Peace Confidence Index (PCI)

TOP-LINE RESULTS

Social Indicator

JULY 2002
While many studies have been conducted on various aspects of this conflict, none have attempted to capture the changes in public perception over a period of time. The lack of such a study was identified as a significant void by Social Indicator (SI), the social research unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA). The Peace Confidence Index study (PCI) seeks to fill this lacuna. The study, funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) under the Governance and Institutional Strengthening Project, (GISP) Sri Lanka, will be conducted bi-monthly to gauge the impact of local and international political developments on public attitudes towards the peace process.
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Introduction

OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this study is two-fold. One is to develop a numerical indicator of the level of public confidence in the peace process using a set of standardised questions which will remain unchanged with each wave. The other is to use a set of questions related to recent social, economic and political developments in order to gauge public opinion in the peace process, which by definition will change from one wave to another.

Such information, collected over a period of time, will provide civil society and policy makers a useful barometer of the opinions of the Sri Lankan polity, and ensure that the collective opinions of the masses are given due importance and incorporated into the policy debate.

SCOPE & METHODOLOGY

The study is carried out using a structured questionnaire administered through face-to-face interviews amongst a 1,745 respondent sample. The 17 administrative districts of the seven provinces, excluding the Northern and the Eastern provinces, and areas under Government control of the Amparai, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Mannar were surveyed. Data is weighted to reflect the actual ethnographic composition of the districts in which the sample was surveyed.

Seven waves of the PCI study were conducted in May, June, September and November 2001 and January, March and May 2002. The latest wave, the results of which are in this publication, was conducted in July 2002. The results of these eight waves offer us data for a comparative study on changing public opinion regarding key issues, ranging from perceptions of war and peace to the proscription of the LTTE. The results are subject to a 3% margin of error.
Executive Summary Of Poll Conducted from 11th to 20th July 2002

• There is increased confidence amongst the Tamil community in the commitment of the government to negotiations in contrast to the perception held by the Sinhalese regarding the LTTE’s commitment to negotiations.

• The level of awareness of the terms of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) remains constant.

• There is cautious optimism about the durability of the CFA. There is a persistence in the lack of confidence along ethnic lines of the commitment of the LTTE and the Government to abide by the terms of the CFA.

• Since March 2002, there is a noticeable increase in the perceived need for a monitoring mission. Since March 2002 however, there is also significant uncertainty over the effectiveness of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), especially amongst Sinhalese and Muslims.

• There is a continued lack of convergence of opinion along ethnic lines on LTTE control of the proposed interim administration.

• Divergence in opinion along ethnic lines, regarding the allegations of abduction and extortion by the LTTE exists along with an awareness across ethnic lines of taxation by the LTTE.

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KEY NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS INFORMING THE OPINION POLL

- Four Mahanayakes issue a joint statement pledging their support for peace & development in Sri Lanka.
- At a passing out ceremony of 436 trained LTTE cadres, LTTE Eastern military leader Karuna says that the LTTE is providing training to its cadres to face the eventuality of war.
- Amidst widespread allegations of child conscription, UNICEF announces that the LTTE has given a fresh assurance that it will not recruit anyone below 18 yrs to its armed forces.
- The President's foreign affairs advisor Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar says the ban on the LTTE can be lifted only if the LTTE assures that it will come to the negotiating table.
- The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) meet Bernard Goonetilleke, Chairman of the Peace Secretariat and Minister Milinda Moragoda to discuss appointing a special commission to investigate alleged assault of LTTE personnel in the Jaffna islands.
- Mr. V. Anandasangaree is appointed the new leader of the TULF and Mr. Joseph Pararajasingham as Vice-President, following the demise of Mr. M. Sivasithamparam.
- The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) announces plans to launch an all-island general strike to demand wage hikes.
- Clashes erupt between Muslim and Tamil groups in Valachchenai.
- The Government bans demonstrations and imposes curfew in certain areas of the East as a result of the above.
- The LTTE leader tells his cadres in the East to observe the Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) between him and the SLMC leader.
- The Prime Minister asks for more time to put the economy back on track.
- The Finance Minister announces that the implementation of Value Added Tax (VAT) will be deferred from 1st July 2002 to 1st August 2002.
- The Government announces a series of measures aimed at reducing the prices of essentials.
- The SLMM releases a statement that lists ceasefire violations by the LTTE and Security forces.
- Diesel and petrol prices reduced and essential items including medicines exempted from tax in a relief package announced by the Finance Minister.
- PA and JVP parliamentarians protest in Parliament on the situation in the Northeast province.
- Indian Member of Parliament and Leader of Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (MDMK) Mr. Gopalaswamy, popularly known as 'Vaiko', is arrested by the Tamil Nadu police under a tough anti-terror law for supporting the LTTE.
• Sri Lankan Tamil political parties call on the Indian government to secure the release of Tamil Nadu politician Y. Gopalaswamy who was arrested by the Tamil Nadu police for his outspoken support for the LTTE. The Tamil National Alliance through its general secretary Mr. R. Sampanthan issued a statement in Colombo condemning the arrest and detention of Mr. Gopalaswamy.

