
The importance of Brentano for 20th century philosophy is indicated by the fact that among his students are to be found such major figures as Husserl, Stumpf, Meinong, Twardowski, Ehrenfels, Masaryk and even Freud. The present collection of essays represents a substantial contribution to our understanding of Brentano. It contains both purely historical essays, and also a wide array of systematic contributions which reveal something of the continuing fertility of Brentanian problems and concepts for present-day philosophy.

The first two contributions, that of Morscher and that of Katkov, both contain brief general introductions to Brentano’s philosophy as a whole. Morscher’s essay considers the question of the nature of what has come to be called ‘Austrian’ philosophy. He begins with the familiar and impressive list of acknowledged Austrians—Bolzano, Brentano himself, Meinong, Mally, Höfler, Mach, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Gödel, Popper. (p.7)—but is driven in the end to what seems to me to be an over-sceptical conclusion that there is no such thing as an essence of Austrian philosophy, that the most we can hope for is to distinguish certain tendencies which they exhibit to varying degrees.
Katkov, in his paper, considers the full range of Brentano’s philosophical interests, which extend from the philosophy of religion to the theory of spatial and temporal continua, and these he treats in tandem with an account of the main events of Brentano’s life. The title of the paper—“The world in which Brentano believed he lived”—is significant, for Katkov reveals clearly the extent to which Brentano was still living in a pre-Kantian world, a world coloured by the thought of the scholastics, and by the music of the Gregorian chant. Indeed the developments in art, science, philosophy and politics of the last two hundred years or so seem to have left Brentano cold.

It is by now part of the stock-in-trade of philosophy that it was Brentano who re-introduced the scholastic concept of intentionality—of the directedness of our mental acts to their objects—and the associated terminology of intentional objects. Two sorts of questions can be posed of such an issue: historical questions concerning, for example, the precise source-materials which Brentano used and the validity of Brentano’s understanding of the scholastic theories; and philosophical questions as to which, if any, of the given theories are true. Klaus Hedwig’s paper deals exclusively with the former category. He lays bare for us the wide scope of Brentano’s knowledge of the scholastic corpus, but shows how Brentano’s understanding of the texts is sometimes marred by his own pre-conception of the history of philosophy (which is, according to Brentano, a cyclical affair, involving repeated rediscovery of and decadent falling away from what is, in effect, an Aristotelian truth). Hedwig points out also, that it was Brentano’s earlier and more problematic theory of intentionality as a matter of the ‘mental inexistence of an object’ which had most influence upon his successors, his later, more mature account received in contrast relatively little attention.

Herbert Spiegelberg’s essay, a study of the extant correspondence between Brentano and Husserl, demonstrates what has not always been evident from the critical remarks which are to be found in the works of the two philosophers and of their students, that Brentano and Husserl enjoyed ‘a lasting loyalty and even friendship over more than thirty years’ (p.98). Perhaps the most philosophically interesting of the issues mentioned in the letters concerns the philosophy of geometry and in particular the possibility of a philosophically adequate foundation of non-Euclidean geometry, which is raised in a letter of December 1892. As Spiegelberg points out, Husserl had at this point just published volume one of his *Philosophie der Arithmetik* (*PdA*) and had planned, indeed almost completed, a second volume, which was to have dealt in a similar way with higher mathematical systems, including geometries. As has recently been made clear by Holenstein in his introduction to the new Husserliana edition of volume one of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, it was almost certainly the difficulties which Husserl encountered in his attempt to apply the methods of volume one of *PdA* to systems of this kind which led him to call into question the validity of those methods and to develop instead some of the characteristically anti-psychologistc ideas of his *Logische Untersuchungen*. The major support for this view is to be found in Husserl’s exchanges with Natorp, which throw serious doubt upon the orthodox account of Husserl’s development in this period, according to which a crucial role is said to have been played by Frege’s 1892 review of the published volume of *PdA*.

