Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: The Case of the Recent Military Intervention (October 12, 1999) and Its Implications for Pakistan’s Security Milieu

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Abdul Shakoor Khakwani received his B. Sc. in Mathematics and Physics from B. Z. University in 1988, M. Sc. in Defense and Strategic Studies from Q. A. University in Islamabad in 1991, MA in Political Science from I. University Bahawalpur in 1993, and MBA in International Business from IBA Karachi in 1998. He has taught at the National Institute of Public Administration in Karachi and is a former Deputy Director of the Institute of Cost and Management of Pakistan. He was a Ford Foundation Visiting Scholar at the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign from June through December of 2001. At present he is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Business Administration at Bahauddin Zakariya University (BZU), Multan, Pakistan.
Civil-military relations in Pakistan have not only been turbulent throughout our history, it has also been an uneasy relationship in the process of historical growth with frequent military interventions, which few have chosen to comment upon. The mere fact that Mr. Abdul Shakoor Khakwani has chosen to write on a military intervention that is as recent as 1999, is an extremely bold and courageous undertaking. The risk in undertaking a study of such a recent event, particularly in a country like Pakistan, where all events pertaining to the military remain shrouded in mystery for decades to come, is that insufficient and sometimes, inaccurate, input is available. Nonetheless, the author has done a marvelous job of collecting facts and piecing them together.

The narrative starts with a study of three theoretical perceptions on Pakistan’s military, and its political role in the country. Since the development of theoretical notions depends on the models studied, often the application of relations between institutes of a different psycho-social environment applied to another are found to be simplistic. The author has, quite appropriately, studied the theoretical notions, analyzed each, and left it to the reader to judge. He has then sought to link these theories to the historical growth of this very perambulating relationship, before moving on to analyze the most recent one. This Herculean task of explaining an issue as complicated as civil-military relations in Pakistan and the causes of frequent military interventions merits an independent study, but for the purposes of understanding the military intervention of October 1999, more than adequate data has been provided.

While many of the events preceding the actual “counter-coup,” as General Pervez Musharraf’s government prefers to refer to its assumption of political power after overthrowing an elected government, are shrouded in secrecy, the author has uncovered enough to establish the linkages of possible causes to the effects, to put forward a plausible and logically acceptable explanation of the event.

His analysis of the security implications, though brief, is incisive and bold. He does not hesitate to offer criticism where it is due, nor credit, where he considers it due. The article should find readership amongst both the casual reader, with an interest in political developments in Pakistan, and the more serious student of this complicated subject. I consider myself honored to have been asked to express my views on it.

Rawalpindi, July 2002

BRIG. (RET.) SHAUKAT QADIR
Pakistani Army
INTRODUCTION

The dynamics of South Asian security politics cannot be understood well without comprehending the role of various forces and institutions at the domestic level. Civil and military institutions and their interaction in a body politic have a direct bearing on a country’s national security policies. This study examines the case of the recent (October 12, 1999) military intervention in politics in Pakistan. After discussing the theoretical framework and issues in civil-military relations, the operative factors that led to the military intervention will be explored, and comparative analyses vis-à-vis previous military regimes will be offered. This discussion also serves to examine whether the concept of civilian supremacy as accepted in the developed states is relevant and valid in the case of a developing country like Pakistan. An additional aim of this paper is to identify differences in foreign policy implications, if any, between the civilian and military regimes, before and after the takeovers.

As such the paper consist of four parts. Part one highlights the salient aspects of several classic works on civil-military relations, namely those by Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and S.E. Finer. This part also includes a critique of the concept of “civilian supremacy”—a model that prevails in western scholarship on the topic—and shows how this model is inappropriate and invalid as far as developing countries like Pakistan are concerned. Finally, part one also reflects how even the concept of “civilian” is inadequate when describing Pakistan’s situation.

Part two focuses on the factors responsible for the recent military takeover. Historically there has been debate over whether the military intervenes as a result of its institutional coherence, organizational supremacy, or political ambitions, or even whether simply the inability and weakness of politicians induces the military to intervene.

The intent of part three is to deal with the implications of the military takeover on security policymaking. What view of security policy is predominant during military rule? Are the two components (domestic and foreign) of security redefined and re-formulated after a military takeover? This paper addresses such questions.

Finally, part four offers observations and conclusions about the nature of military intervention in civilian politics in Pakistan, past and present.

The study is also coupled with some inherent limitations. One such leading limiting factor regards the drawing of the time line. The events of September 11 and its aftermath brought in greater fluidity and dynamism to Pakistan and the region. Therefore, this study has been kept limited up until November 30, 2001.
The military in both developed and developing countries is considered one of the most powerful institutions, vis-à-vis their internal polity and also when it comes to defining, formulating and executing external or security policies. Though in developed states the military’s role and functionality is clearly identified, delineated and settled in relation to other institutions, it is considered to be more assertive and tends to pose a certain degree of challenges to civilian authorities. In the case of developing countries this role is complex, pervasive, diffused and hence problematic vis-à-vis other state institutions, and as such has a greater bearing not only on the domain of security policy formulation but also has a decisive role in the internal body politic. Therefore it is imperative to evaluate the role of militaries in developing and developed countries from a different framework rather on the basis of a single criterion. The present study attempts to explain why civil-military relations theories and frameworks developed from a western perspective fail to explain the same for developing countries like Pakistan. Therefore, the following is a discussion of the work of three leading theorists on civil-military relations, namely Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and S.E. Finer, and the relevancy of this work in the case of Pakistan.

**Huntington**

Before dealing with the theoretical aspects of civil-military relations it is essential to understand the nature of military thought, since the constituent elements or inherent values of the military mind eventually manifest themselves in the soldier’s outward behavior towards other organizations and society at large. According to Samuel P. Huntington, two sets of values are assumed to be characteristically military: bellicosity and authoritarianism. By virtue of these, the soldier is “also thought to be opposed to democracy and to desire the organization of society on the basis of the chain of command” (60). Huntington argues that “[the military] exalts obedience as the highest virtue of military men. The military ethic is thus pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is, in brief, realistic and conservative” (79). Huntington adds, “The military function is performed by a public, bureaucratized profession expert in the management of violence and is responsible for the military security of the state” (61).

The sense of “this responsibility leads the military: (1) to view the state as the basic unit of political organization, (2) to stress the continuing nature of the threats to the military security of the state and the continuing likelihood of war, (3) to emphasize the magnitude and immediacy of the security threats…” (64-5).

Furthermore, in Huntington’s view, on the level of policy formulation it is imperative that “the military man rarely favors war. The military man will always argue that the danger of war requires increased armaments; he will seldom argue that increased armaments make war practical or desirable. He always favors preparedness, but he never feels prepared. Accordingly, the professional military man contributes a cautious, conservative, restraining voice to the formulation of state policy” (69).

While comparing civilian and military approaches to any issue one can find that “the criteria of military efficiency are limited, concrete, and relatively objective; the criteria of political wisdom are indefinite, ambiguous, and highly subjective” (76).

Nonetheless, in the view of Huntington and most of the other analysts of civil-military relations, “the superior political wisdom of the statesman must be accepted as a fact” (76). In fact, according to Huntington, “if the statesman decides upon war which the soldier knows can only lead to national catastrophe, then the soldier, after presenting his opinion, must fall to and make the best of a bad situation” (76).

Having analyzed the military value system, Huntington raises two broad models for “civilian control” or supremacy over the military. The first, the “subjective civilian control” model, is attained by simple and direct maximization of civilian power vis-à-vis the military. This maximizing of civilian control can be done through governmental institutions, social classes (in Europe, the aristocracy and bourgeoisie struggled
with each other for control of the military in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), or constitutional avenues. Nonetheless, as Huntington argues, with the rise of military professionalism, this particular form of civilian control has become obsolete (80-3).

The other form of civilian control desired and preferred by Huntington is “objective civilian control,” which can be achieved by maximizing military professionalism. Thus to him, “it is that distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps” (83). Huntington concludes, “Objective civilian control is thus directly opposed to subjective civilian control...[it] achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state” (83).

In Huntington’s view, “objective civilian control achieves [a] reduction [of military power] by professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral. This produces the lowest possible level of military political power with respect to all civilian groups” (84). It is imperative that “a highly professional officer corps stand ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state” (84). He explains, “If civilian control is defined in the objective sense...no conflict exists between it and the goal of military security” (85).