• SLMM Chief accuses the LTTE of seriously violating the Ceasefire Agreement and says that the LTTE endangered the peace process by forcibly holding 2 monitors aboard a vessel they were inspecting.

• Members of the SLMM assert that they would have to rethink the concept of naval operations after the LTTE forcibly hold two of their monitors on board a vessel they were inspecting.

• Leading diplomats from the European Union meet with LTTE political wing leader Thamilselvan in Kilinochchi.

• Protests in the NE as a result of the arrest of Vaiko by police in TN.

• President meets Prime Minister in crucial meeting to iron out differences.

• Prime Minister completes a five day official visit to the United States of America.

• No confidence motion against the Minister of Defence to be presented in Parliament shortly by the Opposition.

• The Minister of Defence says that the Government is committed to pulling out its troops from temples and schools in the North-East as stated in the Ceasefire Agreement.

• President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf visits Sri Lanka.
Why do you think that the Government goes in for talks? [Multiple Answers]

Why do you think that the LTTE goes in for talks? [Multiple Answer]

I think the LTTE is committed to find peace through talks.
I think the Government is committed to find peace through talks.

When will there be peace in Sri Lanka - Tamil Opinion

What is your understanding/awareness of the contents in the ceasefire agreement between the Government and the LTTE?
What do you think of the longevity of the ceasefire agreement?

What is your opinion of the need for an international third party's involvement to solve the North East war in Sri Lanka?
What is your opinion on the need for a monitoring mission for the CFA to succeed?

I think the Sri Lanka monitoring mission is effective in its monitoring of the ceasefire agreement.

complete control of the proposed North East interim administration?
Please tell me if you believe or do not believe the accusation levelled against the LTTE of engaging in abductions?

- National: 16.4% I do not believe, 79.8% I believe
- Up-country Tamil: 25.6% I do not believe, 66.7% I believe
- Muslim: 20.3% I do not believe, 76.5% I believe
- Tamil: 41.8% I do not believe, 55.7% I believe
- Sinhala: 8.6% I do not believe, 87.7% I believe

Are you aware that the LTTE levies taxes in the North East?

- National: 15.2% I do not believe, 81.1% I believe
- Up-country Tamil: 28.9% I do not believe, 64.1% I believe
- Muslim: 17.6% I do not believe, 79.7% I believe
- Tamil: 43.3% I do not believe, 52.5% I believe
- Sinhala: 7.8% I do not believe, 88.7% I believe
Peace Confidence Index: Changing Perceptions from May 2001 to July 2002

The Meaning of War and Peace

In July 2002, peace continues to mean ethnic harmony for a majority of Sri Lankans (50.6%). But for significant proportions of the population peace also means freedom (36.4%) and an end to the war (31.2%). From May 2002 to July 2002, the view that peace means freedom (34.7% to 36.4%) and feeling safe (14.9% to 15.5%) remains relatively the same. The opinion that peace means ethnic harmony has decreased slightly, from 53.9% in May 2002 to 50.6% in July 2002. On the other hand, the opinion that peace means an end to the war has increased - from 25.4% in May 2002 to 31.2% in July 2002.

What does 'peace' mean to you? [Multiple Answers]
July 2002 has a majority amongst all ethnic groups considering peace to be ethnic harmony – Muslim (66.3%), Tamil (61.5%), Up-country (53.4%) and Sinhalese (47.3%). At the same time, notable proportions amongst the Sinhalese increasingly believe peace to be freedom (39.4% in May 2002 to 44.9% July 2002) and an end to the war (26.9% in May 2002 to 34.3% in July 2002).

On the other hand, in July 2002 war means death and destruction to a majority of Sri Lankans, a view that has increased continuously from 50.8% in March 2002 to 60.2% in July 2002. Noteworthy proportions of the population also consider war to be disharmony amongst the races (26.2%) and fighting for rights (15.8%). The latter has decreased from 21.2% since May 2002.

In July 2002, the perception of war to mean death and destruction exists chiefly amongst the Up-country Tamil (66.9%) and Sinhalese (61.9%) communities in July 2002. Moreover a steady increase can be observed since March 2002 amongst the Sinhala (51.4% March 2002 to 61.9% July 2002), Tamils (35.1% March 2002 to 52.8% July 2002) and Up-country Tamils (58.3% March 2002 to 66.9% July 2002) who perceive war as death and destruction. Although the belief that
war is a means of achieving peace continues to be the highest amongst the Muslims (8.6%) in July 2002, it has declined since May 2002 (12.4%).