A further contribution to the still-to-be-written history of Brentano’s influence upon 20th century philosophy is provided by Izydora Dąmbinska’s essay on Brentano’s reception in Poland. It was, of course, Casimir Twardowski who was most instrumental here, Twardowski having been a student of Brentano who played a leading role in Polish philosophy, both through his own most important
student, Ingarden, and through his founding of the analytic school of Lwów. We shall see, when commenting on Chisholm's contribution to the present volume, that the theory of wholes and parts had a specially important function in the thought of the later Brentano, and the question naturally arises as to the possibility of connections between Brentano's ideas and the work of Leśniewski and his school in the same field. Dambskas suggests that here, too, Twardowski may have played a mediating role, Twardowski having delivered in Lwów a course of lectures on reforms of traditional logic, dealing with the theories of Boziano, Brentano, Boole and Schröder, which was attended by Lukasiewicz and Kotarbinski, and by Leśniewski, (p.123).

Brentano was, as will have already become clear, a devoted admirer of Aristotle. Rolf George's essay in this volume consists of an attempt to measure the extent of Brentano's debt to Aristotle by means of a discussion of some of his exegetical writings, writings which have, it seems, received little serious attention from Aristotle scholars. The essay centres on Brentano's treatment of the question as to whether Aristotle's God, in contemplating himself, is or is not wholly ignorant of the world, and George shows how Brentano, by means of an ingenious re-interpretation of the text, is able to suggest a solution both to this and to a series of related issues.

As is well known, Brentano divided perceptions into inner and outer, the two kinds of perceptions having as their respective objects physical phenomena such as colour-, sound-, or taste-Gestalten, and psychical phenomena—the mental acts of seeing, hearing, or tasting in which these Gestalten are grasped. In his essay on Brentano's epistemology Guido König shows that this dichotomy is nothing other than a modern-day Cartesianism, brought up to date with the tools of descriptive psychology. Thus Brentano's arguments for the dubitability of outer perception parallel Descartes' discussions of perceptual illusions, and his claims for inner perception as a source of absolutely secure knowledge parallel Descartes' search for truths impervious to systematic doubt. König makes clear however that Brentano's dichotomy reflects important truths about our psychological experience quite independently of any larger philosophical claims which may be formulated in its terms; in particular, that every consciousness is bound up with a self-consciousness, the latter being abstractly distinguishable within the former as an act-moment of a quite peculiar kind. Since the latter can exist only within a larger, encompassing whole, it is to be distinguished e.g.: from every act of memory. It is these act-moments which Brentano calls inner perceptions, and he is rightly criticized by König for running together two quite different kinds of entity by designating both as types of 'perception'. For it is clear that inner and outer 'perceptions' have a radically different structure; as König—following Ingarden—suggests, the former can most reasonably be regarded as acts of living though (Durchleben), without transcendent objects corresponding to the target-Gestalten of acts of outer perception.

The same theme is taken further by Følesdal in his contribution to the volume, a comparison of Brentano's theories of intentionality and of perception with those of Husserl. After careful consideration of the various alternative possible interpretations of Brentano's theory of 'intentional objects', Følesdal comes to the conclusion—which coincides with that of König—that it is only with the help of something like Husserl's act-noema-object trichotomy that we can make sense of Brentano's descriptive psychological framework.

Brentano's logical theories are discussed in contributions by Burnham Terrel and Stephan Körrer. Philosophers of recent decades have learned to regard as a
paradigm of philosophical logic a theory such as Russell’s theory of descriptions which demands, if we are to believe in it at all, a radical separation of logic from the psychology of judging, deducing, arguing and thinking. Present-day philosophers will therefore find it difficult to make themselves at home within Brentano’s logical writings, since these present us with a theory of judgment which is, as Terrell emphasises (p.45), embedded in a descriptive psychology. Within such a framework even the most fundamental tenets of, for example, orthodox quantification theory are inadmissible. Consider, for example, the assertion that there are foxes in the wood. This we expect to be rendered as an existentially quantified conjunction, say: (Ex) (Fx & Wx). But this is to imply that such an assertion rests, at some level, on a search through some inclusive value-range (of, say, animals), followed by a recognition that two specific sub-ranges of this value-range overlap, which is psychologically absurd.