Of interest here is the relevance of Huntington’s proposed model of objective civilian control of the military for countries like Pakistan. First, its relevance is cast into doubt by the fact that Huntington formulated this model essentially based on the study of the history and culture of western societies. Second, military professionalism in the case of Pakistan will not make the military “politically sterile and neutral,” as the very aim of a professional army is to develop the latest state-of-the-art weapons acquisition programs, which translates into both the greater influence of and, at times, conflict with resource allocation and security policies. In this regards, S.E. Finer maintains that the very nature of “professionalism” (using Huntington’s definition, with its three ingredients of expertness, social responsibility, and corporate loyalty) in fact often leads to military collision with civilian authorities (and hence, the military becomes politicized). Therefore, to inhibit the military’s desire to intervene in politics requires the firm acceptance of civil supremacy, not just professionalism. Similarly, it is also argued that “military obedience cannot be made totally independent of society’s political system: it is always tied to some group and political ideology.”

**JANOWITZ**

Morris Janowitz, “with his extensive analysis of the sociology of the military officer...ultimately falls back on the professionalism-equals-civilian control theory advanced by Huntington.” However, Janowitz understood civilian control in terms of societal, rather than state or institutional control. State institutions play a secondary role as an extension of society, but societal control, measured in part as integration with society, was Janowitz’s normative and empirical focus. Janowitz also dealt exclusively with militaries in developing countries and had identified five types of civil-military relations while “analyzing the military in the political development of new nations: (1) authoritarian-personal control, (2) authoritarian-mass party, (3) democratic competitive and semi-competitive systems, (4) civil-military coalition, and (5) military oligarchy...the first three differ markedly in the form of internal political control; they have the common feature that the military’s involvement in domestic politics is at the minimal level...”

In a civil-military coalition “the military serves as an active political bloc in its support of civilian parties and other bureaucratic power groups. The civilian group is in power because of the assistance of the military...The military may act as an informal, or even explicit, umpire between competing political parties and political groups as it does in, for example, Turkey. The military may, at this level, be forced to establish a caretaker government, with a view to returning power to civilian political groups...These alliances and caretaker governments are unstable; they frequently lead to a third and wider level of involvement, where the military sets itself up as the political ruling group as in, for example, Thailand, Egypt and Sudan. The result is a...military oligarchy, because for a limited time, at least, the political initiative passes to the military...After ‘take-over,’ the military regime can begin to recognize the task of supplying national political leaders. At this level, the military recognizes the needs for a mass political base. It seeks to develop a broader political apparatus, either with its own personnel, under their direct supervision, or through a system of alliances with civilians.” Janowitz notes Pakistan as among those
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countries (in addition to Egypt and South Korea) that follow this trend. Thus, according to Janowitz’s typology, Pakistan’s situation oscillates between a civil-military coalition and a military oligarchy.

Yet, it is important to see the role of the military according to another typology, whereby the distinction has been made between “designed militarism” and “reactive militarism.” Janowitz explains, “By ‘designed militarism’ we mean the positive and premeditated intent to intervene in domestic politics and to follow expansionist foreign policies...” Reactive militarism, on the other hand, entails “the expansion of military power that results from the weakness of civilian institutions and the pressures of civilians to expand the military role.” Here it would be interesting to apply this classification of military intervention to Pakistan’s situation. Tracing the history of interventions—those of General Mohammad Ayub Khan and General Zia-ul-Haq, and the one under consideration here of General Pervez Musharraf—there emerges two sets of opinions. In one, the military in Pakistan intervenes with premeditated intent; for the other, the intervention of the military is reactive and spontaneous, arising out of the incompetence of civilians. In the case of Ayub, the intervention could be considered that of designed militarism, while with Zia it is a reactive one. It is premature to decide whether the present intervention is of the reactive or designed type, as the process of reaching such conclusions depends heavily on the disclosure of facts and information that have yet to surface.

F. E. Finer seemingly offers a more comprehensive set of generalizations on why the military intervenes in politics. According to Finer, the dynamics of military intervention depend on the factors of “disposition” and “opportunity.” The disposition to intervene results from a combination of “motives” and “mood.” The motives can be further broken down into one or a combination of the following: 1) “manifest destiny of the soldiers”; 2) national interest; 3) sectional interest—class, regional, or corporate self-interest, or individual self-interest; and 4) a mixture of the above motives. The mood to intervene is a complex factor that can be induced by two elements: a “sense of overwhelming power” or “high self-esteem” (at personal and corporate levels); and some kind of grievance. The “opportunity” for the military to intervene in politics depends on two broad factors: 1) an increased civilian dependence on the military or the effect of domestic circumstances (whether owing to an overt or latent crisis, or to a power vacuum in society); and 2) the popularity of the military.

In applying Finer’s model to the context of the October 1999 intervention in Pakistan, one can observe that the “disposition” variable was responsible more so than that of “opportunity,” even though there was an increased dependence of civilians on the military and the military’s take-over was celebrated in society. The “motives” for the intervention were explained in General Musharraf’s takeover speech. Similarly, the “mood” was conducive to intervention because the military felt aggrieved as a result of endangered personal self-esteem and esprit de corps. This aspect is explained in more detail in part two.

CRITIQUE ON “CIVILIAN SUPREMACY”

When a domestic source for the acquisition of weapons and a program for modernization of the armed forces are limited, seeking an alliance relationship and influence over foreign policy is quite important for the military and its professionalism. Thus we can observe that in the case of Pakistan, the professionalism of the military goes hand in hand with praetorianism. In fact, ironically, praetorianism also carries a means for the professional advancement of the military and vice versa, in Pakistan’s case. The regimes of General Mohammad Ayub Khan and General Zia-ul-Haq offer examples of this point. Hence, a scenario exists whereby only a praetorian army, when capable enough to overwhelm civilians in order to fulfill its corporate interests (force modernization, training abroad, procurement of advanced weapons and weapon systems), can seek professionalism (especially under current conditions where technology professionalism is increasingly identified with force modernization and the acquisition of state-of-the-art weapons systems).

As one scholar postulates, “Modern professional armed forces perceive themselves as the sole guarantors of the physical, political and moral integrity of their client: the state. In order to live up to this role they need arms, equipment, sophisticated training and support which—in most cases—can only be
procured from a relatively small number of developed states, most of whom are leading members of such defense alliances.\textsuperscript{13}

This is quite contrary to the argument of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, whereby professionalism keeps the military away from the political arena. For Huntington, a professionalized army concentrates all of its efforts on perfecting its fighting ability and "stands ready" to carry out the wishes of any civilian power, so that, as cited earlier, professionalism effectively renders the military into "politically sterile and neutral" servants of the state.\textsuperscript{14} This relationship may hold true for armed forces in developed countries. In the case of developing countries, however, the very need to perfect its fighting capability makes the army politically motivated, especially under the circumstances of an impending threat from a neighboring or regional hegemony, the military's interpretation of supreme national interests, and resource constraints.

"Given the paramount role of national security and increasing military defense budgets, it is only logical and rational for those who specialize in the stuff of war—the military—to play an important part in the foreign policy of modern states. The military’s professionalism and expertise to handle ever more complicated weapons and modes of warfare have strengthened their position and sharpened their ability to participate in formulating national security, foreign policy included...thus, the militaries are capable and willing to influence security and foreign policies either through normative, institutional and/or group processes or a combination thereof. If every thing else fails, the military if necessary can influence the process by means of a coup or a threatened one."\textsuperscript{15} Therefore certain other parameters have to be looked into while defining a viable civil-military relations model. Historical, cultural, and institutional settings need to be studied to determine the role of the military in a particular society.

**HISTORICAL APPROACHES: COLONIAL AND CULTURAL**

One such useful and effective approach in explaining and analyzing phenomena and happenings in developing countries lies in twin variables—colonial setting and cultural outlook. To some scholars, the root cause of problems of governance in developing countries comes from the fact that the very nature and objectives of institutions founded during the colonial era (with colonial objectives and means)—like military and civil bureaucracies—were nurtured and garnered, while the civil-political institutions were denied the chance to grow and mature. Such a scenario leads to an asymmetry in the development of institutions: the inherited civil-military institutions stand mature and developed on the one hand, while political institutions remain underdeveloped on the other.