In July 2002, when asked to stipulate a time-period for the onset of peace 58.4% are yet unable to do so. This level of uncertainty remains relatively consistent since January 2002 (57.9%) and has prevailed largely throughout the study amongst the Sinhalese (64.3% in September 2001 to 67.4% in July 2002).

On the other hand 21.1% of Sri Lankans feel that peace will come about soon to Sri Lanka, a view that has reduced slightly since March 2002 (24.8%) and exists largely amongst the minority communities (52.8% Up-country Tamils, 50.6% Tamils and 49.3% Muslims). Only 12.4% amongst the Sinhalese are optimistic of the same.

What was the origin/cause(s) of the war in Sri Lanka? [Multiple Answers]

On the other hand 21.1% of Sri Lankans feel that peace will come about soon to Sri Lanka, a view that has reduced slightly since March 2002 (24.8%) and exists largely amongst the minority communities (52.8% Up-country Tamils, 50.6% Tamils and 49.3% Muslims). Only 12.4% amongst the Sinhalese are optimistic of the same.
In July 2002 the belief that communal politics is the root cause of the war in Sri Lanka has reduced since May 2002 (from 40.3% to 37.8%). Some people also identify discrimination against the Tamils (29.2%) and terrorism (14.2%) as causes of the war in Sri Lanka. The belief that the discrimination against the Tamils resulted in the war in Sri Lanka exists largely amongst the Up-country Tamils (54.5%), Tamils (49.2%) and Muslims (48.6%), while most Sinhalese people (39.4%) believe the war to be the result of communal politics.

In July 2002 a significant increase can be observed since May 2002 amongst the Muslims who believe that the root cause of the war is discrimination against the Tamils (34.3% in May 2002 to 48.6% in July 2002) while the belief that communal politics is the root cause of the war shows a sharp decrease from 56.7% in May 2002 to 35.9% in July 2002.

On the other hand amongst the Tamils, the belief that the root cause of the war lies in the discrimination against the Tamils (64.5% to 49.2%), communal politics (37.1% to 30.5%) and Sinhala chauvinism (15.2% to 6.3%) has declined since May 2002.

**SOLUTIONS TO THE CONFLICT**

In July 2002, a majority (84.4%) continue to feel that the war can be ended and peace brought about in Sri Lanka through peace talks. Although this figure has reduced slightly from 87.2% in May 2002, it plots a steady increase since September 2001 (68.6%). The belief in a war effort has increased to 10.1% in July 2002 from 7% in May 2002.

Most in all ethnic communities believe that the war can be ended and peace brought about to
Sri Lanka through peace talks - 93.6% Tamils, 93.4% Up-country Tamils, 92% Muslims and 81.9% Sinhalese. This view remains constant throughout the study. Yet the proportion amongst the Sinhalese (12.5%) who believe that the Government defeating the LTTE can end the war and establish peace in Sri Lanka cannot go unnoticed.

Why do you think there hasn't been a solution to the war for the last 15 odd years? [Multiple Answers]

Many Sri Lankans continue to feel that there has not been a solution to the war for the past 15 odd years as a result of a lack of political will, a view that sees a constant increase from 34.8% in January 2002 to 44.2% in July 2002, and corrupt political and military leadership (30.6%), a view that has decreased from 35% in May 2002. Furthermore, in July 2002 10.6% of the population believe that there has not been a solution for the past 15 odd years because the LTTE does not want peace.

In July 2002 there continues to be an increase in Sinhala (38% in January 2002 to 48.2% in July 2002) and Up-country Tamil (11.7% in January 2002 to 43.2% in July 2002) opinion who believe that the lack of a solution to the war is as a result of a lack of political will. On the other hand, amongst the Tamils the opinion that the lack of a solution is as a result of corrupt military and political leadership (52.7% in May 2002 to 31.5% in July 2002) and lack of political will (16% to 31.5%), has converged in July 2002.

Can total victory be achieved by one of the parties in this war?

...
In July 2002, 59.3% of Sri Lankans believe that neither party can achieve total victory in this war. Yet in July 2002 there is an increase in the proportion of people who believe that one party can achieve victory in this war (16.8 in May 2002 to 22.7%), believing that victory will be the Government’s rather than the LTTE’s.