The inadequacy of orthodox quantification-theoretic readings is particularly apparent in the case of impersonal or ‘subjectless’ sentences such as ‘It is raining’, ‘It is warm’, etc. For however much formal dexterity we might acquire in translating these into sentences involving quantification over, say, events or space-time intervals, there is surely no one who would defend such translations as providing an adequate rendering of what is intended, psychologically, in the use of sentences of the given type. The problem of such impersonal sentences is of such interest that it is a pity that Terrell should have directed no specific attention to it in this issue, even though he mentions Brentano’s own work on the subject (p.47n). From the above it seems that a Brentanist logician, in attempting to reconstruct logic, however much he found himself utilising the insights of modern logicians, would decline the use of the quantification-theoretic devices which have become so familiar. This is not to suggest however that there are no Brentanist insights which are not susceptible to quantification-theoretic interpretation, and the bulk of Terrell’s paper is devoted to insights of this kind, particularly in relation to the frameworks of Leśniewskian and substitutional quantification.

Körner’s paper on Brentano’s Reism and existensional logic also lies within this field. He shows convincingly how Brentano’s analysis of judgments can be interpreted quite simply as resting on a certain sub-system of first-order predicate logic, and he shows also how Brentano’s writings on the concept of (phenomenological) continuum—recently published as Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum, (Hamburg, 1978, edited by Körner and Chisholm)—can be interpreted and made more precise within this framework. A more detailed discussion of Brentano’s analysis of temporal continua (both physical and phenomenological) is provided by Johann Götschel in his contribution to the volume.

With the aid of modern logical tools, particularly the Tarskian conceptions of model and of truth, Paul Weingartner, in his paper, presents an account of Brentano’s criticism of the correspondence theory of truth. He sketches therewith some of the historical background—from Aristotle onwards—both to this issue and to the related problem of non-thing-like entities, especially facts, Sachverhalte, truths in themselves, but including also numbers, classes, properties, all of which Brentano came to dismiss as fictitious. After pointing out that a (formal ontological) language useful for mathematics and philosophy must be of second order, i.e.: must allow quantification over ‘higher-level entities’, Weingartner points to one crucial question which must be answered by the Brentanian philosopher who wishes to deny the possibility of reference to such entities:
Is it possible to reduce (translate) any judgement about entities of higher type (than individuals)—salva veritate,—to a judgment which either asserts or denies the existence of some being in the proper (Brentanian) sense (i.e.: an individual or a substance)? (p.185).

It is clear that amongst individuals of higher type are to be found also, according to Weingartner, Aristotelian accidents. Unfortunately Weingartner seems to hold the orthodox belief that the modern logician, with his theories of properties or classes, can achieve all that the Aristotelian might achieve by means of a theory of accidents. As Angelelli has convincingly shown however, present-day logicians have succeeded in providing analogues of only some of Aristotle's fundamental ontological relationships. That is, they can translate, for example, a sentence such as 'this man is white' (say: 'W(a)'), or 'swans are white' ('(x)(ifS(x) then W(x))') but they have no analogue of statements involving reference to concrete individual accidents, e.g.: specific whitenesses, or specific headaches, inhering concretely in specific individuals. The adoption of a formal ontology committed to such accidents would in fact throw a great deal of light on the problems dealt with by Weingartner in his paper. For it becomes possible to recognise a Sachverhalt (a positive, subsisting state of affairs) as a certain kind of concrete whole, formed of an individual substance and an accident which inheres in it; and then one has the beginnings of a correspondence theory of truth.