Meanwhile, to another school of though the cultural settings and behavioral outlook of the society are the factors that matter most. "Cultural factors include the values, attitudes, and symbols informing not only the nation’s view of its military’s role, but also the military’s own view of that role."\textsuperscript{16}

In the eyes of some western scholars, some cultures exist where the very idea of democratization of society and polity is altogether an alien thing and as such cannot be implanted there. However, an examination of the historical aspect of civil-military relations is needed, and requires objective scholarship of Islamic societies and not simply accepting all views offered by historians (many of whom could be called “Orientalist”). As Edward Said has argued, western authors defined and interpreted history with a superiority bias (of racism and of imperialism) and particular political interests.\textsuperscript{17}

It is important here to question the cultural context to which these “Orientalists” referred. And in the case of civil-military relations in particular, what constitutes the historical-cultural framework? Do such scholars refer to the culture of a praetorian society under study, accepting certain types of influence from contemporary politics; or to the phase of degeneration and subsequent subordination to colonial power; or even to the pre-colonial era?

To this author, the real cultural manifestations pertinent to civil-military relations go back to the pre-colonial era of history. But it is quite difficult to have a genuine recourse to literature or data from the pre-colonial era of developing countries. This sets in relief the fundamental problem of being able to know and identify the exact nature of the historical-cultural context that led to a particular type of relations in a specific era of a particular society. Moreover, one encounters the problem of how these cultural settings are to be interpreted in terms of today’s concepts and classifications of phenomena. One such typical problem
in the contemporary world is to regard contemporary technology and terminology as superior to that of the past, with utter disregard to time and space. This raises the issue of comparability in research. For instance, can a democracy and a monarchy truly be considered comparable institutions? Similarly, what was the nature of civil-military relations that existed in a pre-colonial society such as, for example, that under the Moguls—were the Mogul kings part of a civilian authority or a military one? These questions imply that the study of civil-military relations of a particular society through a historical-cultural approach is a more useful and effective approach than any other. Such a study suggests that civil-military institutions were diffused throughout most Islamic societies and empires (Abbasids, Ottomans, and Moguls).

As Stephen P. Rosen explains, while European civilizations showed a high degree of military separation from society, ancient Indian and Islamic (pre-colonial civilizations) showed a lower degree of military separation from civilian affairs. Thus, the theory of civilian supremacy rests essentially on the assumption that the military remains separate from civil society, which appears invalid in the case of Pakistan. This assumed separation and superiority of civil society fosters confrontation with the military, instead of coordination and harmony in the Pakistani context. “What the British Empire did that is beyond debate was very quickly to professionalize the Indian armies and separate them from Indian society,” Rosen asserts. The salient question here is how long did this artificial separation last?

A second point that deserves mention in the historical-cultural context is the fact that the military is regarded very highly in Pakistani society. This status results from the fact that the study of Islamic history generally focuses emphatically (and, some might argue, scantily) on the rise and fall of heroic warriors and conquerors without explaining at length the nature of the relationship between society and the military, nor more specific aspects of the military: indoctrination; professionalism; training; strategy and the art of war; weaponry; administrative and managerial capabilities; and so on. It is in line with this over-projection of this historical aspect (the indoctrination of society) that in Muslim countries (especially in the case of Pakistan) the society attaches greater values and expectations to the army and army chief (as savior of the nation). It is probably this historical-cultural structure that explains why similar military organizations with common colonial legacies in India and Pakistan have extremely different roles vis-à-vis the internal polity.

**Historical Approaches: Institutional and the Conceptual Inadequacy of the Term “Civil-Military”**

Turning our attention to the specific circumstances of Pakistan, the term “civil-military relations” is a misnomer when it comes to depicting the nature and context of institutions and the polity in Pakistan. Whereas in European societies and in the United States the term “civil” refers not only to political but also the civil state apparatus or bureaucracy, in the case of Pakistan the civil bureaucracy identifies itself as distinct not only from the political institutions but also from the other civil institutions and as such always sides with the military bureaucracy when the situation demands. The civil bureaucracy is always the leading beneficiary of military intervention, as it feels elated and elevated and gains institutional strength during the course of the military regime. Therefore, in order to study democratization in Pakistan one should always cautiously delineate the role of civil bureaucracy during the course of political or military rule. It is interesting to note that while the political party reigns, the civil bureaucracy directly feels the denial of power, authority, and prestige and hence feels the frustration. Tracing the evidence in the history of democratization in Pakistan, one can observe that even before the first military coup in October 1958 took place, the civil bureaucracy had taken over. This came with the first dismissal of the government under Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin in 1953 by the former civil bureaucrat (Indian Civil Service officer) and Pakistan’s third governor-general, Ghulam Mohammad. Hence the original conflict manifested itself as civil bureaucracy versus politician, a trend that would continue. Subsequently, throughout the political history of Pakistan one can bear witness that the most powerful personalities come from either the civil or military bureaucracy (with the single exception of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto). Though the military invariably on all occasions appears to be interested in across-the-board accountability, inclusive of civil services as well, its actions eventually amount to “window dressing” and “symbolic satisfaction” for the Pakistani public. This essentially means that there is no breach in the alliance relationship between civil and military bureaucracies, a subject discussed by Edward Feit. In Feit’s view, “As a result of this
relationship, politicians are usually carefully investigated, disgraced, and often punished, but the bureaucracy, on the other hand, seldom suffers a similar fate even if it is corrupt.22

Similarly it can be discerned from actual events that whenever the military intervention takes place, the political government had long before alienated and frustrated the civil bureaucracy. Bhutto’s case is clear enough to support this notion. And again, in the wake of the recent intervention one can find that Nawaz Sharif’s government had alienated the bureaucracy at large through his moves of accountability and frequent administrative reshuffling in Punjab and the central government. Hence, it is not only the military organization which feels incompatibility in working with political regimes, but also the perpetual force working against the political regime—that of civil bureaucracy. In other words, “The failure of the politicians to produce policies thus acts as a spur to intervention on the part of the bureaucrats, in view of the danger this failure poses to the bureaucracy. Military intervention is, therefore, generally approved of by the bureaucrats who see in it an escape from an impossible impasse. Once the armed bureaucrats, a portion of bureaucracy themselves, have taken office, they will presumably make policies for all.”23

Therefore, it is imperative that in studying democratization in developing countries like Pakistan where civil bureaucracies have a distinct status alongside other civil institutions, an approach be modeled not along a dichotomous plain, as prevails in the western sense, but rather along three plains. Owing to conceptual inadequacies in terms of historical, cultural, and institutional differences and outlook when compared with western societies, one may conclude that the prevalent model of “civilian supremacy” is not valid for developing countries in general and for Pakistan specifically.

SYNTHESIS

Civil-military relations can be better understood in the context of developing countries and specifically for Pakistan if we use the work of Rebecca L. Schiff, who came up with the theory of concordance, in part as a response to the conceptual inadequacies described above. “The theory of concordance highlights dialogue, accommodation, and shared values or objectives among military, the political elites, and society…Concordance theory explains the specific conditions determining the military’s role in the domestic sphere that includes the government and society. Concordance does not require a particular form of government, set of institutions, or decision-making process. But it usually takes place in the context of active agreement, whether established by legislation, decree, or constitution, or based on longstanding historical and cultural values. In contrast to prevailing theory, which emphasizes the separation of civil and military institutions, concordance encourages cooperation and involvement among the military, the political institutions, and the society at large. In other words, concordance does not assume that separate civil and military spheres are required to prevent domestic military institution. Rather, it may be avoided if the military cooperates with the political elites and citizenry.”24

Notes
6 Ibid., 166.
Most Pakistani academicians and others, owing to the evidence currently available, take the latest intervention as a reactive one, while the author’s personal communications with civil and military bureaucrats reveals it to be one of designed militarism.

For a detailed account of all the variables identified, see Finer, 28-73.


Having discussed civil-military relation models, we now come to the specific dynamics of what caused the coup d’état of October 12, 1999. The following discussion examines the causes of the intervention, in order of their significance. Although these causes are considered here separately, they should not necessarily be considered unrelated and hence should not be taken as mutually exclusive.