**ON CREDIBILITY**

Overall, the opinion that the Government is committed to establish peace through negotiations continues to rise in July 2002 - from 44% in November 2001 to 70.2% in July 2002. While Sinhala (68.4% in May 2002 to 66.8% in July 2002) and Muslim (86.7% in May 2002 to 87.8% in July 2002) opinion remain relatively unchanged since May 2002, the opinion amongst the Tamil community of the commitment of the Government to bring about peace through negotiations shows a notable increase (55.1% in May 2002 to 72.8% in July 2002).

In contrast, in July 2002 45.7% of Sri Lankans do not believe that the LTTE is committed to establish peace through negotiations, an increase from 39.5% in May.
Furthermore, the belief that the LTTE is not committed to bringing about peace through talks exists largely amongst Sinhalese, a view that has been on the rise since March 2002 (39.4% in March 2002 to 47.6% in May 2002 to 57.4% in July 2002). On the other hand, in July 2002 while most amongst the minorities believe otherwise – 84% Up-country Tamil, 72.5% Muslim and 72.1% Tamil, this perception has increased dramatically amongst the Tamils since May 2002 – 52.3% to 72.1%.

Why do you think that the Government goes in for talks? [Multiple Answers]

In July 2002, 45.3% of Sri Lankans believe that the Government goes in for talks on account of a commitment towards peace but this view shows a decline from 48.8% in May 2002. This is a view held predominantly amongst the Tamil (56.3%) and Sinhala (46.9%) communities. Yet since March 2002 this perception is on a steady decline amongst the Muslims (39.3% in March 2002 to 29% in July 2002) and Up-country Tamils (55.6% in March 2002 to 34.4% in July 2002).
At the same time, people believe that economic hardship (32.4%) and the realisation that this war cannot be won (28.9%) would result in the Government going in for negotiations, the belief in the latter has increased since May 2002 (24.1% to 28.9%).

On the other hand, in July 2002, equal proportions believe that the LTTE would go in for negotiations to deceive the people (27.4%) and based on the realisation that this war cannot be won (27.7%), although belief in the former has reduced since May 2002 (31.5%). A notable proportion (23.9%) also believes that international pressure would make the LTTE come to the negotiation table.

Why do you think that the LTTE goes in for talks? [Multiple Answer]

The perception that the LTTE would go in for talks as a result of their commitment to peace exists mainly amongst the Tamils (52%) but sees a significant decrease since May 2002 (73%). On the other hand although many Sinhalese (34.4%) hold the view that the LTTE would go in for negotiations to deceive the people. This view has decreased since May 2002 (38.7%).

LEVEL OF TOLERANCE AND PLURALISM

In July 2002 the belief that all the ethnic communities can live together remains the majority view amongst Sri Lankans since May 2001 (80.1% in May 2001 to 89.7% in July 2002).

In July 2002 75.1% of the Sri Lankan population do not identify the Tamil community and the LTTE as one, but notable proportions amongst the Tamils (25.7%) and Muslims (23.7%) feel otherwise.
Overall, a majority (54.2%) do not identify the Government as a Sinhala Government. This view is held largely by the Sinhalese (56.9%) and the Tamils (51.1%) in July 2002. At the same time, nationally 35.7% believe that the Government is a Sinhala Government. In July 2002 there is a dramatic increase in opinion amongst the Tamils who do not identify the Government as a Sinhala Government – from 28.9% in May 2002 to 51.1% in July 2002. In contrast, the proportion of Muslims who identify the Government as a Sinhala Government has increased – 24.8% in March 2002 to 46.5% in July 2002.

In July 2002, 55.1% of Sri Lankans believe that a LTTE cadre is an enemy, a decrease in opinion to 62.7% since May 2002. This decrease is mainly amongst the Sinhalese (74.8% to 67.8%) and the Muslims (33.5% to 19.4%) since May 2002. Nationally 19.8% feel that a LTTE cadre is a human being, a view that has decreased sharply amongst the minorities since May 2002 – 30.6% to 8.1% Tamil, 36.9% to 29.6% Muslim and 59.6% to 49.2% Up-country Tamils.

58.1% of Sri Lankans identify a soldier as a patriot while 47.1% perceive a soldier as a human being. The former notion is held predominantly amongst the Sinhalese (63.8%) and the Muslims (52%) in July 2002.

THE PEACE PROCESS

In July 2002, although a majority of Sri Lankans (86.6%) continue to express their approval of the Government and the LTTE going in for talks, this figure has declined slightly since May 2002 (89.6%). 6.1% disapprove of the same and is an opinion held by 7.8% of Sinhalese. Furthermore, from May 2002 to July 2002 this
approval of the Government and the LTTE going in for negotiations has increased amongst the minorities (94.1% to 97.5% Tamils, 86.7% to 89.8% Muslims and 95.7% to 98.4% Up-country Tamils) but decreased amongst the Sinhalese (89.2% to 84.2%).

