which continue to suffer from the institutionalized violence associated with coca inspired conflicts and the continued militarization of the zone. As elsewhere in “narcostates”—from Peru to Colombia (see Ramirez 2007; García Díaz and Antesana Rivera 2010;
Kernaghan 2013) longitudinal, multi-sited ethnographic data is desperately needed to
determine the extent to which coca capitalisms continue to refigure the socio-political,
economic and moral worlds of Amazonia. This in turn will facilitate much needed
dialogue among the numerous local, regional, national and transnational stakeholders,
particularly those dedicated to formulate and implement alternative strategies that
respond effectively to the global cocaine crisis (Dean 2013c; Geldres 2013).

Peru’s significance as a primary global focal point for the elaboration,
distribution and consumption of cocaine has intensified social discord. Despite the
continued trend focusing the majority of media and analytical effort on its neighbor
Colombia’s role as an embattled “narco-state,” the resurgence in coca production and
narcotics trafficking in Peruvian Amazonia represent challenges that beg resolution. One
thing is clear; President Humala remains rhetorically committed to the U.S.’s historical
anti-drugs position. During his June 2013 bilateral meeting with President Obama in
Washington D.C., Humala clearly articulated his position on “substantively and
qualitatively” fighting “the scourge of drugs” in Peru (Humala 2013). Nevertheless, all
trends indicate that a major “reconceptualization” of the War on Drugs is beyond the ken
of the political mandates of relatively weak states, such as Peru.

President Humala’s current strategy, much like those that have preceded it, has
failed miserably in addressing basic human rights violations and, “the issue of
displacement which has now been at the heart of Andean drug production for 40 years”
(Whittington 2013; see also Aramburú 1979; Santacruz Benavides and L. Flórez Holguín
2012; Arce 2013. For the case of Yurimaguas, Alto Amazonas, see Justice, Dean and
Crawford 2012). In trying to come to terms with the Gordian knot of cocaine
capitalisms, poverty, migration and the inevitable social trauma associated with cocaine’s
shadowy presence that have triggered growing social inequities, ecological disruptions
and marginalization for those at the bottom of the socio-economic rung, the international
community must step-up to the plate. In coordination with sustained poverty reduction
projects, intercultural educational initiatives and robust insights from the public health
community, a fight on corruption (forensic accounting for money laundering, for
example) and regulation of chemical inputs, would all represent an important “middle
ground” in moving beyond the political strictures and cul-de-sacs of blind adherence to a
futile War on Drugs.
Yet bar a thorough rethinking of hemispheric and global narcotics initiatives, Ollanta Humala’s interdiction-oriented counter-narcotics policy has little chance of victory. In operational terms, counter-narcotic initiatives in Peru continue to be sustained by the U.S.’s ineffectual prohibitionist policies, which emphasize surveillance, enforcement, and eradication endeavors, rather than alternative development programs elaborated and implemented in a participatory fashion so as to ensure the sustainable enhancement of community, regional and national wellbeing.

NOTES

1. Comparable to crack, PBC or *Pasta Básica de Cocaína* (also called as *paco*) is an intermediary form of refined powder cocaine. The production of 1 g of crude coca paste (PBC) involves 115 kg of coca leaves, not to mention a substantial quantity of chemical inputs: including roughly 1 kg of sodium carbonate, 8 kg of lime, 5 kg of sulphuric acid, and 7 gal of kerosene (Morales 1989, 1994).

2. The narcotic aspects of coca were known in Europe nearly a century before when Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, the French naturalist, botanically identified *Erythroxylum coca*, listing it in his 1786 botanical encyclopedia (McCoy 2004: 33).

3. Crack is pharmacologically similar to powder cocaine, but its smoke able crystalized form induces more intense and rapid “highs” following initial use, accompanied by more immediate and severe post-consumption “lows.” Poignant narratives of the human destruction at social consequences of cocaine and crack have been well chronicled by journalists and social scientists (among others, see Grillo 2011; Bourgois 2003; Decker and Townsend Chapman 2008).

4. A decline in coca leaf production was registered during the dictatorial regime of Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000), who was staunchly backed by the support of U.S. intelligence and counternarcotics agencies (Dean 2002). By the early-1990s the Peruvian Air Force had managed to virtually eliminate the clandestine aerial bridge linking the Huallaga and Colombia. For those living in the Huallaga Valley the coca boom’s giddy days of rags to riches fortune had all but now vanished.

5. The joint 2011 DEVIDA/UNODC report noted that cocaine fetched wholesale prices of about $1,025 per kg. in coca-cultivating areas of the country (representing an increase of 8.2% relative to the prior year—$947 per kg). In Lima, the wholesale price
of cocaine rose by 50%, while along the northern, eastern and southern borders of Peru prices reportedly skyrocketed by more than 300%.

6. On the cocalero movement in Peru, among others, see Rojas (1995); Durand Guevara (2005); McNulty (2011).

7. In response to the volte-face in Humala’s counter-narcotics strategy, Rose Likins U.S. ambassador in Lima is reported to have stated that, “it would have been nice to have been informed in advance” (The Guardian, 18 August 2011).

8. In contrast to the U.S., the E.U. has approached funding priorities in Peru’s counter-narcotics strategy in a significantly different light. According to EuropeAid, the Directorate–General (DG) responsible for designing EU development policies and delivering aid, between 2007–13 the European Union provided €132M in funding for rule of law and governance projects (20%), and designated 80% of funds for integrated social development of specific regions in an effort to enhance social cohesion.

9. As Whittington argues, since assuming power Humala Peru’s anti-narcotics initiatives increasingly have shifted to eradication and interdiction, mirroring the United States’ backed historically inscribed agenda of coca-leaf eradication and cocaine prohibition (2013).


12. Bagley has argued that relatively weak grass roots associations amongst the cocaleros provided a political vacuum allowing for the country’s armed forces, paramilitaries and guerrilla organizations (Sendero Luminoso, MRTA) to become the primary brokers, intermediaries and/or drug traffickers during these tumultuous times (2013).

13. While not defunct as an organization, the leader of Sendero Luminoso’s presence in the Alto Huallaga—Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala (AKA “Comrade Artemio”) was captured in February 2012, striking a major blow to insurgents who still rely on taxing
the lucrative cocaine and PBC markets of the region, as well as garner funds associated with illicit logging and other contraband.

14. Most of Peru’s international counter-drug funding comes from the U.S., which continues to prioritize prohibition and eradication. According to the U.S. Embassy in Lima, Washington provided Peru $132.8 million of assistance in 2012. $54.3 million was earmarked for counter-narcotics efforts, including: $34.3 million for law enforcement. Moreover, Peru was the recipient of $26.7 million from the U.S. allocated under the rubric of so-called “military cooperation,” which includes anti-narcotics support. This compared with $20.1 million provided for alternative development programs (Embassy of the United States, Lima, Peru 2012).

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