**Organizational Factors**

Foremost in the literature were the organizational factors responsible for the intervention. Organizational factors will have the greatest impact on the military’s perceptions of corporate or institutional interests. The policies of Nawaz Sharif’s regime were provocative of the very esprit de corps and integrity of the army as an institution. It was primarily Sharif’s failure that he did not appreciate the organizational dynamics of the armed forces. Two types of authority constitute a typical organization: line authority and staff authority. Line authority is the one considered primarily responsible for performing main activities (for which the organization exists essentially), and staff authority assists line authority in giving specialized advice. Superior and apex command and leadership positions go generally to the line authority. In the army, line authority comes from the fighting corps—either from infantry, armored, or artillery—while staff authority comes from sources other than from these main fighting corps—that is, from logistics, engineering, intelligence, etc. The folly committed by Sharif in this case was his attempt to appoint General Khwaja Ziauddin (who headed the intelligence corps, and was not from any of the traditional line authority, but rather professionally from an engineering corps) as Chief of Army Staff (COAS). As such, the army as a whole was bound to react. This action was something unacceptable not only to other corps commanders of fighting corps but also for the army at large. It went against the institutional norms of the army and, had it been accepted, translated into greater risks and threats for organizational coherency. General Musharraf himself acknowledged this, explaining, “Our concerns again were conveyed in no uncertain terms but the government of Mr. Nawaz Sharif chose to ignore all these and tried to politicize the army, de-stabilize it and tried to create dissension within its ranks.”

Had Sharif attempted to appoint someone from the line authority/fighting corps as successor to General Musharraf, the case might have been different. Since he tried to break the institutional norms—the commanders of the fighting corps were unanimous in showing him the exit.

**Personalismo**

The term *personalismo* is used to explain the “Latin American political habit of deference to and dependence upon personal authority.” The tendency to interpret and react to everything in terms of personal considerations, instead of organizational, bureaucratic and normative and pragmatic working led to Sharif’s ouster from power. Had he been oriented towards and content just working with bureaucratic institutions instead of being intolerant and expectant of an all-out personalized system of loyalty, things would have been different. As Ayesh Jalal puts it, “politicians are too anxious and frightened of the military and the bureaucracy, given the past history... therefore, the politicians expend much energy in attempting to ward them off and the only way they know how to do this is in an arbitrary and personalized manner.” Being driven and misled by his past arbitrary but successful political encounters, such as throwing out the president, chief justice, naval chief of staff, and even the army chief, Sharif deemed it appropriate to continue to operate in the same way. According to Jalal, “The coup took place primarily because Nawaz Sharif tried to bring the army within the ambit of his personalized rule.” Reflecting on Sharif’s style of politics, one journalist wrote, “Since February 1997, when he began his term as prime minister, Nawaz fired four service chiefs who refused to have a ‘price tag’ on them. This led him to play divisive politics to sow discord among the services, and disintegrate their unity of command.” The same factor applies to General Musharraf as well, whereby he took the issue at a personal level. This has also
been verified by General Musharraf himself, as he told the BBC, “Nawaz Sharif would have remained the prime minister if he had not dismissed me.” This is not something contradictory to the organizational factor cited above as conflicts over substantial issues—when they remain perpetual and unresolved—get transformed into a personalized conflict, as happened in this case.

**Constitutional Factors**

Article 58 2 (b) was the clause in the constitution of Pakistan as instituted by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1985 which empowered the president to dismiss an elected government. In essence, this article prevented the army from direct takeover. However, having felt insecure of his position (despite having the president as his yes-man), Sharif carried out the additional (if perhaps redundant) measure for his regime’s security by nullifying the article from the constitution. This consequently proved counter-productive, and eventually turned out to play a role not only in his ouster from power, but also led to his political death. In the past this clause had been exercised by different presidents in cases of national political expediencies. From the perspective of national security and polity, the clause seemed to be extremely significant as it kept the army away from direct or overt rule.

**The Civil Bureaucracy’s Frustration and Its Tacit Alliance with the Military**

As was explained earlier, an added reason for the coup of 1999 can also be found in the alliance relationship (of shared values and interests) between the civil and military bureaucracy. As the axiom goes, whenever the military intervenes in Pakistan, the civil bureaucracy already feels frustrated with the values and style of the politicians. Both the civil and military bureaucracies have a built-in contempt for and alienation from politicians. This means essentially that politics in Pakistan is comprised of three forces, in broad terms. If one has to convey an image of Pakistani politics figuratively, it can be best represented like three sides of a triangle. Normally, in a democracy politicians occupy the apex of triangle, while civil and military bureaucracies are supposed to be at the bottom and base ends. Nonetheless, in reality an inverted triangle exists—with the civil-military bureaucracy base at the top. This arrangement makes the situation inherently unstable, and indicates a structural problem with the polity in Pakistan. This implies that there exists a tacit alliance rapport between the civil and military bureaucracies.

**Overestimate of the Army’s Managerial Capability**

Economic performance may be attributed to the fact, as has been pointed out by Janowitz, that “the Pakistani military government has shown a great deal of initiative in economic management, and the central ministries are run by civilian experts and professionals who have been given considerable autonomy.” This has been further substantiated by Hasan-Askari Rizvi’s work on the military and politics in Pakistan, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*: “It [the military] has carved out a role and position in the public and the private sectors, industry, business, agriculture, education and scientific development, health care, communications and transportation. Such an omnipresence ensures an important role for the military in the state and society even if the generals do not directly control the levers of power.”

According to David R. Mares, “The organizational and professional qualities [which Peter D. Feaver talked of as auxiliary capabilities] of the military are favorably contrasted with those of politicians and leaders of principal social organizations, who are viewed as entrenched political and economic forces that defend their own interests and thus impede development.” It is imperative, therefore, that since politicians are unable to look beyond their vested interests and manage governmental affairs smoothly, the military has to take on this managerial responsibility as well.

There is a psychological aspect to this military omnipresence in public and private sectors of the economy. The persistent problem of misgovernance and economic mismanagement in civil or public apparatuses on the one hand and the army’s own institutional coherence, experience, and somewhat comparatively better managerial performance vis-à-vis the civilians on the other, led the army to identify themselves as good managers. The paradigm they believed in was: “good managers are good managers everywhere.” This paradigm led them to perceive complex problems simply through the lens of order and
discipline. Therefore, military managers believe, typically, that things will be in place and start to work automatically once proper shape, order, and discipline have been established. Thus, General Musharraf’s address to the nation, wherein he came up with a very ambitious economic and management agenda, reflects the gross overestimate of the army’s managerial capacity.¹¹

THE KARGIL EPISODE

How does Kargil fit into the civil-military equation? Is Kargil the sole factor that plays a role in the intervention or just a catalyst which fostered the process of change? Multiple explanations are given on this account.

Some analysts believe that it was simply an outreach of political folly on the part of Nawaz Sharif, wherein he attempted, once again, to remove the Chief of Army Staff the way he arbitrarily removed Jehangir Karamat, the previous army chief. According to this scenario, therefore, his arbitrary and personalismo style of politics were responsible for his ouster from the post of Prime Minister.

Others say that Kargil is the vital cause, since before Kargil Nawaz Sharif was active in developing an understanding (the Lahore Declaration, which never categorically mentioned Kashmir) with India, and presumably was close to settling the territorial dispute—none of which was in the corporate interests of the army (equivalent to the notion of military industrial congressional complex). The army, therefore, staged Kargil (an ill-equipped logistically and ill-planned operation) without the prior knowledge and authorization of Nawaz Sharif (who only became involved when it developed into a full-blown crisis). This perhaps explains why no judicial enquiry was conducted in the aftermath of Kargil, under either the civil or the military regimes. Nonetheless, even if this explanation is accepted as true, the policies and developments in the post-coup d’état era towards India contradict this whole perspective, since the army itself has not only made unilateral efforts in de-escalating tension along the Line of Control, but also is substantially involved in the continuity of dialogue that was initiated by Nawaz Sharif. Second, this scenario again suggests a conspiracy theory supporting the idea of the army’s all-out hegemonic role in the government, which is not the case. Third, Sharif in fact did give approval of Kargil, but had never anticipated its severe fall-out. A lot stems from his personal style of leadership for overlooking and failing to work out the details.¹² This perspective is also negated by the fact that the Agra summit proved to be a continuation of Sharif’s policy towards India.

Yet to others, it was the Kargil issue that led to the fall of Sharif’s regime. “By bowing under the U.S. administration’s pressure for an abrupt pullout from Kargil, Sharif brought worldwide disgrace to the Pakistan Army.”¹³ Hence the conflict—although won militarily—was lost politically and brought shame and isolation on Pakistan. This explanation also lacks sufficient depth, however, as Sharif never had substantial foreign policy differences vis-à-vis the army. The later parts of this paper show that Musharraf followed and continued with a similar set of foreign policies towards the United States, India, and even Afghanistan.