Do you approve of the Government and the LTTE talking and fighting?

In July 2002, disapproval amongst Sri Lankans of the Government and the LTTE engaging in peace talks whilst fighting has increased consistently since November 2001 (45.7% to 78.3% in July 2002). Disapproval amongst the Sinhalese of the Government and the LTTE engaging in talks whilst fighting has increased considerably since November 2001 (37.6% to 73.8% in July 2002).

Who should be involved in negotiations?

- No peace talks
- Govt., Opposition, LTTE, Tamil, Muslim parties and a third party
- Govt., Opposition, LTTE, Tamil and Muslim parties only
- Govt., Opposition, LTTE, Tamil parties and a third party
- Govt., Opposition, LTTE and other Tamil parties only
- Govt., LTTE and International third party only
- Govt. and LTTE only
Peace Confidence Index

When asked in July 2002 as to who should be involved in negotiations, there is a decrease from 25.8% in May 2002 to 19.1% in July 2002, who are in support for the widest involvement in peace talks. This is in spite of a considerable increase from 13.5% in November 2001. Only 19.9% of Sri Lankans believe that only the Government and the LTTE should be involved in negotiations while 11% perceive that an international third party should also be involved together with the Government and the LTTE in negotiations.

In July 2002, a majority (53.1%) amongst the Muslim community advocate the widest involvement for peace talks. On the other hand the involvement of only the Government and the LTTE in talks has reduced substantially since January 2002 amongst the Muslims – 34% to 15.2%. Support for the widest involvement in negotiations amongst the Tamils (34% to 25.2% in July 2002) and Sinhalese (21.4% to 14.1%) has also decreased since May 2002.

INTERNATIONAL THIRD PARTY FACILITATION

In July 2002 most (30.9%) Sri Lankans believe that an international third party’s involvement is essential to solve the North East war in Sri Lanka. This perception is held mainly by the minorities – 78.1% Tamils, 72.1% Up-country Tamils and 61.5% Muslims.

28.8% of the population believe that an international third party’s involvement will have a positive impact in bringing about a solution to the North East war in Sri Lanka, a view that remains constant since May 2002 (29%) and held increasingly by the Sinhalese (24.1% in March 2002 to 35% in July 2002).

NORWEGIAN FACILITATION

Approval of Norwegian assistance in the Sri Lankan peace process continues to decline in July 2002 - from 53.8% in January 2002 to 37% in July 2002. Approval is highest amongst the minorities (77.4% Tamils, 75% Up-country Tamils and 57.3% Muslims). July 2002 continues to show a decrease in approval amongst the Sinhalese of Norway’s assistance in the Sri Lankan peace process - down from 46% in January 2002 to 27.8% in July 2002. Nationally, 22.8% disapprove of Norwegian assistance, which is an increase from 17.9% since May 2002.
Peace Confidence Index

In July 2002 26.6% think that India's involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process is essential, a view that remains unchanged since May 2002 (26.1%). Likewise 27% feels that Indian involvement will add a positive impact, down from 31.7% in May 2002. But although the minorities express the highest rate of approval in July 2002, it has reduced significantly amongst the Muslims (60.9% to 50%) and increased dramatically amongst the Tamils (42.2% to 52.2%) since May 2002. Nationally, 12.5% feel that India's involvement is not essential in the Sri Lankan peace process.

What is your opinion of the need for India's involvement in the Sri Lanka peace process?
Commitment

In July 2002 most people continue to believe that economic hardship (69.6% in July 2002, down from 75.3% in May 2002) and the need to defend the motherland (60.4%) motivate people to join the forces.

Majorities amongst the Sinhalese (74.4%), Up-country Tamils (70.8%) and Muslims (56.8%) believe that economic hardship drives people to join the forces, although this proportion amongst the Muslims has declined drastically since March 2002 (67.4%). Similarly, the proportion amongst Tamils who believe the same has also decreased substantially since May 2002 (83.6% to 56.8% in July 2002).

In contrast in July 2002, overall 45.1% of Sri Lankans believe that people are forced to join the LTTE. A majority amongst the Sinhalese have continuously expressed this view since September 2001 (51.2% in September 2001 to 52.8% in July 2002).