The modern philosophical theory which is closest to the Aristotelian substance-accident theory sketched above is the Stumpf-Husserl theory of dependent and independent parts—of inseparable moments (including accidents) and separable pieces—presented most fully in Husserl's third Logical Investigation. Brentano, too, developed a related variant of Aristotle's theory, an impressive account of which is given by Chisholm in his contribution to the present volume. Brentano's version of the theory begins with the claim that only things (individuals, substances) exist, and that therefore a philosophically adequate language will involve no reference to other kinds of entity. Now one example of an individual accident mentioned by Aristotle was the concrete individual knowledge (of, say, logic or Greek) inhering in a given subject (say $S$)—it is accidents of this type which are measured in, for example, university examinations. Intuitively it seems that it makes sense to refer to such accidents in and of themselves, and that such reference is possible without committing oneself to the view that the entities in question might exist apart from any appropriate substance. Yet given his prejudice in favour of thing-like entities Brentano will have no truck with views of this kind. He prefers, instead, to work within a theory which allows the designation exclusively of thing-like wholes, that is, in the given example, not only of $S$, but also of the 'larger' whole, $S''$, which is constituted when $S$ acquires the given knowledge. Here $S$ is in a certain sense a part of $S''$, even though there is nothing—in Brentano's world—which when added to $S$ in fact yields $S''$.

Brentano now employs the term 'accident' to designate wholes of the latter kind. The resultant thesis, that an accident is a certain kind of whole containing its substance as part, will sound perverse to Aristotelian ears. Yet, as Chisholm shows, the theory—which is more subtle than I have perhaps been able to intimate here—is highly serviceable, allowing the precise formulation of a whole series of concepts (constituent, aggregate, boundary, ultimate substance, and so on). However only those who accept Brentano's fundamental ontological premise can feel completely happy with Chisholm's paper. What is needed is a comparison of Brentano's theory with the closely related Stumpf-Husserl theory within which
reference to individual accidents in the original sense remains possible.

The role of language in Brentano’s philosophy is discussed in the contribution by Rudolf Haller, who considers in particular the problem of the interdependence of language and thought. He points out, with Brentano, that it is the language we grow up with which supplies us with the general philosophical framework within which we make sense of the world, and further that ordinary language—the ‘Volkssprache’, as Brentano called it,—

provides us with a system of natural classifications which we can certainly refine and amend, but whose basis we can dispense with only with difficulty, for in these differentiations of ordinary language... there is embedded the knowledge of a time (p.212).

Appeals to this (linguistic) division of (epistemological) labour are fraught with quite special kinds of danger, however, as both Brentano and Wittgenstein saw: we are liable to become bewitched in our thinking by linguistic mechanisms which idle. As Haller shows, the details of the safeguards against this danger canvassed by Brentano and his students (especially Marty and Twardowski) bear certain striking similarities to those of Wittgenstein. He goes on to show how the Brentanian analysis of language had a direct influence upon other Austrian thinkers, particularly Karl Bühler (p.215), whose Organon-Modell of linguistic actions influenced in its turn the work of Popper.

The volume is rounded off by a paper on Brentano’s antinaturalistic ethics by Heiner Rutte, and by two papers on Brentano’s theory of will and emotion by Anscombe and Geach. Brentano, as is well known, divided psychical phenomena into three categories, presentations, judgments, and ‘phenomena of love and hate’, the latter comprising both emotions and acts of will. Both Anscombe and Geach adopt, perhaps unknowingly, what would have been seen as the Ehrenfelsian line in the early disputes on the subject, in that both reject Brentano’s running-together of will and emotion within a single category.

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This volume reprints eighteen essays from the journal Research in Phenomenology of 1977. It is intended as a tribute to Heidegger, who had died the previous year, and consists of essays about him.

Three of the famous names of Heidegger scholarship—Mehta, Marx and Pöggeler—contribute somewhat general pieces. Sallis, under the title ‘The Origins of Heidegger’s Thought’, considers not only the historical origins, but also the basic issue and ‘radical origin’ (der Zuspruch perhaps?) of his thinking. He gives a central place to Heidegger’s phrase from 1964 that “we must ask what remains unthought in the call ‘to the thing itself’”. This is how Sallis explicates the title of this book: “the ground of the possibility of things showing themselves”.

Fortunately the occasional quality of these first four essays is missing from the remainder of the book. A collection of memorial lectures would, in the reading, cease to honour their subject and become merely tedious. It is the specialist essays