There is yet another view, which holds that Sharif’s compromises with the United States and anti-Taliban policy became a source of resentment among the armed forces (being pro-Taliban) towards the Sharif regime. For instance, twice in the first weeks of October 1999 Sharif accused the Taliban administration of promoting sectarian violence and terrorism in Pakistan.¹⁴ Recent news disclosed that Sharif had even agreed to the US military operation in Afghanistan to capture Osama bin Laden. Nonetheless, this view also lacks sufficient justification for the military to intervene, as the military itself even before September 11, 2001 came up with policies that went against the Taliban regime.

Therefore, in this author’s view Kargil is just an immediate factor facilitative of the coup d’état. Further insight and details of the Kargil operation at any point in time may determine whether it was of a designed militarism or reactive militarism. The important question would be: who staged Kargil? If it is the military, then the scenario could be one of designed militarism. So far the information revealed in the context of Kargil leads one to believe that this coup is of the reactive militarism type.

Given the factors responsible for intervention, how then would one tend to evaluate these in view of Janowitz’s typology of reactive and designed militarism? One tends to take this intervention as reactive militarism begotten out of “Kargil,” “organizational factors,” and “personalismo.” Meanwhile, in view of
Finer’s model, motives like manifest destiny of the soldier’s and national interests were at work as identified above in the section “Overestimate of the Army’s Managerial Capability,” and also by General Musharraf himself in his takeover speech. The general’s or army’s mood to intervene increased as high self-esteem at the personal and corporate levels were endangered, as explained above in “Organizational Factors” and “Personalismo.” Similarly, the opportunity was also there in the form of increased dependence of civilian regimes on the military, and secondly, the military’s popularity can be gauged from the celebration of the masses on the verge of the takeover. According to one, the army’s moral authority manifests itself when the politicians are in power—and this is based upon the public and politicians’ perception.15

By all of these analyses, one can say that the resentment of the army against Sharif, and hence the overthrow, stems not from foreign policy related issues, but rather were rooted in domestic politics.

Notes

5 Ibid.
11 “General Musharraf’s Address to the Nation,” The Nation (Pakistan), 17 October 1999.
12 Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, Director, South Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C., in an interview with the author.
14 Ibid., 51.
A nation’s foreign and security policy formulation and execution rests on the quality of its domestic polity. The quality of domestic polity, in turn, is based upon the nature and type of its civil-military relations. Huntington argues, “Nations which develop a properly balanced pattern of civil-military relations have a great advantage in the search for security...[and] nations which fail to develop a balanced pattern of civil-military relations squander their resources and run uncalculated risk.”

Having discussed the causes of intervention we now come to the ramifications of the intervention. What are the imperatives of the military regime for Pakistan’s security? In the first instance, has security under the military regime improved or been undermined? How is security defined and interpreted under the military, internally or externally? What view of security prevails and remains predominant under the current regime? And more specifically, how does the present, overtly military rule impact Pakistan’s foreign security relations, especially vis-à-vis the United States, India, and Afghanistan? Is there any substantial foreign policy shift in relation to these countries?

Today the concept of “security” can primarily be defined along two broad dimensions: internal and external. Traditionally, this distinction was based upon the assumptions that threats to a state’s security arise from outside its borders and that these threats are primarily, if not exclusively, military in nature and usually require a military response if the security of the target state is to be preserved. In other words, a state’s level of security and insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities—both internal and external—that threaten to have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes. Therefore, as Caroline Thomas explains, in the context of developing states, “Security does not simply refer to the military dimension, as is often assumed in Western discussions of the concept...[but also to] the search for internal security of the state through nation-building, the search for a secure system of food, health, money and trade, as well as the search for security through nuclear weapons.” Thus, to ensure a state’s security, a delicate balance must be preserved and reconciled between the military and civil society. The dilemma this relationship poses for a developing country is in the question, “What if the two are mutually exclusive?” Or, “What if there exists an inverse or a trade-off relation between the two?” In the context of developing countries, promoting and strengthening one may weaken the other, since the balance is so delicate and precarious to preserve either by civil or military regimes in developing countries. For military regimes, achieving this balance tends to be more difficult because of the fact that military regimes, more often than not, are favorably disposed towards an economic-military view of national security—which usually translates into forming an alliance relationship with external (super or great) powers. Given this security paradigm, the questions arise as to how military regimes in Pakistan conceive of national security, and how the present regime contemplates the reconciliation between internal and external components of national security?

**INTERNAL SECURITY**

The regime’s primary stated objectives on the eve of the takeover were internal in nature. These objectives included “putting the house in order,” so to speak, by creating a basis for economic development, building institutions, restructuring, and establishing accountability. At the same time, the regime had also promised to initiate the process of democratization at the grassroots level, and had given a specific timeframe in which it expected to bring the plan to fruition. As such, the drive for legitimacy was motivated internally. The regime has met with some degree of success, in the eyes of some (this success appears marginal to others) in its movement for accountability and collecting more revenue. It is interesting to observe that, unlike the Ayub and Zia regimes, the present regime has not faced significant political opposition. Rather, the main opposition comes from two other sources. The first is the business class—owing to the government’s attempt to impose tax reforms resulting in new taxes. The other set of people who could conceivably defy the military regime are religious groups. Religious political parties rose to the fore in response to the governments’ proposed procedural amendments to blasphemy law, which they found unacceptable. As a result of the opposition from the business class and religious parties, the government
had to withdraw on both of these accounts. Despite the significant opposition from these quarters, however, the corresponding political parties were unable to take advantage politically on a national scale on the strength of these issues. Rather, the politicians and political parties have responded in an opportunistic way to the idea of local body elections (at the district level), and in a way have politically accepted and facilitated the legitimization of military rule. This also suggests that the military’s success in intervening and maintaining its hold in Pakistan owes a great deal to the gross inability of political parties to organize and align themselves.

The Socio-economic View of Security

A cursory glance at the history of democratization in Pakistan reveals the trend that the end of one economically progressive authoritarian regime marked the beginning of an economically regressive civilian regime, and vice versa. For instance, Ayub’s era—known as progressive in economic terms—was followed by the secession of East Pakistan (a political failure) and Bhutto’s regime, whereby industry received a setback as a result of nationalization policies. Similarly, during the Zia era in the 1980s, Pakistan’s economic performance was far better than that of most of the developing countries in the world. This period was followed by the brief regimes of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir in the 1990s, during which time economic activity and performance was at its lowest ebb, despite the opening-up of the economy through measures like trade liberalization, privatization, and deregulation.

Therefore, because of this pattern some economists are of the view that the economic aspect of security improves during the reign of military regimes, while the rule of political-constitutional governments produces economic chaos. According to Shahid Javed Burki, “The type of democracy we had practiced under two of our three constitutions—the constitutions of 1956 and 1973—had not been good for economic development. These two constitutions— unlike the constitution of 1962—were given by civilian rather than military leaders. The first of these two constitutions had produced economic chaos. The second—the Constitution of 1973—was really operative in two periods. During both—1973-77 as well as 1988-99—it had seen a dramatic slow-down in the rate of economic growth and a sharp increase in the incidence of poverty.”

Nonetheless, what is significant and necessary is to quantify how much of the economic development can be attributed to the good governance and managerial performance of the military regime, and to what extent it is just a function of foreign policy compliance resulting in the easy flow of international capital. Second, economic benefits alone never present the full picture, unless we also calculate the socio-political and economic costs (in the form of the deepening of debt crises for generations to come) associated with the decisions. While the military regimes in Pakistan have been successful in negotiating and achieving foreign policy objectives, their performance in the domestic theater has been abysmal. It is quite obvious that the internal component of security weakens during military regimes. For instance, both Ayub and Zia successfully concluded separate economic and military package deals with the United States and enhanced the economic-military view of security, but had severely negative fall-outs in the area of internal security. The regimes of Ayub and Yahya Khan culminated in the separation of East Pakistan. Zia’s ten years of rule saw the rise and upsurge of ethno-linguistic factions, the extreme polarization of society and militarization of religious groups, along with an increase in the spread of guns, drugs, and social violence. The present regime again follows the trend of past regimes in securing aid and loans from abroad, as comprehensive economic packages are reportedly being worked out in Washington, the European Union, and international financial institutions out of its foreign and security policy compliances.