However 58.2% Up-country Tamils, 48.7% Muslims and 37.5% Tamils believe that people join the LTTE to defend the motherland. In July 2002 22.7% of the population believe that revenge is another factor that motivates people to join the forces, down from 28.1% in May 2002.
Recent Developments: An Opinion Poll Conducted from 11th to 20th July 2002

CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT

In July 2002 83.2% of the Sri Lankan population are aware that the Government and the LTTE have signed a ceasefire agreement. Furthermore, a majority (53.4%) who are aware of the signing of this ceasefire feel they understand the contents of this agreement to some extent, a view that has remained constant since January 2002 (53% in March 2002). In July 2002 the Tamils (59.9%) and Sinhalese (55.5%) express the highest rate of understanding of the ceasefire agreement to some extent. At the same time, many (44.9%) amongst those who are aware of the signing of the agreement, state that they have absolutely no understanding of the contents in the agreement, a view that is expressed largely by the Up-country Tamils (63.9%) and Muslims (59.8%).

3.2% of Tamils and 2.5% of Muslims express complete understanding of the contents in the ceasefire agreement.
Moreover, in July 2002 most Sri Lankans (36.6%) who are aware of the signing of the ceasefire agreement approve of it, a figure that has increased consistently since March 2002 (32.5%). In July 2002, approval of the ceasefire agreement is chiefly amongst the minorities - 84.1% Up-country Tamils, 76.9% Tamils and 61.8% Muslims. On the other hand, most (36.1%) amongst the Sinhalese disapprove of this agreement.

Overall, 10.2% of those who are aware of the signing of the ceasefire agreement approve of the ceasefire agreement but with reservations, a view that has declined since March 2002 (19.5%). Approval of the ceasefire agreement with reservations is expressed amongst the Tamils (17.8%) and Up-country Tamils (11.4%).

Nationally in July 2002, a notable proportion, from 17.7% in March 2002 to 28.6% in July 2002, disapprove of the ceasefire agreement - a view expressed predominantly by the Sinhalese (36.1%).

When those aware of the ceasefire agreement were asked of the longevity of the ceasefire agreement, 39.3% believe that the ceasefire agreement will not last. Although this scepticism has reduced since March 2002 (43.1%), it exists predominantly amongst the Sinhala community (45.2%) in July 2002.

Nationally a similar proportion (38.6%) is uncertain of the longevity of the ceasefire agreement, with 66.3% of the Up-country Tamils, 59.6% of the Tamils and 38.3% of Muslims predominantly expressing this view.

21.7% of Sri Lankans believe that the ceasefire agreement will last, with optimism chiefly being amongst the Muslims (31.9%) and Tamils (27.1%).

Overall a large majority (90.3%) amongst those who believe the ceasefire agreement will not last feel that the LTTE is most likely to break the ceasefire agreement. This view has increased significantly since May 2002 (80.3%) and is held predominantly amongst the Sinhalese (94.8%).
and the Muslims (73.5%).

In addition, in July 2002 most Sri Lankans (63.3%) believe that the Government is genuinely abiding by the terms of the ceasefire agreement. Muslims (72.1%) and Sinhalese (67.4%) hold the belief that the Government is genuine in abiding by the terms of the ceasefire agreement while overall only 9.9% feel otherwise.

On the other hand, in July 2002 nationally, a majority (55.4%) believe that the LTTE is not genuine in abiding by the terms of the ceasefire agreement. This view is held by 63.5% of Sinhalese and 36.5% of Muslims. But in July 2002, nationally 13.2% believe that the LTTE is genuine in abiding by the terms of the ceasefire agreement.

Muslims (38.3%) and Tamils (34.1%) chiefly hold this view.

In July 2002, a notable segment of the population, who are aware of the signing of the ceasefire agreement, are satisfied with its implementation to some extent. Muslims (43.9%), Sinhalese (25%) and Tamils (23%) express this view predominantly.

Furthermore, while 15.4% of those who are aware of the signing of the ceasefire agreement are very dissatisfied with the manner in which the ceasefire has been implemented, 12.3% are very satisfied with the same. While the highest level of dissatisfaction with the implementation of the ceasefire agreement stems from the Sinhala community (19.6%), a majority of Tamils (60.8%) are completely satisfied.

Nationally, there is a high level of awareness (67.3%) amongst those who are aware of the signing of the ceasefire agreement that under this agreement both parties have to vacate school buildings, places of worship and public buildings in the North-East. The lowest awareness (61.9%) exists amongst the Sinhalese.
Amongst those who are aware that under the ceasefire agreement both parties have to vacate school buildings, places of worship and public buildings in the North-East, most (45.5%) disapprove of such an action, a view expressed by 60.3% Sinhalese.

On the other hand, a significant proportion of Sri Lankans (41.8%) who are aware of this clause in the ceasefire agreement approve of the same. This view is held by a majority of the Tamils (94.6%), Up-country Tamils (91.4%) and Muslims (57.5%).