The Impact of the Events of September 11

The events of September 11 have further complicated the issues of military intervention and democratization of society and the polity in Pakistan. First, the aftermath has given the military regime an international legitimacy, as Pakistan’s support and participation was critical to the United States in its fight against Afghanistan. This may hamper and delay the process of democratization, owing to the kind of legitimacy and financial support the regime enjoys from international quarters. In other words, these circumstances may prove to be a replay of the sort of situation present under the Ayub and Zia regimes.
Second, the serious ramifications of September 11 in terms of Pakistan’s military regime are that in drawing attention to its foreign policy-making role, it has also highlighted its sensitivity to internal security policies. Though civilians and military may never differ substantially on foreign policy choices, the military’s explicit rule means facing the wrath of the public. As the events following September 11 have shown, the military’s popularity and internal legitimacy have been eroded drastically. Therefore, there is a shift in the regime’s drive for legitimacy: from internally driven to an externally or internationally oriented one. This may also mean a greater compliance at the international level with the United States and the West at the security policy level, translating into a more repressive regime internally.

**Institutional Fall-outs**

September 11 carries the most serious policy repercussions for national security related organizations. In early October, General Pervez Musharraf moved swiftly against military commanders who resisted his support for the United States, forcing many to the sidelines or into retirement. Now, men who owe their jobs to him personally fill all of the top army posts. Analysts of the Pakistani military say that it amounts to a coup within a coup, and the most important change in twenty years. The dismissal and reshuffling of the top brass within the army can be interpreted in two ways. It signals the friction or tension concerning the organizational integrity of the army—something never exposed before in such clear terms. At the same time, it reflects the army’s ability to resolve and overcome national security policy-making dilemmas. This friction is natural once the army evolves into an agent for security policy-making, rather than policy-implementing, which is inherently riskier and dangerous. One analyst suggests, “The friction itself may have been caused by certain structural imbalances that are the product not so much of the military’s internal working but its interaction with civilian governments and the rise in its stature from implementers of policy to makers of policy.”

In a move similar to this purging of military commanders, three top nuclear scientists were detained for questioning about their links and alleged sympathies toward the Taliban. A more grave concern is not that the top brass generals and scientists were dismissed over the perceived policy differences from within, but for the extraneous reasons of their alleged allegiance and sympathies toward the Taliban. These acts indicate a disturbing eagerness to acquiesce and accept the influence of the United States and its interpretations of the security structure of Pakistan.

**The External Security Economic Front**

As referred to above, the military regime has shown a somewhat better performance on the external economic front by securing fresh loans and the rescheduling of debt payments from international sources like the Asian Development Bank (ADB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. A profile of the government’s cabinet also reveals a strategy of pursuing economic management. These developments resulted in steady cash inflows and debt restructuring by the new economic managers, even before September 11, 2001.

Nonetheless, complying with IMF reforms and adjustments means negating and going against local and national industry and business, in the form of the imposition of new taxes, price hikes in utilities and food, and taking away subsidies. These policies created an environment discouraging investments by domestic investors who become alienated and frustrated with the present regime. This is a situation again quite unlike that of the Ayub and Zia regimes. The Ayub regime not only made foreign capital inflow available, but also augmented local industry through financial incentives and reforms. Similarly, Zia also made reversals on Bhutto’s decision to nationalize and won the confidence of local/national business and industry people. Meanwhile, the present regime seems to be at odds with local business and investors and relies heavily on foreign goodwill. The problem with foreign inflow is that it is highly volatile, inconsistent, unreliable, and strategic in nature (since it depends heavily on the state of international politics). Hence, too much reliance on foreign sources of financing makes the regime more vulnerable—and weakens national security in the long-term perspective.
The scenario also implies, if a trade-off between internal security and international security exists, that the present military regime is certainly disposed towards achieving national security through strategies involving international security, rather than through internal policy.

The United States

One of the common features that invariably all military regimes in Pakistan emphasize is extremely good relations with the United States. This may be because of a strange coincidence whereby military takeovers in Pakistan have accompanied a resurgence in its geo-political significance in world politics—thus making Pakistan a “frontline” state, and hence explaining the convergence of its interests and security policies vis-à-vis the United States.

Nevertheless, unlike previous military regimes in Pakistan who had other options for conflict resolution (rapprochement with the Soviet Union, for example, during the Zia regime)—the present regime seems to be under intense pressure to cooperate with the United States. It may very well be that the regime was already inclined to cooperate, but in any case for all practical purposes it had no option other than to do so. Pakistan, upon resisting American wishes, would have been perceived as harboring terrorists and hence considered equally responsible for the events of September 11. In addition, India’s readiness to join the American coalition against Afghanistan generated greater impetus for Pakistan to join the United States as well. The gravity of the situation was reflected in General Musharraf’s statements that an alliance with the United States was a dire necessity and Pakistan chose this option in order to save its strategic interests and assets. At the same time, Pakistan is in pursuit of its legitimate concerns vis-à-vis Afghanistan; that is, not to have an unfriendly and pro-Indian regime in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The United States at the moment seems to take note of this concern. However, the question arises, what if the Taliban—predominantly a Pashtun entity that Pakistan has now antagonized—remains in one form or another? What if the United States pulls out abruptly (as happened in 1990) and leaves Pakistan once again to face the wrath of Afghan turmoil or civil war? What if the United States stays for longer than required? What if the United States becomes unable to set up a broad-based government in Afghanistan? What if the Northern Alliance and other groups vying for power refuse to accept the American version of peace? What if civil war persists?

The more pertinent issue here is to look for the degree of U.S. interests and hence America’s commitment to Afghanistan and the region. This would be a determinant for explaining its security relations with Pakistan. At a very broad level, U.S. interests seem to be a mixture of short and long-term objectives: from the capture of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda forces, to the destruction of terrorist camps, to routing out the Taliban, to oil pipeline and geo-strategic interests. These do not relate to September 11 only, but instead date back even before that. Though the idea of the pipeline and geo-strategic interests are more often than not denied by the representatives of the U.S. State Department, nevertheless, they do talk of its viability indirectly, and the opinion that the economic benefits of an oil pipeline will have a stabilizing impact for all states in the region, including fostering a strategic stability in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Accordingly, the U.S. concern for Pakistan’s strategic stability has increased manifold owing to the following:

i) Pakistan’s geo-strategic centrality for providing a foothold in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

ii) The fact that most of the strategic analysts in Washington envisage the possible scenario (although this currently has a remote chance of coming true) that Pakistan, a country with nuclear capabilities, risks being taken over by radical Islamists. Hence, the United States wants to reduce such a possibility either by helping the regime in politico-economic terms or by evolving means to ensure the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

iii) The perceived need for greater control of fissile materials and its possible leakage into “the wrong hands” through personnel working in Pakistani nuclear installations.

iv) The desire to avoid nuclear war in the region. The India-Pakistan conflict and its escalation to an exchange of nuclear weapons is perhaps the more real and probable threat than any of the above.
Hence, American interest in the stability of the present military regime is not simply something related to the phenomenon of September 11 and its aftermath. Right on the eve of the takeover, General Anthony C. Zinni, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command, said, “If Pakistan fails, we have major problems. If [military strongman, Pervez] Musharraf fails, hard liners could take over, or fundamentalists, or chaos. We cannot let Musharraf fail.” This was clearly pointed out in a report published in the Washington Post, that it was Zinni who “pushed the Clinton administration to open the diplomatic door with Musharraf when many demanded it be slammed shut. Convinced that Pakistan should be a regional stabilizing force, he helped persuade Clinton to visit Musharraf in March.”

It is equally important to recognize how Musharraf responded to the United States on the eve of the takeover. “When the general finally placed his call it was not to President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen or the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad. Instead Musharraf telephoned Marine Corps General Anthony C. Zinni, who happened to be sitting with Cohen at an airfield in Egypt. ‘Tony,’ Musharraf began, ‘I want to tell you what I am doing…’” This suggests the usefulness of further study, beyond the scope of this paper, on the deeper institutional links between Pakistan and the United States, especially as to how military-to-military relations impact democratization and polity in Pakistan. Some experts are of the view that institutional linkages of this sort may be the cause of democratization in Pakistan, as the U.S. military has become more sensitized over a period of time to the promotion in an effective way of democracy in developing countries. Such linkages may act as an inhibiting factor preventing the military from intervening in a given country. Similarly, the U.S. military can effectively exert pressure for a return to democracy once a coup has taken place. Nonetheless, it can have the opposite impact as well, as happened in the case of Pakistan in past decades. With the realization of Pakistan’s enhanced geo-strategic significance and American concern for regional stability, the military’s presence in the polity is bound to prolong itself, as happened in the cases of Ayub and Zia. General Musharraf has already indicated that he intends to remain as President and Chief of Army Staff (COAS) even after holding the elections in 2002.