**SRI LANKA MONITORING MISSION**

In July 2002, the overall awareness (84%) of the involvement of foreign monitors in monitoring the ceasefire agreement is amongst a majority of all ethnic communities – 86.3% Muslims, 84.6% Tamils, 83.7% Sinhalese and 81% Up-country Tamils.

In July 2002, a majority (39.3%) amongst Sri Lankans who are aware of the involvement of foreign monitors in monitoring the ceasefire believe that such a mission is essential if the ceasefire agreement is to succeed. Furthermore this view has increased since March 2002 (26.7%). The necessity of such a monitoring mission to ensure the success of the ceasefire is expressed by large majorities amongst the Up-country Tamils (95.8%), Tamils (89.5%) and Muslims (84.6%).

Also in July 2002, 33.6% who are aware of the involvement of foreign monitors in monitoring the ceasefire agreement believe that such a mission will have a positive impact on the ceasefire, a decrease from May 2002 (39.4%) and a view expressed mainly by the Sinhalese (41.9%).

I think the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission is impartial in its monitoring of the ceasefire agreement.

28.9% of those who are aware of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission believe that it is impartial in its monitoring of the ceasefire agreement. This figure has decreased slightly since May 2002 (33.1%) and is expressed predominantly by the Muslims (63.4%), Up-country Tamils (51.5%) and Tamils (43.9%).

31.4% of those who are aware of the involvement of foreign monitors in monitoring the ceasefire agreement are uncertain of the effectiveness of its monitoring of the ceasefire agreement - 32.2% Sinhalese, 31.2% Muslims, 27.7% Tamils and 22.7% Up-country Tamils.
Similarly, 26.1% of those who are aware of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission believe that it is effective in monitoring the ceasefire agreement - 56% Muslims, 48.5% Up-country Tamils and 38.9% Tamils, while 21.3% believe otherwise - 24.8% Sinhalese.

Nationally there is low awareness (32.9%) that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission published a statement listing complaints of ceasefire violations received since the Government and LTTE entered into the ceasefire agreement. The Tamils (69.6%) display the highest level of awareness of the same.

Furthermore, 43.5% of Sri Lankans are unaware that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission issued a statement that two members of the Mission were held against their will aboard an LTTE vessel. A notable proportion (40.2%), predominantly amongst the Tamils (51.6%) Sinhalese (39.9%) and Muslims (39.5%) are aware of the same.

**INTERIM ADMINISTRATION**

In July 2002 56% of Sri Lankans are aware of the proposal to establish an interim administration under LTTE control in the North-East. Awareness is highest amongst the Tamils (63.2%), Muslims (67.3%) and Sinhalese (55.5%).

In July 2002, of those who are aware of such a proposal, 73% disapprove of it, an increase from 64.7% in May 2002. This disapproval continues to be expressed by Sinhalese (85.7%) and Muslims (49.3%) in July 2002. In contrast, 85.1% of the Tamils and 57.8% of Up-country Tamils approve of the setting up of such an interim administration.

Of those who approve of the setting up of such an interim administration, a majority increasingly disapprove of the LTTE having complete control of such an interim administration, from 47% in May 2002 to 51.6% in July 2002. In July 2002, the proportion amongst the Sinhalese...
who hold this view has increased drastically since May 2002 – from 73.6% in May 2002 to 85.7% in July 2002. 85.1% Tamils are of the same view, a decrease from 93.5% in May 2002.

In July 2002, of those who approve of such a proposal, a notable proportion feel that the LTTE should have complete control of the interim administration – 38.9% in May 2002 to 33% in July 2002 – a view held by 77.1% of the Tamils.

Moreover, amongst those who approve of an interim administration in the North-East under LTTE control, a majority (49.7%) disapprove of the inclusion of other Tamil political parties in the interim administration. At the same time, 29.1% believe that other Tamil political participation is necessary.

In July 2002, the Up-country Tamils (75.7%) and Tamils (36%) approve of Tamil political participation while most Muslims (77.5%) and Sinhalese (56%) reject the participation of other Tamil political parties in such an interim administration.

In July 2002, 65.4% amongst those who approve of an interim administration under LTTE control approve of Muslim and Sinhala representation in the proposed interim administration.

In July 2002, there is approval for the same amongst most Muslims (94.3%), which is an increase from 84.8% in May 2002, and Sinhalese (80.7%). But only 35.2% of the Tamils, a decrease from 47.7% in May 2002, and 29.3% Up-country Tamils, a drop from 33.3% in May 2002 believe the same.