An issue related to the stability of the military regime is the nuclear program and policy of Pakistan. Seymour Hersh, famous investigative journalist on nuclear affairs, articulates this American concern: ‘The Bush administration’s hunt for Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network has evolved into a regional crisis that has put Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal at risk, exacerbated the instability of the government of General Pervez Musharraf, and raised the possibility of a nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India.”

The scenario envisioned by Hersh and a consequent contingency plan for Washington as to what happens to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in the case of any instability for the regime concerns taking care that those nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of religious extremists, with the possible involvement of not only the Pentagon, but also the special-operations unit 262 of Israel. This presents a very bleak security scenario for Pakistan, implying that nothing is secret and secured from Israel and the United States (and also suggests the potential for the involvement of India, given its level of cooperation with the two). Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi responded to the article in a very comprehensive manner, asserting that the Pakistani army has established an elaborate and effective command and control authority over nuclear weapons, ever since 1977. In addition, he also showed that over a period of time various forces have attempted to defame Pakistan’s efforts to become a nuclear state in the wake of Indian nuclearization, by terming it as an “Islamic bomb” and speculating about a possible attack on nuclear installations in Pakistan. Though Dr. Rizvi has emphasized that this is a speculative scenario, it is not inconceivable, given that the American forces are already stationed in Pakistan, and considering the historical level of distrust and the fact that despite the on-going cooperation between the United States and Pakistan, American authorities, media, and think tanks continue to differentiate between the military and Pakistan’s main intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) and subsequently end up blaming ISI for non-cooperation with the Musharraf regime and the United States. Therefore, any change in government regimes in Pakistan (though the chances are very remote, since it ignores the current institutional and societal dynamics) is bound to be interpreted as a result of religious extremism.

At this point, it is equally important to recognize that the opposition and resentment to the United States, and hence with the Musharraf regime, are of two types: one which is obviously manifested in the streets of Pakistan is religious-based activism; the second can be termed as a secular, genuinely nationalistic and patriotic one—passive and institutional in nature. The problem with American
government, think tanks and media is that they are overwhelmed with radical Islam and hence unable to
make distinctions between these two types of opposition, and increasingly the latter gets mixed up with the
former one. This could prove fatal for the United States in the long-term, where America sees states like
Pakistan either as blind and faithful allies or as religious extremists. In other words, people and institutions
with genuine patriotic concerns are likely to be dubbed as radicals, and hence treated likewise. Therefore,
the very rationale for going all-out along with the United States, perceptibly in order to enhance stability
and security for Pakistan by the military regime, is not free from challenge and criticism.

AFGHANISTAN
Historically, U.S. policy towards Afghanistan had always been shared by and converged with that of
Pakistan. Contrary to popular belief, Pakistan never followed an independent path divergent of U.S.
interests and policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan. The Taliban has been attributed as a creation of both the ISI
(though not acting alone) and the CIA, since both wanted strategic stability in the region. In fact, what
happened after the Taliban established power was that the Taliban’s extremism, ties with Osama bin Laden,
and refusal to cooperate with Unocal (who had proposed the construction of a Central Asia Gas pipeline
between Turkmenistan and Pakistan that would have crossed western Afghanistan) made the United States
anti-Taliban. The U.S. bombing of Afghanistan in 1998, seen in the context and events of September 11,
represented a hardened and entrenched U.S. position to do away with the Taliban.

It is generally believed that Pakistan has completely reversed its Afghan policy under the military
regime. However, this is not the case. Like other nations of the world, Pakistan also felt alienated by the
Taliban and considered the Taliban government a liability due to its extremist policies and harsh treatment
of women, young Afghans, and western aid workers. There was a series of events from which Pakistan
received diplomatic setbacks, such as the destruction of the Buddha statues in Bamiyan in February 2001,
sectarian criminals hiding in Afghanistan, and the Taliban’s inflexibility in dealing with United Nations
workers. In actual fact, Sharif pursued a policy towards the Taliban similar to that of the current
government. Recently it came out that Sharif’s regime gave clearance to U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan. This was further supported by the military’s monitoring of religious institutions—the
maddrassas—that acted as a social and financial support base for the Taliban. This leads to the fact that
foreign policy in regards to Afghanistan remains the same and in continuity under civilian and military
regimes in Pakistan. The events of September 11 increased the pace at once of the United States as well as
Pakistan to adopt anti-Taliban policies. Like the United States, Pakistan is also in a quagmire regarding the
possibilities for the post-Taliban settlement in Afghanistan. Deposed King Zahir Shah and the Northern
Alliance are not attractive options for Pakistan. Pakistan has already annoyed the Taliban and the Pashtuns,
the ethnic group that makes up almost 40-45 percent of the Afghan population. Similarly, the United States
is also quite skeptical of the predominant role the Northern Alliance could potentially play after the fall of
the Taliban. Both Pakistan and the United States are vying for a broad-based representative government in
Afghanistan.

INDIA
India’s initial reaction to the change in government in Pakistan was not to recognize the military regime. It
was widely believed in India that General Musharraf was the one responsible for the Kargil crisis and hence
the exit of Nawaz Sharif, and that peace and negotiations (the Lahore Declaration) were something not
acceptable to the Pakistani army. Nevertheless, owing to Musharraf’s peace initiative, force reduction at the
Line of Control in Kashmir, and U.S. pressure, India changed its stance. Subsequently, the Agra summit
was convened. Later, the ascension of the military regime was considered and interpreted as an opportunity
to settle down Kashmir, as the military was considered to be the real entity with which to talk and strike a
deal (and this was the case even in times when a civilian regime was in power). It was also believed that the
military enjoys greater popularity than political regimes. The Indus Waters Treaty signed by the Ayub
regime was most widely cited as an agreement that stood the test of time.

The events of September 11 had a de-legitimizing effect on Kashmir, from the perspective of Pakistan.
India quickly moved back to square one—that is, of confrontation and denial—from the position of
continuing dialogue and diplomacy. India is now bent on cashing in upon the new atmosphere condemning global terrorism. India wants to make Kashmir militant groups into objects of the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign.\textsuperscript{22} The United States has succumbed considerably to India’s pressure, as the initial list of organizations whose assets were frozen by the United States included two (and later, a third one, Jaish-e-Mohammad) with extensive activities in Kashmir. India sees the build-up of relations between Pakistan and the United States as zero-sum in nature, and wants to prevent Pakistan from again becoming the driving force behind U.S. regional policy.\textsuperscript{23} India has been playing off of and sensationalizing the U.S. concern for the stability of Pakistan and the region by threatening Pakistan with war. The recent massive firing on the international border, let alone on the Line of Control, upon the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, constitutes a message not to ignore India. Hence, it is imperative that U.S. policy officials engage with India at the same time that they do so with Pakistan, so as to reduce the risk of an India-Pakistan war and further instability in the region.

For Pakistan, raising its voice at diplomatic and political levels has and will become even more difficult as India (through its powerful lobbying) is bent on establishing linkages between Afghans and the situation in Kashmir, thereby ignoring Pakistan’s legitimate concerns and the historical context of the Kashmir dispute. India also intends to heighten its threat perception from Pakistan for its alleged support to Kashmir, and to legitimate hot pursuit across the border, possibly leading to war in the wake of the war of the United States against Afghanistan over terrorism.\textsuperscript{24} From the American perspective, “an India-Pakistan crisis at this time would be most unwelcome to U.S. policy makers, and would strain relations with both India and Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{25}

Therefore, one can observe that with the arrival of the military regime, there has been no substantial shift in security policies of Pakistan towards the United States, Afghanistan, and India. The events of September 11 impacted in facilitating and enhancing the building of bridges in Pak-US relations, which even the erstwhile civilians wanted. In the wake of such a priority policy and as has been demonstrated above, Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan should not be viewed as a reversal. Nonetheless, Pakistan-India relations suffered a severe setback, not because of regime change from civilian to military, but in the context of the post-September 11 world.

Notes
\begin{itemize}
\item[3] Ibid., 9.
\item[8] Ejaz Haider, The Friday Times (Lahore, Pakistan), 18 October 2001.
\item[9] I refer to the White House message that Pakistan should either support the war against the terrorists or be considered their allies and treated accordingly. Associates say General Musharraf interpreted that later as a threat that the United States and India, and possibly even Israel, might somehow try to seize Pakistan’s nuclear armory, believed to comprise about 20 bombs. See John F. Burns, “Musharraf, the Indispensable Ally, Grows More Confident,” The New York Times, Monday, 5 November 2001, sec. B.