In July 2002 the proportion of those who do not believe that the LTTE is the sole representative of the Tamil community remains the same - 54.8% in May 2002 to 54.5% in July 2002. This belief is expressed largely by the Sinhalese (67%) and remains unchanged since May 2002 (66.8% in May 2002). However Tamils (71.7% in May 2002 to 73.8% in July 2002), Up-country Tamils (44.4% in May 2002 to 58.4% in July 2002) and Muslims (33.2% in May 2002 to 37.1% in July 2002) continue to believe the contrary.
Nationally, a majority of Sri Lankans (79.8%) believe the accusation levelled against the LTTE of engaging in abductions. While this belief exists amongst most Sinhalese (87.7%) and Muslims (76.5%), Up-country Tamils (66.7%) and Tamils (55.7%) state the contrary.

Furthermore, 81.1% of Sri Lankans believe the accusation levelled against the LTTE of engaging in extortion - 88.7% Sinhalese and 79.7% Muslims. On the other hand, 64.1% Up-country Tamils and 52.5% Tamils reject this accusation.

86.1% of the population are aware that the LTTE levies taxes in the North-East, a view held by 89.5% Muslims, 88.8% Sinhalese, 69.4% Up-country Tamils and 66.2% Tamils.
Please tell me if you believe or do not believe the accusation levelled against the LTTE of engaging in extortion?

Are you aware that the LTTE levies taxes in the North East?

For further information please contact:
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Tel: 370472  Email: cpapoll@diamond.lanka.net
Fax: 370475  Web: http://www.cpalanka.org
## Annex

### District sample (weighted) distribution in July 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombo</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gampaha</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalutara</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandy</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matale</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuwara Eliya</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Galle</td>
<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hambantota</td>
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<tr>
<td>Matara</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anuradhapura</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polonnaruwa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kurunegala</td>
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<tr>
<td>Puttlam</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badulla</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaragala</td>
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<td>Ratnapura</td>
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<td>Kegalle</td>
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<td>Amparai</td>
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<td>Batticaloa</td>
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<td>Trincomalee</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vavuniya</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mannar</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL</td>
<td>1745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Ethnic sample (weighted) distribution in July 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sinhala</td>
<td>1348</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up-country Tamil</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL</td>
<td>1745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**SAMPLE IN METHODOLOGY**

Given that the goal of the Peace Confidence Index (PCI) study is to measure the fluctuations in public confidence levels towards the peace process over time it is essential that the study be conducted repetitively with equal pauses during the study. Thus conducting the study bi-monthly with the use of a clearly defined and constant sample frame during each phase of the study ensures this fact.

The study is conducted using a structured questionnaire that is administered to a sample of approximately 1600 respondents during each phase of the study. This sample is adequate to capture the minimum ethnic diversity within the span of ten days of fieldwork. Although it is undeniable that an individual’s opinion on the peace process is influenced by a number of factors, however the ethnic factor, which is the most important and influential, is the sole factor that has been accommodated in this model.

The total sample is distributed among 22 administrative districts (strata) of Sri Lanka, but in the Ampara, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Mannar districts the entire area is not covered as a result of the prevailing conflict situation and logistical difficulties. The sample size is assigned to each stratum is approximately equal to the population proportions. However, some districts are over sampled due to the ethnic heterogeneity but the over sampling biases are eliminated by weighting the sample.

A sample is allocated to a particular ethnicity within a district only if the population proportion of that particular ethnicity exceeds 9%. A Divisional Secretariat (DS) is selected as the primary sampling unit using the Simple Random Sampling technique while the Grama Niladhari Divisions (GND) in a DS are selected randomly as the secondary sampling unit using the Grama Niladhari Divisions of Sri published by the Department of Census and Statistics as the sample frame.

To maintain the quality of the fieldwork and ensuring a maximum dispersion of the sample within a DS, enumerators are allowed to conduct a maximum of ten interviews a day in a GND. Within a given GND the enumerator is advised to select a starting point randomly and proceed with interviews using the random walk (right hand rule) technique in order to assure the random selection of households.

In the case of urban areas the interviewer is instructed to skip a house while selecting the households, thus resulting in the interview taking place at every alternative household. As the final sampling unit, the respondent is chosen from the household using the “KRISH” grid thus ensuring that each member of the household has an equal chance of being selected to the PCI sample.

The PCI national level estimates are subject to a 3% error margin with a .95 confidence level. It is noteworthy to mention here that the PCI model does not support the regional level analysis at the same level of precision.
Social Indicator (SI) is an independent social research organisation, which conducts polls on socio-economic and political issues. Operating under the Board of Directors of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), SI was established in September 1999, and filled a longstanding vacuum for a permanent, professional and independent polling facility in Sri Lanka on social and political issues.

Polling is an instrument of empowerment, a means by which the silent majority of the public can express their opinions on issues affecting their lives. Our mission is to conduct surveys on key social issues, thereby providing a means through which public opinion can influence the public policy debate.

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