13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 I am indebted to Professor Clifford Singer, Director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security (ACDIS) at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign for alerting me to this point in the course of one of our discussions.


17 Ibid.


19 Regarding the lack of differentiation between the media and official authorities in the United States, a strategic analyst in Pakistan commented, “It must be remembered that what the Western media orchestrates has a direct linkage to what is fed to them by their governments.” See Shirin M. Mazari, “A Need for Caution,” *The News* (Pakistan), 11 October 2001.


23 Ibid.


25 Schaffer, “The U.S. and South Asia: New Priorities, Familiar Interests.”
While focusing on the accumulated history of civil-military relations and military intervention in Pakistan, one may be led to observe the general trend of military intervention as follows:

First, one can conclude that the trend of democratization in Pakistan is non-linear. Instead of the end of an authoritarian regime being linked with the installation and consolidation of a democratic regime, rather what has repeatedly happened is a move back to square one—that is, again in the direction of intervention. The problem is how to break away from or overcome this vicious circle. What is required are structural changes, entailing the development of any one or a combination of economic, socio-political, or managerial-institutional forms.

On the issue of democratization, why is a civil society now perceived to be less inclined to show active resistance to the military? The probable answer lies in the fact that in Pakistani society there has been predominantly the convergence of an elite class, drawn from a narrow clique of industrial, agrarian, business, political, civil, and military bureaucratic elites. These elites tend to converge, and are intertwined through kith and kinship and through business-finance interests. Therefore, the options of civilian (political) or military rule do not actually make for significant differences, either for the elite or for the public at large. In other words, in the case of military intervention, administrative pluralism does exist and replaces the political pluralism in Pakistan—whereby common people satisfy their needs and articulate their interests through formal and informal, social and other kinds of networks, even in the absence of a political layer of management, effectively through more assertive and determined civil and military bureaucracies.

Third, the military in Pakistan has never denied or challenged the very structure of politics, such as the electoral process. “The focus on political process, rather than civil institutions, is important because the Pakistani armed forces did not want to challenge the legality and form of parliamentary institutions—a tradition which they inherited from British India. Even after he had seized power in 1958, General [Ayub] Khan was ‘concerned about the legality of [his] initial action and the subsequent acts that [he] and [his] subordinates commit[ted] under the rubric of martial law.’”

The present regime continues with a similar set of practices as its predecessors.

Related to the above is the fourth factor, which arises out of the military’s inherent weaknesses regarding politics. “Politically the armed forces suffer from two crippling weaknesses…One weakness is the armed forces’ technical inability to administer any but the most primitive community. The second is their lack of legitimacy: that is to say, their lack of a moral title to rule.” The military government must widely be recognized not only as the government but also as the lawful, the rightful government. Though the military regimes in Pakistan invariably have been termed legitimate by the court and other self-defined electoral means, nonetheless, in general these measures can never dispel the very impression of being illegitimate. Thus, once the military takeover is complete, all efforts are directed towards acquiring legitimacy rather than the stated purpose of the takeover. According to Stephen Cohen, “all of the Pakistani generals who have seized power have been concerned about the legality of their initial action and of subsequent acts that they and their subordinates commit under the rubric of martial law.” Partly this can be attributed to the lack of a clear-cut doctrine for the military to intervene, as identified by Stephen P. Cohen: “Their [the military’s] training and indoctrination has emphasized the legitimacy of civilian, not military rule, and the generals therefore lack a clear-cut theory of military intervention that would permit them to undertake sweeping changes in Pakistani society.”

Fifth, one can observe that each of the successive military regimes has become more humane and civilianized than the previous one in its degree of intervention, from the regimes of Ayub, to Zia, to the present one. By “degree of intervention,” I refer to the application of force against civilians in non-military matters. Under the present military regime, courts, media, and other civilian institutions exist and work quite independently from the executive powers of the government—especially as concerns the ordinary people—and thus do not come across areas of high politics.
Sixth, the military regimes’ attempts to de-politicize the government has never worked, in the past or the present, since the candidates who participated in the local body elections were primarily sponsored by the main political parties and even their electoral alliances.\(^5\)

A seventh observation that can be made from this study is the fallacy of a mechanistic and deterministic approach. To some analysts the military exerts too great a hegemony in its heavy-handed intervention in the polity, such that the military is seen as responsible for all deeds and misdeeds in the political milieu of Pakistan.\(^6\) This is an oversimplification and too narrow an approach. Had the military regimes truly enjoyed that extent of power in politics, any number of scenarios might or might not have taken place: the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI) party would have won in 1988; the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) would have been denied power; the vote of no confidence would have been successful against the PPP Prime Minister; the rise of the Mohajir National Movement (MQM) phenomenon would not have been possible; General Jehangir Karamat would not have been ousted from power; and Admiral Mansoor ul haq would not have been forced to resign. Thus, clearly there is not sufficient justification for perceiving the military’s role in the polity as one of all-out hegemon instead of simply as a primary influencer.

Finally, the military in Pakistan has also shown considerable restraint in its intervention. Since Zia left, if one has to appreciate and calibrate the roles of various Chiefs of Army Staff (COAS), then except for that of General Aslam Beg, who has been depicted as the most controversial one, all others showed significant restraint towards the polity. Yet, applying Finer’s classification of disposition and opportunity in the case of General Beg, one observes that he had the disposition—but never the opportunity—to intervene.

**Conclusions**

The term “civil-military relations” with predominant emphasis on “civilian supremacy” is conceptually inadequate to explain the situation in Pakistan, owing to the specificity of its historical, cultural, and institutional milieus.

Factors responsible for the present intervention turned out to be “organizational dynamics,” “personalismo,” “absence of a safety valve clause in the constitution,” “overestimate of the army’s managerial capability,” “the tacit alliance relationship of the civil and military bureaucracy,” and “Kargil.” On the issue of Kargil, raising a counter-factual question may lead to deeper analysis. What if there had been no Kargil? This would mean other causes and issues listed earlier were more fundamental in nature, and hence the Kargil issue would be relegated to being a factor which facilitated and enlarged the fissure vis-à-vis civilians and hence the military takeover.

Political regimes in Pakistan are perceived to be less capable of defining, negotiating, and securing national strategic interests as compared to military regimes. Hence, when compared with civilian ones, the military regimes tend to be more determined, assertive, decisive, and risk-taking in shaping the state’s domestic and foreign policies. The present regime is no exception to that, and tends to define and pursue national strategic interests in terms of a military-economic view of security.

By the same token, there is a perception and realization by external powers that the military is the epicenter of power and authority in Pakistan, and that overt military rule brings stability to the country. Hence, the military regime was granted legitimacy in the wake of the Agra summit and the events of September 11. Such legitimacy in turn gives the regime greater leverage to define and execute security policies more assertively and confidently, internally as well as externally vis-à-vis neighboring and external powers.

Besides the impact on society and the polity, direct military rule has led to severe fallouts on state institutions like the army itself, and that of the related nuclear program, owing to the disturbing acceptance of and acquiescence to the United States in the security apparatus of Pakistan. Following the economic-military view of security also serves to weaken internal security owing to greater emphasis on foreign policy compliances vis-à-vis external powers.

Historically and at present, the changing nature of geopolitics and international politics has had a tremendous bearing on Pakistan’s domestic politics, as the military has demonstrated increasing capability to benefit from the situation so as to perpetuate their regimes. The current regime’s legitimacy was initially
driven internally, but subsequently received international backing. Events like September 11 have clarified and magnified the role of the military in the formulation of the foreign and security policies of Pakistan.

Political stability and civilian supremacy of the type enjoyed by Z. A. Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif does not count much in measuring the overall stability of the political regimes. Subsequent to intervention mass political parties like the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N, or followers of Nawaz Sharif) and PPP are more amenable to the military’s mediation than other religious political parties and business groups.

At times the American stress on democratization seems demanding and at times pliable. In any case, the military-to-military relations—between Pakistan and the United States—can be one of the key factors in explaining Pakistani relations with the United States, and consequently accounts for the support the military regime receives financially, diplomatically, politically, and even by the international media.

In the short term, military rule does provide some relief to public institutions through various political, economic, and administrative measures. Nonetheless, indefinite perpetuation of a military regime generally proves to be catastrophic and counter-productive. Thus, it is imperative for the military to devise not only a doctrinal framework for intervention, but also a clear-cut exit strategy once order has been restored or relief efforts have been achieved.

Notes

4 Ibid.
6 See, for example, Saeed Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997).


